













A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Classical Studies) 













Professor David S. Potter, Chair 
Professor Bruce W. Frier 
Professor Julia C. Hell 
















© Bram L. H. ten Berge 































































My space here is insufficient to list the many friends, colleagues, mentors, and family members 
to whom I owe the greatest measure of debt and gratitude. I would like to thank the Department of 
Classics at the University of Mississippi for the training and support they offered me and for their 
understanding and cooperation whenever tennis competitions took me far away from campus. Special 
thanks to John Lobur for his mentorship and to Aileen Ajootian for her support, attendance at home 
tennis games – which meant the world to me – and for dinners out in Pangrati and Ambelokipi. 
Great thanks are due to the Department of Classical Studies and the Rackham Graduate 
School at the University of Michigan for their continued support and encouragement. Their financial 
support has been beyond generous and has allowed me to attend conferences and conduct a large 
portion of my doctoral research while being out of the country. The staff at the Department of 
Classical Studies has been nothing short of exceptional. I owe special thanks to Michelle Biggs, without 
whom every stage of my graduate career, especially while I was overseas, would have been more 
difficult; never surely have so many administrative questions been asked by an unwitting foreign 
graduate student.  
I would like to thank the following faculty members from the Department of Classical Studies: 
Arthur Verhoogt and Sara Forsdyke, for their unwavering support in both good and bad times. 
Deborah Ross, J. Mira Seo, Francesca Schironi, and David Potter, with whom it was a pleasure to 
teach and who taught me much in the way of effective pedagogy. H. D. Cameron, for his untiring 
enthusiasm for classical antiquity and his selfless commitment to the department and its students. On 






supportive from the start. Julia Hell offered welcome perspectives from another discipline, particularly 
on my approach to Tacitus and literature generally. Celia Schultz has been a mentor, editor, and 
advisor on more occasions than I can list here. Her generosity, straightforward advice, and eye for 
detail have been instrumental both for this dissertation and for my other work. David Potter is owed 
an immense amount of gratitude, for believing in me from the very start, for the training I have 
enjoyed under him, and for his mentorship at every stage not only of this project but of my graduate 
career generally. He is an example and a true mentor. A genuine thank you to all.  
I thank my friends at Michigan, my fellow graduate students not only in Classical Philology but 
also in IPGRH and IPCAA. An extraordinarily intelligent, fun, and creative group of graduate students 
has come through Michigan in the past six years and I have been very fortunate to get to spend a 
major portion of my life in their company, both in Angell Hall and outside of it. I likewise wish to 
thank the students, faculty (Margie Miles, Richard Janko, Jeremy McInerney, Jim Wright, and Nicholas 
Blackwell), and staff who made my year at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens one of 
the best of my life. I will never forget the epic bus trips, rain- and thunderstorms, hikes, climbs, seaside 
tavernas, and ouzo-hours. Greece and its antiquities will forever have a special place in my heart. Many 
thanks also to Guy Sanders, James Herbst, Ioulia Tzonou-Herbst, and Jody Cundy for making my first 
excavation an extraordinarily rich and fun experience. I thank Matthew Harrington for continued 
friendship and for organizing the Latium Vetus program, which provided a phenomenal introduction to 
the archaeology and epigraphy of Rome and its environs and during which I met my wife.  
During my extended time in Ann Arbor, Athens, and Oxford, England, I have been fortunate 
to discuss my work with countless people – friends, fellow graduate students, professors – and it 
would be impossible to record my debt to them individually here. They all have helped shape this 
project and I thank them warmly. Finally, my thanks are due to my family. To my grandfather, 






grandson, but whose doctoral dissertation on Antiphon has been an inspiration for me from the time I 
learned of its existence; to my aunt and uncle, Jajo and Paul ten Berge, whose love for classical 
antiquity has been a constant source of encouragement; to my parents for urging me to follow my 
passion when many would see it differently and for their unconditional support; to my parents-in-law 
for the same reasons. My deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Maggie, whose love, support, confidence, 
and patience has sustained me throughout this study and who has heard way more about Tacitus than 
is good for anyone. She has been my rock, my best friend, and my sounding board, and I am 













































List of Abbreviations viii 
Chapter I. Introduction 1 
Chapter II. Agricola, Historiae, Annales 20 
               II.1  Introduction: the Agricola within its Socio-Political and Literary Context 21 
               II.2  The Nature of the Imperial System of Government 26 
               II.3  Mentorship: Laying the Foundation for a Public Career 45 
               II.3.1  Career Development: the Proper Conduct for Subordinate Officers 55 
               II.4  Governorship of Aquitania 63 
               II.5  Governorship of Britain 72 
               II.5.1  Britain and Agricola’s Predecessors 72 
               II.5.2  Accumulated Experience in One Province 74 
               II.5.3  Agricola the Commander-in-Chief 78 
               II.5.3a  Leadership and Display of Authority 79 
               II.5.3b  Eloquence in Front of Large Bodies of Men 81 
               II.5.3c  Willingness and Ability to Endure Hard Labor and Danger 83 
               II.5.3d  Experience, Foresight, and Deliberation 83 
               II.5.3e  Ability to Exploit and Consolidate Success 85 
     II.5.3f  Ability to Keep One’s Troops Disciplined in Times of Military Inactivity 87 
               II.5.4  Roman vs. Other 88 
               II.6  Imperial Expansion and the Role of Auxiliary Forces 91 
               II.7  The Rationale of Empire 95 
               II.8  Conclusions  100 
Chapter III. Germania, Historiae, Annales 103 
               III.1  Introduction: The Germania within its Socio-Political, Literary, and Military     
                                              Context 
 
105 
               III.2  Foreign Policy and Imperialism in the Germania 118 
               III.2.1  Germania’s situs: the (Im)practicability of Expansion and Annexation 120    
               III.2.2  Germanic mores: Renewing the Military Offensive? 131 
               III.2.3  Germanic mores: Establishing a Trans-Rhenane Province? 141 
               III.2.4  Foreign Policy and Imperialism in the Germania: Conclusions 152 
               III.3  Foreign Policy and Imperialism in the Historiae and the Annales 155 
               III.3.1  Preliminaries 155 
               III.3.2  The Nature and Limits of Empire 157 






               III.3.3a  Germania 168 
               III.3.3b  Armenia and Parthia 175 
               III.3.3c  Britain 180 
               III.4  Germania and the Germani in the Historiae and the Annales 186 
               III.4.1  Germania and the Germani across the Tacitean Corpus 188 
               III.5  Conclusions 197 
Chapter IV.  Dialogus de Oratoribus, Historiae, Annales 200 
               IV.1.1  Introduction: Manuscript Tradition and Reception 200 
               IV.1.2  Format and Structure 203 
               IV.1.3  Choice of Format and Authorial Stance 207 
               IV.1.4  Chapter Overview 212 
IV.1.5  The Dialogus within the Tacitean Corpus and the Rhetorical Tradition 217 
               IV.2  Republic and Principate: Political and Generic Change 223 
               IV.2.1 The Agricola: the Evaluation, Production, and Transmission of Virtus and     
                                               Ingenium 
 
223 
   IV.2.2  The Dialogus: the Evaluation of Ingenium and the Production of Eloquentia in  
                                    Past and Present 
 
228 
               IV.3  The Imperial System of Government and Oratory 235 
               IV.4  Analyzing Change: Periodization and Stances toward the Regime 241 
               IV.5  Past and Present in the Historiae and the Annales 250 
          IV.5.1  Political Transition and Imperial Historiography: the Preface of the Historiae 251 
               IV.5.2  The Nature of Change 254 
               IV.5.3  Galba: Imposing Radical Change 259 
               IV.5.4  Otho: Delicate Balancing 263 
               IV.5.5  Vitellius: Misunderstanding Past, Present, and Future 266 
               IV.5.6  Vespasian and Mucianus: Good ‘Historians’ 270 
    IV.5.7  The Historian: Challenging Tidy Reconstructions and Imperial Ideology 274 
               IV.6  The Annales: Ambiguity and Inconsistency in Searching for the ‘Truth’ 282 
   IV.6.1  Roman History and Reconstructing the Past: the Preface of the Annales 283 
               IV.6.2  Reconstructions of the Past: Anniversary Thinking and Simplistic Analysis 286 
               IV.6.3  Analyzing Past and Present: Republic, Principate, and Civil War 291 
               IV.7  Conclusions 297 


























AE  L’Année épigraphique (Paris, 1888- ) 
 
ANRW H. Temporini et al. (edd.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (Berlin, 1972- ) 
 
CAH2  J. Boardman et al. (edd.), The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd edn. 14 vols. (Cambridge,  
1982–2005) 
 
CIL  T. Mommsen et al. (edd.), Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (Berlin, 1863- ) 
 
ILS  H. Dessau (ed.), Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae (Berlin, 1892-1916) 
 
OCD4  S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth, and E. Eidinow (edd.), Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th  
edn. (Oxford, 2012) 
 
PIR2  E. Groag, A. Stein, et al. (edd.), Prosopographia Imperii Romani saec. I. II. III., 2nd edn.  
(Leipzig, 1930- ) 
 
RE A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll (edd.), Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen  
Altertumswissenschaft (Berlin, 1893-1980) 
 
RIB  R. G. Collingwood, R. P. Wright, et al. (edd.), The Roman Imperial Inscriptions of Britain  
(Oxford, 1965-95) 
 
SCPP  Senatus Consultum de Pisone Patre 
 
SHA  Scriptores Historiae Augustae 
 
 
The names and titles of classical authors and texts are abbreviated in accordance with OLD and LSJ. 
 













The titles of Tacitus’ works are abbreviated as follows: 
 
Agr.   Agricola (De vita e moribus Iulii Agricolae) 
 
G.   Germania (De origine et situ Germanorum) 
 
D.   Dialogus de Oratoribus 
 
H.   Historiae 
 
A.   Annales 
 
 
Editions of Latin texts used: 
 
Agricola, Germania, and Dialogus de Oratoribus: Winterbottom and Ogilvie (OCT: Oxford, 1975) 
 
Historiae: Heubner (Teubner: Stuttgart, 1978) 
 
Annales I-VI: Borzsák (Teubner: Leipzig, 1992) 
 














“Early does not mean “immature” or “inferior.”” 
David Hurwitz on the compositions of Joseph Haydn (2005, xii) 
  
 
In a letter to his friend Cornelius Tacitus, Pliny the Younger predicted that the former’s 
Historiae would become immortal (Ep. 7.33.1). He turned out to be right, but for a long time his 
prediction seemed unlikely to be fulfilled. Unlike Livy, Vergil, and others, Tacitus was never a popular 
author in antiquity. There were only a few references to and quotations from his writings in 
subsequent centuries. The 4th century Historia Augusta claims that the emperor Tacitus (275/6) ordered 
all of Tacitus’ works to be copied and distributed among public libraries (Tac. 10.3). The only 
significant influence of Tacitus’ writings in antiquity was in Jerome’s commentary on Zachariah, where 
the latter refers to the thirty books of Tacitus’ historical writings in a note on the destruction of the 
Temple of Jerusalem.1 The view that the late 4th century historian Ammianus Marcellinus was 
influenced heavily by Tacitus is unsustainable.2 
  The only references to Tacitus in antiquity are to his historical works, the Historiae (ca. AD 
105/6 – 109/10) and the Annales (ca. AD 112/3 – 120), and the Historia Augusta simply calls him 
scriptorem historiae Augustae (Tac. 10.3). His first three works – the shorter Agricola (AD 98), Germania 
(AD 98), and Dialogus de Oratoribus (ca. AD 100-108/9)3 – are never mentioned (aside from a possible 
																																																								
1 Jerome, Comm. ad Zach. III.14: “Cornelius Tacitus, qui post Augustum usque ad mortem Domitiani vitas Caesarum triginta 
voluminibus exaravit.” See Syme 1958a, 211 n. 2, 687. 
2 Seager 1986, viii, 36, 95, 103, 131, 133, 136; Matthews 2007, 32 and n. 45, 456 and n. 11, 468, 549 n. 4. 
3 The dates of composition for Tacitus’ different works are based on both internal references and information in other sources (e.g. 
Pliny’s Letters). The dates of composition for the Agricola and the Germania are based on internal references (Agr. 3.1; G. 37.2). The 
dates of composition, revision, and publication for the Dialogus are discussed on pp. 217-18. The dates for the Historiae are based on 
	
	 2 
contemporary reference to D. 9.6 at Plin., Ep. 9.10.2). Tacitus, as R. Mayer says, “passed into historical 
consciousness as an historian.”4 Indeed, when in 1425 the Italian humanist Poggio Bracciolini was 
informed about the existence (at Hersfeld) of a manuscript containing the Germania, Agricola, and 
Dialogus, he notably wrote to Niccolo Niccoli that the latter were nobis ignota. Moreover, the Hersfeld 
codex only ascribes the Agricola and Germania to Tacitus. Later humanist scholars, such as Beatus 
Rhenanus and Justus Lipsius, questioned Tacitus’ authorship of the Dialogus. Doubt about the text’s 
authenticity remained widespread for two centuries and still surfaced as recently as 1995.5 From 
antiquity onwards, Tacitus’ opera minora (the Agricola, Germania, and Dialogus) were approached 
differently than his opera maiora, the Historiae and Annales. This distinction between the two sets of 
writing is also reflected in their divergent manuscript traditions.6 Annales I-VI (with considerable losses 
in the fifth and sixth books) were transmitted in a single MS (the ‘First Medicean’ or M1), written in 
the mid-9th century, while Annales XI-XVI and Historiae I-V (the former break off at A. 16.35.2, the 
latter at H. 5.26.3) descend together in the ‘Second Medicean’ (M2), written in the mid-11th century. 
The MSS of the opera minora go back to an archetype of 9th century date, the Hersfeldensis, of which a 
mere quire survives. It is telling that in this MS the Agricola, Germania, and Dialogus are grouped not 
with the Historiae and/or Annales but with Suetonius’ de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus, ergo as non-
historiographical imperial texts. Similarly, in other MSS deriving from the Hersfeldensis, the texts are 
transmitted with Frontinus or with the Bellum Troianum of Dictys of Crete. It is also significant that, 
while the Germania and the Dialogus have overlapping traditions, the Agricola’s transmission followed a 
different path in the 15th century. By the end of that century numerous copies had been produced 
containing one or more of the opera minora, via two or three (now lost) hyparchetypes. It was not until 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Tacitus’ correspondence with Pliny (see Birley 2000, 241-42). I follow Syme (1958a, 465-80), Rutledge (1998, 141-43), Potter (1991, 
287-91), Birley (2000), Pagán (2012, 3), and others in seeing a Hadrianic date for the completion of the Annales: see p. 159. 
4 Mayer 2001, 18-19.  
5 Crook 1995, 10, 174, 184.  
6 On the manuscript tradition of Tacitus’ works, see Goodyear 1972, 3 ff.; Reynolds 1983, 406-11; Martin 2009, 239-252; Murgia 2012, 
15-22, and the further references provided in each of those discussions.  
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the modern period that the three texts were united with the coherence they possess today. 
 The printed editions reflect the manuscript preservation. The editio princeps of Tacitus, printed 
ca. 1470 in Venice by Vindelin de Spira, contained Annales XI-XVI, followed by Historiae I-V, the 
Germania, and then the Dialogus. We note the prominence accorded to the historical narratives and the 
absence of Annales I-VI and the Agricola. It was not until 1515 that the former were brought to a wider 
audience, when Philippus Beroaldus the Younger published the editio princeps of the complete corpus. 
The latter’s successor Beatus Rhenanus stands out for publishing an edition (1533, revised 1544) 
containing all of the Historiae and Annales and for arguing that both of Tacitus’ historical works should 
be called Annales, a view that underlines the perceived unity of the opera maiora and, implicitly, their 
distinction from Tacitus’ non-historiographical writings. Justus Lipsius, whose editions (1574-1606) 
included all of Tacitus’ works, initially ascribed the Dialogus to Quintilian and was the first to make 
canonical the division of Tacitus’ historical works into Annales and Historiae. In the following centuries, 
editions of Tacitus became increasingly sophisticated (critical editions really started with Ernesti in 
1752) and over time the corpus was reconstructed with a coherence that did not exist before the 
modern period. This is reflected, inter alia, by the institution of series like the Teubner library of Greek 
and Latin texts and the Oxford Classical Texts series. The opera minora now are grouped together as a 
unit in critical editions, while the Historiae and the Annales have their own standard editions. There is 
no standard edition, however, that includes all of Tacitus’ works and the conceptual distinction 
between the Agricola, Germania, and Dialogus, on the one hand, and the Historiae and Annales, on the 
other, remains firm today. 
The divergent approach to Tacitus’ works that has existed since antiquity is mirrored in the 
secondary scholarship. The bibliographic reviews of Tacitean scholarship show that the Historiae and 
especially the Annales have taken up most scholarly attention. The greater attention given to the 
historical works is informed, in part, by a tacit assumption (in turn informed by what seems to be the 
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usual progression of ancient literary careers) that Tacitus’ early works are immature or preliminary to 
his historical works, which are seen as the culmination of a stylistic and intellectual development: in 
other words, a teleological approach in which the opera minora are reduced to “a marginal infancy.”7 
The earlier works often have been done away with as mere exercises or Vorarbeit, allowing Tacitus to 
experiment with different genres and with the techniques he required for his historical projects.8 One 
may note Sir R. Syme’s chapter “A Historian’s First Steps,” R. Martin’s chapter “The Lesser Works,” 
and other designations that imply or assume the immaturity of Tacitus’ early work.9 S. Borszák, in his 
1968 RE article on Tacitus, endorsed (p. 399) F. Klingner’s claim (1965, 509) that “keimhaft ist das 
historische Weltbild und der Aufriß seiner Geschichtsschreibung schon in der Einleitung zum Leben 
des Agricola vorhande.” Martin, despite aptly noting that the monographs enunciate enduring Tacitean 
concerns, still characterizes the Germania as “a part of Tacitus’ preparation for his new vocation, the 
writing of history.”10 The Dialogus, despite its recognized sophistication, has fared little better, having 
been called an “anomaly” within the corpus and having, like the other monographs, been studied 
mostly in isolation.11 In the most recent monograph on Tacitus, W. Suerbaum prioritizes the Annales 
and excludes the Germania and the Dialogus.12 One consequence is this heuristic distinction between 
																																																								
7 Sailor 2004, 139. Bibliographic interceptions: Benario 1986; 1995; 2005. On the perceived difference in quality between the 
monographs and the historical works, cf. Syme 1958a, 128: “like the first essays of Sallust, the two Tacitean monographs [i.e. the 
Agricola and Germania] stand at the threshold of a magnificent achievement.” On the common progression of ancient literary careers 
and consequent assumptions about Tacitus’ works, see Ash 2007a, 2-3. 
8 It has been suggested that the historiographical and ethnographical sections of the Agricola were taken from a historiographical study 
of Domitian’ reign and were meant as a preliminary study for the Historiae (Andresen 1874; Furneaux-Anderson 1922, xxiii for a 
forceful rejection of this hypothesis). It has been proposed that the Germania was written as an ethnographical excursus for the 
Historiae (Mommsen 1886; Wissowa 1921, 14-15; Paratore 1962, 205-28). Their view has not won acceptance (Rives 1999, 48; 2012, 
53). For the monographs as ‘Vorarbeit,’ cf. also Flach 1998, 190. The scholarly approach to the monographs at times is inconsistent. So 
Syme claims that Tacitus, like Sallust, “benefited from preliminary essays” (1958a, 128), but elsewhere writes that “the Agricola does not 
have to be understood as preface and preliminary to a full-length history” (129), or that “to regard the Germania as in any sense [my italics] 
an introduction to the Historiae of Tacitus is premature and misleading” (148).  
9 Von Fritz, in an otherwise excellent article, calls the Agricola a “little pamphlet” (1957, 74). Cf. Syme (1958a, 129) on the Germania: 
“ethnographic pamphlet.” Syme (1958a, 673) also refers to the Dialogus as possibly a “by-product” of the Historiae. In German 
scholarship, the phrases “kleine Werken” and “große Werken” commonly are used to designate the monographs and historical 
narratives. Such remarks or terms perpetuate a vision of Tacitus’ first three works as inferior or immature (cf. Whitton 2015, 448). To 
avoid perpetuating this vision, in the remainder of this study I refer to the latter not as the ‘minor works’ but as the ‘monographs.’ 
Similarly, I refer to the Historiae and the Annales not as the ‘major works’ but as the ‘historical’ works or narratives. 
10 Martin 1981, 43. 
11 Anomaly: Goldberg 1999, 73-74. Isolation: Sailor 2008, 5; Suerbaum 2015, 6-7. For more discussion on the Dialogus’ reception, see 
pp. 200-203. 
12 Suerbaum 2015, 6-7. 
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‘early’ and ‘late’ Tacitus is that the different works often are studied in isolation. It is telling that in a 
recent volume collecting seminal articles and book chapters on Tacitus, a five-page outline of current 
themes in Tacitean scholarship omits any mention of the relationship among Tacitus’ different 
works.13 Another consequence is that, when they are read together, the relationship between the 
monographs and the historical works most often is articulated in terms of difference on stylistic, 
generic, and conceptual grounds.14  
Scholarly attitudes are reflected further by the relative shortage of English commentaries on 
the monographs. At the start of this study, the standard English commentary on the Agricola was still 
that of R. Ogilvie and I. Richmond produced in 1967 (now superseded by Woodman and Kraus 2014). 
The standard commentary on the Germania by J. Rives (1999) was the first English commentary on the 
work in approximately sixty years, while R. Mayer’s commentary on the Dialogus (2001) was the first 
English commentary on that work in nearly a century. Moreover, the Agricola and the Germania 
predominantly have been the domain of British and German scholarship, respectively, and often have 
been studied within national(istic) frameworks and interests.  
In the past decade, scholarly attention to the monographs has gained some momentum. 
Several scholars, such as D. Sailor (2004, 2008), R. Ash (2007b), and J. Rives (2012), have begun to 
argue against the perceived preliminarity of Tacitus’ early writings.15 Sailor’s monograph Writing and 
Empire in Tacitus (2008), which embraces within its scope the Agricola, the Historiae, and some essential 
chapters from the Annales, is a welcome addition. Even so, the conscious exclusion from that study of 
the Germania and the Dialogus, and the relatively small space devoted to the Annales, is noticeable. 
Elsewhere, A. J. Woodman and C. S. Kraus published a fine new commentary on the Agricola (2014), 
which, however, does not discuss the text’s place within the corpus or its relationship with the later 
																																																								
13 Ash 2012, 11-15. It should be noted, however, that Ash consciously chose to include chapters on the monographs, thus usefully 
creating a more balanced volume. 
14 As Sailor (2004, 139) and Ash (2007b, 434-35; 2014, 186 n. 5) also have pointed out. 
15 Classen 1988, 93-116 also draws attention to commonalities between the Agricola and the historical works. 
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works. C. S. van den Berg published a monograph (2014), originating from his 2006 Yale dissertation, 
devoted entirely to the Dialogus and its place within literary history and criticism. The volume succeeds 
admirably in its aim to “recover the Dialogus” and to dismantle some of the major assumptions that 
have kept modern scholarship from fully appreciating the text. However, van den Berg does not 
entirely deliver on his promise that his study of the Dialogus will “offer some purchase on Tacitus’ 
historical works,” the volume being nearly wholly devoted to the dialogue and its interactions with 
other texts in the rhetorical tradition.16 In a 2012 article, van den Berg rightly stated that, “as modern 
scholarship refines its opinions of the Dialogus in other respects, there is an opportunity to recognize 
further commonalities across Tacitus’ oeuvre. The Dialogus ought to become an essential part of the 
equation.”17 To date, that call largely has remained unanswered. Finally, near the completion of this 
study appeared a volume, edited by O. Devillers (2014), devoted to the monographs and with some 
chapters directly exploring the relationship between the latter and the historical works. The volume, 
issuing from a 2012 conference in Bordeaux, is divided into three sections (“Approches générales,” 
“Regards singuliers sur les opera minora,” “Confrontations ponctuelles entre opera minora et opera maiora”) 
and offers welcome discussions on a range of Tacitean themes, both broader (the Principate and the 
Empire) and more circumscribed (e.g. the concepts of freedom and peace, fear, political boldness, and 
youth) in nature. It is encouraging finally to see a volume dedicated to Tacitus’ monographs, so long 
marginalized. Still, only four out of the twelve chapters fit what one contributor states is the broad 
remit of the volume, namely “to explore the interaction between Tacitus’ minor works and his later 
historical narratives.”18 The Germania receives only one chapter, while in-depth examinations of the 
interactions between the Dialogus and the historical works are a conspicuous absence. It should also be 
noted that, while some of the volume’s contributors stress continuities across Tacitus’ oeuvre, others 
																																																								
16 Van den Berg 2014, 49-50.  
17 Van den Berg 2012, 209. Devillers 2015, 137-53 explores the way in which the Dialogus interacts with the historical narratives, 
focusing primarily on Tacitus’ shifting attitudes towards various emperors.  
18 Ash 2014, 185. The discrepancy is noted also in a recent review (Audano 2015): “quest’ultima risulta però alquanto trascurata 
nell’economia generale del volume.” 
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continue to emphasize difference, thereby maintaining the distinction between ‘early’ and ‘late’ Tacitus 
and perpetuating the assumed inferiority or immaturity of his earlier writings.19  
While interest in the monographs has gained some momentum in the past decade, a full-length 
and inclusive examination of the connections among Tacitus’ different works is lacking. My purpose 
here is to engage in a holistic examination of the corpus and to confront the heuristic distinction 
between ‘early’ and ‘late’ Tacitus.’ Rather than approaching the corpus from assumptions and then 
finding evidence in the texts to support them, I propose to look at what the texts themselves tell us 
about Tacitus and his thinking. In other words, I use Tacitus to get at Tacitus. What emerges from this 
approach is not only that the three monographs set out many of the major themes and concerns that 
appear in the historical narratives, but that Tacitus’ outlook on the Principate and the Empire, and on 
more circumscribed issues, remains, on the whole, consistent.20  The Agricola, Germania, and Dialogus 
explore, from their own particular perspectives, the central issues in the Historiae and Annales.  
While it is perhaps not unreasonable to assume that Tacitus saw his early works as exercises or 
as preliminary to future historiographical projects (there is some hint at this at Agr. 3.3: hic interim liber), 
the argument of preliminarity does not help us understand what Tacitus was trying to do, for all work 
is in some sense preparatory for what comes after it but not predictive of the form that something will 
take. Even if Tacitus saw the monographs as in some way preparatory to his historical works, he surely 
could only have seen them as preparatory to the Historiae since there is no reason to believe that he 
envisioned the Annales before he wrote the Historiae. Furthermore, even if we assume that Tacitus saw 
his early work as preparatory to his later work, there is no need to make the additional assumption that 
there is, or has to be, a major qualitative discrepancy between those works.21 A crucial difference 
																																																								
19 Acknowledged also in a recent review by Whitton (2015, 447-48).  
20 Cf. Keitel 2014, 70: “Tacitus began in the Agricola as he meant to go on. He already had found themes that he would pursue in his 
major works and already had a gift for using selective details and amplification to create unforgettable scenes that crystallized those 
themes and roused the reader to pity and indignation.”  
21 The vision of Tacitus setting out as a rookie and increasingly developing into a mature historian is reminiscent of Jacoby’s 
teleological model of Greek historiography (1956, 16-64, orig. 1909, 80-123), now discounted as being too linear.  
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between Tacitus and other ancient authors was that he was no rookie when he came to the Agricola. 
On any chronology, he began his literary career after age 40, having reached the pinnacle of his 
senatorial career, having acquired a reputation as being one of Rome’s foremost orators, and having 
lived through the reigns of four emperors. By the time he came to the Agricola, “the main lines of his 
political thought were already firmly established.”22 We would do well to take the monographs on their 
own merit and approach them as mature and well-considered works of literature. 
To analyze the connections among the monographs and the historical narratives, I have 
divided my study into three major parts, each devoted to exploring one of the monographs in 
conjunction with both historical works. This format preserves the order in which Tacitus 
conceptualized the issues with which he engages as well as the order in which an ancient reader 
encountered his works. It is important to stress this point. Modern scholarship all too commonly reads 
the monographs against the background of the Historiae and the Annales. Suerbaum, for instance, 
explicitly prioritizes the Annales in his 2015 study, on the theory that it is impossible not to read the 
monographs in light of Tacitus’ final work, just at it would be impossible not to let one’s knowledge of 
Vergil’s Aeneid skew one’s reading of his Eclogues or Georgics.23 First of all, I simply do not think this is 
true. More importantly, the approach of reading the monographs through the lens of the historical 
narratives is fundamentally flawed and comes with serious drawbacks. It fails to interpret the 
monographs on their own terms, investing them with meanings, intentions, and aspects they may not 
have or convicting them for what they do not do. Tacitus wrote the Agricola and the Germania first, in 
close conjunction. Around the same time, he worked up the funeral oration for Verginius Rufus and 
the prosecution speech against Marius Priscus, both of which are lost. He then moved to the Dialogus 
and the Historiae, on which he was at work at or around the same time, with the Agricola and the 
																																																								
22 Martin 1981, 41. Cf. Devillers 2014a, 30: “les opera minora... forment une expression déjà aboutie de la pensée, et dans une certaine 
mesure de l’art, et de l’auteur.”  
23 Suerbaum 2015, 6.  
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Germania in mind. Finally, he moved to the Annales, which he composed and conceptualized against 
the background not only of an entire historiographical tradition but also of his own writings. Indeed, it 
is clear from reading the different works in conjunction that Tacitus expects his readers to be familiar 
with his analysis of the themes he explores in the monographs before they come to his historical 
works. As F. Goodyear aptly notes, “the author Tacitus interacts with most is himself.”24 Tacitus’ 
works never were meant to be read in isolation, and to examine the monographs or even the Historiae 
in light of the Annales is to reverse the order in which the historian came to the themes and issues he 
explores.  
In the second chapter, I examine the connections between Tacitus’ first surviving work, the 
Agricola, and both historical narratives. For the sake of clarity and completeness, I systematically move 
through the monograph, at each stage demonstrating how the concerns and viewpoints enunciated 
there recur in the Historiae and the Annales. I first explore what the preface reveals about Tacitus’ 
outlook on the imperial system of government and the relationship between socio-political and generic 
change. Reading the Agricola and the historical works in conjunction shows that Tacitus saw the 
Principate as a system of government that encouraged broadly similar conduct in its emperors, 
regardless of their personality. While Vespasian and Trajan may be acceptable emperors, the nature of 
the Principate is such that it imposes systemic restrictions on libertas and is hostile toward the eminent. 
The chapters on Agricola’s early years in Gaul and his military apprenticeship in Britain under 
Suetonius Paulinus set out Tacitus’ view of the importance of upbringing and mentorship in the 
development of young Romans. The concern with childhood, education, and training recurs 
throughout the corpus, and Tacitus frequently points to childhood as a factor explaining stained adult 
character. These sections also set out Tacitus’ view of Paulinus, whose characterization becomes more 
complex in the historical works but which largely remains based on Agricola’s example and on Tacitus’ 
																																																								
24 Goodyear 1981, 90.  
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bias against equestrian officials, whom he blames throughout the corpus for failures of provincial 
policy. 
The sections on Agricola’s early offices in Asia, Rome, and Britain enunciate Tacitus’ concern 
with the proper conduct of subordinate officials toward their superiors. One of Tacitus’ principal 
concerns here is Agricola’s conduct under a despotic emperor (Nero), which is described as a ‘middle-
of-the-road’ approach that avoids the extremes of servility and open resistance. Agricola’s conduct 
mirrors that of Tacitus himself, as well as that of Nerva, Trajan, and a range of other senators who 
survived the final years under Domitian. In the historical narratives, Tacitus frequently condemns 
senatorial servility or the open resistance of men like Thrasea Paetus, and he emphasizes the behavior 
of senators who mirror Agricola, whose conduct becomes an exemplum for how one can behave 
honorably under bad emperors. Both in the capital and the provinces, Agricola’s conduct is 
characterized by respect for authority and avoidance of discordia or destructive aemulatio with superiors, 
colleagues, and subordinates. This is another concern that frequently recurs in the historical works, 
where Tacitus identifies discordia/aemulatio as a major cause of the disintegration of provincial 
administration and stability in the capital.  
The chapters on Agricola’s governorships in Aquitania and Britain in turn explore the proper 
behavior of those in positions of authority. These sections articulate Tacitus’ outlook on the proper 
government of non-militarized and militarized provinces, that is of the qualities necessary for good 
provincial government and generalship. Once more, while Tacitus’ characterizations become more 
nuanced and multifaceted in his historical works, the qualities ascribed to Agricola in his capacity as 
governor remain the core criteria by which Tacitus assesses the conduct of other officials. Moreover, 
the qualities that Agricola is said to possess and the faults he is said to avoid reveal what Tacitus 
considers some of the more objectionable ways in which Roman governors and officials typically 
operate. A common view is that Tacitus’ attitude towards Roman provincial rule increasingly becomes 
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more pessimistic throughout his corpus. I argue, instead, that Agricola’s virtues stand out against a 
general background of provincial maladministration: Tacitus’ attitude is pessimistic from the start.  
I should here address head-on a potential critique of my approach. Tacitus ascribes to Agricola 
the outstanding qualities of earlier Romans – Metellus, Pompey, Caesar, Quintus Cicero, Cato – and in 
turn ascribes the same qualities to other governors and generals in the historical works. Many of these 
qualities (foresight, courage, deliberation, etc.) are commonplace in ancient military narrative, and one 
may rightly ask why it matters, if all ancient authors think that the same set of behaviors and qualities 
are the hallmark of good leadership, that Tacitus emphasizes those same behaviors and qualities in his 
different works. While this is a valid point, it should be recalled that, although many aspects in ancient 
historiography are conventional, authors distinguish themselves both by the emphasis they place on 
particular aspects and by the techniques they use to do so. Conventional qualities that are positive in 
republican authors (e.g. facilitas) can be pejorative in Tacitus and yet retain their positive meaning in 
particular cases.25 Politically charged terms like obsequium and libertas have different shades of meaning 
and denote different kinds of behaviors when applied to Agricola, fellow senators, or provincial 
populations. Moderatio, too, is a term whose traditional meaning Tacitus variously transforms in his 
works.26 Moreover, in the Agricola, allusions to the great generals of old function to set up Agricola as a 
republican-style general, while emphasis on the same qualities in the historical works serves the related, 
but different, purpose of evoking Agricola and setting him up as an important exemplum. The 
similarities in Tacitus’ description of Agricola and other Roman officials should not be dismissed as 
the mere repetition of hackneyed topoi.27  
The chapters on Agricola’s governorship of Britain explore a range of issues and concerns that 
remain essential in the historical works. One is the importance of experience in provincial government. 
																																																								
25 Benferhat 2011, 63-66.  
26 Classen 1988, 98 ff. 
27 Cf. Hinds 1998, 34-47 on this mode of reading: “the so-called commonplace, despite our name for it, is not an inert category... but 
an active one, with as much potential to draw poet and reader into, as away from, engagement with the specificities of its history” (40).   
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Agricola’s service as military tribune, legionary legate, and governor in the same province is unique, as 
far as we know, and Tacitus’ account of the man’s governorship reveals an enduring interest in the 
tension between the benefits and drawbacks of lengthy provincial tenures. Tacitus’ account further sets 
out a theory of Roman imperialism and methods of acculturation and reveals an interest in the role of 
auxilia in the Roman military. What emerges is that Tacitus favors imperial expansion on emotional 
and moral grounds, but that, at the same time, he is acutely aware of existing pressures on the Empire 
and the drawbacks of continued expansion. This complex attitude towards Roman foreign policy and 
the Empire’s maintenance recurs in the Germania and the historical works. Like his literary 
predecessors, Tacitus balances Roman perceptions of empire against that of non-Romans. The 
criticism of Rome’s empire placed in the mouth of the Caledonian chief Calgacus evokes similar 
accounts of the Empire in Caesar, Sallust, and Livy and in turn is recalled frequently in analogous 
speeches in the historical narratives. Finally, throughout the work, Agricola’s conduct as governor is 
set in marked contrast with that of the emperors in the capital. This type of indirect commentary on 
the Principate is mirrored in the Germania and the Dialogus, which, as will be seen throughout this 
study, share essential organizational and analytical aspects with the Agricola. 
In the third chapter, I move to the Germania and its relationship with the historical works. Here 
I take a new approach to the text as being principally a reflection upon the challenges and problems 
inherent in imperialism and imperium and on the practicability of a potential conquest and annexation 
of trans-Rhenane Germania. In offering an account of Germania’s geography, natural and mineral 
resources, and customs, the Germania engages with the chief considerations of foreign policy. In the 
first section of this chapter, I undertake a detailed analysis of the work’s description of the Germani 
and their land, focusing on the two ethnographic categories of interest – situs and mores – and 
unpacking in each case the supposed implications for any projected foreign policy with regard to the 
region. The text paints a complex picture of Germania and its tribes, pointing up ways in which 
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conquest and occupation could be practicable, but at the same time establishing ways in which these 
objectives are impracticable, costly, and time-consuming. Given the cultural and economic limits on 
empire, Tacitus suggests that leaving the Germani to their internal discord and retaining influence 
through cultural attraction (‘soft power’) may be the most prudent policy. But, crucially, he nowhere 
advocates a single policy, leaving his readers to draw their own conclusions about the appropriate 
policy in Germania.  
In the second section, I explore what the Historiae and the Annales reveal about Tacitus’ 
attitude towards Rome’s imperium and towards Germania and its tribes in particular. Here I show that, 
while Tacitus’ analysis of imperial rule becomes more detailed and nuanced in the historical narratives, 
it remains consistent at its core: he ties expansion to morality, but continues to point up internal and 
external pressures on the Empire that encourage defensive limitation and consolidation. Although 
persistently restive contexts vindicate military intervention, Tacitus generally advocates consolidation 
and avoidance of financial and military overextension. For the historian, indirect power is real power. 
Reading the Germania and the historical works in conjunction shows that Tacitus’ outlook on imperial 
rule largely remains consistent. The final section of the chapter is devoted to the characterization of 
Germania and its tribes across the three works. While modern scholarship often emphasizes the 
differences between the Germani of the three works, the fact is that, some departures notwithstanding, 
they are depicted consistently across the corpus. Tacitus’ depiction of the Germani becomes more 
multifaceted in the historical works, but crucially remains based on the essential characteristics ascribed 
to them in the Germania.  
The description of the Germani and their land, particularly the former’s propensity to discord 
and violence and the latter’s economic drawbacks, would seem to support a defensive and cost-
efficient foreign policy based on indirect (‘soft’) power. In one sense, the Germania and the historical 
works may be taken as endorsing Tiberius’ decision to recall Germanicus and re-establish the empire’s 
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frontier at the Rhine – a decision, I argue, was not Augustus,’ as still commonly thought, but Tiberius.’  
In the fourth and final chapter, I turn to the Dialogus and its connections with the Historiae and 
the Annales. Like the Agricola and the Germania, the Dialogus sets out concerns and methods of analysis 
which Tacitus subsequently applies in the historical works. I start by giving an overview of the text’s 
reception from antiquity to the present and of the prevailing scholarly responses to it. I follow van den 
Berg (2014) in embracing the text’s chronological and conceptual inconsistencies and propose to read 
these from the perspective of Roman memory and methods of computing time and reconstructing the 
past. The interlocutors, associating socio-political and generic change with major individuals and/or 
events, reconstruct the development of eloquentia and its aspects in broad chronological schemas that 
are plausible but internally inconsistent. The dialogue further establishes tensions between concepts 
and values (laus and ingenium, libertas and eloquentia) that run through the text and ultimately remain 
unresolved. Laying out these tensions and chronological reconstructions, I argue that the competing 
viewpoints, and the chronological and conceptual opacity they establish, serve to demonstrate that 
different narratives and realities are possible and that socio-political and generic change cannot be 
analyzed accurately in tidy frameworks. In this way, the Dialogus is revealed to be reflective of the 
nature and practice of historical and cultural analysis. 
The dialogue’s speakers take up various stances toward the Principate and imperial ideology, 
which relies on tidy reconstructions of the past and Romans’ propensity to think and remember in 
such terms. One of my arguments is that the Dialogus serves not only to promote a more critical 
analysis of cause and effect in discussions of oratory, but to bring greater intellectual rigor to 
discussions of time, periodization, and history generally. In my analysis, I bring recent approaches to 
ancient historiography to bear on the dialogue. The text forces readers to adjudicate between 
competing viewpoints and reconstructions of the past and in doing so trains them to apply a more 
nuanced analysis to the past and their own present. This may be seen as analogous to the way that 
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Tacitus educates his readers in the historical works by recounting how characters in the narrative (fail 
to) scrutinize their past and present. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I explore several examples of this technique. The Dialogus’ 
purpose to work against simplistic reconstructions of the past recurs in both historical works. In each 
case, I start with the preface, which takes up essential concerns set out in the prefaces of the Agricola 
and Dialogus. All of Tacitus’ prefaces are concerned with the relationship between socio-political and 
generic change and with the transition from the Republic to the Principate. As in the Agricola and the 
Dialogus, in the Historiae and the Annales, Tacitus challenges polarizing distinctions between the past 
and present and undermines the notion of a radical change in the world, showing that social, cultural, 
and generic change follows political change gradually. Throughout both historical works, moreover, he 
continues to undermine imperial ideology, pointing up the continuity of discord and civil violence 
from Rome’s early past into the Augustan Principate as well as from the civil wars of 68-69 into the 
Flavian Principate.  
 The concern to complicate superficial reconstructions of the past recurs in the historical 
narratives, where Tacitus describes the emperors and other characters analyzing the past and present,  
only to correct their analysis with his own, more nuanced, reconstruction. Examining the Historiae, I 
show how Galba, Piso, Otho, and Vitellius fail in their analysis of the republican, Julio-Claudian, and 
recent Neronian past and consequently fail to navigate the horror vacui left by Nero’s death. Vespasian 
and Mucianus, in contrast, reveal themselves to be better ‘historians,’ aware of historical precedent and 
understanding the nature of social-political transition. Elsewhere, Tacitus recounts how the Romans in 
69 analyze the civil wars against the background of the republican civil wars (H. 1.50), only to show in 
a digression (H. 2.38) that their analysis is simplistic and, consequently, of little value in their present 
circumstances.  
 From the Annales, I examine two scenes in which Tacitus puts on display Roman ‘anniversary’ 
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thinking and the tendency to reconstruct the past in terms of major personalities and events: A. 1.9-10 
(the reception of Augustus’ reign in the direct aftermath of his funeral) and A. 15.38-44 (public 
perceptions of the great fire of AD 64). In both cases, Tacitus shows how thinking in tidy 
chronological schemas ignores essential details and occludes reality. Finally, in several digressions – on 
the history of Roman law (A. 3.26-28) and luxury (A. 3.55) – Tacitus shows that socio-political 
development is not linear but changes its course depending on one’s perspective. Here, too, he 
reinforces a crucial observation made in the Dialogus and the Historiae, namely that the past is not 
always better and ought not always be used as the benchmark against which to analyze the present.  
In each of the chapters, in sum, I illustrate how principal Tacitean themes and concerns, 
narrative aims and techniques, and methods of analysis are set out in the monographs and taken up in 
the historical works. What emerges is that, in each of the monographs, Tacitus establishes theories of 
analysis that he subsequently applies in his account of the Julio-Claudian and Flavian periods in the 
Historiae and the Annales. In the Agricola, Germania, and Dialogus, Tacitus theorizes, respectively, the 
Roman state, imperial rule, and the nature and practice of historiography, revealing himself to be a 
wide-ranging intellectual, a theorist, educator, and social commentator, as well as a highly skilled 
author. He remains all this in the Historiae and Annales, where he brings an already rich and mature 
mind to the project of writing history. In his historical works, he applies the theories set out in the 
monographs to produce an incisive account of a period well known to most members of his class. 
While his thinking progressively develops, his methods of analysis remain, by and large, consistent. 
This is a fundamentally different picture than the one common in modern scholarship, which sees 
Tacitus progressing from early exercises to his true vocation and which assumes a substantial shift in 
his thinking. A holistic reading of the corpus suggests a more leveled and gradual development. It also 
suggests that we should approach the monographs as the mature pieces of literature that they are. 
 I should clarify here what my study does not do. I consciously do not focus on the 
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development of Tacitus’ style, on the ground that the latter is predominantly a function of genre and 
hazardous to analyze in terms of development or changes in preference. 28 The reception of the 
Dialogus – particularly the way that early scholarship assigned a pre-Domitianic date to the text and 
ascribed it to others authors due to its Ciceronian style – constitutes sufficient warning.  
My method is grounded in traditional philological analysis, based on the close reading of each 
of the texts and of the continuation of language, thought, and analysis across them. This approach is 
apt, since the allusion to, and the recall and re-appropriation of, the language, themes, and analysis in 
prior literary works was the modus operandi of ancient authors. In attempting to establish the nature of 
an author’s analysis and his works, this method is crucial, as it relies on information offered by the 
author himself, as opposed to relying on ‘outside’ information that often is speculative and of little 
hermeneutical value. Not only does Tacitus frequently engage with literary predecessors, but he 
constantly evokes and elaborates on scenes, concepts, and concerns set out in his earlier works. I stress 
here that my approach is not solely literary, however, as I aim at every turn to uncover the historical 
significance of what Tacitus writes about the workings of the Principate and the Empire, about the 
nature of historical analysis, and about what this means about the practice of writing history in imperial 
Rome.  
 The approach and format of my study offer, I hope, several benefits to our reading of the 
Tacitean corpus. One is that any arguments about Tacitus’ thinking and his concerns are based on the 
texts themselves, as opposed to using details of his life to explain them, a method that rightly has been 
criticized for committing the “biographical fallacy.”29 While at times helpful, such methods often are 
based on speculation and unverifiable facts. Moreover, unless we use events or details that are peculiar 
to Tacitus, we essentially treat him as just another senator with literary, oratorical, and legal expertise, 
																																																								
28 The bibliography on Tacitus’ style is extensive. In general, see Martin 1981, 214-35; Hellegouarc’h 1991. See also Syme 1958a for 
the style of the Historiae (191-202) and for Sallustian language in Tacitus (728-32). Van den Berg 2014 illustrates the masterful ways in 
which the Dialogus follows, challenges, and ultimately supersedes its Ciceronian forerunners.  
29 Morford 1991, 3422.  
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thus failing to distinguish the individual from the group. Tacitus was far from a typical ancient 
historian. Aside from the fact that he was over 40 years old and a seasoned orator and politician when 
he came to the Agricola, he remained, unlike some of his predecessors, active in politics and close to 
the center of power during his literary career. This fact has major implications for the nature of his 
writings, as A. Momigliano and others have shown.30 The approach I adopt here focuses on what 
Tacitus himself tells us are his principal concerns.  
Another benefit of the format here is that it allows for a broad analytical scope. Early imperial 
historiography had a tendency to think more biographically in terms of individuals than ideologically in 
terms of systems: the princeps, in accordance with imperial realities, became the organizing principle 
around which to structure narratives. The format I employ to some extent takes the focus away from 
the emperors and their lives and shifts it to the nature and workings of the Principate and the Empire.  
A third advantage of paying close attention to the monographs is that the Agricola allows us to 
reconstruct what some of Tacitus’ public speeches – none of which, if they were ever published, 
survive – might have looked like. The Agricola is closely connected in time to the funeral oration for 
Verginius Rufus, which Tacitus delivered in 97, and further gives us a sense of what the main points 
might have been in his prosecution (in 100, together with Pliny the Younger) of M. Priscus, proconsul 
of Africa (Plin., Ep. 2.11).  
A final benefit is that it allows us to fully appreciate the monographs in coming to a more 
holistic understanding of Tacitus and his corpus. The comparative lack of attention devoted to the 
monographs is remarkable when we consider the luxury of possessing them at all; they survived by the 
narrowest of margins. It is worth considering what our estimation of Tacitus would be if we had lost 
the three works. Our assessment would have to be based solely on what we have of the Historiae and 
																																																								
30 Most recently Sailor 2008. Thucydides and Xenophon were exiles, Polybius a political hostage, Sallust had been expelled from the 
senate before later departing from public life, and Asinius Pollio had withdrawn from politics. Herodotus, too, wrote from the 
‘outside.’ Livy seems not to have belonged to the social class that usually furnished historians. Caesar, Velleius, and Josephus, like 
Tacitus, wrote from the ‘inside’ (cf. Pagán 2012, 3-4). 
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the Annales, in the knowledge that we did not possess three works that contained the first 
instantiations of the author’s principal concerns, methods of analysis, and stylistic preferences. Yet, in 
the unbalanced approach I confront here, our assessment of Tacitus still is based predominantly on the 
historical narratives, on the theory that his earlier works were really only small steps on the way to a 
grand achievement. We have not fully utilized the luxury of possessing Tacitus’ earlier works. This is 
especially evident when we consider how modern scholarship has analyzed what survives of the 
corpus of Tacitus’ predecessor Sallust. Of the latter’s works we have the two monographs Bellum 
Catilinae and Bellum Iugurthinum but only fragments of his Historiae. This has not stopped us, however, 
from formulating Sallust’s principal thematic and intellectual concerns, his stylistic preferences, and his 
qualities as an historian, even though using the monographs to get at Sallust’s later work is not without 
problems.31 The scholarly attitude to Tacitus’ oeuvre has been the opposite to that of Sallust. Whereas 
the latter’s monographs, in the absence of much of his Historiae, have been granted great prominence 
in formulating our estimation of him as an historian, Tacitus’ monographs, perhaps because so much 
of the Historiae and the Annales survives, have been granted comparatively little attention.  
The method I advocate can usefully be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other authors and genres. I 
show that there is a core group of Tacitean concerns that crosses the generic boundaries that might be 
seen to divide a biographical or historiographical work from an ethnography or a rhetorical treatise. In 
looking for conceptual and thematic consistency across the different works, I seek to complicate the 
generic determination on Tacitus’ corpus and, concomitantly, on Latin literature more broadly. My 
method of looking for unifying issues within a corpus may reasonably be expanded to other authors 
and used to recover aspects of Roman thought that are environmentally determined rather than, as is 
often the case now, dictated by the form in which they are composed. 
																																																								
31 A pertinent example is Sallust’s treatment of Sulla. At Jug. 95.2, Sallust writes he will not relate Sulla on any future occasion. Yet the 
fragments of the Historiae betray an obvious interest in the dictator’s character and actions. Either Sallust did not conceive of writing 
the Historiae when he composed the Jugurtha or he simply changed his mind as regards Sulla. Either way, the example illustrates the 










Agricola , Historiae, Annales  
 
The relationship between Tacitus’ Agricola and his historical works often is articulated in terms 
of difference on stylistic, generic, and analytical grounds.32 The work, moreover, when read alongside 
the historical narratives, often is ascribed a sense of preliminarity and immaturity. This approach risks a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Tacitus and his works. It overlooks the fact that the Agricola 
enunciates many enduring Tacitean concerns and occludes the ways in which the historical narratives 
recall, expand on, or are informed by, scenes in the monograph. In this chapter, I explore several of 
the Agricola’s principal themes and concerns and illustrate how they make their way into the historical 
narratives. My first aim is to demonstrate the essential thematic and conceptual connections among the 
three works. My second aim is to illustrate that Tacitus’ broad outlook on the Principate and the 
Empire and on the proper functioning of Roman officials within these power structures remains, by 
and large, consistent throughout.   
The overarching theme of the Agricola is the question of how a senator can flourish within the 
imperial system of government, a question that remains prominent throughout the corpus. This central 
question can be divided into a number of subsidiary ones that likewise recur frequently in the later 
works: a) what is the relationship between the princeps and the senatorial class and how can and should 
a senator position himself vis-à-vis the former? b) what is the proper career development for a senator 
and how is this achieved in an honorably manner? c) what is the appropriate conduct and what are the 
																																																								
32 Ash 2007b, 434-35. Scholarship on the Agricola is quite extensive. Benario’s reviews of Tacitean scholarship offer useful summaries 
of earlier scholarship on the text (1986, 94-98; 1995, 108-12; 2005, 271-75). Plentiful and up-to-date bibliographies can be found in 
König 2013 and Woodman and Kraus 2014, 1-35, 333-48. The major commentaries are Furneaux-Anderson 1922; Forni 1962; 
Ogilvie and Richmond 1967; Heubner 1984; Woodman and Kraus 2014. Birley 1999 offers useful comments as well.  
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attending virtues of a senator in contemporary Rome? d) what makes good governors and generals and 
what is their role within the Roman imperial mission?  
After a short introduction, which situates the Agricola within its socio-political and literary 
context, I discuss Tacitus’ view of the nature of the Principate and its systemic effects on the position 
and conduct of its emperors, on emperor-senate relations, and on the functioning of Roman officials 
in both the capital and the provinces. In the third section, I examine the chapters about Agricola’s 
early years in southern Gaul and his military apprenticeship in Britain under Suetonius Paulinus, 
illustrating the importance of education and mentorship in the development of young Romans as well 
as the ways in which Agricola’s early years impact the execution of his future offices. In the fourth 
section, I move to Agricola’s career as governor of Aquitania, exploring the proper progression of a 
senator’s career and identifying both the challenges governors faced and the gubernatorial qualities 
Tacitus describes as essential for the proper execution of their office. Of particular significance here is 
the interaction with superiors, colleagues, and subordinates and the avoidance of destructive 
competition. In the fifth section, I discuss Agricola’s governorship of Britain, exploring the qualities 
Tacitus considers crucial for the execution of military command and provincial administration. In the 
final section, I consider what the Agricola reveals about larger questions concerning the empire and 
foreign policy, analyzing the complexities of Tacitus’ attitude towards imperialism and towards the use 
of auxilia and their value. What ties these sections together is the simple, but crucial point, that each of 
the above themes, and Tacitus’ analysis of them, recurs largely unchanged in the historical narratives. 
The Agricola enunciates many of Tacitus’ principal concerns and sets out the broad lines of his attitude 
towards the Principate and the Empire, the two power structures that govern Roman life. 
 
II.1  Introduction: the Agricola  within its Socio-Political Context  
 
Examining the connections between the Agricola and the later works makes good sense. The 
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Agricola and the Historiae cover roughly the same historical period, making it likely that there are many 
points of contact, while even the Annales, covering the earlier Julio-Claudian era, reveal many material 
connections with the monograph. Furthermore, there is good reason to consider the significance of 
the Agricola in the Tacitean corpus. The intriguing thing about Tacitus is that chronologically he wrote 
about his ‘latest’ subject matters first, before going further back in time as his literary career 
progressed, a point that has implications for the position of the Agricola. On the one hand, Tacitus’ 
portrait of Agricola informed those of Germanicus, Corbulo, Paulinus, and other senators in the 
Annales, while Domitian often is seen as a model for the later portraits of the Julio-Claudian emperors, 
especially Tiberius.33 On the other hand, the portraits of Agricola and Domitian likely were themselves 
inspired by the literary and oral traditions that existed about earlier emperors and senators.34 Tacitus’ 
first work, then, both was informed by his views of the personalities and events of the early Principate 
and, in turn, informed his account of that same period in the later Annales: the Agricola looks both 
backward and forward. 
The text is notoriously difficult to classify. In its short compass (under a 1000 lines) it contains 
elements common to the genres of biography, historiography, ethnography, funerary eulogy (laudatio 
funebris), and forensic oratory, making for a rich text containing many stylistic features that recur in the 
Historiae and the Annales.35 The text’s ostensible purpose is to record for posterity the life and career of 
the author’s father-in-law. But it does much more than that. Published in AD 98, when imperial power 
had passed from Domitian to Nerva and then to Trajan, the Agricola is intimately engaged with the 
socio-political issues of its time.36 As such, it is part of the range of surviving post-Domitianic literature 
																																																								
33 Cf. Walker 1952 [1968], 219. 
34 Taking Tiberius as the model for Domitian would be logical given that Domitian was known to have read nothing but Tiberius’ 
commentarii and acta (Suet., Dom. 20.1). There were also acknowledged similarities between Nero and Domitian: Plin., Pan. 53.5.  
35 On the work’s stylistic diversity, see Ogilvie and Richmond 1967, 21 ff.; Woodman and Kraus 2014, 1-5, 30 ff. Cf. Beck 1998, 63-
65. As Sailor (2008, 51-118) shows, the Agricola also performs the work of certain social practices, such as the triumph and damnatio 
memoriae. For bibliography on Tacitus’ style generally, see n. 28. 
36 On the way the Agricola positions itself in this transitional period: Sailor 2008, 53 ff.; König 2013, 361-65, with plentiful references 
in the notes; Woodman and Kraus 2014, 1-30; Ogilvie and Richmond 1967, 14 ff. remains useful as well.  
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which sought to interpret the immediate past and present and which, in concert with the new regime, 
portrays Trajan and life under him in opposition to the old regime.37 The text, moreover, engages with 
topical questions about the proper behavior of a senator, about senate-emperor relations, and about 
the qualities expected of an emperor. In the aftermath of Domitian’s regime and the unstable years 
under Nerva, and with Trajan not yet in Rome, the senatorial class faced the challenge of defining its 
position and “to turn some of the new rhetoric into reality, if it can.”38 
Pliny the Younger’s letters showcase the tense atmosphere in post-Domitianic Rome, when 
the late emperor’s victims, who had openly resisted his regime and paid for it with their lives, enjoyed 
sympathy and those who had actively collaborated with the old regime were attacked and criticized.39 
Two exponents of the senatorial opposition were Arulenus Rusticus and Herennius Senecio, Stoic 
philosophers who were executed for composing Lives of Thrasea Paetus and Helvidius Priscus, 
themselves Stoics who likewise had given their life in opposition to their regimes (Agr. 2.1). These 
senators (commonly referred to as the “Stoic Martyrs”) were celebrated in contemporary literary 
works: Titinius Capito wrote Exitus Illustrorum Virorum (“Deaths of Famous Men”, Plin., Ep. 8.12.4) on 
the victims of Domitian, while C. Fannius wrote three books on Nero’s victims (Ep. 5.5.3).40 In 
addition, Tacitus’ close friend Pliny, who had enjoyed success under Domitian, openly professed his 
support for the emperor’s victims, whether out of sympathy for the circle of Helvidius to which he 
was tied or out of a desire to distance himself from the old regime, or both.41  
It is within this broader cultural response to the Domitianic past and the Trajanic present that 
																																																								
37 Martial’s late work, Pliny’s Panegyricus, Dio Chrysostom’s speeches, Juvenal’s Satires, Suetonius’ Lives, and Tacitus’ Agricola all present 
Domitian as a tyrant and explicitly or implicitly endorse the renewed sense of freedom and openness under Trajan. Yet we should not 
uncritically follow post-Domitianic literature in envisioning a rigid break between the Domitianic and Trajanic regimes. See 
Liebeschuetz 1966, 132-33; Whitmarsh 2006, 311-12; Wilson 2003 (a critical assessment of post-Domitianic literature and its depiction 
of Domitian). See Waters 1964 and Jones 2002 for redeeming accounts of Domitian.  
38 König 2013, 365.  
39 On the complexities of the reputation of the Martyrs in post-Domitianic Rome, see the discussion in Sailor 2008, 11-33.  
40 On this genre: Devillers 2003, 43-45 with many useful references. For general discussion of the Martyrs: Sailor 2008, 10 ff. with 
further bibliography. 
41 Note Ep. 1.5, 3.11, 7.19, 7.33, 8.12, 9.13. For Pliny’s attack on Helvidius Priscus’ prosecutor Publicius Certus, see Ep. 9.13; cf. 
4.21.3, 7.30.5 and (possibly) 1.2.6. On Pliny’s character assassination of Aquilius Regulus, see Gibson and Morello 2012, 31, 40-73.  
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the Agricola is situated. It simultaneously is concerned with denunciating Domitian’s reign, with 
articulating the values of the new regime, and with formulating and promoting the proper behavior of 
a senator in contemporary Rome. That behavior, as is evident from both the Agricola and the historical 
narratives, differed from that of the Martyrs, whose courage and open resistance, however admirable 
in principle, Tacitus criticizes as “useless to the state” (in nullum rei publicae usum, Agr. 42.4).42 In 
contrast, Agricola exemplifies a conduct of moderation and useful service for the state, a conduct 
Tacitus would continue to advocate throughout his works.43 This is the conduct that Tacitus himself 
and other senators, such as Verginius Rufus, Vestricius Spurinna, Pliny, Nerva, and Trajan, had 
adopted as well. The Agricola thus serves a wider purpose of vindicating the careers of many who had 
come through Domitian’s reign unscathed.  
In its effort to endorse the ideology of the new regime by commemorating the life of a 
prominent individual, the Agricola is likely to have had much in common with the funeral oration 
Tacitus delivered the previous year for Verginius Rufus, one of the figureheads of Nerva’s regime.44 
We do not have the oration, but we know enough from other sources to imagine what its main themes 
would have been and how Verginius and Agricola were connected: successful governorship of an 
imperial province, military success in the service of the state, uirtus, gloria, and moderation.45 Tacitus 
likely used the occasion to advocate a specific set of values and to hold up Verginius as an example to 
																																																								
42 Tacitus saw the avoidance of political boldness as the only way to achieve stable government: cf. Walker 1952 [1968], 198-202. Cf. 
the introduction to V. Max. 6.2 on the concept of libertas as harmful failure of self-restraint. On the apparent inconsistencies between 
Agr. 42.4 and Tacitus’ treatment of individual Stoics, such as Helvidius and Thrasea, in the later works, cf. Sailor 2008, 17, who 
suggests that Tacitus disavows the Martyrs “as a category” but praises individuals to preserve his allegiance to the views of his peers. 
Tacitus “pays them respect, while furnishing the material for a serious critique of them” (p. 23). 
43 “In all his writings it is to moderate men that his most unstinted praise is given, to such as Manius Lepidus, Memmius Regulus, 
Julius Frontinus, and others who served their country well in trying times”: Furneaux-Anderson 1922, xxx; cf. Devillers 2014a, 28, n. 
153 with further references there; cf. Keitel 2014, 62 ff. on Tacitus’ style as reflecting Agricola’s stance.  
44 Advertising a break with Domitian’s regime, Nerva surrounded himself from the start with prominent senators who were either 
retired or had been away from public life for some time: Frontinus, Spurinna, and Rufus. In 97, Verginius (now 83) was recalled from 
retirement and persuaded to become co-consul with the emperor: Syme 1958a, 3.  
45 Verginius’ refusal of the title princeps when offered to him by his troops became an example of moderation and loyalty to the state 
(Plin., Ep. 9.19; Plut., G. 6.2-3, 10; cf. Tac., H. 1.8.2, 1.52.4). Pliny, describing the funeral and the qualities of his guardian, suggests 
some of the buzzwords: maximi et clarissimi ciuis (Ep. 2.1.1), exemplar aeui prioris (2.1.7), uirtutibus (2.1.3), gloria (6.10.3), optimi... et maximi 
uiri (6.10.1), cuius memoria orbem terrarum gloria peruagetur (6.10.3), tanta in praedicando uerecundia quanta gloria ex facto (9.19.4). Pliny plainly 
echoes the Agricola in numerous places: Ep. 2.1.3 ~ Agr. 1.3, 44.5; Ep. 2.1.10 ~ Agr. 46.1, 4; Ep. 9.19.4 ~ Agr. 8.3; also cf. Ep. 8.14.9 ~ 
Agr. 3.1. Cf. Whitton 2010 on the interactions between Pliny’s letters and Tacitus’ Agricola. In the Historiae, Tacitus throws up some 
doubt about Verginius’ modesty and altruism, saying that he had hesitated to refuse the purple and to back Galba (H. 1.8.2, 1.52.4). 
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be emulated (exemplar aeui prioris, Plin., Ep. 2.1.7). The funeral was a memorable event (insigne atque 
etiam memorabile… spectaculum, Ep. 2.1.1) that brought honor to Nerva and the times (magnum 
ornamentum principi magnum saeculo magnum,	Ep. 2.1.6).46 As such, it served an analogous purpose to the 
Agricola, which, through the commemoration of the life of another prominent senator, played its role 
in the formation of the new Trajanic regime and its values.47 	
Most of Agricola’s career took place outside of Rome. Aside from his early offices under Nero 
and Galba (Agr. 6.3-5), the short interval between his legionary legateship and first governorship (9.1), 
the consulship between his governorships of Aquitania and Britain (9.5-6), and his final years under 
Domitian (40-43), the narrative unfolds in the provinces. The text’s main focus is on the governorship 
of Britain because it was there that Agricola earned the lion’s share of his glory and because narrating 
his father-in-law’s tenure allowed Tacitus to explore the realities of provincial government and to 
juxtapose most forcefully Agricola’s leadership there with that of Domitian in Rome. The conceptual 
analogy between the authority of a governor within the confines of his province and that of the princeps 
in Rome allows Agricola’s governorships to function as a foil to the rule of the emperors in Rome, that 
of Domitian in particular.48 As some have noted, the symbolic significance of Britain being an island, 
separated from the mainland and hence from the rest of the empire, only reinforces this contrast.49 By 
publicizing Domitian’s oppression, moreover, the text urges, almost forces, Trajan to do things in an 
opposite manner. Thus the Agricola functions much like Pliny’s Panegyricus, which, in praising Trajan’s 
conduct early in his reign, essentially lays down the ‘rules’ and senatorial expectations of that reign as 
well.50 Finally, Agricola’s qualities closely resemble those of Trajan himself.51 The conduct of the ideal 
																																																								
46 On the significance of public funerals as a means of advertising (imperial) ideology, see Flower 1999, 136-45. 
47 On Trajanic propaganda: Bennett 1997, 64-74; Schwarte 1979, 139-75; Sailor 2008, 52-53.  
48 See Devillers 2014b, 163-174, recapping much of the recent scholarship on this analogy and its implications. 
49 Clarke 2001 [= Ash 2012, 37-72]; Sailor 2008, 79-80.  
50 On the coercive force of the Agricola, see Wilson 2003, 533: “in complimenting Nerva and Trajan for their restoration of libertas, 
[Tacitus] puts pressure on the new Emperor to live up to the high standards of tolerance for which he is being acclaimed.” Cf. Sailor 
(2008, 153), who notes that Tacitus “leaves the present principes little to do but positively to support the present text.” On the similar 
force of Pliny’s Panegyricus: Ramage 1989, 643-44; Morford 1992, 578; S. Braund 1998, 66–8; Griffin 1999, 153. Bennett 1997, 63-73 
shows that some of Dio Chrysostom’s speeches had a similar function. On the Panegyricus, see the volume edited by Roche (2011). Cf. 
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senator is also the conduct of the ideal emperor: Tacitus characterizes Agricola as a proto-Trajan.  
           Through the idealized portrait of his father-in-law, Tacitus advocates a fundamental and 
consistent set of values that ought to guide a senator, governor, or emperor, values that have their 
origins in the Late Republic and the works of the outstanding authors of that age: Cicero, Caesar, 
Sallust, and Livy. In various ways Agricola, in his capacity as general, governor, or senator, is made to 
resemble renowned men like Q. Caecilius Metellus, Marius, Pompey, Caesar, Quintus Cicero, and Cato 
the Younger. In his own turn, Agricola becomes one of Tacitus’ most important exempla, informing 
the portraits of many of the prominent personalities in the Historiae and the Annales, in both Rome and 
the provinces, in both military and domestic contexts. Thus Tacitus marks out for his father-in-law a 
place within the long tradition of eminent Roman senators and generals and for the Agricola a place 
within the Roman literary tradition.52  
 
II.2  The Nature of the Imperial System of Government  
One of Tacitus’ persistent critiques of the imperial system of government is its restriction on 
the public glorification of the achievements of people other than the sitting princeps and his family. He 
points to this issue in the opening words of the Agricola, where he blames the advent of the Principate 
for the decline in public performance and morality and for the decline in (auto)biographical literature. 
Connecting political with generic change, Tacitus draws a broad distinction between the past (apud 
priores: presumably the Republic, but left undefined), when individual merit (uirtus) was recognized and 
encouraged, and the present (nostris temporibus: probably the Principate generally, but again left 
undefined), which is hostile to it and seeks to suppress and silence it (Agr. 1; cf. D. 1).53 Within this 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Frontinus’ endorsement of Nerva’s regime in de Aquis Urbis Romae, with König 2013, 371-74. 
51 “[The Agricola] stands in close relation to the training and career of the Imperator himself, to his character and his virtues”: Syme 
1958a, 19.  
52 See also Sailor’s intriguing article (2004) on the way the Agricola positions itself within the Roman literary tradition.  
53 Almost every aspect of the preface is controversial. Tacitus, I suspect deliberately, withholds precise definitions. On the preface: 
Büchner 1964, 321-43; Liebeschuetz 1966, 132-33 [= Ash 2012, 82-83]; Leeman 1973, 199 ff.; Martin 1981, 39-41; Whitmarsh 2006, 
311-12; Sailor 2004; 2008, 53 ff.; Woodman and Kraus 2014 ad loc. The prefaces of the Dialogus, Historiae, and Annales draw 
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broader distinction, he differentiates between the immediate past under Domitian and the Trajanic 
present. The hostility and restrictions that mark the Principate generally were extreme under Domitian, 
who imposed silence, executed opponents and burned their books, and all but abolished libertas (Agr. 
2).54 Under Nerva and Trajan, says Tacitus, things improved: Nerva reconciled what was once 
considered irreconcilable, principatus and libertas, while Trajan daily increased Rome’s happiness (3.1).55 
As R. Ash notes, Tacitus’ decision to publish the Agricola and the Germania (on which he had probably 
worked since 93, the year of Agricola’s death) only in 98 was an inventive way to underline this 
ideological message: under the new princeps, literature is revived and uirtus once more allowed to shine.56 
           Despite his praise of the new regime, Tacitus betrays a sense of skepticism that is revealing of 
his attitude towards the Principate. Not only does he need to seek indulgence (uenia, 1.4) from his 
princeps to narrate Agricola’s life, his praise of the new regime is expressed in a concessive clause (3.1) 
that problematizes the clean break between the Domitianic and Trajanic regimes and hints at the fact 
that “like all imperial accessions, Trajan’s innovation must be at once a return to the same.”57 The 
question of whether uenia is directed at Domitian or Trajan remains highly contentious and defies a 
conclusive answer. I concur with those who argue that Tacitus draws a broad distinction between the 
Republic and the Principate and that “the age which is so hostile to virtue” (tam saeua et infesta uirtutibus 
tempora, 1.4) necessarily includes the reigns of Nerva and Trajan as well.58 Hostility to uirtus and 
curtailment of free speech (written or spoken) were institutional aspects of the imperial system of 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
distinctions between past and present as well, albeit it in different ways. See Leeman 1973 and Marincola 1999 on the prefaces of both 
historical works; Sailor 2008, 119-82 on the preface of the Historiae.  
54 Note the connections between Agr. 2 and A. 4.35, 14.50 on the prosecution of authors and the burning of books, and the futility of 
attempts to wipe out memory and fame with posterity. Prosecution (i.e. imperial attention) bestows fame, while availability and 
impunity (i.e. imperial disinterest) risk oblivion. Cf. Plin., Ep. 9.27. See Sailor 2008, 46-47 and the preceding discussion; 250-313.  
55 On the theme of libertas in Tacitus and the present passage in the Agricola, see Wirszubski 1950, 160-67; Hammond 1963, 93-113; 
Ducos 1977, 194–217; Morford 1991, 3420–50; Oakley 2009, 184-94. Cf. Giua 2014, 45-57 for an overview of Momigliano’s views of 
libertas and pax (and the influence of Mussolini’s regime on those views), and the application of these concepts throughout the 
Tacitean corpus. Cf. Pagán 2014, 73 on the complexities of the temporal distinction here.  
56 Ash 2007a, 2; Woodman and Kraus 2014, 6, 74-79, 82-88. Cf. Haynes 2006 on the Agricola as a renewal of speaking, writing, and 
memory in the aftermath of a regime marked by terror and suppression. 
57 Whitmarsh 2006, 311.  
58 So Liebeschuetz 1966, 133 [= Ash 2012, 83], Leeman 1973, 201-202, and Whitmarsh 2006, 312. Woodman and Kraus (2014 ad loc.) 
and Pagán (2014, 73) argue for Domitian.  
	
	 28 
government that essentially were independent of its principes.59 On this view, perhaps we do not need to 
choose: one would need to seek uenia from any emperor. Whatever the precise meaning of Tacitus’ 
words, now unrecoverable, what is certain is that he does not explicitly direct the mark at Domitian, 
which is significant given the historical moment during which the Agricola was published.60 That 
Tacitus was skeptical about the possibility of the new princeps remedying systemic restrictions is 
suggested by the final words of the preface: the Agricola either will receive laus or be excused (aut 
laudatus erit aut excusatus, 3.3). Unlike Domitian, Trajan might be expected to excuse the work. Whether 
Rome would return to the ideals of the Republic, when there was a healthy economy of representation 
(to use Sailor’s term) and excellence (in action or writing) earned laus, remained dubious.61 The fact 
that Tacitus has to avoid a charge of gratia or ambitio – by professing to have written the work out of 
pietas (3.3) – reflects the relations of reciprocity that compromised imperial literature rather than the 
libertas that marked the Republic. 
Ambivalence about the new regime was not peculiar to Tacitus. Pliny, in the second book of 
his Letters, betrays similar uncertainty, balancing relief and optimism with skepticism and negativity.62 
Despite its promises, Nerva’s rule had been marked by uncertainty and instability, when civil war and 
the question of succession again had threatened the imperial framework.63 Hadrian’s regime would be 
inaugurated by the destruction of several eminent Trajanic commanders.64 While, to be sure, Trajan’s 
reign was welcomed after Domitian’s oppressions, every new age made claims about ‘freedom’ and 
‘restoration,’ and seasoned men like Tacitus and Pliny understood the nature of the Principate, 
regardless of the personality of the sitting princeps.65  
																																																								
59 See the discussion in Sailor (2008, 119-82). Cf. Giua 1985, 12 on A. 4.32 and Tacitus’ historiographical endeavor: “ma nella sulla 
digressione sulla storiografia Tacito intende fare una ricostruzione storico-politica globale, che non rifugge da generalizzazioni e 
semplificazioni, perché il suo obiettivo è quello di bollare il principato.” 
60 Sailor (2008, 58-59) notes that the ambiguity is there, perhaps intentionally. 
61 Sailor 2008, 57 ff. For further discussion of the preface and the economy of representation, see pp. 223 ff. below. 
62 Strunk 2012; Whitton 2013, 8. 
63 See König 2013, 362-63, which offers plentiful references to scholarship on the crises during Nerva’s regime.  
64 On the influence of Hadrian’s accession and early reign on Tacitus’ depiction of Tiberius, see Syme 1958a, 236-52, 465-503.  
65 Cf. Sailor 2008, 41: “Trajan may well have been that benevolent, liberal princeps described in the contemporary chorus of praise, but 
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About a decade later, in the preface of the Historiae, Tacitus reveals similar ambivalence. He 
describes Trajan’s reign as “a time of rare felicity, when you may think what you please and say what 
you think” (H. 1.1.4; cf. Plin., Pan. 66.4). While these words seem to reveal genuine optimism, here, 
too, there are hints of uncertainty. Just as he had to beg for indulgence to compose the Agricola, so in 
the Historiae his topic is not the “happy present” (testimonium praesentium bonorum), which he mentioned 
as a possibility at Agr. 3.3, but the safer subject of the Flavian Principate.66 The Historiae fulfill the other 
possibility announced at Agr. 3.3, a work on the prioris seruitutis under Domitian, but the scope notably 
is expanded to include the civil wars of AD 68-69 and the reigns of Vespasian and Titus, a decision 
that “changed the implications of Tacitus’ work, and revised his relationship to the current regime.”67 
Moreover, his praise of Trajan, as in the Agricola, is offset by remarks elsewhere on the nature of 
imperial power that reflect contemporary concerns at the time Tacitus was writing.  
Particularly significant are the events surrounding Vespasian’s accession, which bore plain 
resemblances to the aftermath of Domitian’s reign and Trajan’s accession. For one thing, Piso’s 
adoption by Galba in 69 had obvious relevance to Trajan’s adoption by Nerva in 97, as did the power 
of the army in creating and maintaining an emperor. The deaths of Nero and Domitian, moreover, 
both were followed by a determination to take revenge against delatores active during their reigns. At 
Vespasian’s accession, Helvidius Priscus used the political moment to attack Eprius Marcellus, one of 
the informers who had ruined his father-in-law Thrasea Paetus in 66 (H. 4.6-8). Soon a second feud 
broke out between Curtius Montanus and Aquilius Regulus, another notorious delator and one of 
Pliny’s enemies in his Letters, which in turn provoked another altercation between Priscus and 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the nature of his power was basically independent of his personality and of his personal patterns of conduct, for it was the power 
always present, and ready to be enacted, in the position within society occupied by anyone who was princeps.” On the discrepancies 
between Nervan and Trajanic rhetoric and reality, see Syme 1958a, 12, 131, 220-221; Waters 1969, 385-405; Bartsch 1994, 166-67; 
Bennett 1997, 71-73, 106, 208. Note Wallace-Hadrill 1982, 37 on imperial rhetoric: “a studied display of respect for senate and people 
sustained the illusion of the supremacy of those bodies, while in fact it ceremonially demonstrated the supremacy of the emperor.”  
66 Damon 2003, 4. A work on the Trajanic Principate was never delivered. Ahl 1984, 207 notes that Latin poetry flourished under 
Domitian, not under Trajan. Cf. Pelling 2009, 150; Giua 2014, 50; Pagán 2014, 86 with further references there. Pliny, in a letter to 
Titinius Capito (Ep. 5.8), expounds on the dangers of writing recent or contemporary history. 
67 Sailor 2008, 122.  
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Marcellus (H. 4.42-43). Mucianus and Domitian, after conferring with Vespasian (H. 4.40.3), made a 
decisive intervention on behalf of the informers (H. 4.44), with the result that Marcellus and Regulus 
got off and the senate abandoned its newfound libertas. Tacitus’ description of these debates and the 
remarks he puts into the mouth of different senators are telling and seem reflective of his attitude 
towards the imperial system of government and Trajan’s reign in particular.68 He has Marcellus remind 
the senate that “even the best emperors want some restriction on freedom” (libertatem, H. 4.8.4), while 
he has Montanus ask senators whether they think Nero was the last of the tyrants (extremum dominorum, 
H. 4.42.5). Those who had survived Tiberius and Caligula, says Montanus, had made the same mistake 
and been disappointed; Vespasian’s age and character were reassuring, but examples (in this case, the 
punishment of notorious informers) last longer than men’s characters (non timemus Vespasianum; ea 
principis aetas, ea moderatio: sed diutius durant exempla quam mores), and it had become a principle that the 
first day after a bad emperor was the best one (optimus est post malum principem dies primus, H. 4.42.6; cf. 
H. 1.4.2: finis Neronis...). Moreover, earlier in the work, Tacitus had claimed that Vespasian was the only 
princeps who was changed for the better while in power (solusque omnium ante se principum in melius mutatus 
est, 1.50.3), a claim that makes that emperor an exception that proves the rule. It is hard not to see 
behind these debates, which showcase failed senatorial efforts at libertas, Tacitus’ own disillusionment 
with Trajan’s regime, which had been welcomed (Agr. 3; H. 1.1) but naturally (and, I think, for Tacitus 
not unexpectedly) had not turned out the inverse of that of his predecessors.69  
By the time of the Annales prefatory statements about libertas under Trajan are dropped 
altogether. Tacitus’ outlook is not that of a man who started out a confirmed believer of a system of 
																																																								
68 Whether Tacitus himself ascribed to the views he reports remains ultimately unverifiable. Cf. Syme 1970, 131, 138-39; Martin 1981, 
94, 99; Luce 1986, 143-57 [= Ash 2012, 339-56].  
69 Syme 1958a, 209; Martin 1967; Whitton 2012, 360-62. There were plain resemblances between these debates and the contemporary 
situation under Trajan. The individuals connected with these debates point up “an obvious parallelism between the contemporary 
situation and events of AD 70”: Martin op. cit., 113. Montanus’ speech against Regulus was “no doubt highly relished by Trajanic 
readers”: Syme 1958a, 209 n.4. Note Whitton 2012, 361-62: “Vespasian’s establishment as emperor paves the way for the tyranny of 
Domitian, a future which hangs like a shadow over the surviving books: the Senate’s failure to suppress delators in this inaugural 
moment is the first step toward the devastation of 93. The memory of that year most obviously scars the Agricola and Pliny’s Epistles.” 
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government in which he gradually lost faith.70 It is the attitude of a man who understood the Principate 
and its institutional drawbacks and whose outlook remained, by and large, consistent. The Republic, 
despite its continued moral and ethical force in imperial Rome, was a dead letter, as Tacitus knew. 
Rome had not, as Velleius could suggest, moved from Republic to a better Republic,71 but from 
Republic to Principate, a move necessitated by the persistent discord and civil warfare that had torn 
apart the old configuration (cf. A. 1.1.1). But the Principate was a far from perfect substitute, an 
institution that suffered from systemic problems that were independent of the particular princeps in 
charge. While it would be wrong to say that Tacitus saw the Republic and the Principate as wholly 
divergent systems of government,72 from the Agricola to the Annales he associates libertas with the 
Republic and depicts the Principate as a system of government in which independence, in its various 
manifestations, is curtailed by imperial restrictions.  
Such restrictions were a natural consequence of the social and political nature of the 
Principate, in which supreme power resided with one man who had to ensure that he was more 
prominent than everyone else. The achievements of others could threaten his position, especially if 
anyone excelled him in areas in which he was supposed to be preeminent.73 To preserve their position, 
starting with Augustus, emperors imposed restrictions on the public display of other people’s 
achievements, curbing literary and oratorical freedom,74 restricting the traditional avenues for the 
public display of military glory,75 and essentially forcing self-celebration of members outside the 
																																																								
70 The old thesis continues to be prevalent. Sailor confronts it in his 2008 monograph, though not decisively. Note Whitton 2011, 196: 
“still, one misses a head-on confrontation with the old thesis – which underlies in many ways Sailor’s own tracking through Tacitus’ 
literary career – that his works reveal a gradual descent from optimism to disenchantment.” 
71 On Velleius’ computation of time and his construction of a res publica Tiberiana, see Gowing 1995, 41-48. 
72 In the final chapter, I explore in detail how Tacitus challenges the polarizing distinction between Republic and Principate and the 
notion of a radical change in the world.  
73 Sailor 2008, 52. Cf. Walker 1952 [1968], 78-81; Habinek 2000, 264-303. 
74 See Sen., Ben. 3.27.1 (with Roller 2001, 157 ff.) and Dio 53.19.3-4, 56.27.1 on Augustus. See Sen., Con. 10 pr. 5 ff. on the case of T. 
Labienus, Tac., A. 1.72.3-4 on that of Cassius Severus, 4.34-35 on that of Cremutius Cordus, 14.48-50 on those of Antistius Sosianus 
and Fabricius Veiento, Agr. 2.1 on that of Arulenus Rusticus and Herennius Senecio. On the perils of writing history from the advent 
of Augustus onwards, see H. 1.1; A. 1.1; Plin., Ep. 5.8; Hor., Carm. 2.1. Note also Agr. 2.3 and A. 4.69 on the way informers scrutinize 
people’s words. On imperial scrutiny of people’s words, spoken or written, see Bartsch 1994. 
75 L. Cornelius Balbus in 19 BC was the last senator outside the imperial family to celebrate the traditional Roman triumph, Junius 
Blaesus in AD 23 the last to assume the title of Imperator (A. 3.74.4). Generals could now earn an ovatio or, on imperial initiative, the 
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imperial family into municipal contexts.76 Jealous emperors are recorded as exiling or killing potential 
rivals, downplaying other people’s achievements, and inflating their own successes. In contrast, good 
emperors could be praised for allowing the virtues of others to shine.77 To what extent these 
institutional limitations were in fact imposed is hard to say, as imperial hostility is recorded so 
pervasively and consistently in our sources as to constitute somewhat of a topos.78 What matters here 
is how Tacitus viewed emperor-senate relations, and from both the Agricola and the historical 
narratives it is evident that he saw all emperors, to various degrees, as suspicious of the eminent.79 The 
qualities of prominent senators made them a potential threat to their emperor’s authority. This was the 
alleged cause of Domitian’s hostility toward Agricola, whose military success in Britain threatened to 
“raise him above the emperor” (supra principem attolli, Agr. 39.2). Tacitus writes that envy and suspicion 
inspired Domitian to recall Agricola, even though, after seven seasons and the ostensible completion 
of the province’s conquest, and with military demands on the Danube frontier, a recall and 
redeployment of forces would be the natural course of events. This view of an emperor’s motives 
recurs in the later descriptions of Germanicus’ recall by Tiberius (A. 2.26.4) and that of Corbulo by 
Claudius (A. 11.19-20), likewise sensible decisions which Tacitus ascribes in part to imperial jealousy. 
Elsewhere, he describes Suetonius Paulinus (H. 2.37.1), Corbulo (H. 2.76.3; cf. A. 14.58.2), Junius 
Blaesus (H. 3.38-39), Helvidius Priscus (H. 4.8.3-4; cf. Agr. 2.1), Calpurnius Galerianus (H. 4.11.2), L. 
Piso (H. 4.48 ff.), Agrippa Posthumus (A. 1.6), Asinius Gallus (A. 1.12-13), L. Arruntius (A. 1.13.1-3; 
cf. 6.48.1), M. Lepidus (A. 1.13.2), Cn. Piso (A. 1.13.3), Valerius Asiaticus (A. 11.1), C. Sulla (13.23.1, 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
ornamenta triumphalia (Chaplin 2000, 184-92; Campbell and Tritle 2013, 40-41). The grant of these insignia was regularly combined with 
the offer of the title of Imperator to the emperor, who thus ensured that he maintained his preeminence despite other people’s 
achievements. The emperor and his family also monopolized the right to construct public monuments with the spoils of conquest (ex 
manubiis), Balbus again being the last Roman senator outside the imperial family to do so: Plin., Nat. 36.60; Dio 54.23. 
76 Cf. Eck 1984, 139-42. 
77 Pliny praises Trajan for recognizing the merit of successful generals (Pan. 18-20, 44), while Hadrian, at his own expense, set up a 
public monument to the Trajanic general J. Quadratus Bassus (Campbell 1984, 322). On Tiberius Plautius Silvanus Aelianus’ epitaph 
Vespasian is recorded as saying that the latter “governed Moesia in such a way that the conferment of his honors should not have 
been left to me” (ILS 986), an implicit condemnation of Nero’s hostility to eminent men (Griffin 1984, 118).  
78 Rutledge 2001, on the activities of delatores under the early Principate and their skewed representation in our hostile and biased 
senatorial sources, is a worthwhile read in this regard. 
79 Tiberius and Germanicus: A. 2.26; 2.69 ff.; Claudius and Corbulo: A. 11.19-20; Nero and Corbulo (Agr. 5.3; H. 2.76.3; A. 14.58.2; 
Dio 63.17.1-5); Vespasian and Helvidius: H. 4.4-4.9; Suet., Ves. 15; Dio 66.12; Epictetus 4.1.123; Domitian and Agricola: Agr. 39-42.  
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13.47), Rubellius Plautus (A. 14.22), Memmius Regulus (A. 14.47.1), Torquatus Silanus (A. 15.35), 
Calpurnius Piso (A. 15.48), L. Silanus (A. 15.52.2-3; 16.7), L. Annaeus Seneca (A. 15.65; cf. 14.52), C. 
Cassius (A. 16.7), P. Ostorius Scapula (A. 16.15), and Thrasea Paetus (A. 16.22; cf. Agr. 2.1) as 
potential candidates for, or threats to, the purple on account of their qualities, position, or ancestry.80  
While it is difficult to estimate precisely how Domitian’s reign influenced Tacitus, on one view 
his experience under that emperor predisposed him both to view Julio-Claudian times in a more 
pessimistic light and to perceive broad similarities between Domitian and his predecessors.81 We 
recognize many of Domitian’s defining features – anger (iram, 42.3), hatred (odium, 39.3; odisse, 42.3), 
cruelty (saeuitum, 2.1; saeuitia, 3.2; saeuae cogitationis, 39.3), dissimulation (dissimulari, 39.3; dissimularet, 
43.3), silent scrutiny of people’s thoughts and expressions (45.2), and the storing up of anger only to 
fully express it later (39.3) – in the portraits of his predecessors, for whom Domitian, in many ways, 
served as a literary and conceptual model.82 Especially Tiberius resembles Domitian, mirroring his ira, 
odium, and, above all, his saeuitia and dissimulation.83 Since Tacitus wrote with the benefit of hindsight, 
																																																								
80 Note also the analogous beginnings of the reigns of Tiberius, Nero, and Vitellius, i.e. by the murder of potential rivals; Augustus’ 
alleged hatred of the primores ciuitatis (A. 1.8); Tiberius’ suspicions of Asinius Gallus (A. 1.12); Tiberius’ bestowal of pro-consular 
imperium on Germanicus while the latter served in Germany, but not on Drusus, who was in the capital (A. 1.14). Cf. the claims about 
imperial power at H. 1.21.1, H. 3.66.2-3, and A. 1.69. Mucianus’ position is complex. He possessed both ‘princely’ qualities and many 
vices (H. 1.10, 2.5). He is said to have chosen to make an emperor instead of aiming to become one (1.10, 2.77), but at the same time 
to have acted more as Vespasian’s colleague than his subordinate (2.83, 3.75, 4.4, 4.11, 4.39, 4.68). The details of his death (he was 
dead by 77: Plin., Nat. 33.62) are unknown. Sejanus’ position is similarly complex. Tacitus nowhere suggests that he possessed the 
qualities that would make him capax imperii, but he maneuvered his way to a very powerful position before being executed in 31. In the 
lost books of both historical works, there would have been others designated as worthy of the purple or as threats to it. Annius 
Vinicianus and L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus were candidates for the purple after Caligula’s death and initiated a revolt against 
Claudius in 42 (Dio 60.15.1-2; cf. Suet., Cl. 13.2; Tac., H. 1.89.2; A. 12.52.2; Plin., Ep. 3.16.7-9). Appius Silanus, governor of Spain 
with three legions during Claudius’ succession, was another potential candidate and was executed in 42 (Dio 60.14.2-15.1; Suet., Cl. 
29.1). M. Vinicius, another candidate for the purple, had earned Messalina’s suspicions and was destroyed in 46 (Dio 60.27.4). The lost 
portions on Nero’s reign likely covered the coniuratio Viniciana (Suet., Ner. 36.1; Tac., H. 4.42.1), initiated in 66-67 by Corbulo’s son-in-
law Vinicianus, as well as Corbulo’s eventual destruction (Dio 60.17.2, 5-6). As a final example we may think of the destruction, 
shortly after 95, of Flavius Clemens, who was Domitian’s cousin, and his two sons Vespasian and Domitian, who were designated as 
Domitian’s successors (Suet., Dom. 15.1; Dio 67.14.1-2). On those considered capax imperii in Tacitus, cf. Benario 1972, 14-26.  
81 Walker 1960, 204-20. It is significant that none of the extant historians who write about the early Principate – Velleius, Suetonius, 
and Dio – paints Julio-Claudian times quite as bleakly as Tacitus does. Cf. Giua 2014, 54 (elucidating Momigliano’s views). 
82 Note the ira of Caligula (Agr. 4.1), Galba (H. 1.65.1), Otho (1.21.1, cf. 1.45.2), Vitellius (2.91.3), Tiberius (A. 1.4.4, 1.12.4, 1.13.1, 1.69, 
2.57.3, 3.15.2, 3.22.2; 4.19.3, 4.21.1, 5.4.4, 6.50.3), Claudius (A. 11.26.2), and Nero: 14.49.2, 16.6.1 (iracundia); the odium of Vitellius (H. 
2.59.2, 2.64.1), Tiberius (A. 4.18.3; 4.29.2), Claudius (H. 1.10.1, A. 11.38.3) and Nero (A. 13.15.3, 15.52.3; 15.68.3; 16.5.2; 16.20.1); the 
saeuitia of Galba (H. 1.87.1), Otho (2.31.1), Vitellius (1.68.2, 2.73., 2.77.3), Tiberius (A. 1.4.3, 1.10.7, 1.53.3, 1.72.4, 1.74.2, 4.1.1, 6.6.2, 
cf. 6.19.3, 6.23.2, 6.51.3: intestabilis saeuitia, 16.29.2), of Claudius (13.43.2) and Nero (13.52.1, cf. 14.63.2, 15.44.5, cf. 15.50.3, 15.62.2, 
cf. 15.67.4, 16.10.2, 16.13.2, H. 4.8.2). Note also the analogy between the senate’s inertiae dulcedo under Domitianic oppression (Agr. 
3.1) and the dulcedo otii that gripped all Romans (cunctos) after Augustus solidified his power (A. 1.2.1.). 
83 Note the cross-references at Agr. 39.1 ~ A. 3.2.3; Agr. 39.3 ~ A. 2.82.4. Both reigns deteriorate toward the end; both emperors 
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it is only natural that he perceived and constructed broad analogies between different principes, 
especially given his view of human nature and the imperial system of government: an innate lust for 
supreme power, Tacitus judges, constitutes the common and consistent driving force behind human 
action (uetus ac iam pridem insita mortalibus potentiae cupido, H. 2.38.1; cf. a principio…reges… dictaturae… 
dominatio… principis imperium, A. 1.1.1; cupidine dominandi, A. 1.10.1; cupido dominandi cunctis adfectibus 
flagrantior est, A. 15.53.4).84 This instinctive drive for self-aggrandizement and power – present ever 
since Rome’s foundation (A. 1.1.1; cf. 3.26-28) – was fed, on the part of the emperors, by the system 
of government they headed, since it required them to be pre-eminent and to protect their position 
against rivals. On this view, human nature and the system of government combine to incline different 
emperors to conduct themselves along broadly similar patterns. To be sure, Tiberius is no Claudius 
and Nero no Vespasian, but all Tacitean emperors, to greater or lesser degrees, are hostile to the 
eminent, have a strained relationship with the senate, and display the sorts of tyrannical features 
ascribed to Domitian in the Agricola. The echo of subit… inertiae dulcedo (Agr. 3.1) at A. 1.2.1 (cunctos 
dulcedine otii pellexit) links Domitianic with Augustan oppression, framing the early Principate. Under a 
man like Vespasian, the Principate may be a tolerable institution, but even under such an emperor 
Romans faced systemic restrictions.85  
What would seem to follow from the apparent similarities between Domitian and his 
predecessors is that Tacitus saw the former as the latest product of a system of government that, by its 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
curtail freedom of expression (compare Domitian’s prosecution of the Stoics Rusticus and Senecio with that of the historian 
Cremutius Cordus by Tiberius); delatores have a wide scope under both emperors; both have a strained relationship with the senate; 
both display similar character traits. The broad similarities between these emperors seem to have been recognized: Suetonius writes 
that Domitian read nothing but the commentarii and acta of Tiberius (Dom. 20.1).  
84 The significance of a principio, instead of principio, at A. 1.1.1, has long been noted. See p. 284-85 and n. 686. 
85 Even Vespasian, the most positively portrayed of the Tacitean emperors, restricts freedom and exhibits oppressive traits. Note the 
restrictions felt by Frontinus (Agr. 17.2), the reports of financial oppression (H. 2.84), the way he deals with potential rivals (H. 3.66; 
4.11), the restriction on senatorial liberty at the start of his reign (H. 4.44), and the sentiments expressed by the senators Eprius 
Marcellus (H. 4.8) and Curtius Montanus (H. 4.42). Note also the significance of the dramatic date of the Dialogus (ca. AD 75), hinting 
at Helvidius Priscus’ destruction (Williams 1978, 34). Augustus, too, whose reign Tacitus did not narrate in detail, is portrayed as a 
despot displaying the violence and hypocrisy that typify Tiberius and Domitian (A. 1.1-10; cf. 3.56). At A. 1.9.1, Tacitus describes 
Augustus’ reign as lasting 56 years (from his first consulship in 43 BC, after the demise of Hirtius and Pansa, until his death; the RG, 
Suetonius (Aug. 8.3), and Aper (D. 17.2) offer similar computations), intimating that he aimed at supreme power from the start. On 
the continuity between Augustus’ violence and duplicity during the civil wars and his conduct as emperor, see Keitel 1984.  
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very nature, leads to oppressive rule. This is not to say that individual character does not matter – on 
the contrary, for Tacitus personality and character are important factors affecting people’s behavior. It 
is to say, rather, that the nature of the Principate is such that it generates patterns of behavior, 
relatively consistent over time, on the part of its principes, regardless of their individual character.86 
Tacitus’ conception of human nature and power may usefully be compared with that of Marcus 
Aurelius, who similarly perceived a continuity in the nature of supreme power: “reflect constantly on 
the fact that all such things as happen now also happened before, and on the fact that they will happen 
again. The whole dramas and the analogous scenes that you know from your own experience or from 
history, such as the whole court of Hadrian and that of Antoninus, of Philip, of Alexander, of Croesus: 
all these were similar, just the actors different” (Med. X.27).87 Such a conception of power and control 
helps to explain Tacitus’ simultaneous sense of hope and skepticism about Trajan in the prefaces of 
the Agricola and the Historiae. It also explains, as Tacitus says at A. 4.33.2-3 (cf. digna cognitu, 6.7.5), why 
recording events under earlier emperors (the programmatic statements there are expansive, not limited 
to their immediate context) may help Romans ‘read’ their own princeps.88 
Tacitus’ outlook is underlined by his concern, throughout his corpus, to link different 
emperors by stressing commonalities between their reigns. In the preface of the Historiae, Tacitus 
significantly links (or at least does not distinguish among) the reigns of Vespasian, Titus, and 
																																																								
86 Reflecting on the history of the early Principate, it would not have been difficult for Tacitus and his readers to recognize in 
Domitian features that had marked the personality and conduct of his predecessors, or vice versa. That there were broad similarities 
between the reigns of Tiberius and Domitian and between the latter and Nero was recognized (Suet., Dom. 20.1; Plin., Pan. 53.5). In 
the Agricola, Tacitus points up similarities between Caligula, Nero, and Domitian, and also connects Vespasian with Nero and 
Domitian (pp. 36-37). Cf. Syme 1958a, 517: “Tacitus was writing about the time of Tiberius, he recalled Domitian – and he was not 
oblivious of the present.” Cf. Clarke 2002, 84: “for Tacitus, as for many other Roman writers, Roman history was so predominantly a 
history of kings that it made little difference at what point one started the story.” 
87 Cf. Millar 1992, 3: “Marcus’ words reveal the consciousness of a real continuity; for, just as the memory of Alexander exercised an 
enduring influence on the military role of the emperor, so there persisted long-established conceptions of what a ‘king’ should be 
which did indeed help to transform a Roman princeps into a descendant of the Hellenistic kings.” 
88 See the lucid discussion in Sailor 2008, 259 ff. Cf. p. 256: “and if “Tiberius” can read like veiled criticism of Hadrian, he can equally 
well be the tyrant Hadrian is not, and so an instrument of praise for the current princeps.” Of course, Roman readers could read a text 
in whatever way they saw fit. But if we agree, as Sailor himself does elsewhere in his study, that oppression under the Principate was 
essentially institutional in nature, the utility of Tacitus’ work would seem to lie more in the implicit analogies between the rule of 
previous emperors and that of the sitting princeps than in implied differences. Cf. Clarke 2002, 98-99: “if one of Tacitus’s concerns is 
the static scenario of the Principate, this might support the idea of learning by example how to deal with an ongoing situation.” 
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Domitian, describing the subject matter of that work (the civil wars of 68-69 and the Flavian 
Principate) as one period “rich in disasters, dreadful in its wars, rent with sedition, ferocious even in 
peace” (opimum casibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace saeuum, H. 1.2.1). This notion is 
reinforced in the opening words of Book Four, which marks the transition from the war to the advent 
of Vespasian’ reign: “upon Vitellius’ death, it was not so much that peace had begun as that war had 
ceased” (interfecto Vitellio bellum magis desierat quam pax coeperat, 4.1.1). Moreover, pace saeuum at H. 1.2.1 is 
mirrored by saeuae pacis at H. 1.50.2, which commonly is taken to characterize the whole of the Julio-
Claudian Principate and so creates the impression of a continuous period of oppression from 
Augustus to Domitian. The homogenization of periods or dynasties is reinforced by connections 
among the reigns of individual emperors. A well-known example is the analogous start to the reigns of 
Tiberius and Nero, which both are initiated by the murder of a potential rival (A. 1.6.1, 13.1.1) and 
which in turn mirror the start of Vitellius’ reign (H. 2.64.1). Tacitus further links the Tiberian and 
Neronian Principate in two programmatic statements about the monotony of his narrative material – 
consisting, on his account, of unending death and disaster (A. 4.32-33, 16.16). The totality of these 
links contributes to the impression that the persistent oppression and restriction under the Julio-
Claudian and Flavian Principates was an institutional problem independent of the individual character 
of the emperors.89 
This outlook and technique are already fully at work in the Agricola, where Tacitus pairs Nero 
and Domitian through the similarly restrictive effects of their regimes on Agricola (5.3, 6.3-4, 40-42) 
and where he intimates that Vespasian’s rule restricted the true potential of another eminent senator, 
Frontinus (uir magnus, quantum licebat, 17.2). In fact, the mention of Helvidius Priscus, executed under 
Vespasian, and Priscus’ father-in-law Thrasea Paetus, destroyed under Nero, in the list of Domitian’s 
victims Rusticus and Senecio (Agr. 2.1), at once connects the three emperors in tyranny and type of 
																																																								
89 A conspicuous element of this impression is the activity of the delatores, depicted by Tacitus as a continuous menace posing the same 
threat as civil war. See Sailor 2008, 190-91; cf. Bablitz 2015. On Tacitus’ depiction of the delatores Rutledge 2001 is essential. 
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crime (against men and books), underscoring the recurrent oppression of the imperial system of 
government and calling into question the claim that Nerva had reconciled libertas and principatus. A. 
König points out the force of the impersonal verb licebat at Agr. 17.2, which “makes Frontinus the 
passive object of some external, institutional force, not (just) Vespasian personally.”90 Along the same 
lines, the fact that Tacitus conspicuously leaves Domitian unmentioned in a preface that emphasizes 
oppression and hostility to uirtus may, in addition to illustrating the enduring effects of Domitianic 
terror in the Trajanic present, hint at the fact that such oppression was not tied to specific principes but 
a systemic problem under the Principate.  
Tacitus sees imperial restrictions and the hostility that success may incur as having destructive 
effects on the functioning of Roman officials. His claim that “virtues are best appreciated in the age in 
which they thrive most easily” (adeo uirtutes isdem temporibus optime aestimantur, quibus facillime gignuntur, 
Agr. 1.3) also implies the inverse: virtues thrive most easily in the age in which they are best 
appreciated. The freedom to display merit is thus connected with its further production.91 This notion 
recurs in the Dialogus, the Historiae, and the Annales, where Tacitus connects the production of eloquentia 
and unbiased historiography with freedom of expression and opportunities to showcase talent (D. 1, 
27.3, 36-41; H. 1.1.1: pari eloquentia et libertate; A. 1.1.2: donec gliscente adulatione deterrerentur). In the Agricola, 
Tacitus characterizes the Republic as a time when there existed “a greater inclination and a more open 
path to the achievement of memorable deeds” (agere digna memoratu pronum magisque in aperto erat, 1.2), 
while the Principate suffers from ignorantia recti et inuidia (1.1), with the result that people are 
discouraged from pursuing fine deeds and prevented from realizing their full potential. Agricola’s 
moderation, the outstanding quality throughout the work, at once hints at the limits imposed on his 
talents and at what else he might have achieved. It is no coincidence that he conceived his ambition for 
																																																								
90 König 2013, 367 n. 34.  
91 The destructive effect of imperial power on Romans is mirrored by the impact of the Empire on subject peoples, as the maxim 
ascribed to the Caledonian chief Calgacus serves to show: “virtue and high spirit in subjects is unwelcome to those in power” (uirtus porro 
ac ferocia subiectorum ingrata imperantibus, Agr. 31.3). The Principate and the Empire are contrasted implicitly throughout the text (cf. n. 145).  
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military glory outside of Rome, away from the orbit of the sitting princeps (Agr. 5). Frontinus, Agricola’s 
predecessor as governor of Britain, is said to have been a great man “insofar as it was permitted” (uir 
magnus, quantum licebat, 17.2), while in the Annales Tacitus depicts the senator Memmius Regulus as 
“famous for his authority, integrity, and reputation, as far as this was possible in the shadow cast by 
imperial greatness” (auctoritate constantia fama, in quantum praeumbrante imperatoris fastigio datur, clarus, A. 
14.47.1). In the same vein, Germanicus might have overtaken in military glory even Alexander the 
Great, if Tiberius had not obstructed his ambitions (A. 2.73). The examples, spanning the Tacitean 
corpus and the whole of the early Principate, reinforce the impression of systemic restriction. 
Tacitus’ view that a lack of appreciation of uirtus negatively impacts public performance is not 
novel. Sallust saw his times as suffering from similar problems and likewise distinguishes his own age 
from a better past (as did Cicero in his studies of oratory). In the Early and Middle Republic, says 
Sallust, Romans enjoyed the freedom to display their talents (Cat. 7; cf. Agr. 1.1-2). This era was 
marked by great (military) achievement and so, like Tacitus, Sallust connects the public recognition of 
merit (uirtus) with its further production. In Sallust’s own day, however, when power is held by a few 
men (potentiae paucorum, Jug. 3.3), uirtus meets with such hostility that the historian questions the 
desirability of performing public office. Worse even, Sallust questions why Romans should produce 
any public good on the ground that “to struggle to no purpose and to gain nothing for one’s strenuous 
efforts but public hatred is the extreme of madness” (frustra autem niti neque aliud se fatigando nisi odium 
quaerere extremae dementiae est, Jug. 3.1). The analogies between the contexts described by both authors 
are plain and we can see how Tacitus could make Sallust’s analysis of late republican politics relevant 
to his own times. There is little doubt that Sallust’s view of the hostility of monarchs toward the 
eminent inspired Tacitus’ view of Domitian’s hostility toward Agricola.92 Sallust is a constant 
reference-point in the Agricola, as he would remain in the historical narratives.  
																																																								
92 Nam regibus boni quam mali suspectiores sunt semperque iis aliena uirtus formidulosa est (Cat. 7.1) ~ Id sibi maxime formidolosum, privati hominis 
nomen supra principem attolli... (Agr. 39.2). The intertext is well known and duly noted by all commentators.  
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The publication of a work that explicitly93 sets out to celebrate the uirtus of a senator, not the 
princeps, was one way to work against the restrictive aspects of the Principate and the distortions it 
promotes.94 This is another element shared by the Agricola and the historical narratives, in which the 
recording of people’s uirtutes continues to be one of Tacitus’ principal concerns.95 The disproportionate 
attention given to Agricola in the Agricola, in which the emperors virtually are written out of the 
narrative (the Germania and Dialogus have a similar non-imperial focus),96 prefigures Tacitus’ accounts 
of Germanicus and Corbulo, who, like Agricola, function as major foci away from the capital and the 
emperors. This technique was one way to bestow upon eminent commanders the prestige once 
accorded to them under the Republic, but now monopolized by the emperors, under whose auspices 
they executed military campaigns. Writing the emperors out of the narrative allowed Tacitus to play up 
the personal leadership of these senators and to create the impression that they were personally 
responsible for the major decisions during their tenures.97 This representation of gubernatorial and 
military success, which restored glory where it was due, will have been pleasing to his senatorial readers 
																																																								
93 Note the repetition of the word uirtus (four times in the first chapter alone) and the allusion in the opening words (clarorum uirorum 
facta moresque...) to Cato the Elder’s Origines: Martin 1981, 41. For possible allusions to Xen., Sym. 1.1: Woodman and Kraus 2014, 68.  
94 Syme 1974; Marincola 1999, 318-20; Kraus 2005, 199-200. On the arcana imperii and the monopoly on knowledge and information 
held by the emperors and their families, see H. 1.1 (with Sailor 2008, 121 ff.), A. 1.6.3, and Dio 53.19 (cf. Suerbaum 2015, 80-87). 
Tacitus’ focus in the Agricola stands in noticeable contrast with Suetonius’ imperial focus. In fact, in all three of Tacitus’ monographs 
the emperors are mostly absent, in contrast with his historical narratives: Devillers 2014a, 29. As König (2013, 371-74) shows, 
Frontinus, in his de Aquis Urbis Romae, achieves a similar focus on a senator’s excellence (himself). Pliny, too, in his Epistles, 
conspicuously celebrates contemporary exempla over those from the distant past: Whitton 2013, 9.  
95 Quod praecipuum munus annalium reor, ne uirtutes sileantur utque prauis dictis factisque ex posteritate et infamia metus sit (A. 3.65.1). See 
Woodman-Martin 1989 ad loc. on A. 3.65; cf. Sailor 2012, 41-42. I agree with most that Tacitus here refers to what he considers the 
main aim of annalistic history. Woodman 1995 [= 1998, 86-103] argues that Tacitus does not indicate a general rule, but refers to the 
narration of senatorial motions. The passage is complex. Cf. Turpin 2008, 361 ff. A. 3.65.1 ought to be read in conjunction with H. 1.3 
and A. 4.33.2-3. Tacitus’ first work does on a grand scale what individual passages do in the historical works: to preserve for posterity 
noble deeds and characters worth emulating and to dissuade ignoble conduct by recording negative examples. This aim of 
biographical and historical writing stands in close connection with the function of praise and blame in epideictic oratory. On the 
didactic function of Tacitus’ works, see also Reitzenstein 1926, 20; Streng 1970, 7-8; Griffin 2009, 174-75. 
96 With one exception (Agr. 17.2), the activity of Britain’s governors is described without mention of the emperors, creating the 
impression of a provincial system working independently from the center of power in Rome, an impression underlined by Britain’s 
actual physical separation from the mainland: Schwarte 1979, 162-63; Sailor 2008, 78-79; 2012, 78-80.  
97 While it is likely that Titus, who had little experience of Britain, and Domitian, who had none, left much to Agricola’s own 
judgment on the spot, he would (like any governor or proconsul) have set out for his province with formal instructions (mandata) from 
his princeps and communicated with him to report on his activity, to seek instructions, or to ask permission before undertaking major 
operations. So in his fifth season he refrained from invading Hibernia, a move he thought manageable and salutary (Agr. 24), 
presumably because his request to do so was denied. Tacitus’ account leaves it unclear how often Agricola corresponded with his 
princeps or what his precise instructions were. Like Agricola’s activity in Britain, Corbulo’s activity in the East is accorded great space, 
and the emphasis is not on the eastern policy of the Roman government, but on Corbulo’s personal initiative, on his (moral) qualities, 
and the power of his command. See Furneaux 1896, vol. II, 109, 114, 117-18, 123; Syme 1958a, 493 ff., 579; Campbell 1984, 352-53.  
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and offered obvious narrative advantages: just as the description of Agricola as an independent leader 
reinforced the contrast between him and Domitian, so the lengthy accounts of the campaigns of 
Germanicus and Corbulo, and their elaborate characterizations, serve as a foil to the character and 
record of Tiberius, and Claudius and Nero, respectively.98  
Above I showed how the imperial system of government, because it forces one man to be 
preeminent, engenders oppressive rule. An additional problem with having one man at the top of the 
power structure is that it makes him vulnerable to the influence and manipulation of those nearest 
him. Throughout his corpus, Tacitus is concerned with the degree to which emperors are influenced, 
for better or for worse, by their advisers, freedmen, and other intimates. That concern, too, is set out 
in the Agricola, where Tacitus stresses the malicious influence of Domitian’s intimates on his conduct 
and decision-making: his freedmen enjoy considerable influence and carry out public duties (40.2, 
41.4); they denounce Agricola to him (41); they urge him to select unsuitable officials over the 
seasoned Agricola when military disaster threatens the Empire’s security (41);99 they play a part in 
forcing Agricola to decline a governorship of Asia or Africa (42.1-2) and in engineering his death by 
poison (although this is only an unsubstantiated rumor: 43.2-3). Tacitus’ description of Domitian’s 
refusal to re-employ Agricola is particularly significant, as it points up a persistent problem in the 
imperial system of government: emperors who, out of a desire to preserve their position or through 
the influence of malicious advisors, appoint officials who pose no threat to themselves, but who are 
not the most suitable men for the job.100  
																																																								
98 For in-depth examinations of the characterization of Corbulo, on the one hand, and Claudius and Nero, on the other, see Geiser 
2007, 30-152 and Hausmann 2009, 223 ff.  
99 Domitian preferred men who were connected in various ways to the Flavian house and to himself personally. While Tettius Julianus 
and Funisulanus Vettonianus happened to hold their own and perform well, C. Oppius Sabinus and Cornelius Fuscus turned out to be 
unfortunate selections, losing their life and their legions against the Dacians (Suet., Dom 6.1; Dio 67.6.5; Jord., Get. 13.76-77; Oros., Hist. 
7.10.3 ff.; Eutrop., Brev. 7.23). Sabinus, as far as we know, did not have significant military experience before being appointed governor of 
Moesia, while Fuscus, though he had held important military and political positions (including that of Praetorian Prefect under Domitian) 
was no uir militaris of the caliber of an Agricola, Paulinus, or Corbulo. He was also a known risk-taker, “thriving on what was unknown 
and always looking for danger” (H. 2.86.3; cf. H. 3.4; cf. Juv. 4.111-2); his rashness proved his ruin in battle (Agr. 41.2).  
100 It sometimes is argued that Domitian did not re-employ Agricola because the latter was a “one province man,” not suitable for the 
challenges on the Danube frontier. This claim can be discounted, as it is incompatible with the way the Roman military system 
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 The influence of freedmen and intimates (including women) on the emperors remains a crucial 
concern for Tacitus in his historical narratives. In the Historiae, he stresses Galba’s ruin, despite his 
awareness of the dangers (1.15.4), at the hands of malicious and competitive advisors (1.13 ff., 1.32, 
1.39),101 points up the destructive influence on Otho of his freedmen and intimates (1.22, 1.26), and 
shows Vitellius to be “at the mercy of treacherous advice” (infidis consiliis obnoxius, 3.55.3), failing, at the 
crucial juncture in the war with the Flavians, to heed the advise of his most experienced centurions 
because his intimates kept them away from him (3.56). In the cases of these three emperors, bad 
advice invariably leads to disaster, in contrast with the Flavian party, whose success is based on 
prudent decision-making.102 In Tacitus’ analysis of the civil wars, the influence of intimates on the 
various combatants was a crucial factor in the way events played out. A generalizing maxim is placed in 
the mouth of Helvidius Priscus: “there is no better instrument for good government than good 
friends” (nullum maius boni imperii instrumentum quam bonos amicos esse, H. 4.7.3). After the Flavian victory, 
it was Priscus, too, who argued that the delegation to be sent to Vespasian ought to consist of senators 
selected on the basis of their character (not by ballot, as Eprius Marcellus advocated), as this would 
allow Vespasian to see whom he could trust and prevent him from exposure to malicious advisers (H. 
4.7.3; cf. prauis magistris, 2.84.2). A similar concern compelled the seasoned Mucianus to deny Domitian 
a command against the Gauls during the Batavian Revolt (4.68, 85-86). Mucianus feared that the 
young prince, if given access to an army, might be led by bad advisers (prauis impulsoribus, 4.68.3) to do 
something foolish and ruin everything (ne... paci belloque male consuleret, 4.68.3), either by compromising 
the situation in Gaul or by making war on his father and brother (4.68, 86). The extant portions of the 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
operated. Almost no men served in the same province on multiple occasions and few served even twice with the same army. Having 
limited or no experience in one province did not disqualify good generals from holding command in another, as the careers of 
Corbulo, Paulinus, Frontinus, and Cerialis illustrate (Benario 1979, 171). Tacitus’ claim that imperial jealousy was the cause of 
Agricola’s lack of re-employment should not simply be dismissed as malicious. Tiberius, too, is suspected of having passed over the 
best candidates to protect his own position (A. 1.80; but cf. A. 4.6.2). 
101 Keitel 1991, 2790-94; 2006, 224 ff.; Damon 2003, 166 for further discussion. Keitel 2006, 224-235 shows that Tacitus is more 
concerned than Plutarch with the destructive role played by Galba’s advisors Vinius, Icelus, and Laco.  
102 Keitel 1991, 2790 ff.  
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Historiae contain few examples of powerful and destructive women. The outstanding example is Lucius 
Vitellius’ wife Triaria (H. 2.63-64, 3.77.3), whose destructive influence is contrasted negatively with the 
modesty and high character of Galeria, wife of Aulus Vitellius (the princeps), and Sextilia, mother of the 
two Vitellii (2.64.2; 3.67.1). 
The most prominent examples in the Annales are the malicious influence of Livia and Sejanus 
on Tiberius, that of Messalina, Agrippina the Younger, Narcissus, and Pallas on Claudius, and that of 
Agrippina, Poppaea Sabina, Capito, and Tigellinus on Nero.103 Freedmen like Helico, notorious under 
Caligula (Philo, Leg. 168-83, 203-4), likely received similar treatment in the lost books. Much of the 
action in Tacitus’ account of the Julio-Claudian Principate is driven by the influence and machinations 
of those close to the princeps, whether freedmen, informers, slaves, women, or other intimates. An apt 
example is offered by a passage that has plain affinity with the situation described at Agr. 41. At A. 
13.6 Tacitus describes the Roman response to an alleged Parthian invasion of Armenia under a young 
Nero. Both passages are concerned with the influence on the princeps of his close advisors and with the 
question of whether the former, in the face of a serious military threat, would appoint a distinguished 
commander, or whether jealousy and the influence of advisers would make him appoint a less suitable 
candidate: “the emperor would give clear proof of whether he was advised by good friends or 
otherwise, if, having put aside all jealousy, he were to select a distinguished general, rather than, out of 
canvassing, a rich man backed by favor” (daturum plane documentum, honestis an secus amicis uteretur, si ducem 
amota inuidia egregium quam si pecuniosum et gratia subnixum per ambitum deligeret, A. 13.6.4). The passage 
relates the same issue raised at Agr. 41. In both cases, Tacitus suggests that jealousy may urge the 
princeps to pass over a renowned candidate and that the ruinous influence of advisors may produce a 
man of dubious qualifications. Unlike Domitian’s passing over Agricola, however, Nero appoints the 
																																																								
103 Note also the way that Agrippina the Elder and Plancina curry favor with the legions in their husbands’ province: A. 1.69.4, 2.55.6. 




seasoned Corbulo, the prudence of which decision Tacitus praises explicitly.104  
Finally, in addition to the selection of unsuitable officials, the restrictive nature of the 
Principate is shown to have two distinct, but equally destructive, effects on Roman military 
performance. In the Agricola, Tacitus reveals his distaste for the hackneyed nature of military 
distinctions. There is a clear sense that the triumphalia ornamenta were distributed so readily (“whatever 
else is granted instead of a triumph”: quidquid pro triumpho datur, 40.1) as to signify no true honor, a 
sentiment that recurs in the Annales, where Tacitus writes disapprovingly that these decorations were 
conferred even for nonmilitary reasons.105 As we have seen, in both the Agricola and the historical 
works Tacitus works against this practice by restoring to generals the glory they had earned and 
rectifying the distortion of military achievement perpetrated by the emperors. Moreover, in both the 
Agricola and the Annales Tacitus is concerned to point out the negative effects of the triviality of the 
triumphalia ornamenta, pointing out that it made some governors, unwilling to expend energy or to risk 
their life for minimal glory, indifferent to military action. For example, he criticizes A. Didius Gallus, 
governor of Britain, for attempting to gain credit for conquest while merely consolidating his 
predecessors’ gains and advancing a few positions (Agr. 14.2). In the Annales, Tacitus, recalling this 
scene, further criticizes that same governor for being content to leave action to his subordinates and 
himself to sit back (A. 12.40.4, 14.29.1). Elsewhere, he writes that under Nero conquest on the Rhine 
stalled “due to the inclination of our commanders, who, since the triumphal insignia had become 
commonplace, were expecting greater honor from prolonging peace” (ingenio ducum, qui peruulgatis 
triumphi insignibus maius ex eo decus sperabant, si pacem continuauissent, A. 13.53.1; cf. socordia ducum, H. 
3.46.1). More critical for the Empire’s security was the conduct of men like Furius Camillus, L.  
Apronius, and Junius Blaesus, who unnecessarily prolonged the war against Tacfarinas because they 
																																																								
104 Locus uirtutibus patefactus, A. 13.8.1; cf. Agr. 8.2, 31.3. Note also Nero’s appointment of men of proven competence elsewhere: A. 13.29. 
105 See Campbell 1984, 359-61 on the triumphalia ornamenta. On the prodigality with which Claudius and Nero are said to have 
distributed these: A. 11.20, 13.53; cf. Suet., Cl. 24.3, Ner. 15.2; Dio 60.23.2. Tiberius is said to have awarded triumphalia to informers 
(Dio 58.4.8). On Tiberius and the triumphalia: A. 4.23. Nero rewarded Petronius Turpilianus, the later emperor Nerva, and Ofonius 
Tigellinus with triumphalia for their participation in killing the victims of the Pisonian Conspiracy: A. 15.72.  
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did only the bare minimum to earn the triumphalia before leaving the Numidian in peace and allowing 
him to recover (4.23). These cases, occurring in the reigns of Tiberius, Claudius, Nero, and Domitian, 
point to a systemic problem that obstructs expansion and imperils frontier security.   
Other passages suggest that some senators did appreciate the triumphalia and were eager to 
undertake campaigns to win military glory: so Suetonius Paulinus’ motivation for attacking Mona (A. 
14.29.2; Agr. 14.3). Desire for glory, however, frequently engendered rivalry (aemulatio/discordia) 
between Roman officials, who as a result struggled more against one other than against the enemy.106 
In the historical narratives, Tacitus offers many examples of foreign incursions facilitated by rivalry 
between Roman officials in the provinces.107  
To sum up, the imperial system of government, as Tacitus describes it, by its very nature poses 
challenges to both princeps and senatorial class. To the former, because the system of government he 
superintends pushes him, despite his character and intentions, to oppressive and restrictive rule; to the 
latter, because the system discourages outstanding achievement and engenders destructive rivalry. 
Consequently, Roman socio-political life demanded constant negotiation between ruler and ruled: for 
the princeps between preserving his position, on the one hand, and avoiding oppression and subsequent 
alienation of the senatorial class, on the other; for a senator between carrying out one’s duties 
honorably, on the one hand, and avoiding the emperor’s hostility and the enmity of colleagues, on the 
other. All this raises the principal question underlying the Agricola: given the problems inherent in the 
institution of the Principate, how can a senator flourish in imperial Rome? The answer, as it emerges in 
the Agricola and the historical works, lies in adopting an attitude that manages to steer clear of the 
above problems, allowing one to perform honorable deeds while avoiding conflict with the emperor 
																																																								
106 The organization of Rome’s government (in both the Republic and the Principate), in which too many candidates continuously 
competed for too few positions, was such that it readily fuelled rivalry between Romans at every stage of their career. Note Tacitus’ 
claim that “it is difficult for power and concord to coexist” (arduum sit eodem loci potentiam et concordiam esse, A. 4.4.1). Cf. A. 2.36.  
107 The civil wars of 69 encourage an incursion by the Rhoxolani (H. 1.79), unrest in Britain and Dacia (3.45-46), and the Batavian 
revolt (4.12 et passim). Note other examples at H. 4.54; A. 1.36, 12.49, 13.9. 
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and other officials.108 In the following sections, I explore how Tacitus, in narrating Agricola’s career, 
formulates this mode of life. I examine both the challenges faced by a senator progressing through his 
career and the conduct and choices that Tacitus ascribes to Agricola at every stage. I begin with the 
chapters on Agricola’s youth and first military experience, arguing that, despite their short span, these 
chapters enunciate Tacitus’ enduring concern with the importance of education and mentorship in the 
development of young Romans. For Tacitus, upbringing and early experiences are crucial factors in the 
formation of adult character and form the foundation for a public career.  
 
II.3  Mentorship: Laying the Foundation for a Public Career 
Simply put, one learns to become a good Roman, in the first instance, from other good 
Romans. Sallust began his two monographs by claiming that it is not nature or fate that determines a 
man’s character but his education, environment, early experiences, and mental cultivation (Cat. 2.8, 5; 
Jug. 1). Like Sallust and other Roman authors,109 Tacitus sees parentage, early upbringing, and 
education as crucial factors in the development of young Romans, and in his historical works he often 
points to childhood as a factor in explaining adult character.110 After the preface, the Agricola opens 
with two short chapters on Agricola’s upbringing and first military experience, illustrating the impact 
on his life of two early mentors: his mother Procilla and his governor Suetonius Paulinus. Tacitus 
																																																								
108 This mode of life constitutes a ‘middle course’ between two extremes which Tacitus frequently denounces: many senators, in the 
face of imperial oppression, adopt a ‘servile’ attitude in collusion with the regime or choose the opposite course of open resistance – 
neither of which, Tacitus claims, does much good for the state. The mode of life exemplified by Agricola allows one to work within the 
system and benefit the state at large. Comments on the servile attitude of senators are ubiquitous in Tacitus: H. 1.35, 1.85, 1.90, 2.17, 
2.71, 2.87, 2.90, 2.101, 3.37, 3.44, 3.56, 3.64, 3.67, 3.74, 4.4, 4.8, 4.40, 4.49, 4.81; A. 1.7.1, 1.12.1, 2.12, 3.47, 3.57, 3.65, 3.66, 3.69, 4.17, 
6.8, 6.13, 6.20, 11.25, 13.8, 13.41, 14.10, 14.12, 14.49, 14.56, 15.61, 16.2, 16.11, 16.19, 16.24; cf. D. 13.4. For Tacitus’ view of the 
behavior of public dissidents, esp. the Stoic philosophers, note Agr. 42.4. See Martin 1981, 47; Sailor 2008, 10 ff.; 2012, 26-27. 
109 Tacitus’ contemporary Quintilian perhaps offers the best evidence for Roman notions of character. Discussing the factors he 
considers relevant to determining a man’s character or actions, he points to family and genus, nationality, education and training, and 
station in life, in addition to natural disposition (Inst. 5.10.23-27). Similar categories are found in Cicero (Inv. 2.29-30; Part. Or. 35) and in 
the rhetorical treatise Ad Herrenium (3.7 ff.). Cf. Hor., S. 1.6.65-92. Cf. Levene 2010, 175 ff. On ancient notions of character, the work of 
Gill is essential (1983; 1986; 1990). For Tacitus’ understanding of character(-development): Gill 1983.  
110 See H. 1.13.3 on Otho’s childhood as explaining his proclivity toward destructive luxuria; H. 1.66.2 on Valens’ inability to handle 
sudden riches because of a youth spent in poverty; H. 1.72.1 on the foeda pueritia of Ofonius Tigellinus; A. 1.4.4-5, 6.51.1 on Tiberius’ 
difficult early years in the imperial household; A. 4.1.2 on Sejanus’ youth, in which he is said to have prostituted himself to the 
disreputable M. Apicius; A. 4.13.3 on the youth of one C. Gracchus, who shared his father’s exile; A. 6.20.1, 6.48.2 on Caligula’s 
depraved childhood and corrupted character; A. 13.2 on Burrus and Seneca restraining a young Nero and shielding him from his 
mother’s ferocia; A. 15.34.2 on the disreputable P. Vatinius having grown up in a shoemaker’s shop. 
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stresses three points about Agricola’s upbringing: the fact that he grew up in the moderate 
environment of southern Gaul; the important role of his mother in his upbringing; and the fact that, 
unlike the Stoic Martyrs, Agricola’s love for philosophy left him with a sense of moderation. 
Tacitus depicts Agricola’s father as a virtuous man devoted to oratory and philosophy (4.1). 
The man’s virtues were the cause of an untimely death under Caligula, who destroyed him because he 
had refused to prosecute a certain M. Silanus.111 Agricola’s upbringing thus became the sole 
responsibility of his mother Procilla, whom Tacitus describes as a woman of “exceptional chastity” 
(4.1). She nurtured Agricola’s “good nature” and “upright disposition” by raising him in her own 
home and by sheltering him from “other people’s vices” (peccantium, 4.2-3). Tacitus’ concern with 
childhood and education is not an idle one, for in the Germania (G. 20.1) and the Dialogus (D. 28-9) he 
reaffirms education by the mother in the household as the proper way for young Romans to be raised, 
as opposed to the recent practice of entrusting them to the care of servants, who instill in them not 
“uprightness and modesty” but “impudence” and “disregard for themselves and others” (D. 29.2).112 It 
was his mother, Agricola himself had told Tacitus, who kept his love for philosophy within bounds 
when he risked being carried into extreme thoughts. Soon good judgment (ratio) and experience (aetas) 
mitigated his desire and he “retained what was most difficult to retain from philosophy: a sense of 
moderation” (modum). We are reminded at once of the Stoic Martyrs of the preface (2.1), who were 
destroyed precisely for such extremism and whom the young Agricola may well have desired to 
emulate.113 Tacitus locates the origins of Agricola’s defining qualities in his early upbringing in southern 
Gaul, where his natural disposition was nourished by proper guidance and education. Allusions to 
Catiline’s youth, which Sallust says was corrupted in Sullan Rome, and to Jugurtha and Marius, who 
																																																								
111 Agr. 4.1; Suet., Cal. 23.3; Sen., Ep. 29.6; Ben. 2.21.5; Dio 59.8.4-7. 
112 Note the intertext between the following passages in the Agricola and the Dialogus: in huius sinu indulgentiaque educatus, Agr. 4.2 ~ sed 
gremio ac sinu matris educabatur, D. 28.4, with Gudeman 1914 ad loc. and Mayer 2001 ad loc. D. 28.5 praises Cornelia, mother of the 
Gracchi, Caesar’s mother Aurelia, and Augustus’ mother Atia for raising their sons in a similar way as Procilla. The Gracchi, Caesar, 
and Augustus, like Agricola, lost their father at a young age. Note Sailor 2014, 101-13 on the way Tacitus’ treatment of youth in the 
Agricola and the Dialogus reflects the development of his own career. 
113 Sailor 2008, 113. 
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like Agricola grew up outside of Rome, underline the point and allow Tacitus to contrast 
contemporary Rome with the simplicity and integrity of provincial life.114 That distinction remains 
prominent throughout the corpus.115  
 The chapter on Agricola’s youth prefigures Tacitus’ interest in domestic life and the role of 
mothers in the reigns of the Julio-Claudian emperors.116 The destructive influence of Livia on Tiberius 
and that of Agrippina the Younger on Nero at once come to mind.117 Chaste mothers receive special 
mention, as do cases in which people other than the parents teach their pupils the wrong way of doing 
things.118 It should be noted here that Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, and Domitian all endured 
difficult childhoods, most growing up without reliable parental support.119 The first steps of a young 
Roman on the way to a public career were in the home, where the environment in which one grows 
up, the people one has around, the education one enjoys, and the experiences one has are crucial in the 
formation of one’s character and moral fiber.120 While men like Catiline, Otho, Tigellinus, and several 
of the emperors suffered troubled childhoods that left stains on their adult character, in his youth 
Agricola developed the disposition and the qualities that stand at the base of his future success.  
																																																								
114 Cf. Cogitore 2014, 150: “Agricola symbolise une époque et un lieu... qui surpasse Rome en vertus.” For the allusions: Guerrini 
1977, 481-84. On Catiline’s youth and career: Syme 1964, 65-66. Allusions to Sallust are ubiquitous in both the Agricola and the 
historical narratives: cf. Sailor 2004, 162; Pagán 2014, 78-79.  
115 The distinction underlies much of the Germania, which variously contrasts contemporary Rome with the physical and moral purity 
of the unconquered Germani. Note also D. 28.1-3, A. 3.55.3-5, 13.54.3, 15.30, 15.44.3, 16.5.1. 
116 On women in imperial Rome, see Milnor 2012, 458-75.  
117 Aside from the many comments on the excessive influence of Livia and Agrippina, Tacitus identifies their deaths as major turning 
points in the reigns of Tiberius (A. 5.3.1) and Nero (A. 14.13-14). Their response to their mothers’ death should be contrasted with 
Agricola’s levelheaded response to the death of his mother Procilla (Agr. 7.2) and that of his second son (Agr. 29.1; his first son had 
died young, too: 6.2). Tacitus’ tendency to identify the deaths of important individuals as turning points in imperial regimes is revealed 
at Agr. 44.5. Note, too, the alleged effect of Drusus’ death on Tiberius (A. 4.7). 
118 For the first point, note Vitellius’ mother Sextilia (H. 2.64.2) with Ash 2007a ad loc. For the second point, note Calvia Crispinilla, 
whom Tacitus describes as magistra libidinum Neronis (H. 1.73.1). Also note Tacitus’ comments on the influence of Lepida and 
Agrippina the Younger on a young Nero (A. 12.64). Livia, according to Tacitus, was a mater impotens (A. 5.1.3). 
119 Tiberius spent much of his infancy and youth in flight with his parents (to Naples, Sicily, and Achaea) and then lived in the 
imperial household vying with rivals (A. 6.51.1; Suet., Tib. 6). A young Caligula lived with his mother, Agrippina the Elder, until her 
exile, then with his great-grandmother Livia until her death, then with his grandmother Antonia until, at age nineteen, he was called to 
Capri by Tiberius, who there inculcated him with his vices (A. 6.20.1, 6.45.3, 6.48.2; Suet., Cal. 10). Claudius lacked parental support, 
losing his father when still an infant and being abused and neglected by his mother Antonia, his grandmother Octavia, and his sister 
Livilla (Suet., Cl. 2-3; Dio 60.2). Nero lost his father at age three and soon thereafter Caligula exiled his mother. He was brought up by 
his aunt Lepida almost in actual want, under two tutors, a dancer, and a barber (Suet., Ner. 6.3). Vitellius spent his boyhood and early 
youth on Capri with Tiberius (Suet., Vit. 3.2). A young Domitian lost his mother and, with Vespasian and Titus often away on military 
service, grew up in virtual solitude (Waters 1964, 52-53; Jones 2002, 13-14).  
120 At D. 28.3 ff. Messalla argues that poor upbringing and education lead to an accumulation of vices at every stage of life. The 
Dialogus, of course, relates an important moment in the youth of Tacitus himself: Sailor 2014, 101-13.  
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A second important mentor for the young Agricola was Suetonius Paulinus, under whom he 
served as military tribune in the province of Britain. Like the short chapter on his early years, this 
chapter is inconspicuous, yet it is crucial, as it explains the principal motivation behind Agricola’s 
career and the origin of some of his outstanding qualities. The chapter emphasizes two main points: 
the experience and the skills that Agricola gained during these years and the fact that his governor’s 
suppression of the Boudiccan revolt instilled in him a desire for military glory (cupido militaris gloriae, 
5.3). Tacitus starts by writing that Paulinus, “a painstaking and moderate commander” (diligenti ac 
moderato duci, 5.1) and so a suitable mentor for the moderate Agricola (modum, 4.3), rewarded the latter’s 
efforts and personally promoted him to his own headquarters.121 In contrast with many young 
Romans, who, Tacitus complains, waste their military tribunate, Agricola used these years to 
“familiarize himself with the province” (noscere prouinciam, 5.1), to “become known to the army” (nosci 
exercitui, 5.1), and to “learn from experienced men and follow the best” (discere a peritis, sequi optimos, 
5.1).122 Tacitus does not elaborate on these points, but we know that these were formative years for 
Agricola. The knowledge of Britain he gained (noscere prouinciam), and to which he would add during his 
legionary legateship there, forms the basis for his future success as governor of the province.123 The 
rapport he established with the legions (nosci exercitui) may well be the reason why in AD 70 the 
prospect of his arrival as legionary legate restored to discipline the mutinous legio XX (Agr. 7.3), which 
was stationed in Britain during his military tribunate and had participated in the suppression of the 
Boudiccan revolt (A. 14.34.1). Such loyalty of a legion to a former officer recurs in the Historiae, where 
Tacitus recounts that during the civil wars the legions stationed in Britain, in which were many 
centurions and soldiers promoted by Vitellius, declared for Vespasian on the initiative of Legio II 
																																																								
121 Agricola’s promotion under Paulinus recalls P. Scipio Cornelius Aemilianus’ endorsement of a young C. Marius, who, as military 
tribune, had impressed him at Numantia (Sal., Jug. 63.3). Cf. Pagán 2014, 78-79 on the allusion. 
122 Cf. Lewin 2005, 131: “l’impegno personale rimaneva però un elemento decisivo.” 
123 Richmond 1944, 35; Streng 1970, 11 ff. One of the advantages of serving as military tribune, legionary legate, and governor in 
Britain is that Agricola came to know the province and the legions very well. 
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Augusta, which remembered the merit of its former commander (H. 3.44).124 Drusus Caesar’s military 
tribunate in Illyricum (A. 2.44.1) likewise was aimed in part at procuring the affection of the army (cf. 
Titus’ military tribunates in Germania and Britain: Suet., Tit. 4.1). Finally, the connections Agricola 
established with Paulinus, Petilius Cerialis (legate of the Ninth Legion), and a young Titus (possibly his 
fellow military tribune during these years) will have served him in good stead in the early stages of his 
career.125  
The events of these years, that is the attack against the island of Mona and the subsequent 
Boudiccan revolt, were crucial and provided Agricola with unparalleled experience: “never indeed had 
Britain been more excited or in a more critical condition. Veteran soldiers had been massacred, 
colonies burnt, armies cut off” (non sane alias exercitatior magisque in ambiguo Britannia fuit: trucidati ueterani, 
incensae coloniae, intercepti exercitus, 5.2). Under Paulinus’ leadership, says Tacitus, the province was 
recovered and, while the governor received immense glory for his victory over the rebels, Agricola 
gained essential experience and conceived a desire for military glory (5.3). Further allusions to Sallust 
and perhaps to Alexander the Great serve to underline the importance of this motivation.126 Tacitus 
ends the chapter by saying that such ambition was “unwelcome in an age in which a good reputation 
was as perilous as a bad one” (ingrata temporibus quibus sinistra erga eminentis interpretatio nec minus periculum 
ex magna fama quam ex mala, 5.3), a claim that recalls the sentiments of the preface and that refers to 
Corbulo’s fate under Nero and foreshadows Agricola’s under Domitian (39-41). D. Sailor elucidates 
the significance of these words, in that the Principate, because it is hostile to success, potentially 
																																																								
124 Cf. Wellesley 1972 ad loc.  
125 All enjoyed influence with Vespasian, who appointed Agricola as legionary legate and then as governor in Britain. Paulinus’ 
influence with the Flavians is difficult to estimate: after 69 he disappears from the record. On Paulinus: Birley 1981, 54 ff.; PIR2 S 694. 
Paulinus was not the father of the imperial biographer, as recently has been stated (Villalba Varneda 2011, 322). Cerialis was closely 
related to Vespasian (H. 3.59.2, Dio 64.18.1). Townend (1961, 59) suggests that he was Vespasian’s son-in-law, but the evidence is 
inconclusive (cf. Syme 1958a, 595; Birley 1981, 67). On Titus’ military tribunate in Britain: Birley 1975, 140. Cerialis, under whom 
Agricola served as legionary legate, may well have recommended Agricola to Vespasian for his service in Britain. Titus, upon 
becoming emperor, extended Agricola’s governorship, even though the latter already had spent three seasons there and could have 
expected a recall. On the workings of personal patronage in Rome: Pflaum 1950, 198 ff.; Millar 1967; Saller 1982; cf. Lendon 1997 on 
reciprocity of honor in the army, esp. 237-266; cf. Potter 2006, 17-19.  
126 tanta cupido gloriae, Cat. 7.3; gloriae maximum certamen, Cat. 7.6; adpetens gloriae militaris, Jug. 7.1; tantummodo gloriae auidus, Jug. 63.2. 
Borszák 1982, 39 on the reference to Alexander. On the significance of the allusions to Sallust: Lausberg 1980, 422 n.21. 
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discourages young Romans from pursuing a military career.127 Clearly we are led to believe that 
Paulinus’ example trumped such deterrents and fuelled Agricola’s ambition. Tacitus’ focus is squarely 
on demonstrating Paulinus’ positive influence on the young military tribune.  
Chapters 14-16 of the Agricola offer further information about the revolt that sheds light on its 
causes and on what Agricola would have learned about governing a province. Here we are told that 
Paulinus, by attacking Mona, had left his rear exposed and so facilitated the revolt on the mainland 
(14.3).128 One of its principal causes is said to have been the misconduct of Paulinus’ procurator Catus 
Decianus (15.2), another significant indicator of Tacitus’ outlook, for throughout his corpus the 
senator holds equestrian officials responsible (not always justly) for provincial mismanagement. Tacitus 
next tells us that the rebels gained momentum, attacking Roman garrisons, storming forts, and 
bursting into the headquarters, until Paulinus, in a single engagement, brought the province back to 
obedience (16.2). Finally, in the aftermath of the revolt, Paulinus’ cruel and aggressive policy towards 
the rebels (adroganter in deditos et ut suae cuiusque iniuriae ultor durius consuleret, 16.2) made them continue 
their resistance, until Petronius Turpilianus was sent to replace him (16.3). Intimidation and the 
infliction of harsh punishment on rebels were hallmarks of the Roman military system (as we shall see 
in the second chapter), aimed at cowing enemies into obedience and preventing unrest and 
unnecessary cost. But such methods are salutary only if they succeed in preventing further unrest (as 
Agricola’s methods did: Agr. 38.2-4). Paulinus’ response was excessive (durius) and engendered further 
resistance, hence receiving Tacitus’ disapproval.129  
The expanded account in the Annales is in many ways similar to that in the Agricola. In both 
cases, the revolt breaks out during Paulinus’ attack against Mona (Agr. 14.3; A. 14.29-30.1). In both 
cases (though presented with very different degrees of detail), Roman oppression, greed, and abuse 
																																																								
127 Sailor 2008, 75; 2012, 28. 
128 Cf. Gambash 2015, 65 ff. 
129 Cf. Gambash 2015, 78 ff.  
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spark the revolt (Agr. 15; A. 14.35) and the misconduct of the procurator Decianus is identified as a 
principal cause (Agr. 15.2; A. 14.32.2-3). In both accounts, Paulinus hurries to the seat of action and 
wins a glorious battle (Agr. 16.2; A. 14.37.2), only to be replaced due to his reported arrogance and 
cruelty in the aftermath (Agr. 16.3; A. 14.38). However, there are some notable differences as well. In 
the Annales, Tacitus, apparently not entirely fairly, places even greater emphasis on the misconduct of 
Paulinus’ procurators, stressing that the quarrelsome behavior of Decianus’ replacement Classicianus 
(Suetonio discors, A. 14.38.3) largely was responsible for the continued British resistance and, ultimately, 
the governor’s recall (A. 14.38-39).130 Likewise, Tacitus, decoding in greater detail the preparation and 
execution of the response to the revolt, stresses that it was Decianus’ decision-making that initiated a 
chain of military disasters. The procurator, with Paulinus far away during the outbreak of the revolt, 
refused to send sufficient troops to relieve Camulodunum (14.32.2), forcing Cerialis to rush there only 
to be routed (14.32.3) and causing Paulinus to face the rebels with a legion short (14.33.1). In the 
Annales, moreover, Tacitus records the casualties during these events, information he refers to only 
implicitly in the Agricola: Legio IX was annihilated, Londinum and Verulamium destroyed, and nearly 
70,000 allies and citizens killed (A. 14.33.2). In both the Agricola and the Annales, then, admiration for 
Paulinus’ military achievements is mixed with criticism of his post-revolt policies and, with notable 
emphasis, of the conduct of his procurators. As is evident from the remainder of the Agricola, these 
events made an impact on the young Agricola, making him acutely aware of the importance of 
securing one’s rear before moving forward. Furthermore, seeing Paulinus’ arrogance and severity 
negate the fruits of victory and seeing quarrelsome procurators engender continued unrest and, 
ultimately, the governor’s recall, taught Agricola a keen lesson about consolidating success and 
																																																								
130 According to Tacitus, Classicianus had spread rumors among local tribes about Paulinus’ cruelty and urged them to continue 
resisting until a more moderate governor would replace him (A. 14.38.3). In addition, the procurator sent a rapport to Rome making 
allegations against Paulinus and claiming that no cessation of fighting should be expected unless the governor be replaced (A. 
14.38.3). Tacitus stresses that the discord between the two men interfered with the public interest: bonum publicum priuatis simultatibus 
impediebat (14.38.3). It is significant, as Gambash (2012, 4-5; 2015, 78 ff.) notes, that Tacitus does not refute Classicianus’ allegations. 
On the merits of having the latter, a man of Gallic origins and hence possibly regarded as sympathetic by local British populations, 
replace Decianus in the aftermath of the revolt, see Gambash 2012, 4-5; 2015, 109-10, 114 ff.; cf. de la Bédoyère 2015, 42-46. 
	
	 52 
cooperating with other officials, as becomes clear later in the text. Despite his faults, Paulinus’ example 
fuelled Agricola’s military ambition, and his promotion of the young military tribune afforded the latter 
essential experiences that shaped his defining qualities and skills.131 
 Tacitus similarly is concerned to demonstrate the positive influence of Cerialis’ leadership 
during Agricola’s legionary legateship:  
 
Habuerunt uirtutes spatium exemplorum, sed primo Cerialis labores modo et discrimina, mox et gloriam communicabat: 
saepe parti exercitus in experimentum, aliquando maioribus copiis ex euentu praefecit. nec Agricola umquam in suam 
famam gestis exultauit; ad auctorem ac ducem ut minister fortunam referebat. ita uirtute in obsequendo, uerecundia in 
praedicando extra inuidiam nec extra gloriam erat. (Agr. 8.2) 
 
Agricola’s merits now had room for display. At first Cerialis let him share only toils and dangers, soon 
also gloria: often he put him at the head of a part of the army to test him and sometimes, based on the 
outcome, of larger forces. Never did Agricola boast of his exploits to enhance his fame; he always 
referred his success, as a subordinate ought to, to his director and general. So, by his virtue in obeying 
orders and by his modesty in reporting success, he escaped jealousy without losing gloria.  
 
 
Like Paulinus, Cerialis is described as promoting and encouraging Agricola, allowing him to gain honor 
and accumulate experience.132 What Tacitus shows both governors have in common is that they 
recognize and reward the merit of their subordinate officers. Their influence on Agricola emerges later 
in the text: as governor of Britain, Agricola likewise would pursue a forward military policy to achieve 
military renown and would circulate gloria fairly among his subordinates: “he never greedily 
appropriated the achievements of others” (nec Agricola umquam per alios gesta auidus intercepit, 22.4). 
Tacitus characterizes Paulinus and Cerialis as key mentors to the young Agricola, positively influencing 
his development from a young man into a competent Roman official. 
Tacitus’ emphasis on the proper circulation of gloria under Paulinus, Cerialis, and Agricola 
serves to contrast the nature of their administration in Britain with that of Domitian in Rome. While 
the princeps is depicted as hostile to and suspicious of other people’s merit, the governors in Britain 
																																																								
131 Agricola’s development under Paulinus and Cerialis reflects Rome’s military apparatus functioning ideally, with young Romans 
emulating their commanders and seeking glory by similarly pursuing a forward military policy. If the system works well, these new 
generals in turn inspire the next batch of young Romans, thus creating a continuous supply of experienced commanders who expand 
the Empire in successful campaigns: Sailor 2008, 74-75.  
132 See Sailor 2008, 76-77 (following Lendon 1997) on the reciprocity of honor between Cerialis and Agricola.  
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maintain a fair circulation of glory that motivates their subordinates.133 It is no accident that in Pliny’s 
Panegyricus Trajan, too, is praised for letting the virtues of others shine again (Pan. 18-20, 44). By 
blackening Domitian’s regime, and thus showing how things should not be done, and by setting it in 
contrast with positive examples that reinforce the right way of doing things, Tacitus promotes the 
proper conduct expected of a senator, governor, or emperor, while at the same time endorsing the 
values of the new regime.  
The leadership qualities of those in positions of power and the effects of their conduct on their 
subordinates, enunciated as a topic of interest in the Agricola, remains a principal concern in the 
historical works. In the extant books of the Historiae, military leadership continually is on display and 
Tacitus ascribes the outbreak and the prolongation of the civil wars in part to the failed leadership of 
the emperors and the generals fighting on their side. Vitellius’ character and the effects of his conduct 
on his generals and soldiers is the most obvious example. His self-indulgent lifestyle and poor 
leadership negatively impact his troops, who increasingly emulate his behavior, losing in the process 
their discipline and ultimately their respect for their commander-in-chief.134 Other pertinent cases are 
the positive example set by Vespasian (H. 2.82) and the negative examples set by Otho and 
Hordeonius Flaccus, who corrupt their forces by setting an example of immorality, lack of discipline, 
or timidity. The famous scene of a nighttime riot among Othonian soldiers after the unauthorized 
opening of an arsenal (H. 1.80-85) and the mutiny of Flaccus’ troops, which eventually resulted in the 
murder of their commander-in-chief (H. 1.9, 1.54, 1.56, 4.19, 4.24, 4.27, 4.36), are symptomatic of the 
way in which the behavior of soldiers and other officials mirrors that of their commanders. In the 
Annales, Tacitus stresses the positive effects of Corbulo’s leadership on the performance of his men 
																																																								
133 Sailor 2008, 77-78: “This glory is a correct depiction of military success and, as such, depends on attaining that success. It comes, 
moreover, with an approved mode of circulation that makes it an attainable, and therefore useful, aspiration for others in the 
administration beyond the Imperial legate... This arrangement is desirable not only because it is fair, but rather because equity ensures 
that, when calculating whether or not to undertake “risk and toil” (labor et periculum, 18.5), all actors can rely on receiving glory if they 
succeed in their endeavor...”  
134 Note Mucianus’ words at H. 2.76.4 (principis imitatione). Cf. H. 2.56, 62, 67, 68, 76, 87, 93 etc. For discussion: Ash 1999, 113 ff. 
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(A. 11.18.2-19.1, 13.8.3, 13.35, 14.24.1-3) and records that Vespasian, by his personal example, put an 
end to moral decline through luxury (3.55.4). As we shall see below, Germanicus, Antonius Primus, 
Suetonius Paulinus, and others are depicted as competent leaders as well, variously evoking the 
exemplary Agricola. Tacitus, conceiving of the behavior of those in positions of power as having a 
‘trickle-down’ effect and gradually impacting all ranks, formulates a general rule: legates and tribunes 
follow the character of their supreme commanders and either imitate their strictness or become 
indulgent. Further down the chain of command, soldiers likewise are either disciplined or lax (H. 
2.68.1).135 Emperors, governors, and legates play a vital role in the motivation, training, and 
performance of their subordinate officers. This notion is already fully at work in the Agricola.  
In addition to articulating enduring Tacitean concerns, the chapters on Agricola’s youth and 
military tribunate help to elucidate two famous Tacitean statements in the Annales on the question of 
whether the major events of life are governed by chance or fate.136 While a close reading of Tacitus’ 
works reveals no consistent creed about the workings of fate or chance,137 Agricola’s life is presented 
as an example of the ways in which education, proper guidance, and experience play their role in 
shaping adult character and behavior, thus refuting the popular belief “that the future of an individual 
is ordained at the moment of his entry into life” (A. 6.22.3).138 Elsewhere, in explaining the steady 
career of M. Lepidus, Tacitus is compelled to ask “whether it is due to fate or chance of birth that 
emperors incline favorably to some and take offense at others, or whether there is anything in our 
policies that allows us to proceed between sheer contumacy and ugly servility on a path that is free 
from ambition and dangers” (A. 4.20.3). Agricola’s career plainly reflects the second alternative, as do 
the careers of others who resemble him, such as Lepidus, L. Piso (A. 6.10.3), Poppaeus Sabinus (A. 
																																																								
135 As noted by Ash 1999, 113; Ash 2007a, 248, 264, 278. For examples: H. 2.62, 2.67, 2.68, 2.74, 2.82, 2.84, 3.41 etc.  
136 A. 4.20.2-3, reflecting on the career of Marcus Lepidus, and A. 6.22: “as for myself, when I listen to this and similar narratives, my 
judgment wavers. Is the revolution of human things governed by fate and changeless necessity or by accident? You will find the wisest 
of the ancients, and the disciplines attached to their tenets, at complete variance...”  
137 Furneaux 1896, Vol. I, 29-31.  
138 Similarly, the flawed characters of Otho, Tigellinus, Sejanus, Caligula, and Tiberius are explained not as the inevitable result of fate, 
but of a difficult childhood: see n. 119. 
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6.39.3), L. Volusius (to some extent, A. 13.30.2), and Memmius Regulus (A. 14.47.).139 The careers of 
such men suggest that, with the right character and conduct, one can exercise some control over how 
events turn out and one is not entirely given over to fate. It stands to reason that Tacitus was attracted 
to such an outlook, for otherwise his own success and survival under Domitian, as well as that of 
others, must be attributed not to the right attitude and an understanding of the times, but to luck or 
the uncertain workings of fate. 
           Tacitus is concerned to show how Agricola’s upbringing and military tribunate prepared him 
for his next posts, as quaestor in Asia, tribune and praetor in Rome, and legionary legate in Britain. 
Aware of his station in each of these posts, Agricola displays the sorts of qualities that allowed him to 
move ahead in his career, qualities that have their origins in his early years in Gaul and Britain and that, 
as we shall see, remain the core criteria in Tacitus’ assessment of officials in the historical narratives. 
The Agricola sets out what Tacitus considers the proper conduct for subordinate officers. 
 
II.3.1  Career Development: the Proper Conduct for Subordinate Officers  
Soon after his military tribunate, Agricola was appointed quaestor in Asia (AD 63-64), a 
challenging post, as the province was notorious for the corruption it often inspired in Roman 
officials.140 Tacitus writes that Agricola did not allow himself to be corrupted by his proconsul and the 
province, “even though it is rich and lies open for corrupt men” (quamquam et prouincia diues ac parata 
peccantibus, Agr. 6.2).141 Word-choice suggests that Tacitus wants us to see Agricola’s integrity in part as 
the result of his shielded upbringing in Gaul, which had kept him away precisely from such individuals 
(arcebat eum ab inlecebris peccantium, Agr. 4.2). Agricola’s refusal to be involved in his proconsul’s corrupt 
practices (6.2) suggests that he had learned something from the troubled relations between Paulinus 
																																																								
139 Cf. Sailor 2008, 28-29 on the implications of taking the third way between the two extremes ways of life. 
140 Cicero can praise his brother Quintus for managing to preserve his “integrity” and “restraint” in such a “depraved and corrupt 
province” (Q. fr. 1.1.19). He likewise praises Murena for living an honorable life there (Mur. 12). Cf. Sal., Cat. 11.5-6 on Sulla’s forces 
succumbing to Asia’s riches. On the ways in which senators enriched themselves in the provinces, see Shatzman 1975, 53-63.  
141 Corrupt business between proconsuls and subordinates was a subject Tacitus likely addressed in the case against M. Priscus as well.   
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and his procurators. In fact, Tacitus makes the avoidance of strife, competition, or other difficulties 
with fellow officials a defining characteristic of Agricola’s career, both in Rome and the provinces.142 
The chapter on Agricola’s quaestorship prefigures the chapters on his governorships of Aquitania and 
Britain, where Tacitus reveals a strong interest in the functioning of Roman governors and their often 
difficult relationship with colleagues.  
Like his quaestorship in Asia, Agricola’s execution of his early offices in Rome was marked by 
caution and careful avoidance of discord with other Roman officials (6.3-4). The year between his 
quaestorship and tribunate (AD 65), as well as the year of his tribunate, he spent in “quiet inactivity” 
(quiete et otio), realizing (gnarus) that under Nero “idleness is the same as wisdom” (inertia pro sapientia). 
His praetorship (AD 68), too, he spent in continued silence (idem... tenor et silentium). Some have seen in 
these words implicit criticism of Agricola’s conduct.143 The reason for this is, first, that the terms quies 
and otium elsewhere in Tacitus often have a negative connotation.144 A second reason lies in the implicit 
comparison, drawn in the work, between the condition of senators under the emperors and that of 
provincials under Roman rule.145 The quies and otium that Tacitus here ascribes to Agricola are ascribed 
later to the Britons, on whom Agricola as governor imposes quies and otium (21.1) to turn them into 
docile subjects (seruitutis, 21.2; cf. 11.4). Following the analogy in the condition of senators and 
provincial subjects, it could be suggested that Agricola conducts himself in similarly ‘slavish’ way 
towards his princeps.146 While the Agricola certainly sets the nature of imperial power in Rome in 
dialogue with that of Rome’s imperium in the provinces, a dialogue that persists throughout the 
																																																								
142 As tribune and praetor: Agr. 6.3-5; as legionary legate: 8.1-3; as governor of Aquitania: 9.4; as governor of Britain: 22.4; after 
returning from Britain: 40.3-4. 
143 Bastomsky 1982, 389; Sailor 2008, 98-99; Lavan 2011, 305. Cf. Whitmarsh 2006, 319 ff. 
144 Otium in Tacitus often denotes lack of valor, discipline, or good order, while quies, though sometimes denoting peace and calm in 
the absence of warfare, often refers to indolence and passivity on the part of Romans or Rome’s subjects. Note the following 
examples of otium: Agr. 11.4, 16.3, 21.1, 40.4; G. 14.2; D. 18.5, 38.2; cf. H. 1.46.2, 2.34.1, 2.67.2, 2.93.1, cf. 3.83.2, 4.5.2, 4.70.1; A. 
1.16.2, 12.12.1; of quies: Agr. 21.1, 40.3; cf. H. 1.21.2, 2.15.1, 2.97.1; A. 13.53.1. 
145 Essential for the study of the connections between the Principate and the Empire in the Agricola are Liebeschuetz 1966; Whitmarsh 
2006; Sailor 2008, 97 ff.; 2012, 29-37; Lavan 2011. The communis opinio is that the British and Roman narratives need to be read in 
conjunction. Whitmarsh 2006 demonstrates the ambiguities in the Agricola’s underlying political and ethical message. Lavan (2011; 
2013) is excellent on the various connections between the Roman and British narratives and the unity of the theme of ‘slavery’. Sailor 
2012, 29-37 offers further ambiguities in the analogies between the Principate and Empire. Cf. also Devillers 2014b, 163-74. 
146 Lavan 2011, 305. Much of Lavan 2011 reappears on pp. 124-54 of Lavan 2013.   
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corpus,147 the significance of Tacitus’ description of Agricola here is more subtle, situated in the latter’s 
conduct during the Pisonian Conspiracy of AD 65. The conspiracy is recorded at length in the Annales, 
once more allowing us to see how that work and the Agricola elucidate one another. 
Tacitus’ account of the conspiracy makes clear its extent: its participants came from every 
social and political rank, including senators, knights, tribunes, quaestors, centurions, praetorian 
officers, freedmen, and even mothers, wives, and other female participants (A. 15.48.1, 15.54.1). 
Among them were prominent men like Lucan (one of the ringleaders: A. 15.49.3), Seneca (who, 
however, seems at most to have an accessory: A. 15.56.2; Dio 62.24.1) and “many provincials, men of 
Agricola’s own age and class.”148 Tacitus’ claim that Agricola remained quiet and inactive during these 
years thus points to what he did not do, that is participate in the conspiracy against his princeps. 
Agricola’s stance helped him survive where others fell. Among Nero’s victims were not only 
those guilty of joining the conspiracy, but men who otherwise had incurred his wrath, notably Corbulo 
(Agr. 5.3; H. 2.76.3; A. 14.58.2; Dio 62.17), Seneca (A. 15.61 ff.), Petronius (16.18-19), Thrasea Paetus 
(16.21 ff.), and Barea Soranus (16.21 ff.). This was a time that offered opportunities for delatores, 
making any form of conspicuousness, obstruction, or display of independence perilous and the ability 
to adjust one’s conduct crucial. Agricola’s attitude stands in contrast with that of Thrasea, who, despite 
earning Tacitus’ sympathy, is described as conducting himself in overt opposition to his regime.149 His 
conduct caused increased tension between the senate and the princeps and invited hostility from 
powerful officials, such as Eprius Marcellus and Cossutianus Capito, who inflamed Nero against him 
and set in motion the events that spelled his end (A. 16.21 ff.). Agricola’s silence as tribune further 
																																																								
147 On this broad topic, which I do not examine in detail in this study, see Devillers 2014b, 163-74, who offers many examples and 
plentiful references.   
148 Syme 1958a, 21. Cf. Bartera 2011, 178-81 on the way Tacitus varies the “beginning-of-year” formula for the year 65 to underline 
the importance of the revolt. 
149 He walked out of the senate when Agrippina’s memory was being condemned (A. 16.21.1), absented himself from the vote of 
divine honors to Poppaea, and failed to assist at her funeral (16.21.2). He avoided the annual oath to maintain Nero’s acta (16.22.1), 
refused to sacrifice to Nero’s health or his divine voice, shirked his priestly duties, and did not set foot in the curia for three years 
(16.22). He also openly displayed his admiration for Cato, among other things by writing a Cato. Capito exploited the association 
(16.22.2). For further discussion, see Rutledge 2001, 115 ff. 
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stands in contrast with the indiscretion of Thrasea’s associate Arulenus Rusticus, who was Agricola’s 
colleague for the year and who had to be kept from rashly exercising his veto during Thrasea’s trial (A. 
16.26.4-5). Finally, Agricola’s attitude stands in contrast to the conduct of Barea Soranus, who as 
proconsul of Asia had displayed industria by helping the city of Pergamum prevent the looting of its 
statues and paintings by Nero’s freedman Acratus (A. 16.23). This activity, however admirable and 
fitting for a proconsul, directly interfered with Nero’s designs and, according to Tacitus, was one cause 
for his destruction.150 Agricola’s conduct thus continues to be contrasted implicitly with that of the 
Stoic Martyrs. The destruction of Thrasea, Soranus, and others forms the background against which to 
assess the calculated inactivity of Agricola and others whom Tacitus describes as operating similarly: 
Galba lived through the reigns of five emperors by maintaining a quiet appearance (quod segnitia erat, 
sapientia uocaretur, H. 1.49.3), while Memmius Regulus, marked by Nero as a potential successor and 
hence a target for hostilities (note the force of tamen at A. 14.47.1; cf. suspectum semper inuisumque 
dominantibus qui proximus destinaretur, H. 1.21.1), came through the latter’s reign quiete defensus (A. 14.47.1; 
cf. segnem, A. 5.11.1). Agricola’s stance allowed him to execute his offices without incurring the wrath 
of his emperor or other powerful officials, setting a paradigm followed by similarly moderate senators 
in the historical narratives and by men like Tacitus himself.151  
 Finally, and arguably most significantly in terms of what Tacitus’ generation would have 
remembered of those years, Agricola’s inactivity points to the fact that he did not, like other prominent 
men, become an instrument of his emperor and participate in putting down fellow Romans. Silius 
Italicus, author of the Punica, was believed to have turned delator during these years, earning himself a 
consulship in 68 (at a young age for a nouus homo) and with it a questionable reputation (Plin., Ep. 
3.7.3). Likewise, Ofonius Tigellinus, Petronius Turpilianus, and Nymphidius Sabinus were rewarded 
																																																								
150 The official charge was friendship with Rubellius Plautus and an attempt to stir Asia to revolt. See Rutledge 2001, 119-21. The 
looting in Pergamum was to make up for the losses incurred during the great fire of 64: A. 15.45.1-2; Suet., Ner. 38; Dio 62.18.5.  
151 Cf. Joseph 2014, 140-41 on Agricola’s disavowal of political boldness (audacia, contumacia). 
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handsomely for their role in suppressing the conspiracy (A. 15.72). But the most dubious, and for 
Tacitus’ readers most significant, role was that of the future emperor Nerva. Praetor designate at the 
time, Nerva actively helped put men like Seneca and Lucan down. In accordance with his sordid role, 
Tacitus explicitly pairs him with the disreputable Tigellinus: “Nero exalted Nerva and Tigellinus so far 
that, not content with triumphal statues in the Forum, he placed their effigies in the palace itself” (A. 
15.72.1), where they presumably still stood when Nerva himself moved in as princeps four decades later. 
Nerva’s portrait in the Panegyricus is wholly favorable and, like others, Pliny fully buys into the praises 
of the former emperor. But behind Nerva’s proclamation of libertas and felicitas temporum, and his vows 
for the safety of his fellow Romans (me securitatem omnium quieti meae praetulisse, Plin., Ep. 10.58.7), lay an 
ugly precedent. In 98, Tacitus could not criticize the deified Nerva explicitly for his conduct under 
Nero, but there was always room for subtle criticism: behind the praise of Agricola’s quies and otium 
lurks an indirect jab at Nerva’s conduct during those same years.  
 In the account of the next stages of Agricola’s career, Tacitus continues to stress the man’s 
respect for authority and avoidance of discord with colleagues. When Agricola served as legionary 
legate in Britain and his first governor, Vettius Bolanus, pursued a passive military policy that forced 
him to restrain his ambition, he duly subordinated himself to his superior, advancing his reputation but 
not growing too important. Tacitus musters traditional philosophical and rhetorical concepts (utilitas 
and honestum) and Ciceronian language (peritus and eruditus) to underline Agricola’s qualities: “he knew 
how to obey and had learned to combine the expedient and the honorable” (peritus obsequi eruditusque 
utilia honestis miscere, Agr. 8.1).152 Under his next governor, Cerialis, expansion was renewed and Agricola 
could gain glory, but he downplayed his own achievements and, as a subordinate ought to (ut minister, 
8.3), referred them to his superior. The words ut minister – “as a subordinate ought to” – underline the 
																																																								
152 The terms utilitas and honestum were common in philosophical and rhetorical doctrine, esp. in Cicero. Tacitus engages with these 
concepts in the Dialogus. Cicero combines peritus and eruditus at Brut. 205, Font. 43, and Leg. 2.66. In a methodological statement in the 
Annales, Tacitus writes that the writing of history is useful since most people do not know how to distinguish honesta and utilia from 
deterioribus and noxiis, an ability that marks prudentia (A. 4.33.2). See Woodman and Kraus 2014, 118 for further references.  
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propriety of Agricola’s attitude.153 The result was that “by his virtue in obeying orders and his modesty 
in reporting success, Agricola avoided envy but still gained renown” (ita uirtute in obsequendo, uerecundia in 
praedicando extra inuidiam nec extra gloriam erat, 8.3). Likewise, as governor of Britain, his dispatches to 
Rome would stand out for their respectful spirit. He neither boasted about his successes nor 
emphasized his personal renown, thus honoring his position as a subordinate to his princeps.154  
Tacitus’ concern with the appropriate conduct of subordinate officers toward their superiors 
continues into the historical narratives, where he frequently condemns officials for failing to act in 
accordance with their station. A notable example from the Historiae is the attitude of the otherwise 
gifted general Antonius Primus, who “fails to temper his words, is immoderate in speech, and 
unaccustomed to defer to others” (nec sermonibus temperabat, immodicus lingua et obsequii insolens, H. 3.53.1 
~Agr. 8.3); who treats Mucianus, second-in-command after Vespasian, with contempt (3.49.2); who, 
after his success at Cremona, “was becoming too great a man” (quippe nimius iam Antonius, 3.52.1); who 
writes letters “in a manner too boastful to use to an emperor” (iactantius, 3.53.1 ~ iactantia, Agr. 39.1); 
who is arrogant (infestum and tumidum; superbia and adrogantia, 4.80) and oversteps his rank (uiri aequalium 
quoque, adeo superiorum intolerantis, 4.80.1). Primus lacks the qualities that Tacitus singles out in Agricola.  
A good example from the Annales is the conduct of C. Silius – governor of Upper Germany, victor 
against the rebel Sacrovir, and close associate of Agrippina the Elder – whose “presumption” 
(intemperantia) and “immoderate boasts” (immodice iactantis, A. 4.18.2) provoked Tiberius and hastened 
his destruction in AD 24.155 Silius had claimed that his own troops (suum militem; note the insult in 
calling the legions, legally the emperor’s, his own; cf. suas legiones at H. 3.49.1) had remained loyal 
																																																								
153 This is the sense favored by most commentators. But cf. Whitmarsh 2006, 321. Tacitus points to similar loyalty on the part of 
Germanic officials (G. 14.2). Cf. Sallust on Jugurtha: plurimum facere, minimum ipse de se loqui (Jug. 6.1).  
154 He refrained from attaching the customary laurel to the letter(s) detailing his suppression of the Ordovices (18.6; cf. Plin., Nat. 
15.133). Likewise, in his report to Domitian about his victory at Mons Graupius he did not magnify his own success (39.1). Agricola’s 
letters conveyed that he was loyal, unassuming, and no threat to his emperor’s authority. That this was the expected effect of 
moderate reports seems clear from Tacitus’ claim that Domitian received Agricola’s letter(s) with anxiety and hatred, “even though 
(quamquam) it contained no boastful language whatsoever” (39.1). On the importance of striking the appropriate tone in letters to 
superiors, especially the princeps, note H. 2.55.2, 3.9.5, 3.53.1; A. 4.29.3.  
155 On the case against Silius and his connections with Agrippina, see Rutledge 2001, 140-42. 
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during the great mutinies of AD 14 and that Tiberius’ reign could not have lasted if his (i.e. Silius’) 
legions, too, had desired revolution (A. 4.18.1). It was widely agreed (credebant plerique) that this claim 
was a grave insult to the emperor’s supremacy. Other cases of men overstepping their station are 
Mucianus (whom Tacitus depicts as enjoying excessive influence and as acting more like Vespasian’s 
colleague than his subordinate: H. 2.83.1, 3.75.2, 4.4.1, 4.11, 4.39.2), Sejanus (still an eques and 
notorious for having grossly overstepped his bounds: A. 4.40-41, 6.8; cf. Sen., Dial. 6.22.4), and Macro 
(like Sejanus an eques with excessive influence: nimia... potentia: A. 6.45.3, 6.49-50).  
Delatores, too, many of whom were novi homines, are condemned by Tacitus for acting beyond 
their station and for seeking rewards and rapid advancement by destroying men of superior social 
class.156 But arguably the most prominent example is the conduct of Cn. Calpurnius Piso, governor of 
Syria, who in AD 20 was tried at Rome for treason. A summary of the outcome of the trial is 
preserved on an inscription (the senatus consultum de Pisone patre), which records as one of the charges 
that Piso had ignored Tiberius’ injunctions (mandata) and further instructions contained in letters 
(epistulae) sent to him by Germanicus (SCPP 38-39).157 Piso was accused of having acted as if everything 
in Syria ought to be subject to his own decision and control (36-37), although his imperium was 
subordinate to that of Germanicus and Tiberius (29-36). Acting on his own volition and ignoring the 
majesty of the imperial house (33), Piso was charged with, among other things, having stirred up an 
Armenian and Parthian war and even civil war (37-38, 47). Tacitus follows the decree in stressing 
Piso’s insubordination, pointedly calling him obsequii ignarum (A. 2.43.2) and recording that he was 
accused of “having ignored the limits of his commission and the deference owed to his superior” (si 
legatus officii terminos, obsequium erga imperatorem exuit, 3.12.2).158 These examples, and many others,159 attest 
																																																								
156 For an in-depth examination of delatores under the early Principate and their (skewed) depiction in our sources, see Rutledge 2001. 
157 For the text of this trial, see Eck, Caballos, and Fernández 1996, 38-51; Potter and Damon 1999, 13-42; cf. Potter 1996, 49 and 
Potter 1999, 65-88. Tacitus relates the trial in the Third Book of the Annales. As we may well expect, he does not everywhere uphold 
the details of the trial faithfully: Damon 1999, 143-62. 
158 For Piso’s insubordination towards Germanicus or Tiberius: A. 2.55, 2.57, 2.69, 2.71, 3.14. Piso’s inability to stomach rivals is 
reflected in his conviction that Drusus would be content with Germanicus’ death, as with the removal of a rival (A. 3.8.1). As Keitel 
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to a continued sensitivity on Tacitus’ part to the traditional hierarchies of power and to the proper 
behavior of officials in accordance with their rank.160 Agricola exemplifies the respect that a 
subordinate owes to his commander-in-chief and that a governor or senator owes to his princeps. Not 
only does the Agricola enunciate this enduring theme, but it was a topical concern at the time. Pliny lays 
special emphasis on Trajan’s subordination and service: it was obedience that had made him princeps. 
He had shown respect as a subject to his emperor, as a legate to his governor, as a son to his father, 
and he had accepted the commands of his superiors.161 The key term is obsequium, the trait singled out 
in Agricola; Tacitus continues to present his father-in-law as a proto-Trajan, exemplifying the 
emperor’s qualities and reasserting traditional values that were advertised as hallmarks of the new 
regime.162 
In addition to establishing a paradigm for the proper behavior of subordinate officials, 
Agricola’s career reflects the way that Romans establish the kind of reputation that allows them to 
move ahead. While at the start of a career the patronage of influential individuals (for Agricola: 
Paulinus and Cerialis) is crucial, demonstrated ability was ever more important the more senior a 
person became. The proper execution of his offices and the respect he showed to colleagues and 
superiors made Agricola a suitable candidate for important assignments. The succinct description of 
his return from Britain and his immediate departure for his governorship of Aquitania (9.1) underlines 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
suggests (2014, 62 ff.), Piso’s insubordination is underlined by his ostentatious arrival in the capital (A. 3.9.2-3), which possibly recalls 
Agricola’s quiet return from Britain (Agr. 40). On this contrast, see also Woodman-Martin 1996, 126 with further examples.  
159 For examples of proper respect or disrespect shown by Roman officials or of officials acting beyond their station: H. 1.52, 1.82, 
83-84, 3.53, 4.3, 4.8, 4.15, 4.74, 5.1; A. 1.19, 1.28, 1.34, 1.43, 2.22, 2.26, 2.59, 2.69, 3.12, 4.15, 4.18, 4.40, 6.8, 6.45, 13.2, 13.40, 14.37, 
15.17, 15.25; cf. Mithridates’ conduct at A. 12.21. Note esp. Tiberius’ words to Sejanus about the latter’s station (A. 4.40) and his 
rebuke of Germanicus, who entered Egypt without his permission, an ostensible transgression of his command, an insult to Tiberius’ 
authority, and a violation of Augustan precept (A. 2.59). Tacitus’ critical assessment of Germanicus here is reflected by the fact that he 
rejected the more popular and apologetic version recorded by Suetonius (Tib. 52.2): Goodyear 1981 ad loc. Livia and both Agrippinas, 
too, are frequently condemned for acting beyond their station.  
160 Note the words Tacitus ascribes to the knight M. Terentius: nobis obsequii gloria relicta est (A. 6.8.4) with Syme 1958a, 227. This 
concern extends outside the military and provincial spheres, as is clear from Tacitus’ frequent comments about the inappropriate 
behavior of women like Livia, both Agrippinas, and Plancina, and the excessive influence enjoyed by imperial freedmen. On the last 
point, again a concern manifested early in the corpus, see Agr. 19.2 and G. 25.2.  
161 Plin., Pan. 9.3-5: ad principatum obsequio peruenisti... An non obsequeris principi ciuis, legatus imperatori, filius patri? Ubi deine disciplina, ubi mos a 
maioribus traditus, quodcumque imperator munus iniungeret, aequo animo paratoque subeundi? 
162 See Syme 1958a, 28, 58, 227 on the continued importance of the concept of obsequium in Tacitus. 
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the favor he enjoyed with the Flavian court. Similar succinctness marks the end of the same chapter, 
where Agricola, upon returning from Aquitania, at once is assigned to the governorship of Britain 
(9.6). It is to the account of these governorships that I now turn. Just as the chapters on Agricola’s 
early career reveal what Tacitus considers the appropriate conduct for subordinate officers, so the 
chapters on Agricola’s governorships set out the qualities Tacitus deems essential for those in positions 
of authority. Once more, the qualities here ascribed to Agricola remain the core criteria in Tacitus’ 
assessment of officials in the historical works. Moreover, the description of Agricola’s governorships 
offers indirect commentary on the Principate, as the governor’s conduct in his province is compared 
and contrasted implicitly with that of the principes in Rome.  
 
II.4  Governorship of Aquitania 
Agricola’s first governorship was in the province of Aquitania. Although one of the three 
imperial provinces of Gaul, Aquitania did not have legions at the time, making Agricola’s 
responsibilities mainly administrative and judicial. Consequently, one of his principal tasks was to tour 
Aquitania and visit assize-centers (conuentus) to hear cases that were brought before him.163 Tacitus 
offers a broad description of Agricola’s conduct as governor, recalling previous writings on 
governorship and selecting for mention traditional (moral) qualities seen as essential to provincial 
government. The chapter shows particular affinity with Cicero’s first letter to his brother Quintus (Q. 
fr. 1.1), a treatise about the latter’s governorship of Asia,164 and with Sallust’s paired characterization of 
Caesar and Cato (Cat. 54).165 I cite the passage in full and underline words, or synonyms, that also 
appear in Cicero’s letter and Sallust’s chapter:  
																																																								
163 For a survey of a governor’s duties (incl. the workings of the conuentus), see Burton 1975, 92-106; Talbert 1980, 412-35.  
164 Dated to the end of 60 or the start of 59 BC, “this is no ordinary letter... it is rather a tract, commentariolum de prouincia administranda, 
doubtless intended for a wider circulation”: Shackleton Bailey 2004 [1980], 147. Also see D. Braund 1996, 24 ff.  
165 Cic., Q. fr. 1.1 lauds abstinentia, aequitas, auctoritas, clementia, comitas, constantia, continentia, facilitas, grauitas, humanitas, integritas, mansuetudo, 
moderatio, prudentia, seueritas, and temperantia. Cicero ascribes some of these qualities to Pompey (de Imp. Cn. Pomp. 13.36-42) and himself 
(Att. 5.9.1, 15.2, 17.2, 18.2, 20.6; Fam. 15.4.1). Sallust praises abstinentia (Cat. 3.3), aequitas (Cat. 2.5), constantia (Cat. 54.3), continentia (Cat. 
2.5), facilitas (Cat. 54.3), integritas (Cat. 54.2), mansuetudo, (Cat. 54.2), seueritas (Cat. 54.2-5), and temperantia (Jug. 45.1).  
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credunt plerique militaribus ingeniis subtilitatem deesse, quia castrensis iurisdictio secura et obtusior ac plura manu agens 
calliditatem fori non exerceat: Agricola naturali prudentia , quamuis inter togatos, fac i le  iusteque agebat. iam uero 
tempora curarum remiss ionumque diuisa : ubi conuentus ac iudicia poscerent, grauis , intentus , seuerus et 
saepius miser icors : ubi officio satis factum, nulla ultra potestatis persona; tristitiam et adrogantiam et auarit iam 
exuerat. nec illi, quod est rarissimum, aut fac i l i tas auctor i tatem aut seuer i tas amorem deminuit. integr i tatem 
atque abst inentiam in tanto uiro referre iniuria uirtutum fuerit. ne famam quidem, cui saepe etiam boni indulgent, 
ostentanda uirtute aut per artem quaesiuit: procul ab aemulatione aduersus collegas, procul a content ione aduersus 
procuratores, et uincere inglorium et atteri sordidum arbitrabatur. minus triennium in ea legatione detentus ac statim ad 
spem consulatus reuocatus est, comitante opinione Britanniam ei prouinciam dari, nullis in hoc ipsius sermonibus, sed quia 
par uidebatur. (Agr. 9.2-6) 
 
It is a common belief that the character of soldiers lacks subtlety, since jurisdiction in the camp, which 
is unscrupulous and rather blunt, and which decides most matters ‘by the strong hand,’ does not make 
use of the skills of the Forum. But Agricola, from his natural good sense, as though he were acting 
among civilians, executed his duties with ease and fairness. Moreover, he kept times of work and 
relaxation distinct: when assize-centers and courts demanded his time, he was serious, attentive, strict 
and more often merciful. When business was done, he no longer maintained the image of power; he 
had already discarded despair, arrogance, and greediness. And in his case (and this is very rare) his 
affability did not diminish his authority nor did his strictness diminish the affection of others. To speak 
of the integrity and restraint of such a man would be an insult to his virtues. Fame, to which even good 
men often given themselves up, he sought neither by showing off his merits nor through intrigue. Far 
from competing with colleagues, far from quarreling with procurators, he considered it inglorious to 
have the upper hand, but disgraceful to suffer injury in his dignity. Less than three years he was kept in 
that post and was then recalled with an immediate prospect of a consulship. A general belief went with 
him that the province of Britain would be given to him, not because he had made any statements to 
that effect, but because he seemed equal to the task. 
 
 
Cicero, in his letter to Quintus, writes that, since his brother’s assignment is not military in nature and 
Asia at peace, “the entire province mainly depends on the administration of justice” (Q. fr. 1.1.7). He 
further writes that, in the absence of troops and expected military danger, the quality of Quintus’ 
governorship depends less on fortune and more on the careful execution of his tasks and on his virtue 
and self-control (diligentia... uirtute ac moderatione, 1.1.1). Agricola’s governorship of Aquitania was similar 
in nature, as his province was at peace when he arrived and likewise depended on the execution of 
judicial and administrative duties.  
Tacitus at once points to two important qualities, subtilitas (“discernment”) and calliditas 
(“astuteness”), terms common in Cicero’s rhetorical discussions and denoting, respectively, the ability 
to make fine distinctions and a sense of perceptiveness.166 Using a conventional topos, Tacitus writes 
																																																								
166 For further commentary on the terms Tacitus uses at Agr. 9, see Woodman and Kraus 2014, 120 ff. Calliditas, often ascribed by 
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that military men often lack such qualities, but that Agricola possessed a natural sense of prudence 
(naturali prudentia) that allowed him to dispense justice with ease and fairness (facile iusteque).167 Such 
prudence, which Cicero singles out in Quintus as well (1.1.18, 35, 36, 45), was essential, as governors 
dealt with a wide variety of people, both Roman and native, with divergent interests, demands, and 
legal statuses.168 Keeping these different parties content and under control without resorting to 
corruption, oppression, or injustice was no sinecure and good governors are described as conducting 
themselves with moderation and balance: Agricola executed his tasks with firmness (grauitas) and 
strictness (seueritas), but often was lenient (misericordia) when it was warranted. The maintenance of 
peace and satisfaction is articulated as depending on a governor’s ability to be strict but moderate, 
allowing him to meet different demands without causing conflict and unrest. Allusions to Cicero’s 
Quintus169 and to Sallust’s Caesar and Cato, whose defining traits are, respectively, misericordia and 
seueritas, serve to underline these qualities: Agricola unites in himself the outstanding qualities of these 
men.170 Later, as governor of Britain, Agricola would adopt a similarly balanced approach, showing 
leniency (ueniam) towards minor offenses but treating serious offenses harshly (seueritatem, 19.3). 
Toward his subordinates and in his private capacity Agricola conducted himself with like 
balance: without losing his “authority” (auctoritas) and “strictness” (seueritas), he showed “affability” 
(facilitas) and retained the “affinity” of his friends (amor). As Y. Benferhat shows, facilitas is a positive 
term in republican authors but in Tacitus it most often takes on a pejorative sense.171 Its positive 
meaning here once more underlines Agricola’s republican virtues – all the more so since facilitas was 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Roman authors to Carthaginians and denoting ‘deception,’ ‘trickery,’ and so forth, elsewhere has a positive connotation: Cic., Off. 
1.108; Har. Resp. 19, 4.66; Nep., Han. 9.2; Sal., Jug. 95.3; Liv. 22.22.15.  
167 Camp justice was notoriously brutal: A. 1.29.4-30.1, 1.44.2-5.  
168 Cicero calls this part of a governor’s duties “exceedingly burdensome and demanding the greatest prudence” (Q. fr. 1.1.7). It 
involved reconciling things that were “opposite in interests, aims, and almost in nature” (1.1.36). 
169 Q. fr. 1.1.19-21, 45. Note esp. quibus ille rebus fortasse nimis lenis uideretur, nisi haec lenitas illam seueritatem tueretur... Haec illius seueritas acerba 
uideretur, nisi multis condimentis humanitatis mitigaretur (Q. fr. 1.21). Cicero singles out C. Octavius (1.1.21) and Cyrus the Great (1.1.23) for 
their ability to balance severity and leniency. Elsewhere, Cicero claims that he adjusts his own conduct to his circumstances, showing 
vigor and strictness (uis et seueritas) against Catiline, but leniency and humanity (misericordia et humanitas) towards his client Murena (Mur. 
6). See also Cic., Off. 1.88 on balancing placibilitas, clementia, and severitas; Sen., de Ira 1.18.3-6 on Cn. Piso’s conduct; Plin., Pan. 80.1. 
170 Lausberg 1980, 420. Tacitus’ Agricola also resembles Sallust’s Metellus: Jug. 45.  
171 Benferhat 2011, 63-66.  
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one of Caesar’s defining qualities in Sallust (Cat. 54.3). Again, moderation is the key quality and 
Tacitus’ words insinuate that many officials lacked it. The claim that Agricola’s affability did not 
diminish his authority and that his strictness did not diminish his friends’ affinity implies that many 
officials did fall into either of those extremes. Such extremes were understood to be harmful for both 
the governor and the people he stood over: excessive severity, as the Boudiccan revolt had shown, 
could engender local resistance and alienate the governor from other Roman officials, who were well 
connected in the capital, while excessive leniency ran the risk of engendering misconduct and 
corruption.172 For Tacitus, the key to good governorship lies in maintaining a balance and adjusting 
one’s conduct to the disposition of one’s subordinates and the native population.  
            As good Romans were expected to do,173 Agricola kept his public duties and private life 
distinct and did not let the one intrude upon the other: he was “serious” (grauis), “attentive” (intentus), 
and “strict” (seuerus) when conducting official business, but upon completing his duties he discarded 
his official persona and was affable and affectionate. His conduct once more resembles that of Cato, 
who was known to be “stern and terrible” in the senate and the courtroom, but “kind and benevolent” 
in his private capacity (Plut., Cat. Min. 21.5), as well as that of Scipio Africanus (Vell. 1.13) and Sulla 
(Sal., Jug. 95.3), who were known for their ability to keep their public and private lives distinct.  
Tacitus further identifies several faults which Agricola avoided, but which we are to 
understand as common in the magistracies of other officials: “gloominess” (tristitia), “arrogance” 
(adrogantia), and “greed” (auaritia).174 Auaritia and adrogantia (or superbia) were considered especially 
indicative of foul character and were stock traits ascribed to incompetent or immoral officials unable 
to maintain their integrity.175 In line with his literary predecessors, Tacitus identifies greed and 
																																																								
172 Cf. Cic., Q. fr. 1.1.20-22, 39; Ulp., Dig. 1.18.13 
173 Cic., Mur. 74: “the Romans are men who set aside times for pleasure as well as for work.” Romans were expected to separate work 
and pleasure from an early age: Tac., D. 28.5.  
174 On the difficulty of this sentence, which at first seems to indicate that Agricola possessed these faults while performing his duties, 
but only discarded them in private life, see Ogilvie and Richmond 1967 ad loc.; Woodman and Kraus 2014 ad loc. 
175 Cicero stresses Verres’ auaritia, while at Prov. 11 he charges Aulus Gabinius with auaritia and superbia. See Frazel 2009 for analysis of 
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arrogance as stock traits of bad governors. As we have seen, he charges Suetonius Paulinus with acting 
adroganter in the aftermath of the Boudiccan revolt (Agr. 16.2), while one of the complaints he places in 
the mouths of the British rebels Boudicca and Calgacus is the auaritia of Roman officials, procurators 
in particular (Agr. 15.4, 30.4-5). As these speeches are Tacitus’ own invention, it is significant that he 
includes auaritia among the charges which local tribes plausibly could be thought to have leveled 
against Roman officials. Agricola’s conduct, in contrast, serves to show that Roman power in the 
provinces can be just when it is executed by competent and righteous men.  
Arguably the most important quality of a good governor is self-control (moderatio, temperentia, 
abstinentia, continentia), for only if a governor can control himself can he effectively control others (note 
Cic., Q. fr. 3.1.7). Self-control is the principal quality that Cicero enjoins upon Quintus, that Sallust 
praises in Cato, and that Greek authors like Plato and Xenophon ascribe to good kings.176 It was the 
ability to restrain himself that was supposed to allow a governor or king to rule with moderation and 
justice and to steer clear of corruption and oppression. At the same time, it was a quality that was most 
difficult to acquire (Cic., Q. fr. 1.1.7) and, in light of the various opportunities for self-enrichment in 
the provinces, most difficult to maintain. Tacitus underlines Agricola’s self-control by writing that “to 
speak of the integrity and restraint of such a man would be an insult to his virtues” (integritatem atque 
abstinentiam in tanto uiro referre iniuria uirtutum fuerit), a plain allusion to Cicero and Velleius, who ascribe 
similar self-restraint to Quintus and Cato, respectively.177  
Agricola shows similar restraint when it comes to his reputation, neither showing off his merits 
nor procuring fame in crooked ways (per artem).178 Moreover, he avoids competition (aemulatio) and 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Cicero’s rhetorical strategies in the Verrines and the emphasis on Verres’ auaritia (the word appears 48 times in the speeches). For 
Sallust, greed and arrogance are cardinal sins of immoral officials, Roman and non-Roman, and defining traits of Roman society as he 
saw it: Cat. 3.3, 5.8, 9.1, 10.3-4, 11.1-5, 12.2, 40.3, 52.7, 52.22; Jug. 13.5, 28.5, 29.1, 31.12, 32.4, 42.9, 43.5, 49.2, 80.5, 81.1, 85.45-46, 
91.7, 103.5. Livy speaks of magistratuum Romanorum auaritia superbiamque (43.2, cf. Tac., A. 1.2.2, 4.6.4) and ascribes these flaws to 
Romans and non-Romans alike. Cf. Velleius on P. Quinctilius Varus’ governorship of Syria, marked by excessive greed (2.117.2). 
176 D. Braund 1996, 24 ff. 
177 Cic., Q. fr. 1.1.18: tua primum integritas et continentia; Vell. 2.45.5: cuius integritatem laudari nefas est.  
178 The words are agreed to refer to the ‘votes of thanks’ which provincial subjects could vote to good governors, but which at times 
were procured illegitimately by the latter. Both Augustus (Dio 56.25.6, with Swan 2004 ad loc.) and Nero (A. 15.20-22, with Furneaux 
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rivalry (contentio) with colleagues and the legates of other provinces. A governor’s relations with 
procurators were especially delicate.179 The emphasis on these particular qualities reflects the way other 
governors, as Tacitus has it, coped with the pressure to acquire fame and honor during their term 
abroad.180 The pressure to establish one’s reputation was substantial, as is reflected by the claim, 
repeated in the later works, that “even good men often give themselves up to fame.” 181 We should 
understand as common responses to such pressures what Agricola here is said to avoid.  
The chapter on Agricola’s governorship of Aquitania depicts a governor properly managing his 
judicial and administrative duties, while preserving peace and stability in his province. In describing 
Agricola’s principal qualities, Tacitus not only shows the way the governor established the kind of 
reputation and social standing in the eyes of his peers and his princeps that earned him immediate 
promotion to the governorship of Britain, but reveals what our author sees as some of the more 
objectionable ways in which governors commonly operated.  
Tacitus advocates a fundamental and consistent set of values that ought to guide a governor, 
known from the Late Republic onwards. His allusions to the works of his predecessors place Agricola 
in line with renowned individuals from the past and reaffirm, at a time of socio-political transition, 
traditional values to which Rome (as Trajanic propaganda had it) would return under the new 
emperor. In order to condemn Domitian and endorse the values of the new regime, Tacitus places 
Agricola’s conduct in Aquitania in implicit contrast with Domitian’s in Rome. Agricola’s moderation 
and self-control stand in marked contrast to the oppressive conduct of the princeps, who anxiously 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
1896 ad loc) tried to curb the practice due to its abuse by governors and provincial magnates.  
179 As the emperor’s personal agents, procurators were powerful officials who, from the time of Claudius, held judicial authority to 
decide financial cases in which they were involved (A. 12.60). Ulpian, in de Officio Proconsulis, writes that a governor, despite possessing 
supreme judicial authority in his province, should stay away from cases involving procurators, whose acts and deeds carry the same 
force as if they were carried out by the princeps himself (Dig. 1.16.9.1, 1.19.1). As a military tribune, as we have seen, Agricola had 
witnessed the discordia between his governor Suetonius Paulinus and the procurators Decianus and Classicianus.  
180 Caesar’s Commentarii and Cicero’s letters about his governorship of Cilicia well illustrate the concern of Roman governors with the 
reputation they earned in the eyes of their peers in Rome. For the importance of the reputation that a governor acquired abroad for 
his standing in the capital, see Cic., Pis. 96; Q. fr. 1.1.41-44.  
181 Tacitus makes similar claims at H. 4.6.1 (etiam sapientibus cupido gloriae nouissima exuitur), recording contemporary views of Helvidius 
Priscus and at A. 3.66.4 (quod multos etiam bonos pessum dedit...), where the overambitious Bruttedius Niger is the example.  
	
	 69 
suppresses other people’s fame (Agr. 2, 39-45). It is no coincidence that Domitian’s reign is marked by 
arrogance (in adrogantiam compositus, 42.2), profligacy (licentiam, 7.2), and cruelty (saeuitia/saeuitum/saeuus, 
2.1, 3.2, 39.3, 45.2), vices that Agricola explicitly is said to avoid. Many of Agricola’s qualities in turn 
are ascribed to Trajan in the Panegyricus, which continues to mirror the Agricola.182  
The qualities that Tacitus here highlights continue to be principal criteria in his assessment of 
Roman officials in the historical narratives. For instance, the ability to adjust one’s behavior to the 
disposition of one’s subordinates remains an essential quality of good Tacitean governors or generals, 
and the historian often comments on the degree of severity or leniency that officials apply in specific 
circumstances.183 A good example is Galba’s excessive severity (nimia seueritas) towards the praetorians, 
which Tacitus twice portrays as “old-fashioned morality” backfiring completely (H. 1.5, 1.18).184 
Minicius Justus, camp prefect of the Seventh Legion, displays a strictness too severe for civil war (H. 
3.7.1). Indeed, as Thrasea Paetus claims, “inflexible strictness” (seueritas obstinata), while usually a virtue, 
often is hated (quaedam immo uirtutes odio sunt, A. 15.21.3); hence the importance of carefully adjusting 
one’s methods. Corbulo’s severity has positive effects on his troops (A. 11.19; but cf. Ash 2006, 363), 
as does L. Apronius’ seueritas (A. 3.21), but Aufidienus Rufus’ effort to impose antiquam duramque 
militiam fails miserably with the particular men he is assigned to train (A. 1.20.2). Likewise, Fabius 
Valens displays utilis moderatio in dealing with mutinous forces (H. 2.29.3), but Hordeonius Flaccus is 
criticized for not being strict enough and for failing to contain his men (H. 1.56.1, cf. 1.9.1; 4.19).185 
The ability to gauge the disposition of one’s subordinates or troops remains an essential aspect of good 
Tacitean leadership. 
																																																								
182 The terms modestia and moderatio each are mentioned over twelve times in the Panegyricus. Pliny praises Trajan’s uirtus (3.2, 13.5, 16.5, 
31.1, 55.10, 59.5, 70.2, 72.5) as well as his recognition of other people’s uirtutes (13.1, 44.6-45.1, 70.8, 85.7). Like Agricola, Trajan is 
lauded for his abstinentia (2.6), facilitas (2.7), seueritas (4.6, 46.6, 80.1), grauitas (4.6, 46.5), and integritas (92.2, cf. 44.7). Note how Pliny, 
possibly recalling Agr. 9, praises Trajan for balancing different qualities: ut nihil seueritati eius hilaritate, nihil grauitati simplicitate, nihil 
maiestati humanitate detrahitur (4.6); in omnibus cognitionibus, quam mitis seueritas, quam non dissoluta clementia (80.1).  
183 Note H. 1.5, 1.18, 1.36, 1.51, 1.69, 2.68, 2.69; A. 1.29 (cf. 4.3), 1.36, 3.21, 3.54, 6.30, 11.9, 13.2, 13.35, 13.48, 14.29. 
184 Tacitus’ critical view of Galba’s conduct is evident when we compare his account with the parallel tradition in Plutarch and Dio: 
Geiser 2007, 160-68. Cf. Otho’s words on Galba at H. 1.37.  
185 Cf. Otho’s efficient speech to his unruly soldiers, marked by seueritatis modus (H. 1.85.1). Note also the reputation of Cn. Lentulus 
Gaetulicus (effusae clementiae, modicus seueritate, A. 6.30.2) and Q. Veranius (seueritatis fama, A. 14.29.1).  
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Similarly, the ability to keep one’s public and private life distinct, singled out as one of 
Agricola’s virtues, remains an important quality in the historical works, where Tacitus comments on 
the conduct of distinguished Romans in this respect: the failure of Vitellius, who lets his private 
excesses infect his performance as commander-in-chief (H. 2.68.1-2), and the cases of Mucianus (H. 
1.10.2), Sallustius Crispus (A. 3.30), Otho (13.46.3), and C. Petronius (16.18), who balance a private life 
of luxury and refinement with diligence in public duty, constitute intriguing examples.  
The greed and arrogance that Agricola is said to avoid remain defining traits of Roman officials 
in the historical works.186 I see no conclusive evidence that Tacitus undergoes a fundamental shift from 
the Agricola to the Annales in his view of the goodness and validity of Roman rule, becoming, as some 
argue, ever more pessimistic.187 Throughout the corpus he reveals his conviction that Roman rule can 
be good when executed by righteous and competent men, but that the latter are the exception rather 
than the rule. On Tacitus’ account (however skewed), Agricola’s virtues stand out against a 
background of maladministration:188 prosecutions of extortion (de repetundis) and other cases of 
provincial mismanagement occur frequently in Tacitus189 and continued unabated (except, notably, 
under Domitian) under Vespasian (Suet., Ves. 16.2), Nerva, and Trajan (Dom. 8.2). 
Finally, the discord and competition that Agricola avoids remain a principal concern in all of 
Tacitus’ works and in the historical narratives constitute a major cause of the disintegration of 
provincial and military commands and of stability within the capital.190 The constant manifestation of 
																																																								
186 Auaritiam magistratuum (A. 1.2.2), auaritia aut crudelitate magistratuum (4.6.4), auaritia praefectorum (12.39.3), auaritiam praefecti (12.45.4). The 
Frisii revolt nostra magis auaritia quam obsequii impatientes (4.72.1). Cf. Valerius Messalinus’ words at A. 3.34.2. Civilis ascribes auaritia and 
superbia to Roman officials (H. 4.14.1), as does Arminius (A. 2.15.3). Cf. Boudicca’s words at A. 14.35. Tacitus calls auaritia and adrogantia 
“the principal vices of the stronger” (H. 1.51.4), attributes the combination superbia and auaritia to Antonius Primus (twice: H. 3.49.1, 
4.80) and Agrippina the Younger (A. 14.1.2), and has Otho ascribe the combination tristitia and auaritia to Piso and Galba (H. 1.51).  
187 So Paratore 2012, 183-84 (= 1962, 183-84); Benario 1968, 47.  
188 Cf. Rutherford 2010, 318-19.  
189 Agr. 15, 30-31; H. 1.77, 4.45; A. 1.74, 2.54, 3.38, 3.66, 3.70, 4.13, 4.15, 4.19, 11.6-7, 12.22, 12.39, 13.30-31, 13.33, 13.59, 14.18, 14.28, 
14.31, 14.35, 14.46, 15.20-21, 16.21. Cf. 2.56 (mitius…), 3.33-34. On Tacitus’ description of delatores and prosecutions de repetundis, see 
Rutledge 2001, 54-84, esp. 65-71 and 84. Brunt 1961, 189-227 [= 1990, 53-95] shows that abuse in the provinces was not infrequent after 
the establishment of the Principate. A. 1.2.2 and 15.21.4 should not be pressed to argue that Tacitus thought provincial administration 
became markedly less corrupt after the advent of the Principate (cf. D. 41.2). 
190 In the Germania, internecine discord is a defining trait of the Germani; in the Dialogus, Maternus distinguishes between the 
Republic, marked by discord and sedition, and the Principate, characterized by peace and stability. In the historical works, discord 
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discord in Tacitean Rome reflects the historian’s concern with this aspect of Roman life, as it manifests 
itself in the capital and in provincial administration. Fittingly, Tacitus sees it as a defining trait of many 
Romans that they, unlike Agricola, cannot stomach rivals or show deference to others.191 
Tacitus analyzes Agricola’s career on the basis of a set of criteria and qualities that recur in his 
later works and that inform his depiction of other Roman officials. In some cases Agricola’s portrait 
seems to have directly informed later portraits, most notably those of Germanicus, Paulinus, and 
Corbulo.192 While it often is impossible to be certain that Tacitus had Agricola in mind when crafting 
his later characterizations, the similarities in the depiction of Agricola and others show that Roman 
officials faced the same challenges and that there is a fundamental set of qualities, articulated in the 





between officials is a principal cause of military and governmental instability. The rivalry between Caecina and Valens (H. 1.52, 1.66-
67, 2.30, 2.92, 2.99, 2.101), between Trebellius Maximus and Roscius Coelius (H. 1.60), between Mucianus and Antonius Primus (H. 
3.53, 4.80), between Mucianus and Vespasian (H. 2.5), between Mucianus and Flavius Sabinus (H. 3.75), and between L. Piso and M. 
Silanus (H. 4.48) are exemplary cases in the Historiae. In the Annales, the discord between Piso and Germanicus in the East (passim 
book 2), between Piso and Sentius (A. 2.78 ff.), between Antonius Felix and Ventidius Cumanus in Judaea (A. 12.54; H. 5.9), between 
Corbulo and Quadratus (A. 13.9) and Corbulo and Paetus (A. 15.6) in the East, between C. Silius and Visellius Varro (A. 3.43), and 
Curtius Rufus’ difficilitas with colleagues (A. 11.21; cf. Agricola’s facilitas) are outstanding examples. Note Tacitus’ claims about the 
rarity of concord amongst powerful men at A. 4.4.1 (arduum sit eodem loci potentiam et concordiam esse) and 13.2.1 (rarum in societate potentiae 
concordes). Also note the points that Nero makes at the inauguration of his reign (13.4): the domesticis discordiis, odia, iniurias, and cupidinem 
ultionis, which Nero claims not to bring to the job, are, of course, systemic problems from which the Principate suffers. 
191 So Drusus Caesar (A. 4.3.2), Suetonius Paulinus (A. 14.29.1), Domitius Corbulo (A. 15.6.4), Caesennius Paetus (A. 15.3 ff.), Antonius 
Primus (H. 3.53.1), Cn. Piso (A. 2.43.2), and Agrippina the Elder (A. 6.25.2).  
192 Agricola and Paulinus: auctoritatem (Agr. 9.3) ~ auctoritas (H. 1.87.2); ratio ducis (Agr. 18.4) ~ ducis ratio (H. 2.26.2); tanta ratione (Agr. 
20.3) ~ cui cauta potius consilia cum ratione (H. 2.25.2); clarus et magnus (Agr. 18.5) ~ militia clarus gloriam nomenque (H. 2.37.1); naturali 
prudentia (Agr. 9.2), prudens (Agr. 19.1) ~ prudentia (H. 2.37.2, 2.39.1); et adloquente adhuc Agricola militum ardor eminebat (Agr. 35.1) ~ is ardor 
uerba ducis sequebatur (A. 14.36.3); constantia ducis (Agr. 18.4), constantiam (Agr. 41.3), constans (Agr. 45.3) ~ mira constantia (A. 14.33.1); 
Paulinus at Mona divides his troops into three parts (A. 14.34; Dio 62.8.3) ~ Agricola does the same at Mons Graupius (Agr. 25.4); 
Domitian sends a freedman across the Channel to communicate his wish that Agricola take up the governorship of Syria (Agr. 40.2) ~ 
after Paulinus’ repression of the Boudiccan revolt, Nero sends his freedman Polyclitus to Britain in response to alarming letters from 
Paulinus’ procurator Classicianus (A. 14.39.1-2; cf. Sailor 2008, 80 n. 74). Also note key differences: mira concordia (Agr. 6.1), procul ab 
aemulatione aduersus collegas, procul a contentione aduersus procuratores (Agr. 9.4) ~ aeque discordiam praepositorum... (Agr. 15.2), Suetonio discors (A. 
14.38.2). Agricola and Germanicus: tristitiam et adrogantiam et auaritiam exuerat (Agr. 9.3) ~ inuidiam et adrogantiam effugerat (A. 2.72.2). Like 
Agricola, Germanicus is modest (modestia: A. 2.26.4), self-controlled (temperentia: 2.73.3), and kind towards friends (clementia: 2.73.3). 
Both mingle with and encourage their men (Agr. 20.2; A. 1.71.3). Both are recalled from their commands by allegedly jealous 
emperors (Agr. 39 ~ A. 2.26). Tiberius’ dispatch of Germanicus to the East in order to remove him from his legions in Germania (A. 
2.5, 2.43) mirrors Domitian’s offer of the governorship of Syria to Agricola to induce him to leave Britain (Agr. 40.2). Both men’s 
deaths are depicted similarly: Agr. 43.1-2 ~ A. 2.71 (esp. interceptum ueneno ~ ueneno interceptus). On the connections between Agricola 
and Germanicus, cf. Cogitore 2014, 149-62. Agricola and Corbulo: multus in agmine, laudare modestiam, disiectos coercere (Agr. 20.2) ~ in 
agmine, in laboribus frequens adesse, laudem strenuis, solacium inualidis, exemplum omnibus ostendere (A. 13.35.4); tanta... curaque (Agr. 20.3), gloria 
(Agr. 39.2, 41.1, 41.4) ~ magna cum cura et mox gloria (A. 11.18.2); ... seu patientia ac labore paene aduersus ipsam rerum naturam opus fuit... (Agr. 
33.2) ~ sola ducis patientia mitigabantur, eadem pluraque gregario milite tolerantis (A. 14.24.1).  
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II.5  Governorship of Britain 
 
          In Britain, Agricola faced a new set of responsibilities, for not only was Britain an imperial 
province with legions, but it was unstable and its conquest ongoing. In addition to the type of judicial 
and fiscal duties he had carried out in Aquitania, Agricola would be in charge of the four legions and 
the auxiliary cohorts stationed in the province. As governor and commander-in-chief, he was 
responsible for the preparation and execution of military operations and pitched battles, the 
conditioning of the army in times of military inactivity, the consolidation of newly gained territory, and 
the imposition of Roman power and administration on the province. At the same time, as a 
subordinate to his princeps in Rome, Agricola constantly had to negotiate his position vis-à-vis the latter, 
mainly in the form of dispatches, through which he received instructions (mandata) and reported about 
his achievements. In the twenty-two chapters that cover Agricola’s governorship, Tacitus lays out these 
challenges, articulating the qualities essential for the management of an imperial province with legions. 
Like the chapter on Aquitania, the account of Agricola’s record in Britain reveals many material 
connections with the historical narratives, where Tacitus assesses Roman officials on the basis of the 
same gubernatorial and military qualities. The Agricola sets out Tacitus’ philosophy of provincial 
governorship and military leadership.  
 
II.5.1  Britain and Agricola’s Predecessors 
Tacitus sets the stage for Agricola’s governorship by means of a long digression, in which he 
describes the geography and people of Britain (10-12) and the history of its occupation from the time 
of Augustus to Frontinus (13-17). These chapters are significant for what they reveal about Tacitus’ 
thematic and intellectual concerns. The sections on Britain, which show close affinity with Sallust’s 
description of Africa in the Jugurtha (Jug. 17-19), pronounce Tacitus’ ethnographic interests, which are 
on display in the Germania, in the sections on the Jews in the extant Historiae (H. 5.2-10, which mirror 
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the organization of the chapters on Britain and the history of its occupation), and in those on 
Germania, Britain, Armenia, and Parthia in the Annales. The chapters on Britain offer a background to 
Agricola’s governorship and serve to accentuate his success and his conquest of the province.193 The 
remainder of the digression consists of a swift survey of the previous governors of Britain, which 
serves in part as a foil to Agricola’s achievements.194 I am not concerned here with the veracity of these 
chapters, which has been debated elsewhere. Rather, I am interested in what points Tacitus selects for 
mention and what this tells us about his concerns.  
It is clear from the outset that Tacitus favors expansion and military initiative. He disapproves 
of Augustus’ abstention from expansion into Britain and of Tiberius’ deference to Augustan precept.195 
Claudius’ conquest is duly noted and Vespasian is lauded for renewing the forward movement in 
Britain abandoned by Nero after the Boudiccan revolt. Aulus Plautius, Publius Ostorius Scapula, 
Suetonius Paulinus, Petilius Cerialis, and Julius Frontinus all are commended for advancing the 
frontier, while the remaining governors are castigated for making only limited advances or keeping 
themselves to consolidating territory. Tacitus’ scornful comments about those of Agricola’s staff who 
tried to dissuade him from pursuing war against British tribes confirm his outlook (18.2, 25.3, 27.1). 
Already in the Agricola do we see Tacitus connecting expansion and military initiative with morality, in 
the sense that he considers lack of military initiative a sign of imperial weakness. I explore this notion 
further in the third chapter. 
The subjection of native tribes is one aim of good foreign policy, while a region’s wealth and 
mineral resources are essential for bearing the cost of campaigns and annexation (12.6). A practical 
																																																								
193 The chapters highlight the warlike character of the Britons and underline that Agricola’s conquest confirmed Britain’s status as an 
island and disclosed lands hitherto unknown: cf. Sablayrolles 1981, 55-56. The description of Ocean and its mystical qualities adds 
emphasis to the achievements of Agricola and his fleet. On Ocean and its imagined mystique in the Roman mind, see D. Braund 
1996, 10-23; Fear 2008, 304. The account of the previous campaigns into Britain highlights the fact that Agricola, as the definitive 
conqueror of Britain, succeeded where eminent predecessors, like Julius Caesar, had failed (13.2). On the implied comparison between 
Caesar and Agricola, see Fear 2008, 304-16. 
194 The standard interpretation of these chapters is that Tacitus aims to highlight Agricola’s excellence by focusing on the faults of his 
predecessors. See esp. McGing 1982, 15-20. Martin 1998 refutes this idea, showing that the description of some of Agricola’s 
predecessors is quite favorable. I agree with the latter view. 
195 Tiberius’ deference to Augustus’ precept is another concern that recurs in the Annales. Note esp. A. 1.77.3, 4.37.3, 4.73.3.  
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advantage of military action is that it keeps troops disciplined and so forestalls the enervating effects of 
prolonged inactivity or peace.196 Military action, however, should be pursued only when the rest of the 
province is consolidated and prospects of success are good. This explains why most of Britain’s 
governors keep themselves (to Tacitus’ chagrin) to consolidation. The Boudiccan revolt stands as a 
stern warning against rash military decision-making. Tacitus decided to present the revolt here as a 
failure of intelligence as opposed to a failure of government as in the Annales. That is significant in this 
context because it bears on the issue of what he thinks a governor should know. It is in these chapters, 
too, that he first hints at some of the drawbacks of using client kings (14.1), a concern that preoccupies 
him throughout the Annales.197  
 
II.5.2  Accumulated Experience in One Province 
 
 A principal ingredient of military and gubernatorial success is knowledge based on experience, 
while entering office without prior experience jeopardizes the implementation of projected policy. 
Tacitus stresses that Agricola, in contrast with his predecessors, had great knowledge of Britain and the 
indigenous mindset (animorum prouinciae prudens, 19.1).198 This knowledge was the result of an 
accumulated experience in the province from his previous terms there as military tribune and legionary 
legate. This exposure allowed him not only to get to know the province very well but to witness 
firsthand, as we have seen, gubernatorial and military errors on the part of his predecessors (doctus per 
aliena experimenta, 19.1). Agricola accumulated the type of experience that a governor seeing a province 
for the first time did not and could not ever possess.  
In terms of gubernatorial efficiency, it is quite remarkable that extended tenures in one 
province were a rarity under the Principate. Agricola is unique, as far as we know, in having served as 
																																																								
196 Tacitus stresses the enervating effects of “prolonged peace” (longa pax) under Roman rule: most Britons are still fierce, while sloth 
and inactivity (segnitia cum otio) has made the once warlike Gauls weak (Agr. 11).  
197 See Gowing 1990, 315-330 on Tacitus’ treatment of client kings.  
198 As far as we know, Cerialis is the only one of Agricola’s predecessors who certainly had seen Britain before being appointed its 
governor. For the careers of these men, see Birley 1981, 37 ff. It is possible that Aulus Didius Gallus (Ogilvie and Richmond 1967, 
191) and Suetonius Paulinus (Birley 1981, 55) had accompanied Claudius to Britain as his comes. 
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military tribune, legionary legate, and governor in the same province.199 The reasons for this are plain. 
Extended time in one province allowed governors to develop a dangerous hold on the affections of 
their troops, while some used their long-accumulated power to corrupt ends (cf. A. 2.36).200 Moreover, 
keeping the same men in provinces for extended periods interfered with the proper rotation of office, 
inspiring protests from the senatorial class (cf. A. 2.36), “for whom provincial governorships were 
perquisites to be shared.”201 Despite such drawbacks, long tenures, when held by competent and 
righteous officials, come with palpable advantages, allowing men to build up experience on the spot 
and become more efficient administrators. The question of how long governors should be kept in 
their province was complicated (one could never accurately predict how anyone’s tenure would turn 
out: A. 3.69) and emperors adopted divergent policies. Dio – reflecting idealized Severan/Antonine 
ideology – describes Maecenas as advising Augustus to institute tenures of three to five years, allowing 
governors to gain experience and implement desired measures, but preventing them from gaining too 
much power and becoming corrupt (52.23.2). Tiberius was innovative in keeping governors in the 
same province for extensive periods, but he was exceptional and his motivations are much debated.202 
Tacitus’ comments on Tiberius’ policy in the Annales and his assessment of officials who held long 
tenures reveal his concern with the matter and his attitude is characteristically complex.203 He 
commends the administration of Poppaeus Sabinus, who governed Moesia for 24 years (A. 6.39.3), 
																																																								
199 Birley 1975, 139: “A rapid survey of known careers can produce about fifty senators who held all three posts; but none held them 
all in the same province and only a handful served even twice with the same army.”  
200 See Brunt 1961, 209-11 [= 1990, 75-77], pointing to C. Silius (Upper Germany, AD 14-21), L. Apronius (Lower Germany, AD 28-
34), Pomponius Labeo (Moesia, AD 26-34), Pontius Pilatus (Judaea, AD 26-36), and C. Galerius, prefect of Egypt (AD 16-31).  
201 Goodyear 1981, 181. Cf. Syme 1958a, 441-42; Brunt 2004, 172 on restrictions on provincial commands. 
202 For lists of officials with extended tenures under Tiberius, see Brunt 1961, 210-11 = Brunt 1990, 76-77; Griffin 1995, 46 n. 23; cf. 
Goodyear 1981, 182. Such long tenures are not found again after Tiberius. Marsh (1931, 157) ascribes this policy to Tiberius’ care for 
provincials (cf. Syme 1958a, 441). Others see more sinister reasons, such as the removal from Rome of potential rivals or 
unwillingness to make continuous changes in appointments. Cf. Griffin 1995, 44 ff.  
203 At A. 1.80 he records the popular complaint that Tiberius prevented many from earning promotions, assigned to provinces 
‘mediocre’ men, and at times kept men whom he had appointed to provinces in the capital (e.g. L. Arruntius: A. 6.27.3; H. 2.65.2;  
P. Anteius: A. 13.22). But elsewhere Tacitus claims that Tiberius’ selection of officials was careful and that he always made sure to 
pick the most suitable man for any office (A. 4.6.2-3). It should be noted that Tacitus does not explicitly endorse these public 
opinions. Tiberius tends to prefer extended tenures for governors, but at the same time knows that such tenures encourage corruption 
and arrogance (A. 2.36). He urges the senate to select a suitable and experienced man to assume command against Tacfarinas in Africa 
(A. 3.32), while he lets accumulated experience dictate the right moment for Drusus Caesar to be granted tribunician power (A. 3.56). 
Under Sejanus’ influence, however, Tiberius makes questionable decisions (A. 4.2.3). 
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but stresses that C. Silius and Gn. Lentulus Gaetulicus, governors of Upper Germany from AD 14-21 
and 29-39 respectively, developed dangerous holds on the affections of their legions (A. 4.18, 6.30). 
Silius would be destroyed in 24 on charges of extortion and conspiracy with the Gallic rebel Sacrovir 
(4.19; he certainly was guilty of the former), while Gaetulicus, in the final year of his command, was 
accused of leading a conspiracy against Caligula and consequently executed.204 While long tenures, 
then, could lead to dangerous developments, Tacitus can condemn governors and generals for being 
unfamiliar with their troops or their province, something that longer tenures would remedy.  
While in the Annales Tacitus does not unequivocally endorse or oppose the practice of long 
provincial tenures, in the Agricola he presents a case where accumulated experience in one province 
plainly is beneficial. This is especially clear upon Agricola’s arrival in the province, often a treacherous 
moment, as local tribes looked to the substitution of one governor by another as an opportunity for 
revolt (Agr. 18.1-2; A. 12.31.1; cf. transitus rerum, H. 1.21.2; mutatus princeps, A. 1.16.1; mutatione principis, 
A. 2.64.3). The Ordovices in North Wales had wiped out an allied cavalry unit and stirred up other 
tribes, who were waiting to see how the new governor would respond: if Agricola proved weak and 
hesitant, they would revolt en masse. Though summer was past and others recommended consolidation, 
Agricola swiftly defeated the Ordovices and capitalized on this success by at once moving against the 
island of Mona and taking it. What allowed for the rapidity and decisiveness of these campaigns was 
Agricola’s prior knowledge of the topography of North Wales and the strait between Mona and the 
mainland (Agr. 14.3, 18.4-5).205  
          It is equally crucial that a governor can rely on experienced subordinates to carry out his 
																																																								
204 Suet., Cal. 24.3; Cl. 9.1; Ves. 2.3; Dio 59.22.5, 8; 59.23.1-2, 5, 7-8. Gaetulicus was supposed to have organized the plot together with 
M. Aemilius Lepidus. The nature and extent of the conspiracy are highly uncertain. See Rutledge 2001, 162-63, 372 n. 28. 
205 Richmond 1944, 35. This passage is interesting on stylistic grounds as well. A common technique in the Historiae and the Annales is 
the one whereby Tacitus, in addition to relating what actually happened, hints at alternative outcomes that might have happened if 
circumstances had been different, often by asking the question “what if?” Pagán (2006, 197) calls this technique “side-shadowing,” 
while O’Gorman (2006) uses the term “virtual history.” We may consider the current passage an early example of this technique, with 
Tacitus hinting at a potential major revolt, had not the experienced Agricola but a governor without prior knowledge of Britain been 
appointed. Further examples: Agr. 4.3 (ni prudentia matris...), 16.2 (quod nisi Paulinus...), 23 (ac si uirtus...), 26.2 (quod nisi paludes...), 31.4 (ac 
nisi felicitas...), 37.1 (ni... Agricola), 37.4 (quod ni... Agricola...). 
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projected policies. Tacitus stresses that Agricola (again much like Cicero’s Quintus) selected only the 
best men for each position: “he conducted no public business through freedmen and slaves. He was 
not led by personal feelings, recommendations, or entreaties in his selection of centurions or soldiers, 
but it always was the best man whom he thought most reliable” (19.2-3). These points not only bear 
on what a governor should know or do, but they reflect on Roman society, where the proper 
recognition of merit (uirtus) is awry, where patronage and nepotism are the principal means for the 
appointment and promotion of public officials, and where freedmen had come to hold increasing 
power and influence in the imperial service.206 In the contemporary Germania, Tacitus raises similar 
points, showing that among the Germani uirtus is the principal criterion for the selection of officials 
(G. 7.1, 13.2-3) and that freedmen have no influence in state affairs (G. 25.2). It is a shared aspect of 
both monographs that, by ascribing particular traits and values to Agricola and the Germani, they offer 
critical commentary on contemporary Roman society. In the Dialogus, Aper and Maternus highlight the 
power and influence of freedmen in imperial Rome (D. 7.1, 13.4).  
Tacitus’ concern with experience and the appointment of seasoned officials continues into the 
later works, where he stresses the importance of having tested men occupy major governmental and 
military posts. I have noted the emphasis Tacitus places on Nero’s selection of Corbulo to deal with 
the Parthian invasion of Armenia in 54 (A. 13.8), a selection that “seemed to open up a place for 
merit” (uidebaturque locus uirtutibus patefactus). He again commends Nero for re-appointing Corbulo to 
handle the continued affairs with the Parthians, for this general was “familiar for years with his troops 
and the enemy” (A. 15.25.2), whereas the incompetence of an inexperienced substitute like Caesennius 
Paetus (with whom people were now thoroughly disgusted: Paetus piguerat) might endanger frontier 
security and the execution of foreign policy (15.25.2). It was their accumulated experience in their 
respective areas that made men like Agricola and Corbulo suitable candidates for their posts. 
																																																								
206 Millar 1977, 69-83 on freedmen in the imperial service. Cicero urges Quintus not to use slaves in public business (Q. fr. 1.1.17), not 
to trust men whose reliability is suspect (1.1.10-14) and not to listen to “false, deceitful, profit-seeking whispers” (1.1.13).  
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Elsewhere, Tacitus writes that Tiberius took special care to appoint the best men available, 
meticulously scrutinizing each candidate’s past record.207 The historian praises Junius Blaesus for 
selecting men of “tested virtue” (uirtutis expertae, A. 3.74.3), stresses the extensive experience of 
Germanicus’ legate Caecina (who had taken part in 40 military campaigns as a subordinate or 
commander, A. 1.64.4, 3.33.1), and ascribes Vespasian’s success as governor of Judaea in part to his 
“first-rate subordinates” (egregriis ministris, H. 5.10.1).  
In contrast, the over-promotion of incompetent men remains an unpalatable aspect of the 
Principate for Tacitus. Note, for instance, his bitter remarks on the appointment of Aulus Vitellius (the 
future emperor) to the command of Lower Germany (H. 1.9.1; cf. H. 3.86.1) and his description of 
Otho’s ill-placed reliance on Licinius Proculus, who lacked military experience (bellorum insolens) but 
could surpass in influence seasoned men like Suetonius Paulinus, Marius Celsus, and Annius Gallus 
(H. 1.87.2). A good example of the selection of a wholly unsuitable candidate and its consequences is 
Claudius’ appointment of Julius Paelignus as procurator of Cappadocia (A. 12.49), apparently the 
result of personal favor (Claudio perquam familiaris). Tacitus recounts how the incompetent and morally 
corrupt man plundered the province, how his troops abandoned him and left him defenseless against 
barbarian incursions, how the legate Helvidius Priscus needed to intervene with a legion, and how all 
of this nearly caused a Parthian war. The above examples reflect Tacitus’ continued concern with the 
appointment of seasoned officials, serve to further contrast Agricola with Domitian, and point up 
problems in Rome that are absent from Agricola’s administration in Britain.  
 
II.5.3  Agricola the Commander-in-Chief  
In narrating Agricola’s record as commander-in-chief, Tacitus stresses the following qualities: 
(a) personal leadership and display of authority (b) eloquence in front of large bodies of men (c) 
																																																								
207 “He used to confer offices by taking into account the nobility of a candidate’s ancestry, the distinction of his military service, and the 
brilliance of his civil attainments, so that it be sufficiently clear that no better choice had been available... the Caesar entrusted the imperial 
property to the most tested men, at times to a personal stranger on the strength of his reputation’”(A. 4.6.2, but cf. A. 1.80 with n. 100). 
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willingness and ability to endure hard labor and danger (d) experience, foresight, and deliberation (e) 
ability to exploit and consolidate success (f) ability to keep one’s troops disciplined in times of military 
inactivity. These qualities, as we shall see, are described as essential for maintaining the line of 
command, for preventing mutiny, for the successful planning and execution of campaigns and pitched 
battles, and for the consolidation of success and gained territory. The composite of these qualities 
constitutes, to use K. Wellesley’s term, Tacitus’ “philosophy of military leadership,”208 a philosophy 
that is enunciated in the Agricola. I should reiterate here that, although many of the qualities ascribed to 
Agricola and other generals are commonplace in ancient military narrative, authors distinguish 
themselves not by the introduction of novel elements but by the emphasis they place on particular 
aspects and by the techniques they use to do so. I have already noted how conventional qualities that 
are positive in republican authors can be pejorative in Tacitus and yet retain their positive meaning in 
particular cases. The similarities between Agricola and other generals ought not be dismissed out of 
hand as the mere repetition of hackneyed topoi. 
  
II.5.3a  Leadership and Display of Authority 
Good Tacitean generals lead by example, both on and off the battlefield. As we have seen, 
Tacitus envisions the conduct of those in positions of power as having a ‘trickle-down effect’ through 
the ranks (H. 2.68.1-2; p. 54). In the Agricola, he lays special emphasis on Agricola’s leadership and 
personal initiative. The general often shows himself on the march (multus in agmine, 20.2; saepe in agmine, 
33.4), praising good discipline and keeping stragglers in order (laudare modestiam, disiectos coercere, 20.2).209 
He personally selects the location of military camps and personally explores forests and estuaries (ipse... 
ipse, 20.2). He personally initiates battles against the Ordovices and Caledonians against the advice of 
his overcautious officers and, when he crosses the river Clyde, he does so “in the leading ship” (naue 
																																																								
208 Wellesley 1969, 89. 
209 Agricola mirrors Sallust’s Sulla: in agmine... multus adesse (Jug. 96.3). Trajan also leads on the march (Dio 68.23.1).  
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prima, 24.1). In battle, Agricola is conspicuous too, placing himself in front of the ranks (ipse ante agmen, 
18.2, 35.4) and being present everywhere (frequens ubique, 37.4). In the historical works, Tacitus 
continues to stress the importance for commanders to lead by example, in some cases seemingly 
recalling his father-in-law. Like Agricola, Vespasian (H. 2.82.1), Titus (H. 5.1.1), Germanicus (A. 
1.71.3), and Corbulo (A. 13.35.4) mingle with and encourage their subordinates, both at work and on 
the march. Paulinus’ leadership at Mona and against Boudicca is similar to that of Agricola (n. 192), 
while Tacitus emphasizes the conspicuousness in battle of Arminius (A. 2.17.4), Germanicus (2.21.2), 
Sacrovir (3.41.3, 3.45.2), and Pharasmanes and Orodes (6.35.2). Commenting on Antonius Primus’ 
leadership, Tacitus offers a generalizing maxim: it is the duty of a determined general (constantis ducis... 
officium, 3.17.1)… to be conspicuous and present when difficulties arise (...insignis hosti, conspicuus suis, H. 
3.17.1 ~ frequens ubique, Agr. 37.4; cf. Caes., Gal. 2.21.1).210  
In contrast, failure to display authority prevents commanders from controlling their troops and 
invariably comes with dangerous consequences. About the governorships of Trebellius Maximus and 
Vettius Bolanus, which he treats at greater length in the Historiae, this is the point Tacitus selects for 
mention: their lethargy engendered mutiny and their lack of auctoritas left them unable to restore 
order.211 Tacitus’ silence here about the quarrelsome conduct of Trebellius’ legate Roscius Coelius, 
who inflamed the army against him (H. 1.60), is significant, as it underlines the fact that it lay with the 
governor, as the supreme authority in the province, to preserve stability and order.  
The notion that lack of auctoritas engenders mutiny frequently recurs in the historical works. Its 
prevalence in the Historiae hardly requires elaboration; the failure of Hordeonius Flaccus is exemplary. 
The best examples from the Annales are the great mutinies in Pannonia and Germania, which, among 
																																																								
210 Note the extraordinary weight Antonius Primus enjoyed with the common soldiers. It was one of his defining abilities to generate 
this kind of authority (H. 3.1-3, 3.10, 3.20 etc.). Cf. Shotter 1977, 24. 
211 The mutiny during Trebellius’ term is related in more detail at H. 1.60 (Chilver 1979 ad loc.; Damon 2003 ad loc.). Tacitus’ focus in 
the Agricola is on Trebellius’ poor leadership and the consequent lack of discipline in the ranks. Similarly, Tacitus omits Bolanus’ 
honorable conduct as legate under Corbulo (Stat., Sil. 5.2.34-47) and focuses on his poor leadership in Britain. Tacitus’ concern with 
concord among military forces accords well with the message of Nerva’s CONCORDIA EXERCITUUM coinage.  
	
	 81 
other things, reflect Tacitus’ continued interest in the reaction of armies to the conduct of their 
commanders.212 He ascribes the outbreak of the mutinies in part to the inability of the legates Blaesus 
(1.16.2) and Caecina (1.32) to assert their authority, and he is concerned to point out the flawed 
manner in which Blaesus, Caecina, Germanicus, and Drusus attempt to restore order. I do not treat 
the mutinies at length.213 What matters here is that the response of armies to competent or flawed 
leadership is another persistent Tacitean concern that is enunciated in the Agricola. 
 
II.5.3b  Eloquence in Front of Large Bodies of Men 
In addition to displaying leadership and maintaining auctoritas, good Tacitean generals are able 
speakers. The ability to speak well in front of crowds allowed generals to prevent unrest in the ranks 
(an important theme in the Historiae) and to boost morale.214 The importance of military rhetoric is 
reflected by the common practice in Greek and Roman historiography of inserting pre-battle speeches 
into the narrative, either in direct (oratio recta) or indirect (oratio obliqua) discourse. In the Agricola, 
Tacitus inserts one such speech in oratio obliqua (Boudicca: Agr. 15) and a set pair of pre-battle speeches 
(Calgacus: Agr. 30-32; Agricola: Agr. 33-34) in oratio recta, thus giving the biography a distinctly 
historiographical character. Agricola’s exhortation at Mons Graupius serves to illustrate the impact of a 
good speech on a large body of men. Using persuasive arguments, which reveal knowledge not only of 
the enemy and the landscape but of the failures of his predecessors, Agricola fires up his men. He 
points out their common bond, calling them his commilitones,215 recalling the campaigns, battles, and 
marches they shared and stressing that they now stand before the enemy together. At the same time, 
																																																								
212 None of the other authors covering the revolts (Velleius, Suetonius, Dio) is as concerned with the behavior of the commanders 
and the army’s response to them: cf. Shotter 1968, 197. 
213 See Shotter 1968 and Ross 1973 on Germanicus’ conduct during the revolt; Woodman 2006 on the mutinies in general. For an 
examination of the Roman response to mutinies (with case-studies of Caesar at Placentia in 49 BC, of Octavian during his Illyrian 
campaigns in 34-33 BC, and of Germanicus on the Lower Rhine in AD 14), see Brice 2015, 103-21.   
214 On the description of leaders and crowds in ancient historiography and its connections with Greek and Roman epic: Hardie 2010.  
215 Comparing the use of the term in the Agricola and the historical works reveals something about its currency and force in different 
eras. Augustus abandoned its use after the civil wars (Suet., Aug. 25.1) and it was not until 68, as far as we know, that the term makes 
its way officially into public documents and speeches (Campbell 1984, 32-59). This is reflected neatly by the term’s appearance in 
several of the speeches in the Agricola and the Historiae and its absence in the speeches in the Annales. Tacitus puts the term in the 
mouths of Piso (H. 1.29.2, 1.30.2), Galba (H. 1.35.2), and Otho (H. 1.37.1, 1.38.1, 1.83.2, 1.84.2).  
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he maintains a firm distinction between his own role as commander-in-chief and that of the common 
soldiers (Agr. 33.2-3), an important distinction that recurs in the speeches of Otho (H. 1.83.3, 84.2) 
and Antonius Primus (H. 3.20.1-2). Tacitus is concerned to show that Agricola’s speech had the 
desired effect: “even while he was still speaking the ardor of the troops was rising and the end of his 
speech was met with an outburst of enthusiasm” (et adloquente adhuc Agricola militum ardor eminebat, et 
finem orationis ingens alacritas consecuta est, 35.1). Agricola’s eloquence is presented as an important 
ingredient of his military success and identified as an essential quality in the ideal general.  
In the Historiae and Annales (though paired set-pieces in oratio recta are fewer in the latter), 
Tacitus continues to stress the importance of military eloquence. He continues to ascribe speeches to 
commanders, but not only to those who are successful speakers.216 He also grants speeches to men 
whose lack of eloquence harms their authority.217 Other narrative purposes aside, such speeches 
underline the necessity for those in positions of power to speak well in front of crowds and illustrate 
the consequences for those who fail to do so. In a number of contexts, the impact of efficient 
speeches seems to recall Agricola’s exhortation at Mons Graupius. The speeches of Galba (H. 1.36), 
Valens (H. 1.52), Germanicus (A. 1.49, 2.15), Ostorius Scapula (A. 12.35), Corbulo (A. 13.39; cf. 
15.12), and Paulinus (A. 14.36) all are described as raising the ardor of their troops, just as Agricola had 
raised the ardor of his.218 What we have here is a technique, articulated in the Agricola, whereby Tacitus 
signifies a speaker’s success by the reaction it produces in his listeners. Whether he actually had 
Agricola in mind in each of these contexts is impossible to know, but in any case the textual links attest 
																																																								
216 Note Tacitus’ comments on Antonius Primus (H. 2.86, 3.2-3, 3.10, 3.20, 3.24, 3.60), Vespasian (militariter locutus, H. 2.80.2), Junius 
Blaesus (multa dicendi arte, A. 1.19.2), and Corbulo (A. 15.26.3). Note also the positive impact of the speeches of Valens (H. 1.52.3), 
Cerialis (H. 4.72-74, 5.16), Mucianus (H. 2.76-78, 4.46), Germanicus (A. 1.49, 2.15), Paulinus (14.36), and Corbulo (A. 13.39, 15.12).  
217 Note the speech of C. Dillius Vocula (H. 4.58-59) with Rutherford 2010, 322-23, who speaks of “futile rhetoric.” Cf. the failed 
attempt of Sacrovir to encourage the townsmen of Augustodunum (A. 3.46). Some men, in accordance with their lack of auctoritas, get 
no speech at all: so Hordeonius Flaccus and Vitellius. Cf. Levene 2009, 212-24 on speeches in the Historiae. 
218 Especially Paulinus’ speech recalls Agricola’s in more ways than one (cf. McGing 1982, 17-18). Note also the clamor that the 
speeches of Primus (H. 3.24.3), Mucianus (H. 4.46.3), Cerialis (5.16.2), and Silius (A. 3.46.3) produce in their men. Arnaldi (1945, 44) 
and Paratore (2012, 188-90 = 1962, 187-88) note similarities between Agr. 30-34 and H. 4.68-74, where the speech of a native chief is 
set against that of a Roman general. Laird (1999, 123 ff.) identifies similarities between Agr. 29.4, H. 1.15, and A. 2.40 in the use of the 
locutus fertur expression.  
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to a continuity in analysis and thought across the three works. Good generals in Tacitus are able 
speakers capable of gaining their men’s confidence. 
 
II.5.3c  Willingness and Ability to Endure Hard Labor and Danger 
Another important quality that Tacitus ascribes to Agricola is the willingness to endure “hard 
labor and danger” (labor et periculum, 18.5). The combination of these words has a long history in 
Roman literature, ultimately stretching back to the Alexander-tradition, and it usually is ascribed to 
hardy generals or soldiers capable of enduring military toils and dangers.219 The combination recurs six 
times in the Historiae, but for some reason is dropped entirely in the Annales. Tacitus uses the 
combination to criticize the Vitellian forces for their lack of discipline and to describe the Flavian 
forces in the opposite manner.220 Moreover, he often describes recruits and enlisted forces as unable to 
cope with the burdens of military training and labores.221 In each of these cases, Tacitus evokes for his 
readers the standard he ascribed to his father-in-law.  
 
II.5.3d  Experience, Foresight, and Deliberation 
 While courage and personal initiative are crucial military qualities, without expertise and good 
judgment they readily devolve into rashness. As Tacitus continually shows, while speed is crucial in 
military contexts and unnecessary delay can throw away victory, there is a thin line between speed and 
rashness. Repeated comments show that Tacitus deems rashness in a general inexcusable, even if 
events turn out well.222 A good general, as Tacitus shows in the Agricola, deliberates in anticipation of 
																																																								
219 Note Velleius on Agrippa: labore, uigilia, periculo inuictus (2.79.1) with Woodman 1993 ad loc. The combination appears over 35 times 
in Livy; 5 times in Sallust; 5 times in Caesar; 45-50 times in Cicero; 2 times in Velleius; 5 times in Valerius Maximus; 4 times in Seneca. 
Borzsák (1982, 40) suggests that the words ultimately derive from the πόνοι καὶ κίνδυνοι ascribed to Alexander. Cf. Xenophon on the 
willingness of Epaminondas and his troops to face πόνος and κίνδυνος (Hell. 7.5.19), as well as the καὶ πόνον καὶ κίνδυνον that 
Augustus is said by Tiberius to have endured on behalf of the Roman people (Dio 56.41.5). 
220 On the Vitellians: H. 1.51, 2.69 with Ash 2007a ad loc.; 3.69, 3.84 on the Flavian troops. Note Antonius Primus’ complaint at H. 
3.53.3 and that of Civilis at H. 4.32.2. Cf. discrimina et labor (H. 2.4.4); labori et audaciae (H. 3.59.3).  
221 Ash 2007a, 120. Examples: H. 1.23.2, 1.51.2, 2.16.2, 2.19.1, 2.62.1; A. 1.16, 13.35.1-3. Titus and Corbulo, in contrast, are portrayed 
as readily sharing the toils of their men (H. 5.1.1; A. 13.35). Cf. the Sixth and Third Legions that Corbulo took with him from Syria, 
integrum militem et crebris ac prosperis laboribus exercitum (A. 15.26.1). 
222 Wellesley 1969, 90. See n. 230. 
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his enemy’s moves, allowing for swift execution of strategy without encountering unexpected dangers. 
In addition to deliberation, the key qualities are experience and foresight. It was Agricola’s experience 
of North Wales that allowed for his swift and decisive attacks against the Ordovices and Mona. In his 
sixth season, foreseeing a movement from remote tribes and aiming to forestall danger (timebantur, 
25.1), Agricola reconnoiters the harbors with his fleet (explorauit, 25.1). He employs scouts to learn 
about his enemy’s line (exploratoribus edoctus, 26.1), adjusts his own line in anticipation of his enemy’s 
movements (cognoscit, 25.3; ueritus, 35.4), and takes into account his enemy’s strengths and weaknesses 
as well as the surrounding landscape.223 His topographical expertise allows him to avoid being hemmed 
in by Caledonian tribes (cognoscit... ne... circumiretur, 25.3-4), to foresee the emergence from the hills of 
additional British troops and keep them from attacking his rear (id ipsum ueritus, 37.1), and to prevent 
heavy losses when pursuing the enemy into forests, aware that these are more familiar to the latter than 
to his own forces (37.4).224 His topographical expertise is reflected further by his careful placement of 
new fortifications (ratione curaque, 20.3; opportunitates locorum sapientius legisse, 22.2), which consolidated 
won territory and allowed him to proceed further north without facing revolt in his rear.225  
Tacitus accentuates Agricola’s prudence by recording the rashness and demise of the young 
auxiliary prefect Aulus Atticus (iuuenili ardore et ferocia, 37.6), the only one of Agricola’s subordinates to 
be mentioned by name in the work. This dramatic technique recurs in the Historiae, where the 
recklessness of Arrius Varus serves to underline Antonius Primus’ qualities (H. 3.16-17) and in the 
Annales, where the rashness and death of one of Corbulo’s cavalrymen underscores the discipline of 
the rest (13.40.3). Throughout the Agricola Tacitus underlines Agricola’s experience and prudence by 
																																																								
223 At Mons Graupius he employs light-armed auxiliary forces instead of the legions in part because they move better in the 
mountainous terrain and match up well with the Britons (36.1; cf. 35): Gilliver 1996, 54-67. Similar considerations may explain the 
deployment of auxiliary troops by Germanicus at Idistaviso in AD 16 (A. 2.16), by L. Apronius against the Frisii in AD 23 (A. 4.73), 
and by Cerialis against Civilis in AD 70 (H. 5.17).  
224 Caesar, too, is aware of the danger posed by forests in Britain, as he stresses throughout the fifth book of the Bellum Gallicum. 
Caesar (Gal. 3.29) and Agricola (31.1) clear forests in Britain, as does Germanicus in Germania (A. 1.50).  
225 Whatever the veracity of Tacitus’ claims (variously confirmed or negated by continued archaeological findings: cf. Hanson 1980; 
1987, 177 ff.), they show that he considered the careful placement of fortifications essential for consolidating territory. 
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describing him with such adjectives as gnarus/non ignarus, (e)doctus, peritus, prudens, expertus, with nouns 
like peritia, ratio, ars, cura, adverbs like sapientius, and verbs like cognoscere, timere, uereri, explorare.226 Tacitus 
continues to use these terms to the same effect throughout his historical narratives.  
As in the Agricola, in the historical narratives foresight, experience, and deliberation remain the 
hallmarks of good generalship. Like Agricola, the outstanding Tacitean generals display foresight,227 
know when to hurry or delay a campaign, know how to use the landscape in which they operate,228 and 
consolidate their gains.229 Bad generals in Tacitus generally fail at one or more of these aspects, 
displaying either rashness or unnecessary caution,230 lack of foresight,231 or failure to adjust to the 
surrounding landscape.232 They also fail to capitalize on success or to exploit opportunities.233  
 
II.5.3e  Ability to Exploit and Consolidate Success 
Tacitus is particularly sensitive about this last aspect, as he reveals in the Agricola. There he 
writes that Agricola, upon defeating the Ordovices, used the momentum to move against Mona, 
“aware that renown must be followed up and that, in accordance with the result of the first attack, 
would be the terror inspired by other operations” (non ignarus instandum famae ac, prout prima cessissent, 
terrorem ceteris fore, 18.3). After his victory at Mons Graupius, Agricola pursued a similar policy, inspiring 
																																																								
226 See Pagán 2014, 77-81 on the positive value of fear (in the sense of anticipation) in the character of Agricola. 
227 Note the foresight of A. Caecina (H. 2.17), Vespasian (H. 2.74), the Flavians (H. 3.5), Antonius Primus and Arrius Varus (H. 3.6), 
Antonius Primus (H. 3.15, 60), Titus (H. 5.1), Germanicus (A. 1.56, 2.10, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14), Poppaeus Sabinus (A. 4.47 ff.), C. Cassius 
(A. 12.12), and Corbulo (A. 13.38, 13.39, 13.40; 15.3-5, 15.12). 
228 Note the geographical expertise of Aulus Caecina Alienus (H. 3.9), Civilis (H. 4.22, 5.14 ff.), Germanicus (A. 1.56, 1.60, 1.61, 1.63, 
2.5, 2.14, 2.20-24), Aulus Caecina Severus (A. 1.64, 1.67), Poppaeus Sabinus (A. 4.47), Ostorius Scapula (A. 12.35), and Corbulo (A. 
13.39). Consider also the description of the competing views of the Flavians on the capture of Verona (H. 3.8).  
229 For some examples of proper fortification or consolidation, note Germanicus (A. 2.7), Blaesus (3.74), Dolabella (4.24), Sabinus 
(4.49), Corbulo (11.18-19), and Ostorius Scapula (12.32). Cf. A. 14.31.4 on Suetonius Paulinus’ governorship: “nor did there seem any 
great difficulty in the demolition of a colony unprotected by fortifications – a point too little regarded by our commanders, whose 
thoughts had run more on the agreeable than on the useful.” Cf. Tacitus’ comments on the military acumen of the Chatti at G. 30.2-3. 
The Column of Trajan emphasizes that emperor’s careful consolidation during his crossing of the Danube into Dacia: Bennett 1997, 93. 
230 On rashness, note Tacitus’ comments on the conduct of Cerialis: H. 3.79, 4.71, 4.77-78, 5.14, 5.20-22; A. 14.33. On unnecessary 
delay, note Tacitus’ remarks on Suetonius Paulinus (H. 2.25-26) and Fabius Valens (3.40). 
231 Note Vocula at H. 4.33-34 and Paetus at A. 15.8-9. Comments on lack of foresight and caution on the part of generals or armies 
(incaute, temere, improuide etc.) are ubiquitous in the historical works. 
232 Note the positioning of the Vitellians at H. 2.14; Cerialis at H. 5.15. Vitellius (H. 3.56) and Caesennius Paetus (A. 15.6 ff.) 
exemplify the faults typical of bad Tacitean generals.  
233 Note the comments on Civilis and Vocula at H. 4.34, on Cerialis’ delay at H. 4.75 (but note secutusque fortunam (4.78) and salubri 
temperamento (4.86)), and the failure of the Roman fleet to be present at crucial junctures (H. 5.18, 5.21). Comments on the failure to 
build on success or exploit opportunities are ubiquitous in the historical works. 
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terror by sending his fleet around Britain and by slowly leading his infantry and cavalry through the 
newly conquered territory (38.3-4). Intimidation was a common method in Roman foreign policy, 
aimed at cowing subjects and enemies into obedience and thus preventing unnecessary warfare and 
expense.234 One case in which Tacitus seems to evoke Agricola’s exploitation of success and 
imposition of terror is in his account of the start of Ostorius Scapula’s governorship of Britain (A. 
12.31 ~ Agr. 18). Like Agricola, Ostorius faces provincial unrest upon his arrival. In both cases, the 
Britons use the arrival of a new governor to rise up. In both cases, the campaigning season is already 
over. Unlike Agricola, Ostorius faces the additional challenge that he does not know his army. 
Nonetheless, like Agricola, he takes the field, “aware that the first results are those which engender fear 
or confidence” (ille gnarus primis euentibus metum aut fiduciam gigni, 12.31.2 ~ Agr. 18.3) and, having cut 
down the insurgents, he immediately launches another campaign “to prevent a second rally and an 
unstable peace thereafter” (12.31.2). Elsewhere, Tacitus writes that A. Caecina decided to assault the 
town of Placentia with great force, “aware that the initial successes of the war would determine his 
reputation thereafter” (gnarus ut initia belli prouenissent famam in cetera fore, H. 2.20.2),235 and that Corbulo 
capitalized on the destruction of Artaxata to seize Tigranocerta (utendum recenti terrore ratus, A. 14.23.1). 
The terror imposed by first impressions and the notion that success, where possible, should be 
followed up is another point that is articulated in the Agricola and taken up in the later works (cf. 
Cerialis at H. 4.78.2: secutusque fortunam). Tacitus’ emphasis on Agricola’s ability to capitalizate on 
success places into perspective his frequent comments about those who allow their enemies to 
recover. This is another important concern for Tacitus, who accuses (not always justly) several eminent 
generals of knowingly prolonging wars or even preferring war to peace.236 This notion, too, surfaces in 
the Agricola, where Tacitus has Agricola urge his troops to “prove to the state that this army could 
																																																								
234 Cf. Mattern 1999, 115-22, 221-22. The word terror in the Agricola is almost exclusively ascribed to the Britons: Pagán 2014, 75. 
235 Cf. Tacitus’ description of Corbulo: qui ut inseruiret famae, quae in novis coeptis ualidissima est (A. 13.8.3). 
236 He accuses Furius Camillus, L. Apronius, and Junius Blaesus of having prolonged the war against Tacfarinas (A. 4.23) and charges 
Mucianus (H. 3.52), Vocula (H. 4.34), and Corbulo (A. 15.3, 15.6, 15.10) with protracting war and preferring war to peace. See 
Chilver-Townend (1985, 48) on the unjust charge against Vocula.  
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never have been accused of protracting a war” (adprobate rei publicae numquam exercitui imputari potuisse aut 
moras belli aut causas rebellandi, Agr. 34.4). Tacitus’ comments here and in the later works suggest that it 
was common for military setbacks to be followed by such accusations.   
 
II.5.3f  Ability to Keep One’s Troops Disciplined in Times of Military Inactivity 
          An important duty of a governor was to ensure that, in times of peace or military inactivity, he 
keeps his troops trained and disciplined. Agricola, says Tacitus, used the beginning of the summers to 
train his men, being present himself and constantly encouraging them (20.2). He combined the 
interests of military exercise and preservation of peace by making sudden incursions against local 
tribes, which kept the latter honest and offered his troops welcome action.237 He further engaged his 
troops in the erection of fortifications and in helping native tribes in the construction of temples, fora 
and houses (21.1), as good governors were supposed to do (Ulp., Dig. 1.18.7). Agricola, in sum, offered 
his troops regular military action and, in times of military inactivity, kept them exercised through 
training and civil and military projects. In contrast, failure to keep soldiers active regularly leads to 
mutiny and discord: lack of military action under Trebellius Maximus and Vettius Bolanus engenders 
discordia and petulantia among the soldiers (Agr. 16.3-5).  
In the historical narratives, the proper conditioning of military forces remains a principal 
concern. The notion that military discipline lapses during civil war and through lack of training is 
prevalent in the Historiae and Tacitus’ comments on Vitellius are exemplary. The historian, by showing 
what Vitellius does not do, demonstrates what a commander-in-chief should do. The emperor “did 
not try to inspire his troops by addressing them or having them drilled” (H. 3.36.1). His forces 
increasingly take after his example: in Rome they “did no guard-duty... were not kept in condition by 
service... and their physical strength was weakened through inactivity and their courage through 
																																																								
237 The Germani, too, forestall the consequences of inactivity and peace by actively seeking war (G. 14.2). Also note Tacitus’ remarks 
on the enervating effects of peace on the Gauls (Agr. 11.4) and the Cherusci (G. 36.1).  
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debaucheries” (H. 2.93.1; cf. 2.69.2). Similarly, Cn. Piso, governor of Syria under Tiberius, by allowing 
idleness in the camp and licentiousness in the cities, and by letting the soldiers roam through the 
countryside to indulge their pleasures, loosened discipline so much that he perversely was called parens 
legionum (A. 2.55.5, 2.80.2, 3.13.2). In addition to showing what incompetent commanders do not do, 
Tacitus reinforces the right way of doing things. During the Batavian Revolt, Herennius Gallus and C. 
Dillius Vocula, upon deciding not to engage the enemy, set up a camp and exercised their men by 
having them form in the order of battle and construct fortifications and entrenchments (H. 4.26). In 
the Annales, Tacitus highlights the rigorous discipline and training imposed by Corbulo (11.18-20, 
13.35-36) and C. Cassius (12.12.1), as well as the riverine projects initiated by L. Vetus and Pompeius 
Paulinus to keep their troops active during times of inactivity (13.53.1-2; contrast the “indiscriminate 
grants of furloughs” that weakened Caesennius Paetus’ army: A. 15.10.1). The necessity of military 
training for the preservation of discipline is underlined by the outbreak of the great mutiny in 
Pannonia (AD 14), the source of which Tacitus locates in part in Blaesus’ decision to suspend the 
normal round of duty (intermiserat solita munia, 1.16.2).238  
 
II.5.4  Roman vs. Other 
The discipline and order of well-led Roman armies often is articulated in contrast with the 
rashness and disorganization of barbarian forces. Greek and Roman authors typically ascribe Rome’s 
imperial success to the disciplina or ἄσκησις of its armies, denoting tactical and organizational 
sophistication as well as moral discipline, in contrast with barbarian disorder and softness.239 This 
Roman vs. Barbarian polarity is prominent throughout the Tacitean corpus and already fully at work in 
																																																								
238 The effect of prolonged idleness on the morale of individuals and nations is a concern not limited to military contexts. Tacitus 
envisions idleness as having similarly detrimental effects on the morale of senators under bad emperors (Agr. 2-3) and on native tribes 
under Roman rule (Agr. 11.4, 21; cf. G. 36.1). While it is good policy to accustom, say, Gauls or Britons to inaction (21.1), its presence 
among senators is castigated and should be avoided at all cost in the military sphere. 
239 See Mattern 2004, 189. Selected examples are in Strabo 4.4.2, 7.3.17; Sen., de Ira 1.11.1-4, 3.2.6; Luc. 8.368-90; Tac., G. 4.3, A. 
11.10; App., Gall. 3; Dio 38.45.4-5, 40.15.6; Aelius Aristides 86-88; Vegetius 1.1. Compare the imagery on Trajan’s Column, on which 
“Roman calm is constantly opposed to Dacian panic” (Davies 1997, 63).  
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the Agricola: Boudicca and the Iceni display “barbarian cruelty” (in barbaris saeuitiae genus, 16.1); 
Calgacus’ forces receive his exhortation with discordant and frenzied cries, “as is common among 
barbarians” (ut barbaris moris, 33.1); the organized battle line, strategy, and discipline of Agricola’s forces 
is contrasted with the disorganized and confused movements of British chariots and cavalry (35.3-4, 
36.3); Roman arms trump the unwieldy British weapons (33.5, 36.1-2); the Romans display valor, while 
the Caledonians are called fugacissimi, ignaui, timentes (34.1-2); the Caledonians are urged on in battle by 
their wives and parents, who stand by as spectators (15.4, 32.2: uictoriae incitamenta), a distinctly un-
Roman custom. In some cases, local tribes have the advantage, knowing their own territory better 
(25.4, 32.2, 33.5, 37.4) and possessing particular skills. Germanic tribes, for example, are known for 
their swimming skills and their experience in operating in shallow waters (18.4).  
This constructed opposition between Romans and non-Romans continues in Tacitus’ other 
works in much the same way. In the Germania, the Germani are unable to endure hard work (G. 4.1) 
and spend much of their time sleeping, feasting, and drinking (G. 15.1, 22.1, 23.1). In the Historiae, the 
Roxolani, invading during the civil wars of 69, were “scattered and negligent” and weighed down by 
“desire for booty,” while on the Roman side “everything was ready for battle” (H. 1.79.2). In the 
Annales, a painstaking Germanicus defeats the intoxicated Marsi, who had feasted all night and 
neglected to place watchmen around their camp (A. 1.50-51; cf. Agr. 26.1).240 Barbarian tribes continue 
to be described as waging war with their relatives present as uictoriae incitamenta (Germani: G. 7.2, 8.1, 
H. 4.18.2 (hortamenta uictoriae), 5.17.2; Thracians: A. 4.46.3, 4.51.2; Britons: A. 12.34, 14.34.2), while 
Roman generals exhort their men to fight for what is dear to them at home (quae domi cara, A. 1.67.2). 
Roman custom in this respect is underlined by a senatorial debate about the harmful influence of the 
																																																								
240 Other examples: during the Batavian Revolt Civilis’ forces recklessly enter battle after feasting all night only to be cut down by 
organized and disciplined Roman forces (H. 4.29.1). Cerialis gains an unexpected victory over combined Gallic and Germanic forces 
because the latter engage in a “perverse struggle amongst themselves to secure booty and forget the enemy” (H. 4.78.2). Likewise, in the 
Annales, the Numidian Tacfarinas is defeated in a night battle, since “on the Roman side the infantry was in compact order, the cavalry 
was disposed in companies, and everything was prepared for battle, whereas the enemy, completely surprised, without arms, order or a 
plan, was seized, killed, or captured like cattle” (A. 4.25.2). 
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presence of women in the provinces (A. 3.33) and by Tiberius’ anger about Agrippina the Elder’s 
influence with Germanicus’ legions (A. 1.69). Moreover, the “extraordinary harmony” (mira concordia, 
6.1; cf. concordem sibi coniugem, A. 3.33.1) between Agricola and his wife, who accompanied him to Asia 
and Britain (Agr. 6.2; 29.1), by its exceptionality underlines common Roman practice.241 The notion, 
finally, that local tribes know their own territory well and that this posed dangers to Roman armies 
recurs in the historical narratives, too, particularly with Germanic forces, whose swimming skills and 
expertise in fighting in marshy conditions continue to be their defining trait. The Batavian chief Civilis, 
for instance, by diverting the Rhine and flooding the plains, creates favorable ground for his forces 
against Cerialis, whose men cannot move well in these conditions (H. 5.14 ff.). The account of the 
campaigns of Germanicus and A. Caecina against Arminius (A. 1.63 ff.) illustrates the same issue, 
showing the challenges of dealing with the treacherous woods, marshes, and swamps that were natural 
advantages for the Germani.  
While the constructed opposition between Romans and non-Romans largely continues 
unchanged from the Agricola to the Annales, Tacitus does not everywhere uphold a firm polarity. At 
times, he ascribes conventional barbarian traits to Romans, such as Domitian, Vitellius and his forces, 
and Cerialis.242 In the Historiae, moreover, the distinction between Roman and non-Roman becomes 
faint, one of the effects of the civil wars being a near breakdown of Roman identity.243 Contrasts also 
are not always in Rome’s favor. Tacitus can contrast Rome’s corruption and depravity with the 
simplicity of life in the provinces, while the Germania in many ways sets Germanic custom in positive 
contrast with Roman practice. Furthermore, despite their ‘barbarian’ traits and faults, Tacitus plainly 
respects the abilities of men like Arminius, Caratacus, and Civilis.  
In his later works, Tacitus continually revisits the Agricola’s central themes and concerns, in 
																																																								
241 The section on Agricola’s wife, which enunciates Tacitus’ interest in governors’ wives, should be read in conjunction with the 
debate in the Annales. On the role of wives and women in the provinces, see Marshall 1975, 109-27. On this senatorial debate, which 
is modeled on the debate in Livy concerning the Oppian law (195 BC), see Ginsburg 1993, 86-103.  
242 In the Agricola, Domitian and the Britons share ira, adrogantia, and saeuitia. On the Vitellians: H. 2.21, 2.73. On Cerialis: H. 5.22.  
243 Ash 1999; 2009, 85-99; Master 2008. 
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terms of broader issues, such as the nature of the Principate and imperial rule, and more circumscribed 
subjects, such as the length of provincial tenures, Roman perceptions of non-Romans, and the 
qualities of the ideal governor and general. In the final sections of this chapter, I move to what the 
Agricola reveals about the nature of Rome’s empire and its maintenance, focusing on perceived dangers 
associated with auxiliary forces and on how Romans justified the Empire’s existence.  
 
II.6  Imperial Expansion and the Role of Auxiliary Forces  
 Good generalship should lead to few losses and, like Sallust, Tacitus explicitly praises generals 
who gain victory without shedding much Roman blood.244 That the preservation of Roman life in 
battle was important to Tacitus is clear from his description of Agricola’s battle formation at Mons 
Graupius, which had the auxiliary infantry in the front and the legionary forces held in reserve. Tacitus 
says Agricola did this in part because “the glory of victory would be greater if won without the loss of 
Roman blood” (35.2). Tacitus, the only ancient author to ascribe this purpose to the use of auxiliaries, 
takes up this notion in the Annales, where he writes that Corbulo, when attacked by the Mardi, sent 
Iberian forces against them and so gained victory at the cost only of foreign blood (externo sanguine, A. 
14.23.3).245 Tacitus further points out the utility of auxiliaries in certain contexts, such as the use of 
lighter-armed Batavian and Tungrian troops at Mons Graupius, better suited to the mountainous 
terrain than the more heavily armed legionaries. The use of auxiliaries in great numbers was not 
Agricola’s innovation, as Richmond argued, but seems to have been common practice by this time.246  
Despite their utility in offering tactical variability and preserving Roman lives, Tacitus points  
up the danger inherent in the growing reliance on these troops or in entering battle with a majority of 
																																																								
244 Servius on Verg., Aen. 11.421: et hoc est unde laudat Sallustius duces, qui uictoriam incruento exercitu reportauerunt. Examples in Tacitus: Agr. 
35.2; H. 2.15, 2.44, 3.8, 3.13, 3.60; A. 2.18, 2.46, 3.39, 12.17, 12.46, 13.39, 14.23. According to the 5th century historian Orosius (Hist. 
7.10.4), Tacitus in the Historiae preferred not to give figures for Roman casualties, invoking the example of Sallust and others. But cf. 
Agr. 37.6, H. 2.17.2, A. 4.73.4, 14.37.2. On the fragments of the Historiae, see Barnes 1977, 224-31; Cornell 2013, Vol. 1, 101.  
245 Gilliver 1996, 54-55.  
246 Richmond 1944, 42; Gilliver 1996, 54-56. The same strategy was used by Germanicus at Idistaviso in 16 (A. 2.16), by L. Apronius 
against the Frisii in 23 (A. 4.73), and by Cerialis against Civilis in 70 (H. 5.17). Ostorius Scapula used only auxiliaries against the Iceni 
in 51, but it is unclear whether he had legionaries available and opted to keep them in reserve (A. 12.31). Many scenes on Trajan’s 
Column depict auxiliaries doing the fighting, with legionary forces held in reserve (Richmond 1944, 43). See also Hanson 1987, 175. 
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them. The arguments placed in the mouth of the Caledonian chief Calgacus illustrate the point: 
 
An eandem Romanis in bello uirtutem quam in pace lasciuiam adesse creditis? nostris illi dissensionibus ac discordiis 
clari uitia hostium in gloriam exercitus sui uertunt; quem contractum ex diuersissimis gentibus ut secundae res tenent, 
ita aduersae dissoluent: nisi si Gallos et Germanos et (pudet dictu) Britannorum plerosque, licet dominationi alienae 
sanguinem commodent, diutius tamen hostis quam seruos, fide et adfectu teneri putatis. metus ac terror sunt infirma 
uincla caritatis; quae ubi remouerisi, qui timere desierint, odisse incipient…  
In ipsa hostium acie inueniemus nostras manus: adgnoscent Britanni suam causam, recordabuntur Galli priorem 
libertatem, tam deserent illos ceteri Germani quam nuper Usipi reliquerunt. (Agr. 32.1-4) 
 
Do you think the Romans are as courageous in war as they are licentious in peace? They owe their fame 
to our strife and dissension and they turn the errors of the enemy to the glory of their own army, an 
army that, made up as it is of the most diverse nations, is held together as much by success as it will fall 
apart by disaster. Unless you think that these Gauls and Germani, and (it is a shame to say) these many 
Britons, who, though they lend their lives to support a foreigner’s domination have been its enemies 
longer than its slaves, are bound by faithfulness and affection. Fear and terror are their weak bonds of 
attachment; when you’ll have removed these, those who have ceased to fear will begin to hate...  
In the very ranks of the enemy we will find our own forces. Britons will acknowledge our cause as their 
own; Gauls will remember their past freedom; just as the Usipi recently abandoned them, so will the 
other Germani...  
 
 
Calgacus’ words demonstrate the danger in the make-up of Roman armies and the reliance on auxilia. 
While auxiliary regiments regularly were stationed in provinces other than those in which they 
originally were levied (A. 4.5), there were contexts in which they were pitted against forces of their 
own nationality (the Batavian Revolt is a good example). Much like in civil war, Calgacus argues, their 
recognition of their kinsmen will urge the Britons to defect.247 Not only that, the Gallic and Germanic 
forces will abandon Agricola, just as the Usipi had recently done, when they recall their past freedom 
and current state of servitude under the Romans, who impose on them military levies, physical labor, 
and exactions of tribute and grain.248 That all this is not merely a debating point is shown by the 28th 
chapter, in which Tacitus relates the actual mutiny of a cohort of Usipi, who killed a centurion and a 
number of soldiers who had been training them (28.1). While the story of the mutiny perhaps is better 
known for the extraordinary naval journey undertaken by the rebels (28.2-3), a primary purpose of its 
																																																								
247 In Herodotus’ account of the battle of Mycale, the general Hegesistratos argues that the Ionians serving in the Persian army will 
defect upon seeing their kinsmen (9.90.2) and recalling their past freedom (9.98.3). At 9.103.2 they indeed do. As regards the 
drawbacks of composite armies, Pagán (2014, 83-84) also finds connections with Pericles’ funeral oration (Thuc. 2.39.1-2).  
248 Again we note Tacitus’ debt to his predecessors, who ascribe similar denunciations of Rome’s empire to native chiefs. Calgacus’ 
speech, as is well known, evokes the speeches of Sallust’s Mithridates (Hist. 4.69) and Caesar’s Critognatus (Gal. 7.77). 
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inclusion is to “show the capacity of auxiliaries to desert Rome.”249 Without any explicit statement, 
Tacitus hints at Agricola’s potential abandonment by his auxiliaries. That this did not happen might be 
to Agricola’s credit or his good fortune, but does nothing to invalidate its potentiality.250 Tacitus 
balances the utility of auxiliary regiments against the frailty of their loyalty and the danger for Roman 
armies when that loyalty is compromised. This view may well reflect a contemporary debate about the 
use of these forces.251  
 No less important is the fact that Tacitus conceptually separates Agricola’s auxiliaries from his 
legionaries. By the time of writing, auxiliary units were embedded within the imperial system, and the 
distinction in identity between Roman and non-Roman forces had become increasingly blurred.252 As 
early as the AD 60s, “auxiliaries emerge as significant agents of change within provincial society. They 
are no longer (if indeed they ever really were) helping forces ancillary to the legions; rather, they are a 
significant source of power in their own right.”253 Contemporary authors, such as Josephus, describe 
auxiliary cohorts under the broader label of “Romans,” underlining the fact that such forces had 
become ever more Roman. Along the same lines, Tacitus’ frequent allusions to Jugurtha in his portrait 
of Agricola, and his depiction of Calgacus as the ‘ideal barbarian,’ point up how ‘Roman’ such figures 
had become.254 For Tacitus, the increasing ‘barbarization’ of Roman armies was an alarming trend and 
his concern to emphasize that there existed a difference in status between auxiliaries and legionaries is 
telling.255 This concern persists throughout the corpus. In the Historiae, as we have seen, the distinction 
between Romans and non-Romans is very faint, the civil wars causing a near collapse of Roman 
																																																								
249 Ash 2010, 278.  
250 Ostorius Scapula dangerously entered battle with only his auxiliary forces (sine robore legionum socialis copias ducebat, A. 12.31.4). 
According to Dio (68.11.3), several auxiliaries, having deserted Trajan for Decebalus, were caught in an attempt to gain access to and 
assassinate the emperor during the second Dacian War. 
251 Timpe 2007, 438; I. Haynes 2013, 60-63.  
252 I. Haynes 2013, esp. pp. 51-73. Note also Tac., H. 2.80.3 (with Ash 2007 ad loc.) on the ties of intimacy and kinship formed 
between Roman soldiers and local populations. 
253 I. Haynes 2013, 59.  
254 Pagán 2014, 84. Grethlein (2013, 155 n. 173) suggests that Tacitus’ narrative of foreign events often is less ambiguous than that of 
events in Rome and that one reason for this may be the “Romanness” of particular native chiefs (e.g. Calgacus or Caratacus).  
255 I. Haynes 2013, 61-62.  
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identity. As in the Agricola, in the Historiae, Tacitus explicitly separates auxilia from legionary forces. In 
his account of the mutiny under Trebellius Maximus (H. 1.60), he stresses that the auxilia did not join 
at once in the mutiny and relates their defection from their governor separately.256 In the Annales, too, 
although the ‘barbarization’ of Roman armies is less of a concern there, we find contexts in which 
Tacitus carefully distinguishes between auxilia and legionaries, stressing the divisive discord between 
both groups and often describing auxilia as initiating conflict (see n. 448).  
The Caledonian revolt in the Agricola prefigures many episodes of auxiliary desertion or local 
resistance in the historical works that consistently recall Calgacus’ language and arguments. Like the 
Caledonian, the Batavian Civilis (H. 4.14, 4.17, 4.32), the Tencteri (H. 4.64), the Trevirans Valentinus 
(H. 4.68) and Tutor (H. 4.76.4), the Batavians (H. 5.25), the Germanic chief Arminius (A. 1.59, 2.9.10, 
15), the Gauls Florus and Sacrovir (A. 3.40), the Numidian Tacfarinas (A. 4.24), the Thracians (A. 
4.46, 4.48), and the Britons Boudicca (A. 14.35; cf. 14.31) and Caratacus (A. 12.34, 12.37) all are given 
speeches in which they use similar arguments of freedom and slavery to rouse their fellow natives, 
describing the Romans as domini and condemning the burdens they impose.257 The frailty of auxiliary 
loyalty is underlined by the response of Gallic auxiliaries to the Vitellian defeat at Cremona (adfectu, H. 
4.31.1 ~ adfectu, Agr. 32.1; cf. H. 4.76.4), by the transfer of loyalty of Germanic and Gallic cohorts to 
Civilis during the Batavian Revolt (H. 4.17-19, 21, 25, 37, 54-57, 65-66), and by the report that 
Arminius and Inguiomerus possibly were aided in escaping from battle by some auxiliary Chauci, who 
knew them and let them pass (A. 2.17.4). What Tacitus describes as particularly dangerous are cases in 
which desertion or revolt is initiated by allied chiefs who themselves once served as auxiliaries. Such 
men, retaining bonds of affection with fellow native tribes, use the experience they gained in Rome’s 
armies to invest those tribes with military discipline and exploit their knowledge of Roman military 
																																																								
256 I. Haynes 2013, 60.  
257 For a comprehensive study of barbarian speeches in Roman historiography, see Adler 2011; 2013, 291-304. Cf. Rutherford 2010, 
319 ff. See Master 2012, 98-99 on Tacitus’ depiction of provincial anger against Rome and its implications for managing the Empire. 
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strategy and the shortcomings of the Empire’s defenses.258 Arminius, Tacfarinas, Gannascus, Florus, 
Sacrovir, and Civilis all are examples of this phenomenon and they all recall Sallust’s Jugurtha, who 
used the experience he gained under Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia (Jug. 7; 101.6 on his using the 
Latin language in battle) against the Roman generals sent out against him. A dangerous corollary of 
Rome’s military success, Tacitus shows, is that it made the city increasingly dependent on auxiliary 
forces to defend the Empire and that serving in Roman armies gave those forces military expertise that 
made them more formidable opponents in case of revolt.  
 
II.7  The Rationale of Empire 
The arguments placed in the mouth of the British rebels serve to point up the negative impact 
of Roman power on provincials and offer a pretext for why the latter would revolt against it. The 
attribution of speeches to enemies or provincial subjects was a useful technique to present a non-
Roman perspective on the Empire to a Roman reader. Against the non-Roman viewpoint stands the 
Roman one, which articulates the Empire as a beneficial or necessary power structure. This broad 
outlook underlies Tacitus’ description of Agricola’s policies in Britain:  
 
Sequens hiems saluberrimis consiliis absumpta. namque ut homines dispersi ac rudes eoque in bella faciles quieti et otio per 
uoluptates adsuescerent, hortari priuatim, adiuuare publice, ut templa fora domos extruerent, laudando promptos, 
castigando segnis: ita honoris aemulatio pro necessitate erat. iam uero principum filios liberalibus artibus erudire, et ingenia 
Britannorum studiis Gallorum anteferre, ut qui modo linguam Romanam abnuebant, eloquentiam concupiscerent. inde 
etiam habitus nostri honor et frequens toga; paulatimque discessum ad delenimenta uitiorum, porticus et balinea et 
conuiuiorum elegantiam. idque apud imperitos humanitas uocabatur, cum pars seruitutis esset. (Agr. 21) 
 
The following winter was spent executing a number of highly salutary designs. For in order that people 
who are scattered and uncultivated, and therefore easily inclined to war, might become accustomed 
through pleasures to peace and quiet, Agricola encouraged them privately and offered them public 
assistance in the construction of temples, fora, and houses, praising those who were quick to the task 
and criticizing those who were sluggish: thus a competition for honor took the place of compulsion. He 
moreover educated the children of chiefs in the liberal arts and showed such preference for the natural 
talents of the Britons over the studied efforts of the Gauls that, as a result, those who shortly before  
 
																																																								
258 Timpe 2007, 438. Note the training Civilis gained in Roman camps: addito si quid militaris disciplinae in castris Romanorum (H. 4.17.5). 
Arminius learned the Latin language when commanding Germanic auxiliaries: nam pleraque Latino sermone interiaciebat, ut qui Romanis in 
castris ductor popularium meruisset (A. 2.10.3). Cf. A. 2.13.2: inter quae unus hostium, Latinae linguae sciens; A. 2.45.2: quippe longa aduersum nos 
militia insueuerant sequi signa, subsidiis firmari, dicta imperatorum accipere. Cf. Vell. 2.110.5 (Pannonians), 2.118.2 (Arminius).  
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disavowed the Roman language now longed to be eloquent in it. Then they considered it an honor to 
dress like us and togas became prevalent; and little by little they went astray towards the allurements of 
vices, that is colonnades, baths, and the refinement of banquets. Among those unfamiliar with such 
practices this was called “civilization,” although it was but a part of their enslavement. 
 
 
This passage has raised a great deal of debate since it unmistakably shows Agricola executing measures 
aimed at the moral corruption and the enslavement of the Britons.259 The ostensible incongruity 
between this depiction of the governor and the otherwise wholly positive presentation of his career has 
urged some to explain away Tacitus’ words and lay the blame for their corruption with the Britons 
themselves.260 It is unnecessary, however, and ultimately unhelpful, to resort to such measures since 
exculpating Agricola here leaves unsolved a later passage in which he explicitly says that the conquest 
of Hibernia would be beneficial in that it would deprive the Britons even of the sight of freedom (e 
conspectu libertas tolleretur, 24.3). The envisioned policy is clear and so is Tacitus’ approval of it.  
Rather than explaining away Tacitus’ statements, we need to understand the underlying vision 
of the Empire on which this policy is based. This vision is based on a set of unspoken assumptions – 
not peculiar to Tacitus – about the nature of the Empire and the people living under it, and about the 
greater benefit that both Britons and Romans are supposed to derive from the former’s subjection to 
the latter.261 The principal aim of Agricola’s measures is to accustom the Britons to “peace and quiet” 
(quieti et otio, 21.1), that is the pacification of a turbulent province.262 The Britons’ warlike nature (faciles 
in bella, 21.1) is supposed to be the result of their lack of civilization, making them savage, unruly, and 
mutually discordant. Their ‘civilization’ by the Romans, then, is seen as salutary in that it is supposed to 
make them more orderly and soft and consequently less inclined to and fit for war. This is what 
happened to the once warlike Gauls, who were ‘softened’ under Roman rule (Agr. 11.4). The projected 
																																																								
259 Cf. the condemnation of Roman imperialism expressed by the Tencteri, who urge the Ubii to “renounce the pleasures through 
which, rather than through their arms, the Romans prevail over subject nations” (abruptis uoluptatibus, quibus Romani plus aduersus subiectos 
quam armis ualent, H. 4.64.3).  
260 So, for instance, D. Braund 1996, 161 ff.  
261 As Sailor (2012, 31) rightly notes. Since the nature of Roman imperialism and the concept of Romanization continue to be hotly 
debated (see esp. Mattingly 2011), I advisedly state here that the following pages reflect what I understand to be Tacitus’ view of the 
Empire and its administration, not my personal view of the realities of the processes he describes.  
262 On the Roman policy of conciliation in the aftermath of the Boudiccan revolt, see Gambash 2012, 1-15.  
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benefit, then, of the spread of Roman culture and ‘softening peace’ across the provinces is the 
prevention of continuous warfare between native tribes and between the latter and Romans. Put 
differently, the moral degeneration and enslavement of the Britons serves the larger aim of preserving 
peace and order. That this outlook is not peculiar to Tacitus is clear from the words of Cicero, who 
likewise articulates Roman control as ensuring stability within the provinces (Q. fr. 1.1.34), and of Pliny 
the Elder, who also sees the process of ‘acculturation’ (for lack of a truly satisfactory term) as a key 
element in Rome’s imperial mission (Nat. 3.39). 
The second assumption justifying the Empire lies in the ugly alternative it is supposed to 
prevent: given the prevalence of discord and persistent warfare among native tribes, termination of the 
Empire can only result in universal strife and possibly even mutual destruction.263 The mutiny of the 
Usipi and their subsequent fate (Agr. 28) demonstrates the consequences when Roman control is 
removed. The Germanic cohort, after killing the centurion and Roman soldiers that were training 
them, fled in a few vessels and circled around Britain in a disorganized and uncertain fashion. Having 
run out of provisions, they were forced to raid the property of the coastal Britons – who fiercely 
defended themselves – and finally were reduced to cannibalism. Having next lost their vessels from 
not knowing how to control them (it is implied that removing their Roman preceptors prevented them 
from learning such skills), they eventually were picked up by fellow Germanic tribes, who sold some 
into slavery; what became of the others we are not told. Other narrative purposes aside, the passage 
shows that all the Usipi gained from killing their Roman superiors is that it left them helpless in a 
violent world intent on their destruction: “they destroy the very forces that enable them.”264   
From this perspective, the Empire is justified because, despite the moral degeneration and 
enslavement it imposes upon native tribes, it protects them from internal strife and foreign wars. This, 
																																																								
263 Note the words ascribed to Cerialis at H. 4.74.3: nam pulsis, quod di prohibeant, Romanis quid aliud quam bella omnium inter se gentium 
existent? See Evans 2003, 270. Discord among barbarian tribes is ubiquitous in Tacitus.  
264 Evans 2003, 271; Sailor 2012, 33. Cf. the similar fate of the Ampsivarii (A. 13.56).  
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in turn, is also why the ‘burdens of empire,’ that is the tribute and the conscription, are legitimate, 
because without it the Empire cannot be maintained. Cicero formulates the same rationale in his letter 
on governorship to his brother Quintus.265 What Cicero there spells out is what Tacitus takes for 
granted in the Agricola. According to this view, the role of the provinces is that of imperial ‘partners’ 
sharing the financial and military burdens of maintaining the Empire, the structure that provides 
universal peace and quiet (pacem ... otium, Q. fr. 1.1.34 ~ quieti et otio, Agr. 21.1).  
This vision of the Empire and its purpose is reiterated in the historical works. In the Historiae, 
Cerialis, attempting to restrain rebellious Gallic forces, expresses the same rationale, arguing that, until 
the establishment of the Empire, Gaul had been on a course of self-destruction due to incessant 
internal strife (quos discordiae usque ad exitium fatigabant, H. 4.73.2; bellaque per Gallias semper fuere, 4.74.1; cf. 
prouinciarum aemulatio... nondum uictoria, iam discordia erat, 4.69.2; cf. Caes., Gal. 6.15) and had suffered 
persistent attacks from Germanic tribes (4.73-74; cf. G. 37.5). The Empire, Cerialis claims, serves to 
protect the Gauls from both these evils, and all the Romans demand in exchange is a financial and 
military contribution to ensure its maintenance (4.74.1-2): 
 
nam neque quies gentium sine armis neque arma sine stipendiis neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt: cetera in 
communi sita sunt. ipsi plerumque legionibus nostris praesidetis, ipsi has aliasque prouincias regitis; nihil separatum 
clausumue. 
 
For tranquility among nations cannot be maintained without armies; armies cannot be maintained 
without pay; pay cannot be maintained without tribute; all else we have in common. You often 
command our legions. You rule these and other provinces. There is no privilege and no exclusion.  
 
 
While Cerialis acknowledges that the Empire is not perfect and difficult to endure when led by 
rapacious officials (4.74.2), it is still better than the dreadful alternative it is supposed to prevent. This 
notion helps to put into perspective Calgacus’ arguments and his use of the Usipi as his example. 
																																																								
265 “Asia must also remember that, if it were not in our empire, it would have suffered every calamity that foreign war and strife at home 
can inflict. Since the Empire cannot possibly be maintained without taxation, let Asia not grudge a part of its revenues in exchange for 




While his arguments are reasonable enough in light of the rapacity of Roman officials, and while the 
example of the Usipi suits his larger point, ultimately what he is striving to gain is worse than what he 
is enduring already. To this must be added the point that his arguments have no bearing on the 
conduct of Agricola, who neither is a raptor orbis nor “makes a desert and calls it peace” (30.4-5). 
Agricola’s conduct disproves Calgacus’ claim that the Empire is always and inherently evil, showing 
that it can be just when executed by righteous men.266 Cerialis, drawing a significant analogy between 
domestic and provincial administration, stresses this very point: much like the Principate, the Empire 
is difficult to endure when led by bad men, but it is worth waiting for the appointment of more 
suitable ones (H. 4.74.2; cf. Eprius Marcellus’ claims at H. 4.8).  
The rationale expressed by Cerialis is taken up in the Annales, where Tacitus has both Romans 
and non-Romans expound on the benefits offered by the Empire. For instance, he ascribes a speech 
to the Cheruscan chief Segestes, in which the latter affirms his loyalty to Rome on the theory that 
peace is to be preferred over war (pacem quam bellum probabam, A. 1.58.1). Elsewhere, Tacitus has the 
Marcomannic chief Maroboduus exclaim that Arminius’ revolt against Varus greatly hurt Germania 
(magna cum clade Germaniae, A. 2.46.1), unleashing (as indeed it would) recurrent internal discord and 
warfare. The Roman perspective is articulated most explicitly by Claudius in his speech on admitting 
Gauls into the senate (A. 12.24). The emperor, stressing the same points as Cerialis, reminds the senate 
of the benefits of incorporating foreign troops into Roman armies and celebrates the peace that had 
reigned in Gaul since its conquest by Rome. The vision of the Empire and the nature of the people it 




266 An analogous discussion of the nature of Rome’s empire can be found in Sallust, which should be read in conjunction with that in 
the Agricola. Like Tacitus’ Calgacus, Sallust’s Mithridates argues that Rome’s rule is inherently evil and therefore should be abolished. 
Yet, just as the example of Agricola’s conduct disproves Calgacus’ claims, so Sallust himself identifies a historical moment (146 BC) 
when Rome’s rule turned evil and unbearable (Cat. 10.6), suggesting that the problem is not the Empire itself but the particular men 
who superintend it. See the lucid discussion at Sailor 2012, 32-33.  
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II.8  Conclusions 
         The Agricola is a work of its time, intimately connected with the events surrounding the transfer 
of imperial power from Domitian to Nerva and then to Trajan. It deals with topical questions about 
the relationship between the princeps and the senatorial class and about the proper behavior expected of 
each. As such, it has much in common with another defining text of its time, Pliny’s Panegyricus. 
Agricola’s function as a proto-Trajan, heralding the new emperor and his regime, is of particular 
significance. Despite the fact that the Agricola is firmly grounded in its socio-political moment, Tacitus’ 
later works constantly take up its principal themes and concerns.  
The monograph enunciates Tacitus’ outlook on the Principate and the Empire. Tacitus 
articulates the former as a system of government that, by its very nature, encourages restrictive rule, 
regardless of the individual character of the principes. This is not to say that individual character is 
inconsequential – far from it. For Tacitus, individual character is crucial for explaining human action 
and motivation. It is to say, rather, that the imperial system of government is such that it suffers from 
systemic problems independent from the particular princeps in charge. This explains the apparent 
similarities in his portraits of Domitian and the latter’s Julio-Claudian and Flavian predecessors. It also 
explains Tacitus’ skepticism during the early Trajanic regime (as expressed in the prefaces of the 
Agricola and Historiae) and his subsequent disillusionment. Trajan had established a welcome peace after 
Domitian’s oppressions, but his regime gradually exhibited the same systemic faults that had marked 
past regimes. It often has been argued, on the basis of the prefaces of the Agricola and the Historiae, and 
of Maternus’ description of the Principate at the end of the Dialogus, that Tacitus started out a believer 
in the system only to become ever more disillusioned during Trajan’s regime; in other words, Tacitus’ 
outlook shifted throughout his literary career. A holistic reading of the corpus shows that this view 
cannot be sustained. Tacitus’ outlook on the Principate was pessimistic from the start and, while his 
analysis of the imperial system of government increasingly becomes more complex and multifaceted, 
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his analysis remains, on balance, consistent throughout. 
The nature of the Principate was such that it required a senator constantly to negotiate his 
position vis-à-vis his princeps. The Agricola articulates what Tacitus considers the appropriate behavior 
for a senator in imperial Rome. Throughout the corpus he advocates the conduct exemplified by his 
father-in-law, a conduct of moderation and balance that allows senators to honorably execute their 
offices without incurring the wrath of their emperor and other officials. In both the Agricola and the 
later works, this conduct is contrasted with the type of boldness and ostentatious opposition that 
causes unstable government. 
As regards the nature of the Empire and provincial administration, Tacitus’ outlook remains 
generally consistent as well. The rationale of the Empire is articulated similarly across the corpus, as are 
the benefits and some of the drawbacks of continued expansion. Among the drawbacks identified in 
the Agricola are the growing reliance on auxiliary forces and the increasing ‘barbarization’ of Roman 
armies, concerns that continue to occupy Tacitus throughout. I explore the complexities of Tacitus’ 
attitude towards imperialism and imperium in depth in the next chapter.  
The Agricola sets out Tacitus’ philosophy of generalship and provincial governorship. The 
gubernatorial and military qualities that Tacitus ascribes to Agricola remain the core criteria in his 
assessment of governors and generals in his later works. The particular vices that Agricola is shown to 
avoid are significant because they shed light on what Tacitus sees as the questionable conduct of 
rapacious Roman officials; Agricola’s virtues stand out against a background of widespread provincial 
mismanagement. From both the Agricola and the historical works it is evident that Tacitus thinks 
provincial administration can be just when executed by competent and righteous men, but that 
corruption and maladministration are extensive. He identifies the appointment of seasoned officials as 
one way to prevent these problems, but points out that patronage and personal favor often lead to the 
promotion of unsuitable men.  
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Reading the Agricola and the historical works in conjunction reveals numerous thematic and 
conceptual connections and shows that Tacitus’ outlook on the Principate and the Empire, and on 
more circumscribed issues,267 generally remains consistent. My method of looking for unifying issues 
across different works offers tangible benefits. Scenes in the later works constantly evoke, elaborate 
on, or are inspired by scenes in the monograph. In fact, it seems that Tacitus expects his readers to be 
familiar with the themes he treats in the Agricola before they come to his later works. A holistic reading 
further elucidates Tacitus’ selection of material268 and raises crucial questions about his historical 
method: how, for example, are we to interpret his claim to impartiality in the historical works (H. 1.1.3; 
A. 1.1.3) against the background of his plainly biased treatment of Domitian in the Agricola?269  
Finally, in light of the connections between the Agricola and the historical works, the former 
should be included in any list of Tacitus’ sources for the Historiae and the Annales. Typically, treatments 
of Tacitus’ sources focus on the works, in whatever genre, of his literary predecessors, on 
documentary, archival, and epigraphic evidence, and on oral traditions. But one of the most important 







267 A further connection between the Agricola and the historical works that I have not discussed in this chapter but that is worth 
noting is that between the end of the Agricola and the so-called ‘obituaries’ of the historical works, most developed in the Annales. On 
these obituaries, see Syme 1958b, 18-31 (= Syme 1970, 79-90 = Ash 2012, 245-58). There also are notable resemblances between Agr. 
46 and A. 4.38 (Tiberius on posthumous fame) and 15.62 (Seneca’s final words to his friends). 
268 Another notable example of Tacitus’ selection of his material is his description of Agricola’s inclusion of Domitian in his will (Agr. 
43.4) and that of the wills of Fulcinius Trio (A. 6.38), L. Vetus (A. 16.11), and C. Petronius (A. 16.18). In the Annales, Tacitus reveals 
his distaste for the practice of including emperors (esp. bad ones) in wills, praising Vetus for refusing this “servile act” (seruitio; cf. 
foedis… adulationibus, A. 15.59.5; cf. A. 16.17.5-6) and recording how Trio included in his will terrible imputations against Macro and 
Tiberius and how Petronius’ will detailed Nero’s sexual outrages. In the Agricola, Tacitus naturally does not criticize Agricola for 
including Domitian in his will, but rather stresses that the latter did not deserve to be included in it.  
269 Ash 2007b, 434. And what are the implications of his treatment of the Julio-Claudians and Flavians in the historical works, and his 










Germania, Historiae, Annales  
 
 
“Although the Germania often features as a point of comparison in linguistic studies of Tacitus’ Latin, it 
is not often taken up as a conceptual or historiographical point of comparison for the later historical 
works (possibly because of its genre). Sailor 2008, for instance, omits the Germania and Dialogus from his 
study “because they do not form part of that arc of narrative works that imagine themselves as a 
sequence” (p. 5)... there is no doubt that the Agricola manifests more obvious points of contact with the 
Histories and Annals, but the Germania too deserves attention.”270  
 
The above excerpt from R. Ash’s recent chapter on the Germania neatly encapsulates the 
prevalent scholarly attitude towards the work, which often is studied in isolation and largely remains 
untapped for thematic and conceptual connections with Tacitus’ later works.271 In this chapter, I seek 
to demonstrate that in fact there are significant connections between the Germania and the historical 
narratives and that the work has close affinities with the Agricola as well. The chapter has three main 
parts. In the first, I explore Tacitus’ attitude towards Roman imperialism and imperium as it emerges 
from the monograph. Here I take a new approach to the work, reading it as primarily a reflection on 
the factors (geography, topography, climate, natural and mineral resources, national character and 
custom) that inform the formulation of Roman foreign policy.272 This approach accommodates all of 
the text and its complexities and offers a reading that is less constrained by the work’s genre. The 
Germania, I argue, illustrates and reflects the complexity of the question whether expansion into 
Germania (which Tacitus defines, with one exception (G. 29.3), as the area north of the Rhine and the 
Danube and west of the rivers Vistula and Hron; cf. G. 43.1), or indeed elsewhere, should be pursued. 
																																																								
270 Ash 2014, 186 n. 5. Suerbaum 2015 similarly excludes the Germania and Dialogus from his study.  
271 It is telling that in the recent volume on the opera minora (Devillers 2014) Ash’s chapter is the only one devoted to the Germania.  
272 For an examination of the same factors at work in the conception and territorial organization of what would become the Seleucid 
Empire, see Kosmin 2014.  
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The moral desirability of extending the Empire’s termini, the practical desirability of ending instability 
on the Rhine and Danube frontiers, and the perceived necessity of preventing a unified Germania, are 
offset by serious drawbacks of a northward campaign and annexation, such as financial strain, military 
impracticability, and cultural incompatibility. While Tacitus tends to favor expansion on moral and 
emotional grounds, he points up financial, cultural, and military considerations that impose limits on 
empire. I show that he does not direct the work in a conclusive direction but leaves his readers to 
decide what the proper foreign policy concerning trans-Rhenane Germania should be, a stance that is 
characteristically Tacitean and reflects the complexity of the question at hand.  
In the second part, I discuss Tacitus’ outlook on imperialism and foreign policy as it emerges 
from his historical narratives, arguing that the latter reveal similar complexity about extensibility and 
limitation and that Tacitus’ view of imperium and its limits remains, on the whole, consistent 
throughout. Tacitus continues to advocate for extension and military initiative on moral and emotional 
grounds, but at the same time he draws attention to internal and external pressures on the Empire that 
make a defensive policy imperative. Imperial foreign policy, starting with Tiberius, was cost-efficient 
and conservative, aimed at maintaining Rome’s imperium and the image of superiority without incurring 
unnecessary cost and loss of life. This policy was executed through methods of terrorization, 
diplomacy, and indirect control, while discord among foreign tribes located outside the Empire was 
incited and carefully exploited. This policy is enunciated in the Germania and recurs unchanged in the 
Historiae and Annales.  
In the final part, I trace Tacitus’ characterization of Germania and its tribes from the Germania 
into the historical works. Here I take issue with the common view that the Germani are described less 
favorably in the historical works than in the Germania.273 A systematic examination of the three works 
shows that, although the depiction of individual tribes becomes more multifaceted in the later works, 
																																																								
273 Throughout this study, I employ the terms ‘Germania’ and ‘Germani’ in order not to confuse ancient Germania with modern 
Germany or the ancient Germani with the modern Germans. See Rives 1999, 1-11; cf. Krebs 2011, 81-104. 
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Tacitus ascribes to them the same stereotypical traits he had ascribed to them collectively in the 
Germania. Here I also illustrate how the monograph serves as a reference point in the later works, 
which continually recall and elaborate upon Tacitus’ initial portrait of the Germani. The three parts 
combine to show that there are various conceptual connections between the Germania and the 
historical narratives and that their relationship is marked more by continuity than by change.  
 
III.1  Introduction: the Germania  within its Socio-Political, Literary, and Military Context 
Examining the connections between the Germania and the historical narratives makes good 
sense, seeing that Germania features prominently in all three works. Moreover, all three works were 
composed at times when foreign policy was a principal concern in Rome, in the first instance around 
the accession of an experienced military emperor who governed Upper Germany at the time of his 
appointment and, subsequently, during the years of that emperor’s expansion into regions bordering 
the Empire’s termini. The questions about Germania raised at Trajan’s accession will have been the 
same as those raised during his reign about Dacia, Arabia, Armenia, and Parthia and, upon the failures 
in the east, about Hadrian’s policies.274 Hence it is reasonable to look at the works side-by-side and 
consider how Tacitus’ outlook on foreign policy developed over the course of Trajan’s reign. 
A major difficulty in assessing the Germania is that, unlike the Agricola, it lacks a preface, leaving 
us with the text itself and its socio-political and military context to reconstruct its aims.275 Political 
events in Rome and military affairs abroad combine to shed light on Tacitus’ choice of subject and its 
composition. While the nature of the work is ethnographic, as in the Agricola the generic framework 
serves as a vehicle for the exploration of broader issues. So the description of Germania and its tribes 
serves, by contrast and comparison, as a critical analysis of Rome itself, the ‘mirror’ culture in the 
																																																								
274 For a Hadrianic date for the completion of the Annales, see p. 159. 
275 The scholarship on the Germania is extensive. Bibliographic reviews can be found in Benario 1983, 209–230; 1986, 99-106; 1995, 
112-20; 2005, 275-81; Lund 1991b, 1989-2222 (with a comprehensive annotated bibliography); Stadele 1997. The major commentaries 
are Much 1937, Anderson 1938, Lund 1988, Perl 1990, Benario 1999, Rives 1999 (now standard). Birley 1999 offers useful comments 
as well. On the text’s narrative purpose(s): Rives 1999, 48-56. See also Timpe 1989; Lund 1991b, 2189-2215; Beck 1998, 9-13.  
	
	 106 
work.276 It shares this aspect with the Agricola, which contrasts Agricola’s administration of Britain with 
that of Domitian in Rome. Such analysis was intimately bound up with the transfer of imperial power 
from Domitian to Nerva and then to Trajan and with the formulation of the values of the new regime. 
The Germania is also bound up with foreign policy, as Roman-Germanic interactions, had continued to 
make Germania a major concern throughout the first century.  
The Germani for long had loomed large in the Roman imagination, being formidable enemies 
that had inflicted crushing defeats on Roman armies and being a continued object of conquest for 
different emperors. Germania was the subject of various literary works before Tacitus’ time. Evidence 
from Plutarch (Mar. 11) suggests that the Germani were recognized as a people separate from the 
Gauls by the late second to early first century BC.277 This tradition was taken up and elaborated by 
Caesar, whose Bellum Gallicum offers ethnographic descriptions of the Germanic tribes he encountered. 
As is well known, Caesar characterizes the Germani as more savage and uncultivated, and as less 
tractable, than the Gauls and therefore as less suitable for inclusion within the Empire than their 
neighbors to the south.278 To bolster his claim of having completed the conquest of Gaul, Caesar made 
the Rhine the border between the Gauls and the Germani, even though in reality that river did not 
constitute a polarizing cultural boundary.279 Caesar’s account of the Germani would remain the 
principal model for later authors. For Tacitus, who evokes the Bellum Gallicum in the opening words of 
the Germania, Caesar is still summus auctorum on the subject (28.1).  
While there is no evidence for an ethnographic work on Germania before Tacitus’ time, the 
area is mentioned in the geographical authors, and the wars against the Germani (and the notion of 
																																																								
276 For the notion that the Germania sets out to contrast the simplistic, virtuous, and hardy Germani (‘noble savages’) with the morally 
corrupted Romans, see Wolff 1934, 121–164. Cf. Anderson 1938, xvi–xix; Beare 1964, 69–73; Isaac 2004, 433, 436; cf. O’Gorman 
1993, 147–149 [= Ash 2012, 112-14]; Krebs 2005, 41–43.   
277 Plutarch, through his sources, transmits the contemporary view of the invading Teutones and Cimbri as being Germanic: “the most 
prevalent conjecture was that they were some of the Germanic peoples which reach as far as the northern ocean, a conjecture based 
on the size of their bodies, their light-blue eyes, and on the fact that the Germani call robbers ‘Cimbri’” (καὶ µάλιστα µὲν εἰκάζοντο 
Γερµανικὰ γένη τῶν καθηκόντων ἐπὶ τὸν βόρειον ὠκεανὸν εἶναι τοῖς µεγέθεσι τῶν σωµάτων καὶ τῇ χαροπότητι τῶν ὀµµάτων, 
καὶ ὅτι Κίµβρους ἐπονοµάζουσι Γερµανοὶ τοὺς λῃστάς, Plut., Mar. 11.3).  
278 See now Schadee 2008, 175-78. See also Rives 1999, 24 ff.; Dench 2005, 52-54. 
279 Schadee 2008, 162-63 with further references there; Rives 1999, 25.  
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Germania as a locus of war) frequently appear in the works of historians as well. Livy, in the now lost 
Books 104 and 108, related Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul and his encounters with Germanic tribes, 
including an account of the situm Germaniae moresque. In Books 139-142, he related Drusus the Elder’s 
campaigns of 12-9 BC, but the nature of the account and the way he depicted the Germani remains 
uncertain.280 Velleius, who served under Tiberius in Germania, published a two-book summary history 
of Rome in AD 30, in which he covers Tiberius’ campaigns of 12-9 BC (2.97), those of AD 4-6 (2.105-
109), and those of AD 10-11 (2.120-121.1), including an account of the Varian disaster and remarks on 
Germanic mores and Varus’ failure to deal with them (2.117-119). The next account of note is the now 
lost Bellum Germanicum of the early imperial historian Aufidius Bassus, which either covered the 
campaigns of AD 4-16 or those of 10-16.281 Aufidius’ second work, a general history from at least the 
time of Cicero’s death (Sen., Suas. 6.18.23) to at least AD 31,282 and continued by Pliny the Elder (A fine 
Aufidii Bassi), probably covered the campaigns in Germania, but, as with his Bellum Germanicum, we do 
not know the scope of the work. While it is accepted that Tacitus used Aufidius as a source for the 
Annales, it is uncertain whether he did for the Germania.  
The most important work on the Germani close to Tacitus’ time was Pliny the Elder’s 20-
book Bella Germaniae, which covered “all the wars with the Germani” (omnia quae cum Germanis gessimus 
bella, Plin., Ep. 3.5.4), probably starting with those against the Cimbri and ending either with Corbulo’s 
campaigns and recall in 47 or continuing up to the mid-to-late 50s, Pliny’s own time.283 Tacitus 
certainly used the work for the Annales (A. 1.69.2) and is agreed to have done so for the Germania.284 
Despite a few remarks of Pliny the Younger (Ep. 3.5.4), Suetonius (Cal. 8.1-2), and Tacitus himself (A. 
1.69), we know nothing about the nature of the work. Having served under Corbulo against the 
																																																								
280 Given that in the Agricola Tacitus cites Livy as an authority on Britain (Book 105 on Caesar’s expedition into the island), it is likely 
that he read Livy on Germania as well.  
281 For AD 4-16: Syme 1958a, 274 and appendix 38 (697-700); Syme 1983, 9; for AD 10-16: Timpe 1968, 12-15, followed by Pelling, 
OCD4 204; cf. Fabia 1893, 407; Cornell 2013, Vol. 1, 519 ff.  
282 Cornell 2013, Vol. 1, 519-21.   
283 Cornell 2013, Vol. 1, 530. 
284 Cornell 2013, Vol. 1, 531. 
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Chauci in 47 (Nat. 16.2-4) and later in Upper Germany under P. Pomponius Secundus, Pliny had 
personal experience in Germania, and observations about the Germani in his Naturalis Historia (9.45, 
10.53, 22.8) make it likely that the Bella Germaniae contained many practical facts about Germania and 
its tribes as well. Pliny further wrote a now lost two-book biography of Secundus (Plin., Ep. 3.5.3), 
which presumably contained observations about that man’s command in Upper Germany. Finally, his 
30-book history A fine Aufudii Bassi, covering the later Julio-Claudian period, will have contained 
sections on Germania, but unfortunately this work, too, has been lost.  
In addition to historical works, geographical works like those of Strabo or Pomponius Mela 
contained sections on Germania that reflect the increase of knowledge following the campaigns under 
Augustus and Tiberius.285 As Rives notes, Strabo was the first to describe the rivers Elbe, Ems, Weser, 
and Lippe and the first to write about the Bructeri, Chatti, Quadi, Chauci, Semnones, and 
Langobardi.286 It is uncertain whether Tacitus consulted these works. Frontinus’ Strategemata contained 
eyewitness remarks about Domitian’s campaigns in Germania, including observations about the 
Germani’s ferocity (1.1.8) and experience fighting in forests (1.3.10, 2.3.23), but, while Tacitus clearly 
respected Frontinus, we do not know whether he used his work. Another lost work on Germania 
written during Tacitus’ lifetime was Statius’ de Bello Germanico, a poem on Domitian’s Chattian 
campaigns that we may reasonably imagine eulogized the emperor’s endeavors.287 Finally, it is likely 
that governors and legates who had served in Germania composed commentarii or other accounts of 
their service. L. Antistius Vetus, who served as governor of Upper Germany, is credited with having 
written a geographic and ethnographic work that may have contained firsthand observations about the 
Germani.288 Moreover, it is possible (though unverifiable) that Corbulo composed commentarii about his 
operations in Germania in addition to those about his command in the East (A. 15.16). There was, in 
																																																								
285 Rives 1999, 39.  
286 Rives 1999, 39. 
287 The poem is referred to by Valla in a scholion to Juvenal 4.94.   
288 Devillers 2003, 39-40 with further references there. 
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sum, a wide range of literary works on Germania on which Tacitus could have drawn. While Caesar 
and Pliny the Elder seem to have been his primary sources, it stands to reason that he consulted all the 
material on Germania readily available to him.  
While the majority of this material primarily dealt with the wars against the Germani, Tacitus’ 
monograph notably is ethnographic. This seems to mark a departure from previous work on the area 
and, as far as we know, from Roman ethnographic literature generally. Ethnographic monographs as a 
genre were not as prevalent among the Romans as they were among the Greeks and, aside from 
Arrian’s Indika, the Germania is the only extant ethnographic monograph of ancient times. Tacitus’ 
ethnographic focus is significant in light of the work’s socio-political and military context. The account 
of Germanic society and culture offers a critical inward look at contemporary Rome, while the 
description of Germania’s situs and mores points up the complex considerations that bear on 
imperialism and imperium. To understand the work’s military context, we should briefly consider the 
military balance at Trajan’s accession. 
 The Germani had constituted the terminus of Caesar’s conquests and were one of the objects of 
Augustus’ imperial ambitions. Tiberius and his brother Drusus had reached the Elbe in 9 BC and by 
AD 6 the area was stabilized and its provincialization well advanced, though not formally completed.289 
In that year, Tiberius conducted a campaign into the territory of the Marcomannic chief Maroboduus 
(modern Bohemia and Moravia), which, if successful, would have closed the land bridge between the 
North Sea and the Balkans. But the outbreak of a major revolt in Dalmatia and Pannonia (AD 6) 
forced Tiberius to abandon these aims and strike an agreement with Maroboduus, three years after 
which the Varian disaster forced Augustus to evacuate the area between the Rhine and the Elbe. 
It has been the traditional view that Varus’ defeat urged Augustus to re-establish the Rhine as 
																																																								
289 To what extent the area between the Rhine and Elbe had been provincialized and municipalized between 9 BC to AD 9 remains a 
contentious question. The evidence from Lahnau-Waldgirmes and Haltern has illustrated that the process had advanced considerably 
by the time of the Varian defeat. Eck (2004; 2010) argues persuasively that a prouincia Germania embracing territory west and east of the 
Rhine was in fact established at this time. Further archaeological evidence will be needed to clear up the matter decisively. 
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the northern boundary of the Empire. Archaeological evidence, however, coupled with contemporary 
(Ovid’s Tristia) and later (Tacitus’ Annales) literary testimony, and a reassessment of the date of the 
composition of the Res Gestae, suggests that Augustus aimed at re-establishing provincial control in the 
area between the Rhine and Elbe and that it ultimately was Tiberius’ decision to forgo re-annexation.290 
The archaeological evidence from Lahnau-Waldgirmes seems to suggest that the site was abandoned in 
AD 9 but that it continued to be used intermittently as a military base until 16, the year of Germanicus’ 
recall, after which it was given up for good.291 The sites at Hedemünden and Bentumersiel seem to 
support this impression.292 The final abandonment of these trans-Rhenane sites in 16 reflects a change 
in the way the Romans saw the area they had previously occupied.  
As regards the Res Gestae, A. Cooley has argued that the text was not composed in 2 BC and 
subsequently edited but written towards the end of Augustus’ life, in June of AD 14.293 This re-
assessment bears on the document read in the senate after Augustus’ death, which included his advice 
																																																								
290 At Tr. 2.225-230, which should be dated to shortly after AD 9 (Thakur 2008, 76-77), Ovid anticipates Tiberius’ successes in 
Germania after the Varian disaster. At Tr. 3.12.45-48, dated by Syme (1978, 38) to AD 10, Germania not only is called rebellatrix (cf. 
ceteras rebellium gentis, Tac., A. 2.26.3; Sen., Apoc. 12.21-2: ille rebellos fundere Parthios), a term that conceives of the Germani still as Roman 
subjects (Potter 1990, 197), but also is described as “finally placing her sad head under the foot of the great leader [i.e. Tiberius]” 
(teque, rebellatrix, tandem, Germania, magni triste caput pedibus supposuisse ducis). Tristia IV (dated to AD 11) anticipates Tiberius’ triumph 
(which he would receive in AD 12) and reaffirms the image of the Germani as a subjugated people (iam fera Caesaribus Germania, totus ut 
orbis, uicta potest flexo succubuisse genu, 4.2.1-2), in line with traditional visual representations of captured nations trampled underfoot. 
Ovid’s poetry, which carefully reflects imperial discourse, points to a policy aimed at re-establishing control in the area between the 
Rhine and Elbe abandoned in the aftermath of the Varian setback. Tacitus’ Annales confirm this: uetere in prouincia at A. 1.58.5 suggests 
Rome still laid claim to a new trans-Rhenane province. In the next chapter, Tacitus has Arminius urge the Cherusci to follow him 
against Germanicus if they prefer “their fatherland, parents, and ancient life to masters and new colonies” (si patriam parentes antiqua 
mallent quam dominos et colonias nouas, 1.59.6). Colonias here refers to nothing less than re-establishment of Roman control across the 
Rhine (Goodyear 1981, 90, 225; cf. Woolf 2009, 207). At A. 2.14.4, Germanicus exhorts his forces by reminding them that the Elbe is 
now closer than the Rhine and that this will be the final battle. Arminius implies the same thing at 2.15.3 (libertatem... seruitium), while at 
2.19 the Germani, upon a crushing defeat, are prepared to abandon their settlements and retreat beyond the Elbe. At 2.41, Tacitus 
writes that Germanicus was prohibited from completing (conficere) the war, suggesting more than a series of vindictive campaigns. 
Indeed, at 2.73 Tacitus writes that imperial jealousy prevented Germanicus from “crushing Germania into subjection” (seruitio premere).  
291 The archaeological evidence from Lahnau-Waldgirmes suggests the construction of a series of planned towns and market spaces 
east of the Rhine aimed at long-term occupation. The construction of the site seems to have commenced ca. 4 BC. It probably was 
abandoned in AD 9 or shortly thereafter, in the wake of the Varian disaster. Evidence of what seems to have been a temporary camp 
(Rasbach and Becker 2007, 110-11) suggests that the site continued to be used as a military base during the campaigns of Tiberius and 
Germanicus, before being abandoned permanently upon the latter’s recall. Waldgirmes likely is one of the sites referred to by Dio at 
56.18.1-4. For the archaeological record at Lahnau-Waldgirmes, see Becker 2003, 337-350; von Schnurbein 2003, 93-107; Rasbach and 
Becker 2003, 147–199; 2007, 102-116. For a succinct summary of the findings, see Wolters 2008, 65-69. Becker 2003, 338 n. 5 offers a 
good sample of opponents against AD 9 as the year of initial abandonment. 
292 Hedemünden: Grote 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015. Bentumersiel: Strahl 2009; 2011, 293-306. 




that the Empire be preserved within the boundaries extant at the time.294 In light of the above 
evidence, it seems that the boundary in question is the Elbe, not the Rhine. Augustus’ claim to have 
advanced the Empire’s boundary to the Elbe (RG 26.1) “indicates that he did not regard the area as 
lost for good after the death of Varus.”295 It is evident from the Annales that Germanicus’ original 
assignment was not only to avenge the Varian disaster but to re-establish control of the area between 
the Rhine and the Elbe.296 But costly losses, the failure to gain a decisive victory, and the breakdown of 
Rome’s network north of the Rhine under pressure from Arminius forced Tiberius to decide that the 
cost of re-annexation was too high. In AD 16, he redefined Germanicus’ mission as revenge (now 
achieved) and elected to pursue diplomacy in the future.297 Germanicus’ successes had served the 
purpose of revenge, and the demonstration of Roman power and authority, reinforced by two 
inscribed tropaea erected by Germanicus in the territory of the Cherusci (AD 16), was ideologically 
and diplomatically sufficient. The point was reinforced in AD 19 by the display, across the Empire, of 
the senatorial bill recording Germanicus’ commemorative honors and achievements (preserved in part 
of the Tabula Siarensis and the Tabula Hebana) and by the erection of a triumphal arch on the bank of 
the Rhine.298 In Rome itself, the senatorial bill, the erection of an arch commemorating the recovery of 
the Varian standards (A. 2.41.1), and Germanicus’ triumph (2.41.2) successfully advertised the war as 
																																																								
294 Tac., A. 1.11.4; Dio 56.33.5-6. The fact that Suetonius does not mention this document has been the basis of an argument that it is 
Tiberian, meant to seek posthumous Augustan sanction for the policies he wished to pursue (e.g. Ober 1982; Gruen 1990, 410; 1996, 
188). The argument is intriguing but lacks evidence. 
295 Potter 2013, 330; cf. Griffin 2000, 127; Woolf 2009, 207; Eck 2014, 14. 
296 Cf. Woolf 2009, 207; Eck 2010, 14; Potter 2013, 330. Revenge merely was one part of the overall policy. Reconstructing the 
campaigns in Germania based on what he read on the Tabula Siarensis (which, after Germanicus’ recall, records revenge (uindicata) as 
the campaigns’ original purpose) and in written sources after AD 16 (e.g. Aufidius Bassus and Pliny the Elder, who presumably 
followed the official account as well), Tacitus initially wrote (naturally but erroneously) that revenge was Augustus’ aim when he 
appointed Germanicus to the command of the German legions (A. 1.3.6). Tacitus’ own narrative negates this claim. Of course, 
Tacitus did not possess the archaeological evidence we now have to aid his interpretation of Roman foreign policy at this time.  
297 Hence the surprise and dismay of Germanicus, who claimed he needed only one more year to complete his assigned task (A. 2.26).  
298 Germanicus’ original assignment: Ridley 2003, 196-203; Potter 2013, 330. Cf. Lehnmann 1991, who also argues that the conquest 
of Germania was abandoned not by Augustus, but by Tiberius. Revenge: Gruen 1990, 408-09; Mattern 1999, 184-94; Potter 2013, 
330. Losses during Germanicus’ return journeys: A. 2.23 ff. Other costs and losses during the campaigns: A. 1.65, 1.71, 2.5. Tiberius’ 
decision: A. 2.18, 2.22, 2.26.2, 2.43. That there was financial strain is evident from Tiberius having to default on Germanicus’ 
promised monetary grants to the legions in AD 14 (A. 1.36.3, 1.52.3, 1.78.2). Tiberius reiterates this concern at A. 4.4.2, providing a 
pretext for a trip to the provinces that never took place. On military finances: RG 17.2; Suet., Aug. 49.2; Dio 55.24.9. Germanicus’ 
victory inscriptions: A. 2.18, 2.22. Text and commentary for the Tabula Hebana and Tabula Siarensis: Lott 2012. Arch: A. 2.83.  
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completed and its original purpose as accomplished.299 
Henceforth Roman policy toward the Germani was marked by diplomacy and indirect 
control.300 In the aftermath of the Varian disaster, Rome maintained its imperium beyond the Rhine. 
Tribes like the Batavi, Frisii, and Chauci long remained loyal (G. 29.1, 34.1, 35), while Rome retained 
indirect influence by installing such client kings as Vannius of the Quadi (A. 2.63.6) and Italicus of the 
Cherusci (A. 11.16). At the same time, Germanic auxiliary cohorts continued to fight alongside Roman 
legions, while Rome offered assistance to certain tribes (e.g. when Domitian aided the Lugii against the 
Suebi: Dio 67.5.2-3).  
All the same, the Germani remained the only foreign people successfully to have resisted the 
Roman advance and hence their conquest remained an alluring source of potential military glory. 
Caligula launched a campaign that, despite being depicted as a farce in our sources, reflects the 
continued appeal of a Germanic conquest. Corbulo’s campaigns against the Frisii and Chauci again 
raised the issue of expansion, but Claudius preferred diplomacy (A. 11.18-20) and turned his attention 
to Britain. Under Nero, aside from a swiftly quelled insurrection of the Frisii (A. 13.53-57), matters in 
Germania were peaceful. Vespasian created a more permanent Roman presence north of the Main and 
in the upper Neckar area, but whether his aim was to improve communication with the Danube region 
or to lay the groundwork for further expansion, or both, remains hard to reconstruct.301 During 
Vespasian’s reign, Rutilius Gallicus, legate of Lower Germany from 76-79, campaigned east of the 
Rhine in the territory of the Bructeri and took captive the prophetess Veleda, who would play a major 
role in the Batavian Revolt and enjoyed great auctoritas among the Germani (G. 8.2, H. 4.61, 4.65, 5.22, 
																																																								
299 The show had worked: bellum pro confecto acceptum est (A. 2.41). Cf. Vell. 2.129.2 (of Germanicus): domitorem… Germaniae; Suet., Tib. 
52.2: gloriosissimas victorias; Cal. 1.1: hoste… devicto; Dio 57.18: Γερµανικὸς δὲ τῇ ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς στρατείᾳ φερόµενος εὖ µέχρι τε τοῦ 
ὠκεανοῦ προεχώρησε, καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους κατὰ τὸ καρτερὸν νικήσας τά τε ὀστᾶ τῶν σὺν τῷ Οὐάρῳ πεσόντων συνέλεξέ τε καὶ ἔθαψε, 
καὶ τὰ σηµεῖα τὰ στρατιωτικὰ ἀνεκτήσατο. Strabo, as Goodyear (1981, 315) notes, “writing soon after the triumph, gives the game 
away, when he says Arminius was still sustaining the war (7.1.4 καὶ νῦν ἔτι συνέχοντος τὸν πόλεµον). Arminius must indeed have been 
conspicuous by his absence on May 26, A.D. 17.” 
300 For further discussion of Rome’s foreign policy under the Julio-Claudians, see pp. 168-186. 
301 Levick 1999, 162; Rives 1999, 30.  
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5.24; Stat., Sil. 1.4.90; AE 1953, 25).302 Domitian, wishing to emerge from the shadow of the military 
achievements of his father and brother, took all this a step further in the 80s, undertaking a successful 
campaign against the Chatti, bringing the Taunus area under Roman control, establishing the 
provinces of Lower and Upper Germany (which, however, consisted for the most part of long-held 
territory west of the Rhine), and transforming the frontier east of the Rhine into a fortified border 
area. While his aims and the extent to which he continued or departed from his father’s designs remain 
uncertain, he presented himself as having completed Germania’s conquest, by triumphing over the 
Chatti, adopting the name “Germanicus,” and making the patently false claim, advertised on his 
coinage, that Germania had been subjugated (‘Germania capta’, ‘deuictis Germanis’, ‘Germania deuicta’). 
These claims were, as we shall see, one reason why Tacitus might have chosen to write the Germania.  
Finally, in the 80s and early 90s, while the Rhine border remained fairly stable, Rome’s focus 
shifted to the Danube frontier, where it suffered a series of devastating losses that are significant for 
assessing the military balance at the time of Trajan’s accession (see n. 99). In 85, the Dacians, upon 
invading Moesia, killed its governor Oppius Sabinus and annihilated a great number of his forces. This 
was followed only a year later by the destruction of the praetorian prefect Cornelius Fuscus, who lost 
both his life and a legion against the Dacians. These setbacks, the greatest since the Varian disaster, 
were followed by defeats (notably with Domitian himself in the field) against combined forces of 
Marcomanni, Quadi, and Iazyges (in 89), who another three years later (92) invaded Pannonia and 
caused the demise of yet another legion. The funerary altar at Adamclisi that likely commemorates one 
of these setbacks appears to have been designed in such as a way as to efface the memory of these 
losses and to highlight the extent of Rome’s empire.303 Tacitus, whether or not he knew about the altar,  
 
																																																								
302 Veleda is one of few Germani mentioned by name in the Germania. The other three are Aurinia, her fellow prophetess (G. 8.3), 
Maroboduus, chief of the Marcomanni, and Tudrus, chief of the Quadi (42.2). For Veleda, see Merkelbach 1981. 
303 See Turner 2013, 277-304. As Turner shows, the monument’s design achieves two main goals. First, the commemoration of 
individual soldiers served to establish and increase the bond between the emperor and his troops. Second, the inclusion of the 
abbreviated origins of all the soldiers served to illustrate the massive extent of the Empire. 
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had a different take, emphasizing the losses, the incompetence of the generals, and the danger to the 
Empire’s security (Agr. 41.2-3; cf. H. 1.2).  
In light of past and current Roman-Germanic relations, the false claims of an emperor who 
had died only two years before, the succession of a uir militaris who commanded the Rhine legions at 
the time of his appointment, and the ongoing debate about the proper maintenance of the Empire, we 
can deduce several plausible aims underlying the Germania. I have noted already the social and moral 
commentary on contemporary Rome to which a work of this genre lends itself. Another principal aim 
of the work seems to have been to set the historical record straight. This is another concern that the 
Germania shares with the Agricola: just as the latter, by ascribing to Agricola the glory that Domitian had 
tried to devalue, serves “to restore a healthy and correct system of representation and to restore to all 
what they are due,” so the Germania, by accurately describing Germania and its tribes, serves to rectify 
Domitian’s distortions.304 This is the sort of rectification of official versions with which Tacitus would 
continue to be concerned in his historical works. Connected with the concern to disprove Domitian’s 
claims is the suggestion, first posited by Nicolet, that the work serves as a literary conquest of, or a 
means of symbolic power over, an area that remained unconquered militarily.305 A similar aim may 
have informed the Agricola, which can be seen as a literary re-conquest of an area conquered by 
Agricola, but soon after abandoned by Domitian.306   
It has been argued that the Germania serves as a call to arms urging Trajan to complete the 
subjugation of trans-Rhenane Germania that Domitian plainly had failed to accomplish.307 While 
Tacitus stresses military weaknesses on the part of the Germani and hints at the potential danger of a 
unified Germania, the many points in the text that discourage conquest undermine this argument. As 
																																																								
304 Sailor 2008, 117 for the citation; Rives 1999, 52-53. Tacitus disparages Domitian’s success at Agr. 39; G. 29.3, 37.2, 37.5. 
305 Nicolet 1991. See also O’Gorman 1993, 135-54 [= Ash 2012, 95-118]. Tan (2014, 1-24) argues that Tacitus’ description of 
Germania’s geography serves to create the opposite impression: “any sense of mastery over space is withheld from us, intellectual and 
physical dominion over the ends of the earth denied” (p. 6). 
306 On this notion, see Rutledge 2000, 75-95; Clarke 2001, 94-112; Sailor 2008, 81 ff.  
307 So, e.g., Isaac 2004, 436; Krebs 2005, 78-81.  
	
	 115 
significant is the fact that Tacitus nowhere takes an explicit stance nor directs the text in a conclusive 
direction, instead leaving his readers to draw their own conclusions.308 It was, as Syme acutely saw, 
“not for the consular Tacitus to play the mentor to a military emperor.”309 
A more sensible suggestion would be that the work serves as a manual about Germania and its 
tribes, to be utilized in considerations of foreign policy and by commanders and governors charged 
with its execution.310 This suggestion is attractive for several reasons. First, the plain allusion in the 
opening words to the start of Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum (Gallia est omnis ~ Germania omnis) may serve to 
signify that, just as Caesar’s work “was not a history, but a more practical type of document, the report 
of a general and a contribution to public affairs,” so the Germania had a similarly practical function.311 
Second, the division of the work into two clearly demarcated halves – the first dealing with Germania 
as a whole (1-27.1), the second with the individual tribes making up the whole (27.2-46) – serves to 
point up the practical challenges of dealing militarily and administratively with an area that was both 
categorically ‘Germanic’ and at the same time divergent in its socio-political, geographical, and military 
makeup. The opening of the second half of the monograph (27.2) indeed is distinctly didactic.312 Third, 
given the Romans’ lack of a formal military and governmental training-system, literary works – 
especially ethnographies, histories, and military handbooks – were used by senators to learn the tools 
of the trade.313 The didactic value of the combination of the Agricola and the Germania is significant: the 
former offers the exemplary portrait of the ideal governor and general, while the latter offers useful 
information about a region whose conquest and annexation will have been discussed at the time. The 
Germania offers detailed (if not always up-to-date) information about the names and origins of 
																																																								
308 The lack of a preface and conclusion is notable. In several places, Tacitus explicitly leaves room for multiple interpretations (G. 2.2-
3, 3.3, 46.4). The first part of the work ends without conclusive remarks: “such, on the whole, is the information we have received 
concerning the Germani” (27.2). The introduction to the second part of the work is similarly non-committal: “now I shall set forth 
the institutions and religious rites of the different tribes – to what extent they differ – and also what nations have migrated from 
Germania into Gaul” (27.2). The final words of the work – in medio relinquam (46.4) – underline Tacitus’ stance.  
309 Syme 1958a, 47, 125-29.  
310 See Beck 1998, 9-62; cf. also Momigliano 1975, 71: “Caesar went to conquer Gaul with Posidonius in his satchel.”  
311 Rives 2012, 54.  
312 For a list of literary antecedents for similar didactic openings, see Thomas 2009, 62.  
313 See esp. Campbell 1987, 13-29 (“Teach Yourself”). Cf. Norden 1923, 186-88; Momigliano 1975, 71. 
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Germanic tribes, about their character, settlement patterns, natural and mineral resources, forms of 
government, military apparatus and fighting style, religious practices, and even about such things as 
clothing, education, and upbringing. It further offers information about Germania’s geography and 
topography and about forms of production and trade. The work offers precisely the sort of 
information useful for a legate or governor who had not seen Germania before. It is also precisely the 
information that is crucial when imagining conquest, annexation, and governance of a particular 
area.314 For example, the knowledge that the Germani are a people who place extraordinary value on 
their libertas, are discordant, and are easily roused to violence and warfare is crucial information for a 
governor attempting to impose Roman administration and control.315  
Accurate and practical information about foreign lands was essential for the formulation and 
execution of foreign policy, and we have evidence that information collected by officials on the spot or 
that reached Rome in other ways often was inaccurate or simply false.316 Caesar was criticized by his 
legate Asinius Pollio for giving too much credence to the reports of his subordinate officers (Suet., Jul. 
56.5). Pliny the Elder complains about officials disinclined to ascertain the truth (Nat. 5.12), while 
Tacitus relates examples of officials sending inaccurate reports to Rome (e.g. Caesennius Paetus at A. 
15.25; cf. 15.18.1). The publication of a fairly comprehensive account of Germania and its tribes, ahead 
of potential northern campaigns, may have been deemed very practical indeed.  
Modern scholarship has been quick to dismiss the notion that the work is aimed at practical 
utility on the theory that Tacitus’ information is outdated, that the nature of the work is literary and 
																																																								
314 One of Trajan’s military virtues is said to have been the collection of just this type of information about different people and their 
lands (mores gentium, regionum situs, opportunitates locorum, et diuersam aquarum coelique temperiem, Plin., Pan. 15.3). Caesar, too, was keen on 
acquiring first-hand knowledge about different nations and their inhabitants (Gal. 2.15, 3.7, 4.20). Note Cicero’s advice to Quintus about 
the people of Asia Minor (Q. fr. 1.1). Tacitus stresses the importance of knowing a people’s animus in the speech of C. Dillius Vocula, who 
praises Caesar’s and Augustus’ knowledge of Gallic character (melius diuo Iulio diuoque Augusto notos eorum animos, H. 4.57.2). Corbulo is 
aware of Armenian mores (A. 14.23). Striking examples of ignorance of a people’s psyche are Varus’ vision of the Germani as a peace-
loving people (Vell. 2.117.4; Tac., A. 2.46.1), Caligula’s order to the Jews to place a statue of himself in their Temple (H. 5.9.2; cf. 5.5), 
and Claudius’ advice to Italicus and Meherdates (A. 11.16, 12.11). The Frisian revolt of AD 28 was caused by Olennius’ ignorance of 
the size of Frisian livestock, which led him to impose too harsh a tribute (A. 4.72 ff.; cf. L. Piso and the Termestini at A. 4.45). 
315 Something Varus seems not to have understood, imposing change too rapidly and forcefully (Vell. 2.11.4-118.1; Florus 2.30.29-39; 
Dio 56.18.2-5; cf. Tac., A. 1.58, 2.46.1). Roman incompetence caused the Frisii to revolt (A. 4.72-74).  
316 See Woolf 2009, 207-17 on the generation of ethnographic knowledge through encounters between local informants (familiar with 
Roman culture), reporting on their traditions and customs, and Roman ethnographers, who had their own preconceptions. 
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not political, and that his works nowhere seek “an immediate practical effect.”317 These claims are 
difficult to sustain, both in light of Tacitus’ explicit statements elsewhere about the value of his work 
and of the way Romans themselves claim to have utilized literary works as sources of knowledge.318 In 
any case, a work’s practical aims need not be denied at the absence of an explicit authorial statement 
about its value. The argument that the work does not include the type of information of a modern 
intelligence report or that it relies too heavily on literary sources instead of eyewitness observation to 
be of practical utility is anachronistic and fails to take into account common Roman practice.319 Woolf 
demonstrates the likelihood that part of Tacitus’ information came from local informants (see n. 316), 
while Rives suggests that Tacitus carefully arranged his material to reflect contemporary conditions.320 
The Germania often is used to make assertions about the author’s outlook on the Empire and 
imperialism. All too frequently the text is used to argue that Tacitus favors continued imperial 
expansion, while others use the text to make the opposite point, that Tacitus here is pessimistic and 
aims to discourage a renewed military offensive. The text offers much evidence that supports either of 
these positions, but both are problematic, since the only way to sustain them is by ignoring plain 
evidence to the contrary. Both arguments fail to take into account the entire text, focusing either on 
the geographical and/or ethnographical sections while omitting authorial statements, or vice versa.321 
There also is the risk of reading the Germania in light of what Tacitus writes in the Historiae and the 
Annales. It must be kept in mind that Tacitus wrote the Germania in 98, when the major Trajanic 
developments in Dacia, Arabia, and Parthia had not yet played out. Any examination of the text ought 
																																																								
317 Rives 1999, 52.  
318 Cf. p. 115 with the notes there. Tacitus lays special emphasis on the exemplary value of the Agricola and encourages his readers to 
contemplate and emulate Agricola’s example (46.1-4). The Dialogus “stages itself as a model for imitation and the attempts to define 
rhetoric also detail a program of elite existence more generally” (van den Berg 2014, 12). Tacitus likewise stresses the utility of his 
historical works (note H. 1.3.1, A. 3.65.1, A. 4.33.2-3). On the exemplary and didactic nature of Roman thought and discourse, see Roller 
2001; 2004; 2009. See also Turpin 2008. Cf. Classen 1988, 115-16; cf. Clarke 2002, 98-99. 
319 Syme in particular objected to Tacitus’ use of outdated material (1958a, 125-29). So, too, Lund 1991a, 1951-54; Thomas 2009, 59. 
320 Rives 2002; 2012, 49.  
321 For example, the excellent article by Tan (2014) limits itself to the geographical sections of the Germania and does not take into 
account the ethnographic evidence (which offers contrasting evidence). Nor does it take into account Tacitus’ claims about expansion 
(or its abandonment), which ought to be included to reach a comprehensive understanding of the author’s outlook. Some recent 
accounts (e.g. Gruen 2011, 159-169; H. Haynes 2014, 41-43) are more attuned to the text’s complexities, but interpret its ambiguity 
and contradictions mainly as instances of Tacitean wit and irony – unnecessarily, I think.  
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both to be comprehensive and limit itself to what Tacitus knew and could know at the time of writing. 
Taking this approach, it is evident, as we shall see, that Tacitus neither presents a case for nor a case 
against conquest and annexation of trans-Rhenane Germania. 
Another reason why the Germania has not received a wholly satisfactory reading is that the text 
intrinsically is not about Germania itself but about the problems inherent in imperialism and 
imperium.322 Germania was a logical topic for an exploration of foreign policy and imperium in light of 
contemporary concerns about the region and past Roman-Germanic relations. By the end of this 
chapter, I hope to have offered the reader an approach that can accommodate the entire text and its 
complexities. I begin with a number of citations from the work that reflect the complexity of Tacitus’ 
attitude towards imperialism and imperium in 98. 
 
III.2  Foreign Policy and Imperialism in the Germania  
 
If you indulge their drunkenness by offering them as much as they want, they will be overcome no less 
easily by their own vices than by arms. (G. 23.1) 
 
The Bructeri were driven out and utterly destroyed by a coalition of neighboring tribes, either from 
hatred of their arrogance, or from the attraction of plunder, or through some special favor of the gods 
towards us. It did not even grudge us the spectacle of the conflict. Over sixty thousand fell.... before 
our delighted eyes. (G. 33.1) 
 
Long, I pray, may foreign nations continue if not love for us, at least hatred for each other, since with 
the destiny of our empire pressing onwards fortune can offer nothing greater than the discord of our 
enemies. (G. 33.2) 
 
Drusus Germanicus indeed did not lack daring; but the ocean barred the explorer’s access to itself and 
to Hercules. Subsequently no one has made the attempt and it has been thought more pious and 
reverential to believe in the actions of the gods than to inquire. (G. 34.2) 
 
If we count from then until the second consulship of the emperor Trajan, it amounts to roughly two 
hundred and ten years: so long have we been in conquering Germania. (G. 37.2) 
 
In recent times they [i.e. the Germani] have been more triumphed over than defeated. (G. 37.5) 
 
A famous river [i.e. the Elbe] once known through experience but now through report alone. (G. 41.2)  
																																																								
322 The lucid account of Gruen (2011, 159-78), e.g., focuses primarily on the Germani as a literary construct, but not on the wider 
issues that that construct raises and serves to explore. Cf. H. Haynes (2014, 41-43) and Ash (2014, 185-200), whose focus likewise is 
predominantly literary and who do not explore the questions about foreign policy raised by the text. 
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These seven citations from the Germania illustrate the complexity of Tacitus’ attitude towards Roman 
imperialism in 98 and towards Rome’s relationship with Germania in particular. On the one hand, they 
reflect his natural proclivity towards expansion, as evidenced by his frustration over losses of 
Germanic territory and the false claims of his former emperor. On the other hand, there is the clear 
sense that leaving the Germani to their internal hostilities will result in their mutual self-destruction 
and keep their attention away from harassing Roman territory. On this view, diplomacy and indirect 
control (‘soft power’) would be preferred to military action.323 Similar complexity marks the 
contemporary Agricola, where Tacitus endorses gubernatorial adventurism and praises governors in 
proportion to their military aggression, where he approves of Agricola’s ambition to incorporate 
Hibernia (modern Ireland) into the Empire (Agr. 24) and stresses that the man’s conquests disclosed 
lands and people hitherto unknown (Agr. 22.1, in contrast with the knowledge diminished by the loss 
of Germanic territory), but where at the same time he shows the drawbacks of continued expansion. 
Tacitus’ attitude reflects the wider Roman outlook on the Empire and its boundaries in the post-
Augustan age, in which “new arguments... were gradually advanced in favor of limitation, while 
arguments favoring extensibility were increasingly linked with assertions about Roman morality.”324 
This outlook is mirrored in his description of Germania and its tribes, which reveals ways in which the 
Germani might be undermined and annexation could be practicable and which at the same time points 
up the military and administrative impracticability of a northern conquest and annexation.  
In the following sections, I undertake a detailed examination of the description of Germania 
and its tribes, focusing on the two ethnographic categories of interest – situs and mores – and unpacking 
in each case the supposed implications for any projected foreign policy with regard to the region. 
While Tacitus’ comments on Germania are significant on their own merit, they gain from being read in 
																																																								
323 Throughout this study, I follow Potter’s definition of ‘soft power’ as implicit imperial control, as opposed to Joseph Nye’s original 
definition of the term as cultural power and influence (Nye 1990; 2004).   
324 Potter 2013, 319. Even before the Augustan age there were fears about the decline of the Empire. When the censors prayed for its 
continued aggrandizement, Scipio Africanus claimed it was extensive enough and prayed for its consolidation (V. Max. 4.1.10).  
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conjunction with contemporary or near-contemporary accounts of other provincial populations. The 
obvious comparanda are Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum, to which Tacitus directs the reader in the opening 
line of the text, and his own Agricola, by virtue of its subject matter and contemporary publication. 
Accordingly, the sections on Germania’s situs and mores are interspersed with reflections on how the 
perception of Germania and its tribes compares and contrasts with that of Gaul and Britain and, in 
some cases, Judaea. I begin with the description of Germania’s situs – that is its geography, topography, 
climate, and natural and mineral resources. 
 
III.2.1 Germania’s situs: the (Im)practicability of Expansion and Annexation 
 
Germania omnis a Gallis Raetisque et Pannoniis Rheno et Danuuio fluminibus, a Sarmatis Dacisque mutuo metu aut 
montibus separatur: cetera Oceanus ambit, latos sinus et insularum immensa spatia complectens, nuper cognitis quibusdam 
gentibus ac regibus, quos bellum aperuit. Rhenus, Raeticarum Alpium inaccesso ac praecipiti uertice ortus, modico flexu in 
occidentem uersus septentrionali Oceano miscetur. Danuuius molli et clementer edito montis Abnobae iugo effusus pluris 
populos adit, donec in Ponticum mare sex meatibus erumpat: septimum os paludibus hauritur. (G. 1)  
 
Germania as a whole is separated from the Gauls, Raetians, and Pannonians by the Rhine and Danube 
rivers, and from the Sarmatians and Dacians by mutual fear or mountain ranges. Ocean, embracing 
wide peninsulas and islands of huge expanse, surrounds the rest, where certain tribes and kings recently 
have become known to us, revealed by war. The Rhine rises in an inaccessible and precipitous peak of 
the Raetian Alps and then with a slight bend turns westward to flow into the Ocean. The Danube pours 
down from a gentle and slightly rising slope of Mt. Abnoba and visits many nations before it bursts 
forth into the Pontic Sea through six mouths; a seventh mouth is lost in the marshes. 
  
 
The opening of the Germania is significant for two reasons. First, because of the allusion in the opening 
words to Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum, for not only is Caesar the only literary authority Tacitus mentions 
explicitly in the work (28.1), but in the absence of a preface the allusion may serve to tell us something 
about the practical nature of the work (see p. 115). Second, because of the first impression of 
Germania it offers a reader. The opening chapter stresses the geographical unity of a massive region 
otherwise divided among a great number of divergent and rarely unified tribes.325 The chapter further 
																																																								
325 According to Caesar, Gaul was neatly divided into three major parts by its principal rivers, while Germania, according to Tacitus, 
lacked substantial internal boundaries. This gave the Germani a certain ‘mobility’ and ‘fluidity’, as Riggsby articulates it, a feature 
commonly ascribed to the nomadic peoples of the north (e.g. Strabo and Diodorus’ Celts and Germani, Herodotus’ Scythians; cf. 
Sallust’s Numidians). On this aspect and its implications, see Riggsby 2006, 21-72. 
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highlights the country’s separation from its neighbors and its inaccessibility due to imposing natural 
barriers (cf. G. 44.3). The chapter is a powerful introduction to the first half of the work, which treats 
Germania as a whole (de omnium Germanorum origine ac moribus, 27.2) and in part serves to create the 
impression of a unified cultural, political, and military power. It describes a region that is difficult to 
access (and escape from), especially if the Germani should manage to unite their forces. The 
description, moreover, is of a dreadful place (informem terris, asperam caelo, tristem cultu adspectuque, 4.1), 
bounded on one side by Ocean, that formidable physical and conceptual boundary, and on the other 
sides by two mighty rivers, the Rhine and the Danube, and imposing mountain ranges.326 The opening 
chapter at once establishes some of the potential military challenges posed by Germania’s 
geography.327  
 This grim picture is developed in the rest of the work. Tacitus stresses the dangers posed by 
the immense and hostile Ocean, “seldom entered by Roman sails,” and by “rough and unknown seas” 
(2.1; 17.1; cf. A. 2.15.2, 2.23 ff.).328 Of the former expeditions into the northern Ocean only that of 
Drusus the Elder receives explicit mention, and the description is gloomy.329 While Drusus in 12 BC 
sailed as far as Jutland in an attempt to reach the Pillars of Hercules (Plin., Nat. 2.167; Aug., RG 26.4; 
cf. Strabo 7.1.3) – the mythical northern pillars that balance those in the south in ancient theory –  
Tacitus stresses that “Ocean barred him from inquiring into itself and Hercules” and that “no one 
																																																								
326 There was a longstanding tradition that large bodies of water constituted major physical and conceptual boundaries. Note, e.g., 
Polybius’ description of the destruction (in 255 BC) of a Roman fleet off Camarina, on the southern coast of Sicily (1.37); Diodorus’ 
praise of Caesar’s “astonishing skill” in bridging the Rhine (5.25.4); Augustus’ claims about Ocean and distant rivers as the boundaries 
of the Empire (RG 26, 30, 31); Tacitus’ claims to the same effect (A. 1.9.5; cf. Anicetus’ words at A. 14.3.3). On the Rhine as a 
boundary: H. 2.32, 4.55, 4.64, 4.73, 5.24; A. 1.59, 1.36, 1.49, 1.69, 2.6, 4.5, 11.19, 12.27, 13.56. Note also Tacitus’ description of Ocean 
(Agr. 10.6), of the strait separating the island of Mona from Britain (Agr. 18.4), and of the river Clota as a boundary cordoning off 
unknown tribes (Agr. 24.1; cf. Agr. 23.1). According to Suetonius, Claudius, after his campaign into Britain, set up a naval crown as a 
sign that he had crossed and, as it were, subdued the Ocean (Cl. 17.3). Caesar’s Gaul is divided into three principal parts by its major 
rivers. For a lucid discussion of Ocean in the Roman imagination, see D. Braund 1996, 10-23. A good example of the conceptual 
force of bodies of water as boundaries is Tacitus’ description of the Rhine and Danube as the boundaries of the Empire in his time 
(G. 1), which Tan (2014, 4) argues serves to deny the Flavian advances in the Neckar and Main river valleys. 
327 Tan 2014, 1-14 is excellent on the description of Germania’s geography and the ways in which the text constructs an image of 
Germania as a formidable and inaccessible place.  
328 Tacitus personifies Ocean as a formidable opponent with an alien and terrifying nature: Rives 1999, 263. 
329 In addition to Drusus’ expedition, Tiberius in AD 5 sailed over to and up the Elbe (Vell. 2.106.3), while Germanicus in AD 15-16 
sailed down the Fossa Drusiana through the Lacus Flevum into the North Sea before reaching the Ems, on which he suffered disaster in 
a heavy storm (Tac., A. 2.23-26).  
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subsequently has made the attempt [to reach the Pillars]” (34.2). Reaching the Pillars seems to have 
been an important Augustan objective to bolster claims to world rule (RG 26.4). Tacitus’ words 
undermine those claims and stress that after Germanicus’ costly losses on the Ems in AD 16 (A. 2.23-
26) the fleet did not play a decisive role in Rome’s more limited military operations in Germania.330 
The perils of the Germanic waterways further stand out when read against the description of the 
Ocean near Britain and the achievements of the fleet there. The Ocean around the northern and 
western British coastline is described as similarly vast and imposing (Agr. 10.6; cf. Caes., Gal. 3.8), but, 
while Agricola successfully circumnavigated all of Britain, the Ocean and seas in and around Germania 
had proven obstacles to the designs of Drusus and Germanicus, and of Rome thereafter. 
In other ways Germania’s geography was uninviting and dangerous as well. The vast region 
has many wide and open expanses of land (26.2; “deserts” (solitudinibus), H. 4.73.3; Caes., Gal. 6.23.1) 
with few nucleated settlements, which provide suitable ground for Roman legions (A. 2.14.2: campos 
militi Romano ad proelium bonos; cf. A. 1.51), but at the same time it is densely covered with “rough 
forests and foul swamps” (in uniuersum tamen aut siluis horrida aut paludibus foeda, 5.1; cf. H. 4.73.3; Hor., 
Carm. 4.5.25), which were notoriously dangerous for Roman forces and favorable to local tribes, as 
Varus, Germanicus, and Cerialis had experienced.331 Tacitus, in the Agricola and the Annales, and 
Caesar, in the Bellum Gallicum, draw attention to the prevalence of forests and swamps in Britain and 
Gaul332 and suggest ways in which Roman commanders might deal with these geographical realities.333 
The absence of any such suggestions in the Germania reinforces the image of impenetrability. The 
																																																								
330 Campbell 2013, 183-84. Germanicus’ officer Albinovanus Pedo, in a poem on this voyage that is partly preserved by Seneca the 
Elder (Suas. 1.15), wrote that “the gods call us back and forbid mortal eyes from knowing the ends of the world.” Tacitus presumably 
hints at this naval disaster in chapter 37 of the Germania, where he points to losses under Germanicus.  
331 Varus: Dio 56.19-22; cf. 54.33. Germanicus and Caecina: A. 1.63 ff. Cerialis: H. 5.14 ff. For a lucid and concise account of the 
logistical challenges posed by Germania’s geography and terrain, see Engels 2013, 363-66. Cf. Kosmin 2014 on the conception and 
territorial organization of the Seleucid Empire, especially the challenges posed by the “sheer expansiveness” (p. 254) of the land. 
332 Note the significance of swamps and forests in the case of the Belgic Menapii: this tribe, Caesar says, “was protected by one 
continued extent of swamps and woods” and, possibly due to this sense of security, “they alone out of Gaul had never sent 
ambassadors to Caesar on the subject of peace” (Gal. 6.5).  
333 On the clearing of forests by Caesar: Gal. 3.29; by Agricola: Agr. 31.1; by Germanicus: A. 1.50.3. On the construction of ‘plank-roads’ 
or ‘long bridges’ (pontes longi): A. 1.61.1, 1.63.3-4. On these pontes, see Schetter and von Uslar 1971, 201-24; Wells 1972, 240 n. 6; 
Chevallier 1976, 90-91; Lendering and Bosman 2012, 43-44.  
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Hercynian Forest, which stretched from the middle Rhine to the Vistula (28.2) and was formidable and 
mysterious due to its size and depth, stood out (G. 30.1; Caes., Gal. 6.25 ff.; Strabo 7.1.5). Caesar writes 
of Germani who, after 60 days of travel, did not reach its extremities (Gal. 6.25) and spends a further 
three chapters describing the wild beasts it contained, strange and unknown to Roman eyes (6.25-28; 
cf. Tac., A. 4.72.2: ingentium beluarum feraces saltus). Tacitus is less descriptive. Aside from telling us that 
the territory of the Chatti is coterminous with the forest (G. 30.1), he withholds information about its 
extent, emphasizing its vastness by leaving it undefined.334 Germania, moreover, is broken up by 
substantial rivers, which were dangerous passageways during the storms that often raged there (Diod. 
5.26.1; cf. storms in Pannonia: A. 1.30.2-3, 2.23 ff.), and by substantial mountain ranges (e.g. those 
dividing the tribes that make up the Suebi, G. 43.2). Several tribes inhabited forests and mountaintops 
that hardly were accessible (43.2).  
The physical challenges were magnified by Germania’s harsh climate, which had short 
summers and long winters and in which it was often cold, windy, and rainy (2.1, 4.1, 22.1; Caes., Gal. 
4.1).335 Britain, too, suffers from frequent rains, but extreme cold is rare, its climate being milder than 
the continental Germanic climate (Agr. 12.3; Caes., Gal. 5.12). The climate of northern Gaul is similar 
to that of Germania, with severe winters that arrive early (Caes., Gal. 4.20, 7.8, 8.5; cf. Tac., H. 1.51.2), 
but the rest of Gaul enjoys milder conditions. All of this is significant with regard to the general 
conditions in which Roman armies in Germania would have to operate. Aside from imposing harsh 
conditions, short summers and long winters meant shorter campaigning seasons (cf. A. 2.5.3), while 
climate governs agricultural production, which in turn determines army provisioning (cf. H. 4.26-27, 
4.35). The climate also bears on what sorts of men Roman armies would be fighting. Common 
ethnographic conception had it that climate, soil, and the general conditions of a country determined 
																																																								
334 Tan 2014, 11. 
335 Diodorus (5.25.2, 5.25.5), Varro (R. 1.2.3-5), and Seneca (Prov. 4.14) also emphasize the harsh Germanic winter. The part of 
Germania bordering Noricum and Pannonia was drier (G. 5.1). 
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the basic physiology and character of its inhabitants: colder and harsher conditions were believed to 
create physically strong and courageous, but unintelligent people, while milder conditions were 
supposed to create handsome and smart, but physically weak and cowardly people (Vitr. 6.1.3-11; G. 
4.1, 29.2).336 According to this thought system, the harsh Germanic climate made the Germani fiercer 
and more formidable enemies than, for instance, the Britons and Gauls and, consequently, made the 
conquest of Germania a more challenging prospect than that of Britain and Gaul had been. The net 
impression of Germania gleaned from the text is that of an inhospitable and forbidding place, massive 
in size and difficult to define. While its vast open plains make suitable ground for Roman legions, the 
country presents serious challenges, making military campaigns there costly, inefficient, and dangerous. 
Tiberius had understood this. 
 While the description of Germania’s geography, then, mostly discourages a military offensive, 
the account has more complex implications for the establishment of a Roman administration. For one 
thing, Tacitus implies that a Roman occupation of Germania would be impracticable. Roman-style 
habitation commonly was marked by large urbanized centers with a centralized organization, and, 
where possible, Rome inserted its own social and political institutions into the local proto-urban and 
socio-political fabric that had developed around Late Iron Age oppida.337 This was one reason why the 
provincialization of Gaul could proceed relatively swiftly.338 The proto-urban layout of Britain, as Caesar 
reports, was similar to that of Gaul (multitudo creberrimaque aedificia fere Gallicis consimilia, Gal. 5.12),339 and 
hence the traditional methods of acculturation – the construction of temples, fora, and houses – had 
also worked well there (Agr. 21).340 Judaea, too, despite consisting for the most part of scattered vici, 
																																																								
336 See Schadee 2008, 163 with further references there.  
337 It has long been recognized that areas that were urbanized before coming into contact with Rome were integrated more quickly 
within Roman territory than were non-urban areas. See, e.g., Kunow 1990; Edmondson 1990; Keay 2001.  
338 Kunow 1990, 92-3; Woolf 1998, 7 ff. 
339 Tacitus does not comment explicitly on the habitation patterns or degree of urbanization in Britain in the Agricola. Since he 
acknowledges the information related by earlier authors about Britain’s situs populosque (10.1) and adds only novel information on 
Caledonia (whose shape was unknown to Fabius Rusticus and Livy) and the islands around it, we may infer that he follows the 
information transmitted by Caesar and other authors on habitation patterns in Britain.  
340 Despite the fact that they, like most barbarians, were seen as a “scattered” people (dispersi, Agr. 21.1). 
	
	 125 
had towns (oppida) and, most significantly in terms of its ‘imageability’ (see p. 126), was one of the few 
areas in the Empire that was centered, like Rome, on one major city (H. 5.8.1; Carthage is the other 
notable example). In most of Germania, however, as Tacitus describes it, this proto-urban fabric did 
not exist,341 making the imposition of Roman habitation more costly and time-consuming. Moreover, 
the fact that the Germani live scattered over long distances (16.1), cannot bear to live in adjoining 
dwellings (16.1), and think of city walls as munimenta seruitii (H. 4.64.2) illustrates the stark differences 
between the Germani, on the one hand, and the Romans, “the most city-proud people known” 
(Procopius, Bell. 8.22.7), on the other, and points up the impracticability of establishing Roman-style 
settlements.342 Archaeological evidence from sites deep into trans-Rhenane Germania, such as Lahnau-
Waldgirmes, Anreppen, and Haltern, show early imperial attempts at urbanization as part of the 
establishment of a prouincia Germania.343 Tacitus’ description of Germanic living patterns suggests one 
reason for the failure of these attempts. 
 Connected with the absence of urbanization was the absence of an infrastructure of roads. The 
Germanic landscape, dominated by huge open expanses, swamps, and forests, was a configuration that 
in many ways was incompatible with the way Romans imagined space. The sheer vastness of 
Germania’s territory would pose challenges for communication, security, and transport.344 The lack of 
a road network made impossible the type of connectivity that was crucial for the administrative and 
economic framework of the Roman province. It is significant, as Lee notes, that the Peutinger Table 
includes routes deep into Persian territory, but that, aside from Roman roads within the former 
province of Dacia and the Agri Decumates, the information about regions north of the Empire is 
																																																								
341 “It is well known that none of the Germanic peoples live in cities... they do not lay out their villages in our style... they do not even 
use stones or bricks” (nullas Germanorum populis urbes habitari satis notum est… Vicos locant non in nostrum morem conexis et cohaerentibus 
aedificiis... Ne caementorum quidem apud illos aut tegularum usus, G. 16.1-2). 
342 Cf. Pomponius Mela, who notes the absence of cities among the Sarmatians (3.33), and Ammianus, who writes that the Alamanni, 
upon occupying northern Gaul in the 350s, avoided cities “as though they were tombs, surrounded by nets” (ipsa oppida ut circumdata 
retiis busta declinant, 16.2.12). Schadee (2008, 178) astutely points out that the prevalence of forests can be seen as the antithesis of 
civilization: “they are primeval landscape, untouched by human activities such as agriculture or the building of towns.” 
343 Roymans 2004, 196-200. 
344 Cf. the weakness of the organization of the Seleucid Kingdom: “an insistence on the significance, symbolic and practical, of the 
monarch’s mobile presence was undermined by the sheer expansiveness of the land” (Kosmin 2014, 254).   
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restricted to features like the “Marcian forest” (silua Marciana), the “Bastarnic mountains” (alpes 
Bastarnicae), the “Sarmatian wastelands” (solitudines Sarmatarum), and the “deserted regions” (sors 
desertus).345 The absence of such features as an infrastructure of roads detracted from what K. Lynch 
calls the “imageability” of a region, making it difficult for Romans to visualize the establishment of a 
viable economic and administrative network in the “trackless wasteland” that Germania continued to 
be known as (solitudines auias, Pan. Lat. 12.5.2).346 
 In addition to infrastructural concerns, the nature of agricultural production, the quality of the 
soil, and the harsh climate raise questions about production levels and the economic viability of a 
Roman occupation. Germanic soil is fairly fertile and there are many extensive fields (5.1, 26.2). The 
country generally is rich in livestock, though these are mostly undersized (5.1; cf. A. 4.72.2). Tacitus 
further conjectures that the islands and lands in the west, like the remoter regions in the east, have 
unusually rich forests and groves (45.5). Moreover, the fact that wheat is the predominant crop grown 
in Germania (26.3; cf. 45.3) would seem to allow for the adequate provisioning of Roman armies 
operating in the region (cf. Caes., Gal. 8.17).347  
At the same time, Tacitus points up factors that would seem to impede agricultural production. 
Germanic soil apparently was not rich everywhere, for Tacitus (like Seneca) could claim that the poor 
soil leads to hunger (4.1; Sen., Prov. 4.14) and that it is harsh to cultivate (2.1; cf. Var., R. 1.2.3-5). The 
soil will also not grow “fruit-bearing trees” (frugiferarum arborum, 5.1), by which Tacitus probably means 
olives (a main staple of the Mediterranean diet and economy) and certain fruits (cf. Var., R. 1.7.8; Col., 
de Re Rust. 3.1.3).348 Diodorus, too, comments on the absence of some fruits due to the excessive cold 
(5.26.2). Indeed, the long and harsh Germanic winters prevented agricultural production during a large 
																																																								
345 Lee 1993, 90.  
346 I owe the reference to Lynch and to the fourth century oration to Lee 1993, 89-90. For a broad treatment of networks and road-
systems in pre-modern societies, see the volume edited by Alcock, Bodel, and Talbert (2012), especially Hitchner’s chapter on 
connectivity in the Roman world (pp. 222-34).  
347 In times of draught, however, the grain supply could become dangerously inadequate: H. 4.26-27; cf. 4.35.  
348 See Rives 1999, 131.  
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part of the year (16.3; cf. Var., R. 1.2.3-5). Even more detrimental to Germania’s economic potential, 
as Tacitus has it, are the nature of agricultural production and Germanic attitudes towards it. Unlike 
the Romans, the Germani focused primarily on the production of wheat, neglecting other uses to 
which they might put their land (“they do not plant orchards, fence off meadows, or irrigate gardens,” 
26.3; cf. Caes., Gal. 6.22).349 Furthermore, they are said to shun the labor necessary for productive 
agricultural work and to spend most of their time making war, devoting themselves to food and sleep, 
and leaving work in the field to women and old men (4.1, 14.3, 15.1, 26.3, 45.3).350 All this bears on the 
logistics of military campaigns, for, despite the fact that wheat is the principal crop grown in 
Germania, the general lack of productivity might imperil the provisioning of Roman armies and limit 
the ability of commanders to fight in certain areas (cf. Caes., Gal. 6.29). The description of the 
Germani’s disposition, moreover, is significant in light of what we are told in the Agricola about the 
Britons and Gauls. While those peoples, under the right kind of governor, could be encouraged to 
participate actively in establishing a Roman political and economic presence, the Germani’s disinterest 
in common Roman practice, combined with their lethargy, would seem to prevent their being readily 
co-opted in setting up a Roman administration. Velleius and Florus made similar observations.351  
In contrast with that of Germania, the soil and climate of Britain and Gaul allowed for the 
cultivation of most ordinary crops, while agriculture and animal husbandry were established practice.352 
As for Britain, with the exception of olives, vines, and other crops at home in warmer climates, the soil 
produces all ordinary crops and, though these ripen slowly due to the excessive moisture in the soil 
and sky, they grow rapidly and abundantly (Agr. 12.5; except perhaps in the far north: 31.2). As for 
																																																								
349 Gaul, with its generally rich agriculture, viticulture, and oleoculture plainly was more in tune with Roman forms of production.  
350 The attitude of the Fenni reflects the general disinclination towards agriculture (46.3), while the attitude of the Aestii forms an 
exception that proves the rule (45.3). 
351 Velleius, in describing the Varian disaster, shows how the Germani were “not softened by the imposition of law” (2.117.3) and 
pretended that “their own barbarous nature was being softened down by this new and hitherto unknown method” (2.118.1) in order 
to ambush an unsuspecting Varus, ignorant of their true nature. Florus similarly writes that Varus naively thought “he could restrain 
the violence of the Germani by the rod of a lictor and the proclamation of a herald” (2.30.31). In the words of the Cheruscan 
Segestes, Tacitus points up the impracticality of Varus’ leges (A. 1.58.2; cf. A. 2.46.1). The prevailing thought seems to have been that 
the usual methods of ‘acculturation’ and ‘softening peace’ did not work with the Germani.  
352 Cf. Judaea, which had a rich soil (uber solum) that produced all ordinary crops (fruges nostrum ad morem, H. 5.6.1). 
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Gaul, despite the fact that the harsh winters in the north could impede harvests (Caes., Gal. 1.16), the 
country generally possesses a very fertile soil that produces all ordinary crops, the olive and vine 
included. Caesar writes that the fertility of the Gallic soil was a principal reason why Germanic tribes 
used to cross the Rhine into Gaul (Gal. 1.28, 1.31, 2.4; cf. A. 11.18.1). In fact, he lays special emphasis 
on the disparity between the richer Gallic and the poorer Germanic soil (neque enim conferendum esse 
Gallicum cum Germanorum agro neque hanc consuetudinem uictus cum illa comparandam, 1.31). In the Historiae, 
Tacitus has Cerialis make the same point in his speech to the Treviri and Lingones during the Batavian 
Revolt (H. 4.73.3). What emerges is that Germania’s agricultural potential, despite various upsides, is 
perceived to be limited in numerous ways as compared with that of Britain and Gaul. While the 
Britons and Gauls had in place an agricultural system that was, on the whole, in tune with Roman 
agricultural practice – a system that continued to be the mainstay of those provinces – the nature of 
Germanic agricultural production is described as suffering from shortcomings that would make the 
imposition of a Roman-style administration more challenging and less viable economically.  
 Regarding the potential of mineral resources, trade, and networks of exchange, Tacitus leaves 
the reader with an ambivalent impression. He writes that the Germani lack silver and gold (5.2) and 
have no interest in their possession or use (5.3), but at the same time leaves open the possibility that 
gold and silver exist in Germania but have not yet been discovered (5.2). These comments are curious 
in light of what he writes in the Annales. There we learn that Curtius Rufus had his men expose silver-
mines in the territory of the Mattiaci, but that their profits were slender and short-lived (A. 11.20.3). 
Their omission in the Germania underlines the scarcity of precious metals and reinforces the impression 
of Germania’s economy as being generally underdeveloped.353 Control of mineral resources was 
another important aspect of the Roman occupation of any given area, and, as with existing proto-
urban networks, Rome tended to appropriate and expand the production of existing mining areas. 
																																																								
353 Resources from Gaul, Spain, and Italy (including taxes and gold) made up for losses during Germanicus’ campaigns: A. 1.71, 2.6. 
	
	 129 
Britain’s gold and silver mines (pretium uictoriae, Agr. 12.6; cf. Strabo 4.199)354 and Gaul’s rich mineral 
resources (aurum et opes, praecipuae bellorum causae, H. 4.73.3; Gallos quid aliud quam praedam uictoribus?, H. 
4.76.1;  aurum et opes, A. 11.24.6) were an important incentive for conquest and helped defray the cost 
of annexation. Judaea, too, possessed great wealth (auctae… res, H. 5.10.1) and offered rich mineral 
resources, such as bitumen and minerals for glass production (“of which there is an unlimited supply 
for exporters,” egerentibus inexhaustum, H. 5.7). Caesar had laid the groundwork for Rome’s control of 
lucrative mining areas in both Spain and Gaul of which Augustus was to take charge fully.355 By 
Tacitus’ time, Spain, Gaul, Britain, Dalmatia, Noricum, and Asia Minor had developed into substantial 
mining areas, but it was dubious, as the Germania suggests, whether Germania could offer such 
economic prospects.356  
Continuing his treatment of metals, Tacitus further stresses a relative lack of iron in Germania 
(ne ferrum quidem superest, 6.1). The Aestii and Fenni serve as examples of tribes lacking this metal 
resource (45.3, 46.3), while the Cotini are said to be the only Germani to possess iron-mines (43.1; cf. 
Ptol., Geog. 2.11.11). The Chatti use iron tools (30.3), while an island in the Ocean, perhaps modern Als 
or Fyn, seems to possess iron weapons (40.3). The general scarcity of iron is another feature of 
Germania’s situs that would prevent the Romans from using a valuable resource on the spot, and again 
Germania’s resources stand in negative contrast with those of Gaul and Britain. The former possessed 
an extensive network of iron mines (ferrariae), which, Caesar notes, made the Gauls practiced experts in 
all kinds of tunneling (Gal. 7.22; Gaul also possessed substantial copper mines: 3.21). The iron 
																																																								
354 Caesar possibly refers to the use of gold coins in Britain at Gal. 5.12.4, but the reading is uncertain. Cicero, in his correspondence 
with Quintus and Caesar (who were in Britain at the time), says he hears “there is no gold or silver in Britain” (Fam. 7.7.1). To Atticus 
he writes that “there is not a scruple of silver on that island” (Att. 4.16.7). Cicero’s words cannot be pressed as evidence for the 
absence of these precious metals, for elsewhere (Att. 4.17.3) he relates that Caesar, upon his departure, imposed monetary tribute on 
the Britons. Tacitus suggests that Caledonia has poorer natural and mineral resources than southern Britain: Agr. 31.2. 
355 The tribute that Caesar imposed on many tribes allowed him to pay his veterans lavishly and carry with him to Rome massive sums 
of gold and silver booty. Suetonius claims that Caesar, having organized Gaul into a province, imposed on it an annual tribute of 
40,000,000 sesterces (Jul. 25.1). Caesar rarely refers to booty in the Gal., but the wealth he amassed was notorious: Suet., Jul. 54; Vell. 
2.56; App., BC 2.17.41; Oros., Hist. 6.121. 
356 Western Dacia boasted rich gold and silver mines that would be appropriated by Trajan after the Second Dacian War. The most 
important ancient sources on Roman mining are Strabo, Diodorus, and Pliny the Elder’s Nat. (books 33-36). For the most recent 
treatment of mining and metal supplies in the Roman Empire, see Wilson and Bowman 2015.  
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production in Britain was fairly extensive as well, although Caesar claims that it was restricted to the 
coast and to small quantities (5.12).357 Tacitus simply speaks of alia metalla (Agr. 12.6). Once more 
Germania’s resources are presented as comparatively poor. The one exception to this pattern is the 
abundance of timber (materia, 16.2), with which Germanic dwellings were furnished (16.2) and which 
provided a necessary resource for Roman armies, as we are told in the Historiae and the Annales 
(caedendis materiis, H. 5.20.2; latera concaedibus munitus, A. 1.50.1).   
Concerning coinage and trade, the text paints a similarly complex picture, one that once more 
suggests difficulty but leaves room for potential. Tacitus tells us that the majority of the Germani – 
that is those living in the interior – still rely on barter, while the tribes close to the frontier recognize 
the value of silver and gold for trade purposes (5.3). Moreover, the interior tribes are said to value 
older issues of Roman coinage, while the tribes near the frontier prefer newer types (5.3; cf. 15.2). 
Regardless of whether Tacitus here follows common ethnographic stereotypes (equating geographical 
proximity to the Empire with degree of civilization: he probably does) and of whether the numismatic 
and archaeological record bears out his observations (Rives shows it partly does), what matters is the 
image of Germania he shapes. That image is one of a generally primitive economy in which the 
monetary and economic devices long in use in the Empire had not yet been discovered. The apparent 
development of a small-scale economy near the frontier, however, suggests that continued interaction 
with Germania’s tribes might effect a gradual (diu... 5.3; 15.2) change towards a more developed, 
Roman-style economy.358 The difficulty, of course, lies precisely in the prolonged investment necessary 
to effect such change.  
 Another feature of Germania’s landscape that might afford economic opportunity is the great 
number of rivers, tributaries, canals, and lakes, which might be developed into riverine networks to 
																																																								
357 The archaeological evidence from British sites refutes Caesar, who in any case did not progress deep into the island. On iron 
production in Iron Age and Roman Britain, see Davies 1935; Cleere and Crossley 1986; Sim and Ridge 2002; Schrüfer-Kolb 2004.  
358 Cf. O’Gorman 1993, 140-41 [= Ash 2012, 103-05]. 
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facilitate transport and economic growth, much like the large river-systems in Gaul that had driven 
economic growth there.359 Tacitus stresses the importance of the Rhine as a corridor for trade and 
economic development, and the text suggests that long-term interaction might extend economic 
activity into the interior. Against such prospects, however, stands the long-term investment necessary 
to effect this growth and, what is more problematic, the absence of an extensive road network that 
might cover Germania’s huge open expanses (26.2) and connect the waterways with other far-lying 
areas. As any Roman knew, an extensive network of waterways is nothing without an extensive road 
network to support it.360  
 On the whole, the text paints a complex picture of Germania’s natura and situs, pointing up 
ways in which a Roman conquest and occupation might be practicable, but, to a larger degree, 
establishing ways in which these objectives are impractical, costly, and time-consuming.361 Many 
features of Germania’s situs detracted from its imageability, making it difficult to envision the 
establishment of a trans-Rhenane province. Yet, it is crucial to note, Tacitus nowhere explicitly 
advocates a particular policy nor does he direct the text in a conclusive direction. If at this point the 
reader may draw a conclusion from the text, it would be that the problems inherent in Roman foreign 
policy are complex and defy a straightforward answer.  
 
III.2.2  Germanic Mores: Renewing the Military Offensive? 
  Just as the work’s geographical sections sketch a complex image of Germania’s natural and 
mineral make-up, so the ethnographic sections shape a multifarious image that underlines, quite 
																																																								
359 On the riverine network in Gaul, see Campbell 2012, 263-78.   
360 On the importance of intra-terrestrial waterways along with land-based networks, see McCormick 2001, 77-82, 663-69; Hermon 
2010; Campbell 2012.  
361 Krebs argues that the work’s geography and ethnography point to the practicability of conquest and that the work therefore serves 
as a “Plädoyer” for military action into Germania (2005, 78-81). Tan (2014, 1-24), in contrast, argues that the text’s geography serves 
to show that Germania is inviolate and inaccessible and, consequently, discourages a renewed military offensive. The arguments of 
Krebs and Tan reflect the general trend in scholarship on the Germania, in which scholars occupy opposing positions about the 
foreign policy advocated by the text. In light of the evidence thus far presented, neither position can be endorsed. As regards the 
economic downside of conquest and annexation of Germania, note the comments of Strabo (17.3.24-25; cf. 2.5.8 on the lack of profit 
to be had from Britain) and Appian (Praef. 7).  
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evenhandedly, the virtues and vices, and the strengths and weaknesses, of the Germani.  
As regards Germanic character and custom (mores), the text provides much evidence in support 
of a northern military offensive. Tacitus principally defines the Germani as a number of dispersed and 
naturally discordant tribes that rarely combine their strength for common purposes (29.1, 33.1-2, 36, 
40.1; the whole second half of the monograph underlines this point; cf. British (Agr. 12.1-2) and 
Jewish (H. 5.8.3, 12.3-4) discord). Their warlike character and fierce temper cause them to be 
impulsive (licentia, 11.2, 21.2; cupiditas and impotentia, 35.2) and to resort to war and violence rashly 
(14.2-3, 22.2), a trait that would seem to afford opportunities to experienced Roman generals.362 
Moreover, the Germani are said to be neither clever nor cunning (gens non astuta nec callida, 22.3), a 
curious description that stands in contrast with the reputation for deceit they had earned generally and 
with the image we receive of them in the later works.363 Tacitus evidently followed ethnographic 
stereotypes, depicting the Germani as less formidable enemies on account of their lack of intelligence 
and prudence. Elsewhere, we are told that Germanic weapons, armor, and cavalry are substandard 
(6.1-3; cf. Agricola’s claims about the inferior British arms: Agr. 33.5, 36.1-2) and that their bodies 
facilitate short bursts of energy but no sustained action (4.1). They also cannot function in the heat 
(4.1; cf. Plut., Mar. 3.4-5). Moreover, when they are not fighting, they constantly are drunk and 
indolent (15.1, 22, 23.1) and so ruin their military discipline. Finally, their military strategy, in terms of 
both cavalry and infantry, is quite one-dimensional (6.3-4). The military shortcomings of the Germani 
collectively are underlined by the qualities of the Chauci, who form a conspicuous exception:  
																																																								
362 Note the maxim about “barbarian rashness” at A. 13.36.2: is quamquam incautos barbaros et bene gerendae rei casum offerri scripserat. 
363 Like many Roman enemies, the Germani often were considered treacherous and cunning. Caesar characterized Ariovistus and the 
Tencteri as deceitful (Gal. 1.40.8, 4.13.1, 4.13.4). The Varian disaster, in which Varus’ legions were ambushed and massacred by what 
appeared to be friendly Germanic forces, increased the Germani’s reputation for deceit (Tac., A. 1.58.2, 2.46.2). Velleius calls the 
Germani “a race born to treachery” (natum mendacio genus, 2.118.1). The Batavian noble Civilis is characterized as an especially 
intelligent and cunning chief (Tac., H. Book 4 passim). Note esp. H. 4.13.2: “but Civilis was cleverer than the average barbarian” (sed 
Civilis ultra quam barbaris solitum ingenio sollers). In the same line, Tacitus pairs the Batavian with Sertorius and Hannibal, two other 
notoriously cunning generals. Civilis and Sertorius are linked conceptually through their similar facial disfigurement, which Tacitus 
underlines by means of an allusion to a passage about Sertorius in Sallust’s Historiae (ferens simili oris dehonestamento (Tac., H. 4.13.2) ~ 
dehonestamento corporis (Sal., Hist. 1.88)). Tacitus’ Civilis also recalls Velleius’ Arminius (ultra barbarum promptus ingenio, Vell. 2.118.2). For 
the implications of this allusion, see Ash 2014, 189-90.  
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Duriora genti corpora, stricti artus, minax uultus et maior animi uigor. Multum, ut inter Germanos, rationis ac sollertiae: 
praeponere electos, audire praepositos, nosse ordines, intellegere occasiones, differre impetus, disponere diem, uallare noctem, 
fortunam inter dubia, uirtutem inter certa numerare, quodque rarissimum nec nisi ratione disciplinae concessum, plus 
reponere in duce quam in exercitu. Omne robur in pedite, quem super arma ferramentis quoque et copiis onerant: alios ad 
proelium ire uideas, Chattos ad bellum. Rari excursus et fortuita pugna. Equestrium sane uirium id proprium, cito parare 
uictoriam, cito cedere: uelocitas iuxta formidinem, cunctatio propior constantiae est. (G. 30.2-3) 
  
This people possesses a tougher physique, tight limbs, a fierce countenance, and a greater mental vigor. For 
Germans they have a great deal of judgment and cleverness: they elect their leaders and obey them. They 
keep their ranks, recognize opportunities, and postpone their attacks. They plan their day, entrench 
themselves at night, regard fortune as doubtful and valor as unfailing and, what is rarest of all and owed to 
their judgment and discipline, they place more trust in their general than in the army. Their whole 
strength lies in their infantry, which they burden with tools and provisions in addition to arms: other 
people you may see going out to battle, the Chatti to war. Sallies are rare and so are unplanned 
engagements. It is, of course, characteristic of cavalrymen to win a quick victory and make a quick 




By stressing what military qualities the Chatti possess Tacitus underlines what most Germani lack: 
Roman disciplina. The Germani’s image as being rash, indolent, and drunk and as lacking the discipline 
and physical qualities necessary for enduring military action is directly at odds with the physical and 
moral qualities that formed the basis of Roman military success.364 The above points, which bear 
similarities to what Tacitus tells us about the Britons, underline Roman military superiority and suggest 
ways in which seasoned generals could undermine Germanic forces. 
 These aspects are only part of the picture, however, for the Germani’s virtues are no less on 
display than their shortcomings. Of particular interest is the contrast between pure and old-fashioned 
Germanic morality (the notion of the ‘noble savage’) and the moral corruption of contemporary 
Rome, which is significant not only for the perception of Germanic military strength but for the 
practicability of incorporating Germania into the Empire, as will be seen.  
 In the second chapter, we explored the notion that the imperial system of government is 
hostile to uirtus and noted the destructive impact of this hostility on the performance of public 
officials, both in the capital and the provinces. Tacitus’ remarks in the Agricola about the lack of 
																																																								
364 Note Appian (Gall. 1.3), whose characterization of the Germani variously corresponds to that of Tacitus. Appian wrote that the 
Germani, though men of huge stature and great valor, lacked endurance and military discipline, causing them to be overcome by the 
“science and endurance” (ἐπιστήµη καὶ φερεπονία) of the Roman forces under Caesar.   
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appreciation of uirtus in Rome should be read in conjunction with what he writes about Germanic 
morality and the workings of uirtus in Germania. The concept of a pure and preserved Germanic 
morality runs through the work and touches on most aspects of Germanic life. The Germani are said 
to be an indigenous people that has preserved the purity of its race by its physical separation from 
other nations and by rejecting intermarriage (2.1-2, 4.1; the Jews have a similar practice and outlook: 
H. 5.5; cf. A. 15.44.4). This policy stands in marked contrast with the intermarriage between Gauls and 
Romans, which, as Claudius argues at A. 11.24, was one aspect of the successful acculturation of that 
province. The Germanic race is “distinct, pure, and only like itself” (propriam et sinceram et tantum sui 
similem gentem, 4.1; cf. sincerus et integer... populus, H. 4.64.3),365 an image reflected by their typically 
Germanic appearance (“fierce blue eyes, red hair, and huge bodies,” 4.1). Their indigenous nature is 
affirmed in their ancient songs, in which they celebrate the earth-born gods Tuisto, his son Mannus 
(the forefather and founder of the Germani), and his three sons (2.2).366 By enjoying a modest 
upbringing in their mother’s care and living a life of “sheltered chastity, uncorrupted by temptations” 
(saepta pudicitia...), men and women preserve their morality and vigor from childhood into adulthood 
(18-20). Boys and girls marry late and so preserve their vigor (20.2; cf. Caes., Gal. 6.21). Unlike nearly 
all foreign people, the Germani are content with a single wife only (the most praiseworthy aspect of 
their moral code, according to Tacitus: 18.1) and adultery is rare (19.1). Women (unlike their Roman 
counterparts: A. 3.33) share the toils and dangers of their husbands (18.3) and together they transmit 
their strength untarnished to their children, who retain their parents’ physical and moral vigor and pass 
it on to their children, and so forth (18.3).367 Tacitus thus describes a cyclical system which ensures a 
continuous supply of physically and mentally vigorous people, in contrast with the situation in Rome, 
																																																								
365 This phrase, among others, is what led Momigliano to rank the Germania, along with the Iliad, among the hundred most dangerous 
books ever written (1966, 112-13). The phrase was misused to posit a direct connection between the ancient Germani and modern 
Germans (Rives 1999, 1-11) and, in Nazi ideology, to bolster claims to racial superiority. Scholarship on the reception of the Germania 
is vast. Isaac 2004, 137 n. 327 offers a comprehensive list. See Krebs 2005 on the Germania’s reception and influence in the early 
modern period; Lund 1995 for the early 20th century. The most recent study is Krebs’ A Most Dangerous Book (2011).  
366 The claim to an autochthonous and indigenous nature recalls the same claim made by the Athenians. See Isaac 2004, 138-40.  
367 Cf. Philostratus’ comments on the way parents transmit their moral and physical characteristics to their children (Gym. 28). 
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where, as we have seen, upbringing and education (D. 28 ff.), the nature of the Principate, and the 
corruptions of the capital (note esp. A. 15.44.3: sed per urbem etiam, quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda 
confluunt celebranturque) enervate public morality and performance. This image of imperial Rome recurs 
in Messalla’s speech at D. 28.1-3.   
The public display and appreciation of uirtus and a healthy competition for glory (aemulatio) are 
further aspects of Germanic mores that attract Tacitus’ attention (7.1, 13.2-3, 14.1) and that stand out 
against the defective circulation of glory and the prevalence of discordia that mark Tacitean Rome. 
Tacitus is interested particularly in the relationship between the leading men (principes) and their retinue 
(comitatus, G. 13), which resembles patron-client relations and, in military contexts, bears on the 
relationship between a commander-in-chief and his subordinates.368 The leading men notably are 
chosen for their merit (ex uirtute, 7.1). They lead by example (exemplo, 7.1) and earn respect by standing 
out and fighting in the front (conspicui... ante agmen agunt, 7.1). It is considered a disgrace (turpe, 14.1) for 
leaders to be outdone in valor by their followers or vice versa. Moreover, there is great competition 
(aemulatio) among the followers to be first in the leader’s estimation and among leaders to have the 
largest and bravest retinue (13.2-3).369  
In the second chapter, we explored the positive correlation between the freedom to display 
merit and public performance. Both Sallust and Tacitus established that connection. We also noted the 
‘trickle-down’ effect of the conduct of those in positions of power down through the ranks and the 
positive impact of exemplary conduct on the performance of subordinate officers and society 
generally. While in the Agricola and the historical works Tacitus records examples of such behavior, 
they evidently are exceptions to the, in his view, deplorable conduct of the governing class, making the 
description of the workings of uirtus and positive aemulatio among the Germani all the more pointed. 
																																																								
368 Note also the resemblance to young Romans following eminent orators as part of their oratorical training (D. 2.1, 34.1-3). 
369 Just as noble deeds are publicly appreciated, so cowardly and criminal acts receive conspicuous punishment (12.1-3). Also note the 
custom among the Tencteri whereby the inheritance of certain property is granted not to the eldest son but to the one who proved 
himself the best and fiercest in battle (32.1). 
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This contrast between Germania and Rome has military implications, for the perceived opposition is 
one between a people relying on a continuous supply of vigorous men, who are encouraged to display 
uirtus and earn gloria, and the Romans, whose morality has been impaired and whose system of 
government discourages excellence and often appoints unqualified officials. On this view, Rome 
would face a formidable task against any Germanic force, however united. Indeed, it has been argued 
that one thing Tacitus intimates in the Germania is that, owing to the loss of its traditional moral 
qualities, Rome’s “hope of success against the Germans lies, at the moment, not in her arms, but in 
their divisions,” a point he stresses at G. 33.2: nihil iam praestare fortuna maius potest quam hostium 
discordiam.370 
This side of the argument is strengthened by Tacitus’ comments on Germanic libertas (11.1-2, 
21.1, 25.2, 37.3, 44.1, 45.6). The libertas of the Germani is connected explicitly with their military 
strength and seen as the principal reason why they had held out against Rome for so long: 
 
Ex quo si ad alterum imperatoris Traiani consulatum computemus, ducenti ferme et decem anni colliguntur: tam diu 
Germania uincitur. Medio tam longi aeui spatio multa in uicem damna. Non Samnis, non Poeni, non Hispaniae 
Galliaeue, ne Parthi quidem saepius admonuere: quippe regno Arsacis acrior est Germanorum libertas. Quid enim aliud 
nobis quam caedem Crassi, amisso et ipse Pacoro, infra Ventidium deiectus Oriens obiecerit? At Germani Carbone et 
Cassio et Scauro Aurelio et Seruilio Caepione Maximoque Mallio fusis uel captis quinque simul consulares exercitus 
populo Romano, Varum tresque cum eo legiones etiam Caesari abstulerunt; nec impune C. Marius in Italia, diuus Iulius 
in Gallia, Drusus ac Nero et Germanicus in suis eos sedibus perculerunt...’ (G. 37.2-4) 
 
If we count from then until the second consulship of our emperor Trajan, it amounts to roughly two 
hundred and ten years: so long have we been in conquering Germania. In the space of this long period 
there were many losses on both sides. Neither the Samnites nor the Carthaginians nor Spain nor Gaul 
nor even the Parthians have given us more frequent warnings. The freedom of the Germani indeed is 
fiercer than the despotism of an Arsaces.371 What else can the East taunt us with than Crassus’ demise, 
while it lost Pacorus and was crushed under Ventidius? But the Germani, with Carbo, Cassius, Scaurus 
Aurelius, Servilius Caepio and Maximus Mallius either routed or captured, robbed the Roman people of 
five consular armies at once and even robbed a Caesar of Varus and three legions with him; nor was it 
without loss that Gaius Marius in Italy, the divine Julius in Gaul, Drusus, Nero [Tiberius], and 




370 Toynbee 1944, 41.  
371 On the meaning of acrior, see Lund 1988, 208. Tacitus’ comments are prophetic: the Arsacid dynasty lasted until AD 226, while 
Germanic tribes went on to overthrow Rome’s empire in the west. See Birley 1999, 122; cf. Krebs 2011, 155. 
	
	 137 
Tacitus underlines the Germani’s strength by setting them apart from the Parthians, who in turn are 
set apart (note the force of ne... quidem) from Rome’s other enemies.372 Already here does Tacitus pair 
the Germani and the Parthians as the principal objects of his (and Rome’s) attention, which they 
continue to be in the Annales.373 But the point is the Germani’s military strength, which is on full 
display. The argument that Tacitus here advocates a renewed military offensive misses the point.374 He 
notably characterizes the wars against the Germani as a single, continuous, and unsuccessful attempt, 
with many losses on both sides, and the present tense of uincitur underlines that conquest has not been 
accomplished. This is one of the ways in which Tacitus denies the claims of earlier Romans to have 
solved the question of Germania, Domitian in particular. Noting the Cimbric victories during Marius’ 
time, the losses suffered against Germanic tribes by Caesar, Drusus, Tiberius, Varus, and Germanicus, 
and during the Batavian Revolt, Tacitus stresses the numerous setbacks against the formidable 
Germani, a point he has Cerialis reiterate in the Historiae (4.73.2: quot proeliis aduersus Cimbros Teutonosque, 
quantis exercituum nostrorum laboribus quoue euentu Germanica bella tractauerimus, satis clarum). The source of 
the Germani’s strength is their libertas, which made them fiercer than people living under Parthian 
despotism. In the Historiae, Civilis makes precisely the same point while exhorting the Gauls to join his 
revolt (seruirent Syria Asiaque et suetus regibus Oriens, 4.17.4).375 While the opposition between freedom 
and slavery, and their association with courage and cowardice, was an ethnographic and political 
commonplace,376 it had real meaning within the system of conventions and preconceptions that shaped 
																																																								
372 For a similar description of Rome’s enemies, cf. Ov., Tr. 2.225-230 with Thakur 2008, 74 ff.  
373 Tacitus’ scorn of Parthia’s victories merely serves to highlight the strength of the Germani and is negated by the ne... quidem, which 
illustrates Parthia’s power. Cf. H. 1.40.2: igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologaesum aut Pacorum auito Arsacidarum solio depulsuri; A. 2.60.4; 
12.10.2; 15.13.2. On the complex view of Parthia’s servility, on the one hand, and its martial courage, on the other, see Isaac 2004, 
371-80. Note also CIL iii. 3.3676 (= ILS 2558), an early second century AD inscription from western Hungary, in which a Batavian 
soldier boasts about his swimming skills and proudly proclaims that “no Roman or barbarian ever could beat me, no soldier with his 
javelin, no Parthian with his bow.” 
374 So, e.g., Drexler 1952, 61-66; Thielscher 1962, 15; Dauge 1981, 251-53; Timpe 1989, 81-85; Isaac 2004, 434-437; Krebs 2005, 31-
110. My view here corresponds with that of Gruen (2011, 169-71). The interpretation of chapter 37 is closely connected with the 
interpretation of 33.2, on which more below (pp. 153-54).  
375 Not only does Civilis associate the East with despotism and slavery, he associates (albeit implicitly) the strength of the Germani 
with their freedom: proinde arriperent uacui occupatos, integri fessos (H. 4.17.5). 
376 Rives 1999 ad loc. For the opposition between freedom and slavery, associated most famously with Herodotus’ Greeks and 
Persians, respectively, see Isaac 2004, 257-303 (“Greeks and the East”). 
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ancient Greek and Roman thought.377 According to this thought system, the freedom of the Germani 
made them fierce and courageous warriors. Chapter 37, hardly a call for resuming the offensive, 
forcefully underlines this image. Yet, it should be noted, Tacitus’ comments on the ‘free’ Germani 
merely add another factor to an already complex discussion; they do not sway that discussion into a 
conclusive (in this case, pessimistic) direction. Indeed, the freedom of the Germani is qualified as well. 
Many tribes, on Tacitus’ own account, are subject to kings and do not have access to libertas. Moreover, 
without ratio and disciplina, which only the Chatti possess, libertas readily devolves into licentia.  
The appearance of the Germani, whose huge bodies and fierce countenance were awe-
inspiring, added an additional factor to Roman perceptions of them.378 On four occasions Tacitus 
notes the strong frames and fierce looks of the Germani – the Chatti and Suebi in particular.379 In the 
Agricola, he posits a Germanic origin for the Britons living in Caledonia due to their red hair and huge 
limbs (rutilae... comae, magni artus, 11.2). The Marcomannic king Maroboduus was renowned for his 
physical strength (cf. Vell. 2.108.2), the Cheruscan chief Arminius for his fierce countenance (Vell. 
2.118.2; Tac., A. 2.17.4). The Germani’s appearance had a psychological impact on Roman forces. 
Caesar describes his men as becoming frightened by the reports of Gauls and traders, who claimed 
that the Germani were men of “huge stature” (ingenti magnitudine corporum, Gal. 1.39), “incredible valor” 
(incredibili uirtute), and “practice in arms” (exercitatione in armis), and that often, upon encountering them, 
they “could bear not even their countenance and the fierceness of their eyes” (ne uultum quidem atque 
aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse). Imagining the size and fierceness of the Germani paralyzed Caesar’s 
men, who had to be prevented from fleeing in disgrace (1.40). In the Annales, Tacitus records a similar 
incident under Suetonius Paulinus, who, when attacking the island of Mona, saw his men become 
																																																								
377 Cf. Rives 2012, 56.  
378 Caes., Gal. 2.30, 4.1, 6.20; Vell. 2.108.2, 2.118.2; Col., de Re Rust. 3.8.3; Vegetius 1.1.4; cf. Plut., Mar. 11.3; App., Gall. 1.3. 
379 G. 4.1: truces oculi... magna corpora; 20.1: hos artus, in haec corpora, quae miramur; 30.2: duriora genti corpora, stricti artus, minax uultus (of the 
Chatti); 38.2: altitudinem (of the Suebi). Corpus ut uisu toruum at A. 2.14.3 continues the notion. Cf. H. 3.24.2: oculosque non tolerent. Note 
Caligula’s fake triumph over the Germani, which involved the emperor, drawing on ethnographical stereotypes, using particularly tall 
Gauls, dyeing their hair red, and giving them Germanic names and having them speak ‘German’ (Suet., Cal. 43-49; Dio 59.25.2–5, 
with Dench 2005, 37-41).  
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paralyzed with fear at the sight of an unconventional foe (A. 14.30; cf. H. 4.22.3: obstupefecerant obsesses). 
The psychological impact of strange and unusually fierce appearances was real, and the Germania offers 
a general rule: “in all battles it is the eyes that are conquered first” (primi in omnibus proeliis oculi uincuntur, 
43.4). Tacitus stresses the frightening aspect of several Germanic tribes, who are aware of the 
psychological impact of their appearance. So the Suebi tie their hair in a knot to look taller and more 
frightening to their enemies (terrorem... hostium oculis, 38.2). But the most terrifying are the Harii, who 
engage in veritable psychological warfare: “their shields are black and their bodies painted black. They 
choose pitch-dark nights for their battles and by their terrible and gloomy appearance, like a ghostly 
army, they create terror, as no enemy can withstand this novel and infernal sight” (43.4).380  
Another aspect of Germanic military strength that Tacitus stresses is the fact that their 
squadrons, unlike their Roman counterparts, are not formed at random or by chance musters, but by 
family and kinship groups (7.2). This, says Tacitus, was the principal source of the Germani’s courage 
(praecipuum fortitudinis incitamentum, 7.2), as they fought for what was dearest to them. Moreover, as was 
common with barbarians, their wives and relatives were present during battle as further incentives to 
valor (G. 7.2-8.1-2). While this is another ethnographic commonplace (pp. 89, 191), Tacitus stresses 
the real value this practice could have: “it is recorded that some armies that were already wavering and 
about to collapse were rallied by women pleading unwaveringly” (8.1).381 The presence of women and 
children near the battlefield was another unexpected sight for Roman eyes (A. 14.30.1).382 The 
comments on the psychological warfare conducted by certain tribes, and on women and children 
attending battles, give Romans a sense of the unconventional situations they might encounter. 
																																																								
380 On Tacitus’ evocative description of the Harii, see Benario 1999, 109. Isaac (2004, 435 n. 56) usefully notes that the Harii recall 
Xenophon’s Thynoi, a Thracian people similarly specialized in night fighting (Xen., An. 7.2.22; cf. 7.4.14). According to Caesar, the 
Britons dyed themselves with woad (uitrum), which turns blue, to look more terrifying in battle (Gal. 5.14). The Germani also employ 
an enhanced battle cry to frighten enemies (G. 3.1). 
381 Plutarch (Mul. Virt. 6 on Celtic women) and the 2nd century Macedonian rhetorician Polyaenus (Strat. 7.50) record similar examples.  
382 A particularly gruesome practice is described by Strabo, who records that the wives of the Cimbri, who accompanied their husbands 
during expeditions, were attended by prophetesses, who would beat on hides stretched out over wagons to produce “an unearthly noise” 
and would sacrifice prisoners of war by cutting their throats and collecting their blood in cauldrons (7.2.3). 
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Above we identified the persistent discord and warfare among the Germani as a military 
advantage for Rome, in that the former rarely combine their forces and impulsively resort to war and 
violence. Against this perceived benefit stand opposing considerations that underline Germanic 
military strength. For the perpetual discord among them has served to make the Germani fierce 
warriors with long-accumulated fighting experience. This was one factor (exercitatione in armis, Caes., 
Gal. 1.39; cf. pluris tamen bonos proeliatores bella quam pax ferunt, D. 37.7; diu Germanicis bellis exerciti, H. 
4.12.3) that had frightened Caesar’s men. Tacitus describes many tribes as possessing respectable 
military skills. We already have noted the military qualities of the Chatti. The Batavi, too, are skilled 
fighters and known for their valor (uirtute praecipui, 29.1).383 The Mattiaci match the Batavi but possess a 
keener spirit (acrius animantur, 29.2). The Tencteri have a reputable cavalry (laus... equitum, 32.1), while 
the Frisii are known for their strength (34.1). The renowned Chauci (populus inter Germanos nobilissimus, 
35.1) always are ready and equipped to go to war (35.2), while the Langobardi are a bold people ready 
to face danger (periclitando, 40.1). The Marcomanni are foremost in glory and strength (praecipuae 
Marcomanorum gloria uiresque, 42.1) and won their territory by valor (uirtute parta, 42.1).384 They, in turn, 
are matched in their qualities by the Naristi and Quadi (42.1). These last three tribes, Tacitus says, 
“form as it were the front of Germania (Germaniae frons) along the line marked by the Danube” (42.1). 
This phrase, which “evokes the idea of a battlefield with three especially powerful peoples facing 
Rome,” reflects respect and demonstrates power.385 A man like Maroboduus in his day could muster a 
force of 74,000 (Vell. 2.109.2), and it should be recalled that the Marcomanni and Quadi had crushed 
several Roman armies a decade before Tacitus penned the Germania. The prestige of the Marcomanni 
and Quadi is reflected further by the fact that their former kings Maroboduus and Tudrus are the only 
																																																								
383 In fact, Batavian cohorts were considered the best auxiliary forces, as we shall see below.  
384 Tacitus’ claims once more are prophetic (see n. 371). During the Marcomannic Wars (166-73, 177-80) the Marcomanni and Quadi 
managed to invade Italy, the first Germani to achieve this feat since the Cimbri. The Marcomanni also played some part in the 
subsequent wars on the middle Danube, although their precise role remains difficult to reconstruct. On the Marcomannic Wars, see 
Birley 1987 and van Ackeren 2012, esp. 29-44, 83-91, 222-228, 229-233, with further references there.  
385 Isaac 2004, 435 for the citation. 
	
	 141 
Germanic men mentioned by name in the work (42.2). It has been argued that Tacitus’ description of 
these tribes serves to advocate conquest, in that it would be too dangerous to leave the Germani 
unconquered.386 It would be an odd way for an author, however, to advocate war and at the same time 
emphasize numerous factors indicating the impracticability of conquest. The sizeable list of skilled and 
bold Germanic tribes serves, if anything, to illustrate the massive difficulty Rome would face if it were 
to renew the offensive.  
The Germania does not unequivocally advocate or discourage a renewed military offensive into 
trans-Rhenane Germania. While it is all too natural to mine the text for evidence on either side of this 
question, the simple, yet crucial, point is that Tacitus leaves the matter open.  
 
III.2.3  Germanic Mores: Establishing a Trans-Rhenane Province? 
The description of Germanic mores offers a similarly complex picture regarding the viability of 
establishing a Roman Germania. While the text identifies factors that suggest a basic compatibility 
between Roman and Germanic culture, it points up various ways in which Roman and Germanic 
customs are too incompatible for the customary means of acculturation to be viable.  
Good arguments can be made for the viability of incorporating the Germani into the Empire. 
One of the principal ways the text homogenizes Germanic and Roman society is by describing features 
of the former in terms that are characteristic of the latter, a method known as interpretatio Romana.387 
The most useful way to draw meaningful comparison was through the application of similar analytical 
terms to both cultures. C. Krebs shows how the text describes Germania as a res publica Germanica, an 
																																																								
386 Isaac 2004, 436.  
387 The concept of interpretatio Romana most often is used by scholars of ancient religion, denoting the general identification of a 
foreign godhead with a member of a people’s own pantheon. Although the concept is used widely in the study of ancient Roman and 
provincial religion, its only extant use in Latin literature is in the Germania (G. 43.3). Hence there is a real danger in applying to a wide 
range of texts and contexts a term specific to one section of a single work. Krebs (2005, 31 ff.) rightly distinguishes between 
interpretatio Romana and interpretatio Tacitea. The standard interpretation goes back to an article by Wissowa (1916-1919, 1-49). Krebs 
(2005, 50-53) sees the concept as a feature of Roman cultural imperialism. For Timpe (1992, 448-55), Tacitus’ interpretatio Romana is a 
more abstract notion, as opposed to a concrete correspondence of Roman and non-Roman deities. Ando (2005, 41-51) disputes the 
traditional application of the concept in modern scholarship. Gruen (2011, 169 ff.) shows the complexity of the concept, rightly 
noting that its use by Tacitus is far from one-sided. See also Lund 2007, 289-310; Roymans 2009, 219-38. 
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actual state, on the model of its counterpart, the res publica Romana, and with the socio-political and 
religious features and appellations that characterize the Roman state.388 The use of terms like potestas 
and auctoritas for the formal power of kings, imperium for that of generals, legati for ambassadors, 
principes for nobles and comites for their retinue, and plebs for the common people (who are balanced 
against proceres at 10.2) is a plain example of interpretatio Romana and one way the text makes Germanic 
society recognizable to a Roman reader. Likewise, some Germanic gods are described as similar to 
Mercury, Hercules, and Mars. Legends bring Ulysses and Hercules to Germania (3.2). The Germani 
sacrifice to Isis (9.1), venerate Castor and Pollux (43.3), and are said to take the auspicia, use sortes, and 
inspect the sounds and flights of birds (G. 10).389 The ceremony in which young Germani are granted 
their first set of weapons and so are formally inducted as members into society resembles Roman 
youths receiving the toga uirilis (G. 13.1). The system whereby the nobles decide about small matters 
and the whole populace about greater ones (G. 11.1) recalls the traditional division between the duties 
of the senate and the popular assembly during the Republic. Finally, as in Rome, banquets play a 
significant role in Germanic society (15.1, 21.2, 22.1-3), and the Germani enjoy some form of public 
entertainment (24.1). These observations point up broad similarities between Germanic and Roman 
culture that bear on the practicability of acculturating the Germani. For the organization of “refined 
banquets” (conuiuiorum elegantiam) and other forms of public entertainment was one of the methods 
used by Roman governors to civilize (and corrupt) native tribes (Agr. 21.2). The above descriptions 
add to the imageability of Germania, diluting the stark differences between the two cultures and 
allowing a reader to imagine Germani and Romans functioning together.   
This line of reasoning can be extended by considering the supposed effects on the Germani of 
prolonged interaction with Romans. As noted above, Tacitus suggests that the tribes living near the 
																																																								
388 Krebs 2005, 78 ff. Cf. Perl 1990, 170.  
389 On the syncretistic process through which local gods were assimilated to Roman deities, see Roymans 2009, 219-38.  
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Empire’s frontier gradually assimilate to Roman custom through prolonged interaction.390 This 
concept is underlined most forcefully in the mercantile encounters between Germani and Romans 
(5.3, 45.4-5), a process of exchange through which the former gain a greater recognition and 
appreciation (adgnoscunt atque eligunt) of precious metals and gradually become complicit (probant) in the 
Roman appropriation of Germania’s resources. As E. O’Gorman notes, “this is Romanisation by 
stages: proximity, recognition, assimilation.”391 Of especial interest is the self-identification of the Ubii, 
who, though not ashamed of their origins, prefer to be called Agrippinenses after the founder of their 
colonia (G. 28.4; cf. A. 12.27.1).392 The significance of this self-identification is evident in the Fourth 
Book of the Historiae, where we are told that, in the eyes of Civilis and his forces, the Ubii had 
abandoned their Germanic roots (H. 4.28 ff.). They consequently were besieged (4.59 ff.) and forced 
to join the Batavian Revolt (4.63 ff.) before the garrison was killed and the Ubii’s allegiance to Rome 
restored (4.79).393 Elsewhere, Tacitus stresses like assimilation of Germanic tribes to Roman custom. 
About the Mattiaci he writes that, although their location and boundaries place them squarely within 
Germanic territory, in their hearts and spirit they follow Rome (mente animoque nobiscum agunt, 29.2). 
Similarly, about the Batavi (conceptually paired with the Mattiaci: G. 29.2), whose territory was located 
within the Empire, Tacitus stresses their allegiance to Rome and the privileged status they enjoyed as a 
result (29.1). He does not explicitly connect the Batavi with their revolt in 69-70 (which is mentioned 
swiftly but not fleshed out in the 37th chapter), but emphasizes the mutual respect between them and 
Rome.394 The Germania, in sum, offers much evidence that allows a reader to imagine a basic level of 
compatibility between Germanic and Roman culture. 
																																																								
390 Essential for this aspect of the Germania is the article of O’Gorman (1993, 135-154 = Ash 2012, 95-118), who teases out some the 
ways in which the text suggests that Germania can be civilized and molded through its interaction with Rome.  
391 O’Gorman 1993, 140-41 [= Ash 2012, 103-105].  
392 The point often is missed or taken as ironic. So, e.g., Gruen 2011, 165 n. 138. 
393 The Batavian condemnation of the Ubii at H. 4.28 ff. is paralleled by Arminius’ condemnation of Segestes at A. 1.59.  
394 For a comprehensive archaeological and historical study of the incorporation of the Batavi into the Empire (with focus on issues 
of ethnic identity), see Roymans 2004. See I. Haynes 2013, 112 ff. on the Batavi as auxiliaries. On the Batavian Revolt, cf. Brunt 1960; 
on its literary depiction in the Historiae, especially the complex character of Civilis, see H. Haynes 2003, 148-77; Ash 2014, 185-200. 
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 Once more, however, the above observations are qualified and offset by others that serve to 
make the opposite point: that Germani and Romans are too different from one another and that 
cultural incompatibility imposes limits on empire. So the positive example of the Ubii and Mattiaci 
buying into Roman culture is offset by the example of the Hermunduri, who, despite enjoying a 
privileged status as being the only Germanic tribe allowed to trade not only at the border but deep 
within the province of Raetia, “reject the Roman houses and villas that are laid open to them” (his 
domos uillasque patefecimus non concupiscentibus, 41.1). The example is powerful, since the Hermunduri, by 
virtue of their trading privileges and hence greater degree of immersion within the Empire, should (on 
the model posited above) assimilate more, not less, to Roman culture.  
Likewise, the image of a res publica Germanica, built up by the use of a variety of Roman terms 
and concepts, is balanced by Germanic customs and character traits that undermine it. In terms of 
religion, while Germanic divinities are associated with Roman gods, the Germani are said to reject the 
building of temples or the use of statues to represent their gods, deeming it “inconsistent with the 
grandeur of divine beings to confine them within walls or depict them in any human likeness” (9.2; cf. 
H. 2.78.3: nec simulacrum deo aut templum).395 This practice would seem to undermine the traditional 
methods of acculturation – explicated at Agr. 21 – of which the construction of temples was an 
important element. The Germani, moreover, practice human sacrifice, “a horrifying barbarian custom” 
(barbari ritus horrenda... 39.1), in order to appease their version of Mercury and Mother Earth (9.1, 39.1, 
40.4). Germanic prophetesses, as I have noted, sacrificed prisoners of war (see n. 382), as did the 
																																																								
395 This observation, too, is qualified, for elsewhere Tacitus notes that the Germani believed that divinities accompanied them while 
fighting (deo imperante) and so removed effigiesque et signa from their sacred groves and carried them into battle (7.2). He also mentions a 
templum associated with the goddess Nerthus (40.3) and in the Annales mentions a templum of Tanfana, razed to the ground by 
Germanicus’ forces (A. 1.51.1). It remains unclear what precisely Tacitus means when he speaks of templa in these cases. Most try to 
solve the discrepancy by claiming that the term templum denotes ‘sacred space’ and that the effigiesque signa are symbols as opposed to 
actual images (Goodyear 1972, 319; Rives 1999 ad loc.). Gruen (2011, 177) rejects such attempts and argues that the apparent 
inconsistencies show that the Germani were not uniform in their rejection of temples and statues. Again we may consider here the 
ethnography of Judaea. The Jews built temples, but, like the Germani, condemned images of divinities (H. 5.5.4). Moreover, unlike 
Germanic and Roman religion, Jewish religion was monotheistic (5.5). These discrepancies posed difficulties, as is illustrated by 
Caligula’s order to have a statue of himself set up in the Temple in Jerusalem, a decision that instigated fierce resistance (H. 5.9.2). The 
basic incompatibility between Roman and Jewish religion was one cause of recurrent unrest in Judaea, exemplified by the revolts of 
66, 115-17, and 132-35 (the Bar Kokhba Revolt). The Historia Augusta reports another revolt under Antoninus Pius (Ant. Pius 4-5). 
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Germani who defeated Varus and his legions (as Germanicus and his men discovered in the 
Teutoburg Forest: A. 1.61). Germanic religious practice, then, despite possessing familiar elements, 
generally is perceived as being incompatible with Roman religious thought. For difficulties negotiating 
such discrepancy we need only look at the persistent unrest in the province of Judaea (see n. 395).  
 Other customs described in Roman terms, such as the holding of assemblies and the induction 
of youths into society, likewise are qualified by their peculiarities. So the libertas of the Germani causes 
them to disregard calls to convene, with the result that it often takes them two or three days to 
assemble (11.1). They deliberate while drunk (22.2-3) and in arms, which they brandish wildly to show 
their assent (11.2). In fact, Tacitus writes, most public and private business is conducted under arms 
(13.1), a practice starkly different from what was deemed proper in Rome, where most people were 
not supposed to bear arms.396 While rapid disarmament of a population was not the first act of settling 
a province,397 what matters here is perception: the way the Germani are perceived to conduct business 
is ill matched with Roman ways. In the Historiae, this contrast is underlined by Civilis, who complains 
about this very aspect of Roman administration (uel, quod contumeliosius est uiris ad arma natis, inermes ac 
prope nudi sub custode et pretio coiremus, H. 4.46.1). Likewise, the formal induction of Germanic youths into 
society, while broadly analogous to the advancement of Roman youths, is described in terms that at 
once complicate the analogy. The distinction between the toga that defines the advancement of 
Roman youths and the weapons that mark that of young Germani serves to draw a contrast between 
the civil and peaceful ideals of Roman adult life and the warlike and violent aspects of Germanic 
adulthood.398  
The distinction between the Roman toga and Germanic arms bears, in a more nuanced way, 
on acculturation. For a principal marker of the success of Agricola’s policies in Britain was that it 
																																																								
396 On the bearing of arms and the presence of a police force in Rome, see Nippel 1984, 20-29.  
397 Brunt 1975, 260-70. 
398 Cicero, by metonymy, uses the word ‘toga’ to denote ‘peace’ and the word ‘arms’ to denote ‘war’ (de Orat. 3.167): Rives 1999, 180. 
Pertinent also in this case is Cicero’s famous adage that “arms should yield to the toga” (cedunt arma togae, Off. 1.77). 
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encouraged the Britons to go about clad in togas (frequens toga, Agr. 21.2). There is no indication 
anywhere in the Germania that the same success could easily be achieved among the Germani, as Varus’ 
failures had shown. We may in this instance look forward to the First Book of the Annales, where 
Tacitus puts in Arminius’ mouth an anti-Roman sentiment that makes the same point: “the Germani 
will never excuse their having seen between the Elbe and the Rhine the Roman rods, axes, and toga” 
(A. 1.59.4).399 Likewise, while the Germani display an interest in public entertainment, the latter was 
limited in scope (G. 24.1; cf. 19.1) and unlike the broad range of public entertainment in Rome, a 
contrast underlined by the disinterest of Frisian chiefs when witnessing a performance in Pompey’s 
theater (ignari, A. 13.54.3). Moreover, as we have seen, the Germani’s non-urban infrastructure and 
idiosyncratic lifestyle are described as remarkably ill suited to the construction and use of such venues 
as baths and theaters.400  
 Other defining Germanic customs and character traits raise questions about the viability of 
establishing a peaceful Roman administration. Tacitus records the actions of Agricola to advocate a 
gubernatorial policy geared towards the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability. While 
this policy had the intended pacifying effect on the Britons, the Germani are described as possessing a 
unique set of characteristics that suggest the impracticability of those traditional methods. Aside from 
being (like most barbarians) a scattered and warlike people, the Germani are described as placing great 
value on their sense of libertas (and as eager to defend it), as being generally indifferent to Roman 
practice, and, perhaps most problematic, as possessing a lifestyle that thrives on violence, war, and 
unrest. The tradition that developed around the Varian disaster centers precisely on this aspect. Varus 
entered his province with a vision of the Germani that seems to have equated the latter with other 
																																																								
399 Also note Tacitus’ comments on the advance through Italy of Aulus Caecina Alienus, who, clad in foreign garments, was received 
poorly by the toga-clad citizens of the towns and colonies he passed through (H. 2.20). 
400 The Roman penchant for public entertainment, and its destructive effects on public morality, are decried by Messalla at D. 29.3-4, a 
passage that may well look back to the Germania. 
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foreign peoples long conquered by Rome.401 He applied the customary methods of cultural 
imperialism to the Germani, which, however, were wholly unfit to deal with the latter and backfired. 
Holding the Germani to be a people that “enjoy the blessings of peace” (uiros pacis gaudentes, Vell. 
2.117.4) and expecting that “men who cannot be subdued by arms can be softened by the 
administration of law” (hominum, quique gladiis domari non poterant, posse iure mulceri, Vell. 2.117.3; Tac., A. 
1.58.2, 2.46.2), Varus both displayed a lack of understanding of Germanic mores and demonstrated the 
shortcomings of the model underpinning the Roman imperial mission. Whether or not this 
reconstruction of Varus’ actions is accurate (Velleius’ account seems aimed at vindicating Augustan 
and Tiberian policy and laying blame with the governor), it reflects contemporary perceptions of the 
Germani and offers an explanation for failed Roman policy in dealing with them.402 
That Germani and Romans were indeed very different people is further suggested by Tacitus’ 
depiction of Germanic client kings in the Annales. There we see a pattern whereby royal hostages, who 
either have grown up in Rome or spent a long time there, are sent out as client kings to rule a country 
that is by now completely foreign to them.403 They often are ill received, despised as foreigners, and 
soon deposed. The example of Italicus is particularly apt. This man was sent out by Claudius in 47 to 
rule the Cherusci, who had applied to Rome for a king (A. 11.16 ff.). The son of Arminius’ brother 
Flavus, Italicus was born and raised in Rome (apud urbem) and was practiced in both Germanic and 
Roman ways (in patrium nostriumque morem exercitus). Before sending him off, Claudius advised Italicus to 
consider himself a ciuis, not an obses, going to an externum imperium, advice that, as Gowing notes, 
reflects a poor understanding of Germanic mores and was unlikely to guarantee success.404 After an 
initially warm reception, the Cherusci soon came to despise him, as one raised hostili in solo and infectum 
																																																								
401 On the notion that Varus functioned as a governor of a traditional provincia and conducted himself in the manner typical of Roman 
governors, see Eck 2010, 14: “Dass diese provincia Germania somit als Untertanengebiet Roms zu leiten war, entsprach nicht etwa nur 
einer Sichtweise, die Varus für sich selbst entwikelt hatte, das war vielmehr die Ansicht aller Römer in diesen Jahren.” 
402 See Eck 2010 for a redeeming account of Varus’ conduct.  
403 On Tacitus’ description of client kings in the Annales, see Gowing 1990. For Tacitus’ view on hostage-taking generally, see Allen 
2006, 224-44.  
404 Gowing 1990, 321. Claudius’ advice to Meherdates (A. 12.11) about the Parthians reflects similar ignorance of non-Roman custom. 
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alimonio seruitio, cultu, omnibus externis, and consequently as a threat to ueterem Germaniae libertatem. He was 
soon deposed, then restored, after which he is recorded as res Cheruscas adflictabat (A. 11.17.3). 
Conceptually, Italicus’ example is significant, for by virtue of his birth and education in Rome his 
appointment as king over the Cherusci virtually is analogous to the appointment of a Roman governor 
over a province. Italicus’ case illustrates the failure of Roman policy with regard to the Germani, 
similar to Varus’ failure four decades earlier. The episode underscores the notion of cultural 
incompatibility. Notably what is seen to be insufferable to the Germani is Italicus’ moral corruption, 
which, despite his Germanic qualities, renders him servile and foreign and made him a threat to the 
Germani’s sense of racial purity. The phrase infectum… omnibus externis that characterizes Italicus evokes 
the nullis aliis aliarum nationum conubiis infectos that characterizes the Germani collectively at G. 4.1, 
underlining a major obstacle in the way of negotiating Germanic and Roman culture.405 In the Historiae, 
the same point is made by the Tencteri, who, in urging the Ubii to join the Batavian Revolt and 
renounce Roman culture, stress Germanic racial purity (sincerus et integer, H. 4.64.3). Once more, Judaea 
is a pertinent comparandum. Tacitus stresses in both the Historiae and the Annales that, much like the 
‘pure’ and self-contained Germani, the Jews “viciously hate all outsiders” (aduersus omnis alios hostile 
odium, H. 5.5.1; odio humani generis conuicti sunt, A. 15.44.4). One reason for the recurrent unrest in the 
province of Judaea (see n. 395) was a basic incompatibility between Roman and Jewish mores. Tacitus’ 
characterization of the Germani points up similar difficulties. 
The mismatch between Roman and Germanic mores and the Germani’s aversion to foreign 
influence raises concerns about the viability of the model of Roman cultural imperialism. For that 
model is based on a vision in which a morally superior power (in this case Rome), through a complex 
process of exchange and collusion, imposes its culture on a morally inferior and less developed native 
population, resulting in what may be called a ‘hybrid’ culture (‘Gallo-Roman,’ ‘Romano-British,’ 
																																																								
405 Cf. Allen 2006, 224-44; Malloch 2013 ad loc.   
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‘Romano-Spanish,’ etc.) and the successful incorporation of the latter into the empire of the former. 
The native population is supposed to benefit from this process by becoming civilized, while their 
gradual pacification (i.e. their becoming less warlike as a result of their civilization) serves the interests 
of the ruling power.406 One concern is that the model, in order to be successful, requires there to be a 
sufficient degree of cooperation and common ground between the two cultures. In other words, both 
cultures should be sufficiently compatible for the acculturation scheme to be viable to begin with. In 
the other representative case in Tacitus, that of Britain, this requirement seems to have been 
sufficiently satisfied, not least because the Britons, on Tacitus’ own conjecture, were a medley of 
people with different origins.407 The Germani, in contrast, are perceived to be an indigenous people 
that has preserved its racial purity by avoiding intermingling with outsiders. This racial and cultural 
exclusivity raises questions about compatibility and imposes demands on the acculturation model that 
it is not designed to accommodate. Tacitus recounts what he presents as the views of former Germani 
on Roman power and culture to underscore the point. The anti-Roman rhetoric mentioned above is 
placed in the mouth of Arminius and, in Italicus’ case, in that of the Cherusci collectively. This 
technique of bringing one’s audience into dialogue with contemporary observation is typical of 
Tacitus’ works and a potent way to underline ethnographic and socio-political conceptions.  
A second concern with the model is that it presupposes the moral superiority of the colonizing 
power. Pliny the Elder celebrates the idealized version of the model, in which Rome, as the center of 
the world, spreads humanitas (through softening peace and the promotion of the Latin language) and 
brings together into one nation, as it were, the discordant and wild peoples of the world (Nat. 3.39). 
This is the model Tacitus approvingly shows Agricola executing in Britain. Martial, in one of his 
epigrams, echoes the party line, praising the Roman qualities and refinement of Claudia Rufina, a lady 
																																																								
406 For the view of Romanization or acculturation not as a systematic and one-directional process, but as a process of negotiation, see 
Mattingly 2011, an excellent treatment of Romanization, the theoretical problems inherent in the model, and the ugly realities of 
colonization and acculturation.  
407 While he admits that he has no evidence to prove his conjectures, he uses geographical proximity and similarities in appearance to 
argue that the Caledonians have Germanic roots, the Silures Iberian roots, and the Britons nearest Gaul Gallic roots (Agr. 11).  
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of British origin (11.53). Already in Vergil do we witness the same sentiment: “remember, Roman, to 
rule nations through your imperium (these will be your skills) and to crown peace with civilization, to 
spare the conquered, and to war down the haughty” (tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento (hae tibi 
erunt artes), pacique imponere morem, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos, Aen. 6.851-3). What happens when 
the model is disturbed, when it is acknowledged that the colonizing power is morally corrupt?408 
Contemporary Romans challenge the model by directing attention to the moral corruption of the 
capital. In such accounts, the process of acculturation predominantly is perceived as negative, in that 
what is spread across the world are not virtues and noble qualities, but vice and luxury. Tacitus 
acknowledges that the humanitas spread by Rome essentially consists of vice and that what the Britons 
gain from prolonged contact with Rome is nothing short of moral depravity and servitude (Agr. 21). 
While he endorses the ultimate goal of pacifying the Britons and subjecting them to Rome’s imperium, 
he recognizes that the method used to achieve this goal is not the noble process advocated by his 
senatorial peers, but one geared towards having foreign populations mirror the depravity of the capital. 
In the Historiae, he has the Tencteri articulate this notion from the provincial viewpoint: “renounce the 
pleasures through which, rather than through their arms, the Romans secure their power over their 
subjects” (abruptis uoluptatibus, quibus Romani plus aduersus subiectos quam armis ualent, H. 4.64.2). In the 
Dialogus, he has Messalla make the same point: “the evils which first came up in Rome soon spread 
through Italy and are now diffusing themselves into the provinces” (quae mala primum in urbe nata, mox 
per Italiam fusa, iam in prouincias manant, D. 28.2). Tacitus’ contemporaries Juvenal and Pliny, with whom 
he shares stylistic and intellectual affinities, express similar criticism, describing Rome as the center of 
the disease of corruption, infecting the world, much like a disease infecting the body (Juv. 2.78-80; 
Plin., Ep. 2.27).409 Like Tacitus, Juvenal uses the example of royal hostages being morally corrupted in 
																																																								
408 O’Gorman 1993, 146 ff. [= Ash 2012, 111 ff.]; D. Braund 1996, 9, 162 ff.; Pagán 2014, 85.  
409 The core of Juvenal’s Second Satire “presents an image of disease and rot spreading uncontrollably from the centre outwards in 
images drawn from farming (pigs) and viticulture” (S. Braund 1996 ad loc.). Pliny’s outlook is on display in a letter to Rufus 
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Rome to illustrate the point (2.159-170).410 In the accounts of such authors, the act of conquest is 
divested from its expected meaning since the moral gradient has been reversed.  
The Germania takes all this a step further, for the Germani possess freedom and simplicity and 
are ascribed the kinds of moral qualities that Rome once possessed but has long since lost or 
abandoned. Not only is Rome a locus of moral corruption, but the Germani are in some ways the 
morally superior party and, in a reversal of the acculturation model, it is Rome that ought to learn from 
and adopt aspects of Germanic culture as opposed to the other way around. This is in line with the 
distinction – prevalent throughout the Tacitean corpus and relevant to the provincial origins of many 
of the senatorial class (including Tacitus himself) – between the corruption of contemporary Rome 
and the simplicity and integrity of provincial life.411 This distinction underlies much of Claudius’ 
argument about the admission of Gauls into the senate (A. 11.24). O’Gorman elucidates the complex 
narrative layers in which Germania, by virtue of its simplistic and pure qualities, conceptually is aligned 
with Rome’s past, whereas contemporary Rome, by virtue of its moral corruption, is aligned with the 
East, the region Romans commonly associated with such defects.412 Yet the text still presupposes 
Rome as the center and as the conquering power imparting its values and customs on the nations of 
the world. These different narrative layers challenge the traditional vision of conquest and 
acculturation, adding yet further complications to the discussion fostered by the text.   
My discussion of Germania’s situs and mores has served to show that the Germania does not 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Sempronius (Ep. 4.22). In it, he relates the decision taken by a committee (on which he served) to abolish a gymnastic contest at 
Vienne, since “it had corrupted the mores of Vienne, just as our contests have corrupted the mores of the entire world. For the vices of 
Vienne stay within their own walls, but ours spread far and wide. Just as in the human body, so in the body of the state, the gravest 
illness is the one that spreads from the head. Farewell.” For Rome as the center of corruption, note Tac., A. 15.44.4 and A. 16.5.1. 
410 “We have indeed extended arms beyond the shores of Ireland and the recently captured Orkneys and the Britons content with the 
shortest night, but the things that now occur in the city of the victorious people those whom we have conquered do not do. 
Nonetheless, one Armenian, Zalaces, is said to have been more effeminate than the other young boys and to have given himself to a 
passionate tribune. Look at what our exchanges accomplish: he had come as a hostage, but here men are made. For if an extended 
stay will have put the city onto the boys, a lover will not ever be lacking. They will dispense with their trousers, knives, bridles, and 
whip: that is how they bring the mores of Roman youths back to Artaxata” (Juv. 2.159-170).  
411 On the other hand, the emphasis on the corrupt methods of acculturation has potentially uncomfortable implications, since, as 
‘Romanized’ Gauls, Tacitus and Agricola are ultimately end products of this ugly process: O’Gorman 2014, 180. 
412 O’Gorman 1993, 146 ff. [= Ash 2012, 111 ff.]. Also note how the proper circulation of gloria in Britain under Agricola is 
conceptually aligned with a past era, in which merit and achievement were properly recognized and awarded: “in Britain, then, we see 
in action a historical era that on the Continent has already passed” (Sailor 2008, 92).   
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unequivocally advocate or discourage a renewed military offensive into Germania and that it does not 
conclusively demonstrate or negate the practicability of a provincia Germania. The text illustrates and 
reflects the complex nature of Roman foreign policy, particularly as regards Germania and its tribes, 
whose geography, topography, resources, and customs imposed an unconventional set of restraints on 
Roman perceptions of space and imperium.  
 
III.2.4:  Foreign Policy and Imperialism in the Germania: Conclusions 
The Germania does not advocate a particular foreign policy. The text should not be used to 
argue that Tacitus is fundamentally in favor of continued expansion nor to make the opposite claim 
that he is wholly pessimistic and in favor of limitation. Both arguments are undermined by evidence to 
the contrary.413 Tacitus’ attitude in 98, as it emerges from the text, plainly lies somewhere between 
these two extremes. Several of the authorial comments laid out at the start of this discussion (see p. 
118) show that Tacitus connects imperial expansion with morality, in that he sees unwillingness to 
expand the Empire as a sign of moral weakness. Similar dissatisfaction underlies his remarks on 
Augustus’ disinclination towards expansion into Britain (Agr. 13.2). This attitude perhaps is not 
unconnected to the fact that Tacitus was the son-in-law of an imperialist governor who enjoyed the 
type of gubernatorial latitude that apparently was more the norm under Vespasian than other 
emperors. Trajan, too, was a product of that age. At the same time that Tacitus deplores imperial 
limitation, however, he shows an acute awareness of the financial, cultural, and military constraints that 
impose limits on empire. If there is anything we may conclude from the Germania about Tacitus’ 
attitude in 98, it is that it is highly complex, which is what we would expect given the divergent and at 
times conflicting factors that bear on the formulation of foreign policy and that influence Roman 
perceptions, ranging from the moral and the emotional to the cultural, economic, and military. Placing 
																																																								
413 The argument that the Agricola (e.g. Rutledge 2000; Sailor 2008, 81-89; Mambwini Kivuila-Kiaku 2014, 98) and the Germania (e.g. 
Laederich 2001; Isaac 2004, 436; Krebs 2005) serve to urge Trajan to further expansion is problematic given the complexities of 
Tacitus’ attitude, which ought not be classified as either ‘pro-imperalism’ or ‘contra-imperialism.’ 
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Tacitus on either side of a spectrum would be to miss the point.414  
 Arguments about Tacitus’ outlook on imperialism in the Germania to a large extent depend on 
one’s interpretation of G. 33.2, where Tacitus utters the following sentiment: “may the tribes retain if 
not love for us, at least hatred for each other. For, with the destiny of empire pressing onward, fortune 
can give us no greater boon than the discord of our enemies” (maneat, quaeso, duretque gentibus, si non 
amor nostri, at certe odium sui, quando urgentibus imperii fatis nihil iam praestare fortuna maius potest quam hostium 
discordiam, 33.2). Just before uttering this statement, Tacitus records the destruction of the Bructeri at 
the hands of fellow Germanic tribes, an event that in part reflects, according to our author, divine 
favor towards Rome (seu superbiae odio seu praedae dulcedine seu fauore quodam erga nos deorum, 33.1). The 
above lines, among the most controversial in all of Tacitus, have generated a mass of literature.415 
Scholarship has, on the whole, taken up two opposing positions. The reference to the destiny of 
empire is either taken to be positive, in that Tacitus refers to the continued successful expansion of the 
Empire, or pessimistic, in that he intimates that the age of conquest has passed and that Rome is now 
dependent on the discord of its enemies for the successful maintenance of its imperial rule.  
While I suspect that Tacitus, seemingly referring to cyclical theories of the development of 
states or empires, is pessimistic here, the interpretation of the reference ultimately is inessential to the 
larger point he makes. For the current extent of the Empire already imposes structural military, 
financial, and cultural pressures on its maintenance that only would be exacerbated by further 
extension. The crucial point is that the greatest advantage to Rome, regardless of whether the Empire 
is extended or not, lies in the continued internecine strife amongst Germanic tribes. This notion 
applies to other peoples beyond the Empire’s frontiers as well. Supported by its persistent emphasis on 
Germanic discord and violence, the text suggests that Rome would do well to leave the Germani to 
their internal dissensions and pursue a policy of indirect influence (‘soft power’), one based on 
																																																								
414 Claims that the Germania lacks nuance (e.g. Mellor 2010, 51) simply are not borne out by the text.  
415 Benario (1968, 37-50) and Lund (1991, 2127-47) offer useful overviews of the literature produced on these lines up to their time.  
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projecting power outward (by inspiring terror) and maintaining imperium through collaboration with 
native chiefs.416 The first aspect is reflected by Tacitus’ remark on the allegiance of the Batavi and the 
Mattiaci: “the greatness of the Roman People has pushed forward fearful respect for the Empire out 
beyond the Rhine and the old frontiers” (protulit enim magnitudo populi Romani ultra Rhenum ultraque ueteres 
terminos imperii reuerentiam, G. 29.2). The ‘soft’ power gained in exchange for military and, more 
frequently, financial aid to the Marcomanni and Quadi is reflective of the second aspect (sed uis et 
potentia regibus ex auctoritate Romana. raro armis nostris, saepius pecunia iuuantur, nec minus ualent, G. 42.2; iam et 
pecuniam accipere docuimus, 15.2).417 This is the policy that Tiberius pursued when he decided to recall 
Germanicus and forgo re-annexation of the land between the Rhine and the Elbe (A. 2.26), and so the 
Germania may be seen as implicitly endorsing Tiberius’ policies in Germania.418 This policy finds 
adherence in contemporary accounts. In a letter to a certain Macrinus, written around the same time as 
the Germania, Pliny writes that Vestricius Spurinna was awarded a triumphal statue by Nerva in 97 for 
having installed a client king among the Bructeri and for having subdued this ferocious tribe by the 
mere threat of war, by terror, “which is the most splendid kind of victory.”419 That notion, analogous 





416 On ‘soft power,’ see Potter 2013, 319-32. On Rome’s grand strategy as based on image and instilling fear in the minds of its 
enemies, see Mattern 1999. Nearly half a century after the composition of the Germania, Appian wrote that Rome had preserved its 
empire through “prudence” and imperial limitation, by not incorporating into the Empire “poverty-stricken” and “profitless,” and 
therefore “useless,” barbarian tribes (Praef. 7). This outlook echoes that of Strabo, who, at the end of his Geography, divides the world 
into civilized and taxable parts, which are under Roman control, and uncivilized and profitless parts not worthy of incorporation into 
the Empire (17.3.24-25; cf. 2.5.8 on the minimal profits he thought could be had from lands on the fringes of the inhabited world).  
417 Also note Civilis’ perspective on Roman payments to the Germani at H. 4.76.2. 
418 This policy had yielded results with regard to Cappadocia as well, which had been reduced to stipendiary status not by force of 
arms but through Tiberius’ auctoritas (Vell. 2.39.3). 
419 Nam Spurinna Bructerum regem ui et armis induxit in regnum, ostentatoque bello ferocissimam gentem, quod est pulcherrimum uictoriae genus, terrore 
perdomuit (Ep. 2.7.2). On the addressee and the date of the event related here: Whitton 2013 ad loc.; cf. Sherwin-White 1966, 154-55, 
who draws different conclusions. On the date of the second book of letters: Sherwin-White 1966, 20-41; Whitton 2013, 16 ff. Both 
Sherwin-White and Whitton offer plentiful references to the scholarship on each of these issues up to their own day. The Bructeri 
were some of Rome’s fiercest Germanic enemies in the first century AD: Rives 1999, 256 with further references. 




III.3  Foreign Policy and Imperialism in the Historiae  and the Annales   
In the second part of this chapter, I explore Tacitus’ outlook on Roman power and foreign 
policy as it emerges from his historical works, focusing on his accounts of Germania, Britain, and the 
East and seeking to determine to what extent, if any, his outlook changes over the course of Trajan’s 
reign. In so doing, I make two principal claims. The first is that Tacitus’ view of the nature of Roman 
imperium and control and his attitude towards Roman imperialism remain consistent across this works. 
As in the Agricola and the Germania, Tacitus approves of military initiative, but the many factors he 
points up that impose limits on empire reveal his conviction that extension should occur sensibly and 
that, more often than not, defensive consolidation is the more economical course of action. My second 
claim is that Tacitus’ description of the Germani in the historical works largely follows their 
description in the Germania. Here I take issue with the common view that the Germani are portrayed 
less favorably in the historical narratives and, consequently, that Tacitus’ view of them shifts over the 
course of his literary career. I show, instead, that the depiction of Germania as a region and the 
Germani as a people remains, by and large, consistent throughout. While single tribes can be 
characterized differently in the three works, they still conduct themselves in typically ‘Germanic’ 
fashion.  
III.3.1  Preliminaries 
Just as an examination of the Agricola and the Germania ought to limit itself to what Tacitus 
knew and could know in 98, so the historical narratives are delineated by the context in which they 
were written and the historical time period they cover. The Historiae were composed during the 
expansionist campaigns into Dacia and Arabia, while the Annales were written before, during, and after 
Trajan’s Parthian War.421 Both works cover earlier time periods, the Historiae the civil wars of 68-69 
and the Flavian Principate, the Annales the Julio-Claudian era from the accession of Tiberius to the 
																																																								
421 For a Hadrianic date for the completion of the Annales, see p. 159. 
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death of Nero. In each case, we ought to keep in mind the context in which Tacitus composed these 
works and the extent to which they reflect contemporary socio-political and military conditions.  
Trajan pursued a policy of diplomacy and indirect control with regard to Germania, invaded 
and annexed Dacia after two bloody wars (101–102, 105–106) only after Domitian’s and his own 
policy of consolidation and frontier security failed to ensure stability, and annexed the Nabataean 
kingdom and turned it into the province of Arabia (in the spring of 106), apparently with no serious 
war involved.422 Reconstructing the emperor’s Parthian War is more problematic, as our evidence is 
scanty, consisting of Xiphilinus’ excerpts from Dio, some fragments of Arrian’s contemporary 
Parthika, several late fourth-century allusions, and numismatic and epigraphic evidence offering some 
insight into the war’s chronology.423 The official cause for the war was that the Parthian king Osroes 
had deposed Axidares (ca. AD 113), the king of Armenia sanctioned by Rome, and replaced him with 
a new king, an overt violation of the Neronian arrangement. But later sources, most notably Fronto 
and Dio, present this violation as a pretext and in hindsight ascribe Trajan’s decision to his excessive 
eagerness for military glory. To be sure, Trajan’s decision to annex Armenia and make war on the 
Parthians constituted an overt departure from the policy pursued by Corbulo, who, in response to 
similar violations and provocations, had contained the situation by avoiding outright war with Parthia.  
To posterity, Trajan’s policy will have seemed rash. But it is crucial to remember that lack of 
evidence prevents us from knowing what had transpired in Armenia and Parthia to motivate the 
emperor’s decision. It is not inconceivable that events in Armenia, whatever their nature, reminded 
him of the persistent unrest in Dacia and urged him to depart from the policy pursued by the Julio-
Claudians, which often had failed to control this border zone effectively. Indeed, not everyone thought 
																																																								
422 Germania: Bennett 1997, 74. Dacia: Griffin 2000, 109-13, 126. Arabia: Bennett 1997, 176 ff.; Griffin 2000, 123, 126. Griffin 
suggests that Trajan’s decision to annex Arabia, as opposed to appointing the son of the dead vassal king as its next client king, 
reflects his having learned from Decebalus that such arrangements could not be expected to preserve peace and stability.  
423 On Trajan’s Parthian War: Griffin 2000, 123-28 with further references there.  
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Trajan’s plans overambitious.424 Given our lack of evidence we probably should assume that Trajan 
had good reason to divert from a policy that had worked well for him in the past. It is also crucial that 
we keep in mind that, before his death, Trajan had realized the impracticability of his designs and had 
started the process of withdrawal and stabilization continued by Hadrian. Trajan, then, as far as our 
evidence allows, generally pursued a cost-efficient foreign policy geared towards consolidation and 
avoidance of unnecessary warfare. This arrangement was altered in contexts that saw recurrent 
instability: Dacia and possibly Armenia. We have noted the endorsement of this policy in Pliny, who 
lauds cost-efficient victory as the best type of victory, as well as in Tacitus’ Germania.  
 
III.3.2  The Nature and Limits of Empire 
 
Britain was thoroughly conquered and at            perdomita Britannia et statim omissa. (H. 1.2.1) 
once neglected.    
 
He then came to Elephantine and Syene,             exim uentum Elephantinen ac Syenen,    
once the gateways of the Roman Empire,   claustra olim Romani imperii, 
which now extends to the Red Sea.  quod nunc rubrum ad mare patescit. (A. 2.61.2) 
 
 
The above two statements are essential for understanding Tacitus’ attitude towards Rome’s 
imperium and the maintenance of the Empire. They contain the answer to the question of whether he 
regarded provincial boundaries as the limit of Roman imperium or whether he saw them as mere 
physical boundaries beyond which imperium could extend. The answer to this question in turn bears on 
his outlook on foreign policy and Rome’s control of areas outside the Empire’s termini. 
The first statement, from the opening chapters of the Historiae, is a reference to the Flavian 
conquest of Britain, culminating in Agricola’s victory at Mons Graupius in 83, and to Domitian’s 
subsequent neglect of its final completion.425 In the Agricola, Tacitus reveals the Roman belief that 
																																																								
424 As Griffin notes (2000, 127), the four Trajanic commanders put away at the beginning of Hadrian’s reign probably belonged to 
those who thought Hadrian should have tried to regain the lost provinces: SHA, Hadr. 7.1-2. Fronto criticized Hadrian for the same 
reason (Princ. Hist. (Haines) II.213 paragraph 14, II.207 paragraph 10).  
425 On the gradual withdrawal of forces from Caledonia following Agricola’s victory, see Fulford 2000, 559-66; cf. Chilver 1979, 40-41. 
	
	 158 
Agricola’s victory had broken the British resistance in Caledonia and had constituted the final battle in 
the conquest of the island. So much is clear from perdomita at Agr. 10.1, recalled by our phrase here, 
and from Agricola’s words at Agr. 33-34. The victory was reinforced by the establishment (in 84) of 
the legionary fortress at Inchtuthil (on the river Tay) for legio XX.426 But the final advance was never 
made. Agricola was recalled and the process of withdrawal soon started. Already during the governor’s 
tenure some troops were transferred to Germania to serve in Domitian’s Chattian campaigns. The 
Dacian campaigns during the next years necessitated the transfer of additional forces from Britain, 
including the withdrawal of legio II Adiutrix (which was replaced by legio XX at Inchtuthil) and an 
unknown number of auxilia. This was followed later by the abandonment of the fortress at Inchtuthil 
(still unfinished) and ultimately (throughout Tacitus’ lifetime and beyond) of the system of auxiliary 
forts stretching southward through Caledonia down to the line of Stanegate and the rivers Tyne and 
Solway.427 Several factors underlie Tacitus’ indignation at H. 1.2.1. There can be no doubt that he 
condemned Agricola’s recall ahead of the finalization of the island’s conquest. He probably also 
disapproved of Domitian’s sudden decision to make war on the Chatti in 82-83, which necessitated the 
transfer of forces from Britain to the Rhine frontier. But, above all, he suspected imperial jealousy of 
Agricola’s achievements. That, as we have seen, was in line with his view of the imperial system of 
government and the behavior it inspired in its emperors, a persistent theme that recurs here in the 
opening chapters of the Historiae: a decade after the Agricola, his resentment clearly had not subsided.  
A second, and no less important, factor underlying Tacitus’ indignation was the reduction of 
Rome’s imperium as a result of Domitian’s policy-making. Post-Augustan discussions about the nature 
of power distinguished “between the concept of the soft power of Rome – its hegemony – as opposed 
to the hard power represented by the boundaries of the provinces.”428 Tacitus held the same view, 
																																																								
426 Fulford 2000, 562.   
427 Chilver 1979, 40; Fulford 2000, 563. 
428 Potter 2013, 319.  
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seeing the boundaries of the provinces as the physical limits of the Empire, as opposed to Rome’s 
imperium, which could extend beyond them. This is evident from his description of the extent of the 
Empire at A. 2.61.2 (claustra olim Romani imperii, quod nunc rubrum ad mare patescit), where he distinguishes 
between the claustra, also used elsewhere to denote physical boundaries (H. 2.82.3; A. 2.59.3), and 
Rome’s imperium.429 For Tacitus, indirect power was real power and in areas that did not bear the cost 
of annexation this was accomplished in part by the use of client kings and native chiefs. In his 
description of the Empire’s defenses at A. 4.5, it is clear that Tacitus saw client kings as part of the 
Empire.430 This is confirmed in the Thirteenth Book of the Annales, where we are told that eastern 
client kings were instructed to prepare military forces to support Corbulo’s campaigns under Nero.431 
It is these conceptions of power that shed light on the military contexts alluded to at H. 1.2.1 and A. 
2.61.2, the two citations with which we began.  
The evidence provided by the inscriptions of the Bronze Herakles from the Mesopotamian 
kingdom of Mesene, discovered and published in the mid-to-late 1980s, suggests that, after Trajan’s 
and, shortly thereafter, Hadrian’s withdrawal from Mesopotamia, Mesene remained a Roman client 
kingdom.432 If this is right (and it seems to be), it follows that, after the abandonment of the province 
of Mesopotamia, Tacitus still saw Rome’s imperium as extending to the Persian Gulf. The implication 
for the composition of the Annales would be that the work was completed after 117.433  
 In contrast with the situation in Mesopotamia, the withdrawal of Roman forces from northern 
Britain in the mid 80s to early 90s was not followed by the installment of client kings or native chiefs 
																																																								
429 Potter 1991, 288.  
430 Mauros Iuba rex acceperat donum populi Romani. cetera Africae per duas legiones parique numero Aegyptus, dehinc initio ab Syriae usque ad flumen 
Euphraten, quantum ingenti terrarum sinu ambitur, quattuor legionibus coercita, accolis Hibero Albanoque et aliis regibus qui magnitudine nostra proteguntur 
aduersum externa imperia. et Thraeciam Rhoemetalces ac liberi Cotyis, ripamque Danuuii legionum duae in Pannonia, duae in Moesia attinebant (A. 4.5), 
with Potter 1991, 288-89. 
431 Haec atque talia uulgantibus, Nero et iuuentutem proximas per prouincias quaesitam supplendis Orientis legionibus admouere legionesque ipsas propius 
Armeniam conlocari iubet, duosque ueteres reges Agrippam et Antiochum expedire copias quis Parthorum finis ultro intrarent; simul pontis per amnem 
Euphraten iungi; et minorem Armeniam Aristobulo, regionem Sophenen Sohaemo cum insignibus regiis mandat. exortusque in tempore aemulus Vologesi 
filius Vardanes: et abscessere Armenia Parthi, tamquam differrent bellum (A. 13.7).  
432 As expounded by Potter (1991, 277-90).  
433 There is no space here to discuss the difficulties of A. 2.61 and its implications. I follow Syme (1958a, 465-80), Rutledge (1998, 
141-43), Potter (1991, 287-91), Birley (2000), Pagán (2012, 3), and others in seeing a Hadrianic date for the completion of the Annales.  
	
	 160 
to maintain Rome’s imperium. Domitian and especially Trajan and Hadrian seem not to have regarded 
the loss of northern Britain of major strategic importance.434 For Tacitus, however, the extent of 
Rome’s imperium was bound up intimately with Roman morality and “anything other than full 
subjugation of the island was to him inconsistent with uirtus exercituum et Romani nominis gloria (Agr. 
23.1).”435 The reduction of Rome’s imperium in Britain stood in marked contrast to its extension into 
Dacia and Arabia, which were added to the Empire while Tacitus was writing the Historiae. The same 
vision of power underlies his resentment in the Germania about the losses of Germanic territory. The 
loss of territory between the Rhine and the Elbe (‘hard’ power), compounded by the loss of indirect 
influence (‘soft power’) due to Arminius’ meddling with other Germanic chiefs, constituted a real 
reduction of Roman control beyond the Rhine frontier. 
For Tacitus, then, indirect power was real power. This is not to say that he approves of every 
aspect of the client king system. As we have seen, he stresses the persistent failure of Roman-bred 
clients to establish peaceful rule in areas whose culture and customs are incompatible with those of 
Rome.436 But the use of loyal clients or chiefs who enjoy the respect of their countrymen offered a 
means of exerting control and ensuring stability in areas that did not bear the cost and effort of 
annexation, allowing Rome to concentrate its resources elsewhere.437 
Tacitus’ attitude towards imperialism largely corresponds with post-Augustan notions of 
power, in which expansion continued to be glorified but recognition that the Empire had all but 
reached its natural limits favored limitation and defensive stabilization.438 What emerged was a 
																																																								
434 Fulford 2000, 563. The gradual withdrawal from northern Britain prefigured the major Hadrianic fortifications that turned the Empire 
into a fortified camp and that served as a polarizing boundary between Roman and non-Roman. On the importance of this shift in 
ideology, which Tacitus did not follow, see Potter 1991, 286 n.32, 288 n.43.  
435 Chilver 1979, 41.  
436 Gowing 1990, 315-30.  
437 Cf. Laederich 1991, 291. 
438 On Roman ideology of empire during the Republic and the Principate and the different scholarly positions on the matter, see the 
useful introduction in the Companion to Roman Imperialism (ed. Hoyos, 2013). Crucial in the scholarly debate are Luttwak 1976 (for long-
term, grand strategy and a defensive mindset); Isaac 1992 (against long-term coherence and for expansionist mindset); Potter 1996 
(middle ground between Luttwak and Isaac); Mattern 1999 (on asserting hegemony and dominance through an outward policy of 
intimidation and military superiority). The essays collected in Champion 2004 remain useful as well. 
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complex and dynamic foreign policy that had to negotiate glory and prestige with cost and local 
realities. Tacitus, as we have seen, generally approves of expansionist policy, while he tends to connect 
avoidance of expansion with moral weakness. But imperial expansion often could be impractical and 
expensive, and dominance over foreign tribes could be achieved in other ways. Hence a policy of 
outward projection of power (intimidation), geared towards “universal recognition of their empire’s 
maiestas, its “greaterness,”” and towards cowing enemies into deference based on Rome’s 
acknowledged military superiority.439 This aspect of Rome’s foreign policy is reflected in our texts by 
the frequent occurrence of such nouns and phrases as terror, metus, uis Romana, uis principatus, magnitudo 
populi Romani, magnitudo Romana, and of such verbs as exterrere, minitari, arma ferre/ostendare. This was a 
policy that allowed for the preservation of peace and stability without incurring unnecessary cost and 
bloodshed and that could be made to fit into the traditional ideology of victory, glory, and 
supremacy.440 So, as we shall see, Corbulo earned great military glory for his accomplishments in the 
East, although he did not engage the Parthians in a single pitched battle. A passage from the Historiae 
affords an insight into the Roman endorsement of this policy. Eprius Marcellus celebrates it – and its 
execution by Corbulo – in his speech against Thrasea Paetus: “is it the peace throughout the world or 
victories won without loss to our armies that displease him?” (pacem illi per orbem terrae an uictorias sine 
damno exercituum displicere?, A. 16.28.3). Marcellus’ words may reasonably be taken to reflect 
contemporary attitudes in Tacitus’ own time. If diplomacy and intimidation failed and enemies 
resisted, they would be engaged and the image of Rome’s superiority brutally restored. This ideology 
already is on display in Vergil: “remember, Roman... to spare the conquered and to war down the 
haughty” (tu... Romane, memento... parcere subiectis et debellare superbos, Aen. 6.851-3). Expansion is reserved 
																																																								
439 Mattern 1999, 209-10. On international recognition of Rome’s military superiority, cf. Livy, praef. 7: ea belli gloria est populo Romano ut 
cum suum conditorisque sui parentem Martem potissimum ferat, tam et hoc gentes humanae patiantur aequo animo quam imperium patiuntur. 
440 Appian (Praef. 7) and Aelius Aristides (Or. 26.10, 22-29) claimed that Rome did not need to further expand its boundaries, since in 
magnitude and duration the Roman Empire had surpassed any former empire and it already possessed the best of the world’s lands and 
seas. Appian regarded the areas bordering the Empire as insufficiently profitable to bear the cost of annexation. Aristides claimed that, 
since Rome was powerful enough to expand its empire at will, it did not need to do so.  
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for areas outside the Empire that saw recurrent instability: so Agricola’s task to complete the 
subjugation of all of Britain and Trajan’s annexation of Dacia and perhaps Armenia. A final important 
strategy was the incitement and exploitation of internal discord and war among tribes located outside 
the Empire’s termini. In the following sections, I lay out how the above policies and considerations are 
expounded in the historical narratives. What emerges is that the latter develop in greater detail and 
complexity the same vision of empire as does the Germania. 
Numerous passages in the historical works confirm Tacitus’ general endorsement of military 
initiative and expansionist designs. This is reflected perhaps most explicitly in his criticism of imperial 
restrictions on governors. Tacitus, a product of the Vespasianic and Trajanic age, plainly was an 
advocate of gubernatorial adventurism.441 This is one of the factors (his view of client kings as part of 
the Empire is another) that show that he did not share in the change in ideology under Hadrian, who 
was less interested in gubernatorial initiative and whose major frontier fortifications cordoned off the 
Empire, drawing a dividing line between the Empire and the world outside it.442 Imperial jealousy and 
the hackneyed nature of the triumphalia ornamenta (cf. pp. 31-44) are the most frequently adduced 
factors curbing imperial expansion. Fear and jealousy, Tacitus alleges, urged Domitian to recall 
Agricola from Britain (Agr. 39; H. 1.2.1) and to offer him an appointment as governor of Syria (Agr. 
40; cf. A. 2.5.1, 2.43). Jealousy also is alleged or intimated in Germanicus’ recall by Tiberius (A. 
2.26),443 Corbulo’s recall by Claudius (A. 11.20.1-2), and the same general’s enforced suicide under 
Nero (Dio 62.17).444 The civil wars of 68-69 had revealed “that secret of empire, that an emperor can 
be made elsewhere than in Rome” (euulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri, H. 1.4.2; cf. 
2.76.4), a maxim that articulates the danger posed by distinguished commanders who enjoyed the 
																																																								
441 As the disproportionate attention given to the activity of Agricola, Germanicus, and Corbulo reflects: see pp. 39-40.  
442 App., Praef. 28; SHA, Hadr. 12.6, with Potter 1991, 286 n. 32, 288 n. 43, with further references there. 
443 Tiberius’ alleged jealousy of Germanicus: passim Books 1 and 2, 3.2-3, 4.1. 
444 Tacitus’ claim that Tiberius felt comfortable honoring Furius Camillus’ military achievements in the senate because of the modesty 
of the man’s life is telling (A. 2.52.5). The fact that Gn. Lentulus Gaetulicus, one of Sejanus’ close adherents, escaped punishment and 
kept his command in Upper Germany during the purge of Sejanus’ former supporters (A. 6.30) showcases the power of, and the 
threat posed by, commanders of militarily powerful provinces.  
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loyalty of their legions. That it took until then for a princeps to be made outside of Rome may be 
surprising. Tacitus’ resentment at imperial jealousy of great commanders reflects his appreciation of 
republican-style military initiative (underlined by the bitter remark beatos quondam duces Romanos ascribed 
to Corbulo at A. 11.20.1) and underlines one of the main factors curbing expansion. Gubernatorial 
enterprise is discouraged further by the triviality of the triumphalia ornamenta, which Tacitus constantly 
deplores. His criticism of the inaction of some of Britain’s governors and of imperial disinterest in 
expansion (cf. Agr. 13.3; A. 4.32.2: princeps proferendi imperi incuriosus) confirms his general outlook.  
Tacitus’ approval of military initiative and expansion is balanced by his understanding of 
structural pressures (internal and external) on the Empire that advocate limitation and stabilization. It 
had long been acknowledged that the extent of the Empire made it difficult to manage and defend.445 
It was no secret that legions (at times) and auxiliary cohorts (often) had to be moved to pressured 
regions (A. 4.5.4), opening up other areas to attack. Tacitus describes the Dacians as taking advantage 
of legions having been withdrawn from Moesia (H. 3.46), the Aedui as breaking out in part because of 
the distance between them and the nearest Roman forces (A. 3.43), and Tacfarinas as encouraging 
revolt by spreading rumors that the Empire was facing attacks elsewhere and forced to transfer troops 
from Africa (A. 4.24). Elsewhere, C. Dillius Vocula is concerned to prevent similar information from 
spreading throughout the world during the Batavian Revolt (H. 4.58.5).  
Tacfarinas’ rumors point up a related, no less serious, danger: simultaneous incursions into the 
Empire at different points.446 Roman power would have been overthrown, says Tacitus, had Mucianus 
not prevented the simultaneous attack on the Empire by the Germani and the Dacians (H. 3.46). 
Throughout the narrative of the Batavian Revolt, Tacitus hints at the possibility of a Gallo-Germanic 
coalition under Civilis attacking the Empire from multiple points, while elsewhere he writes that Gaul 
gained courage from incoming reports that the winter camps in Moesia and Pannonia were being 
																																																								
445 Note Tiberius on the magnitudo imperii, the tanta molis of its management, and the fortuna to which it was exposed (A. 1.11.1).  
446 This would lead to massive problems under Marcus Aurelius and in later periods. For the wars under Marcus: Birley 2012, 217-33. 
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threatened by Sarmatian and Dacian bands and that camps in Britain were facing similar treats at the 
same time (H. 4.58).  
Revolts and incursions into the Empire often occur as a result of Roman internal discord, both 
in the provinces and the capital. While discord is a typically barbarian trait in Tacitus, he points up its 
persistent occurrence among Romans as well and, just as Rome knows how to take advantage of 
barbarian conflict, so barbarian tribes capitalize on Roman instability (real or alleged) to make 
incursions into the Empire. The civil wars of 68-69 are the principal example of internal discord 
facilitating barbarian attack. The Sarmatian Rhoxolani took their chance when “people’s minds were so 
turned to the civil war that foreign affairs were neglected” (conuersis ad ciuile bellum animis externa sine cura 
habebantur, H. 1.79.1). Civilis initiates his revolt in the knowledge that Rome is being torn apart by civil 
strife (H. 4.55.4). The Dacians monitor the war and break in as soon as they learn that “the entire 
empire is divided against itself” (cuncta in uicem hostilia, H. 3.46.2), while the Gauls look for Rome to be 
“broken by a continuous series of civil wars and internal disasters” (si populum Romanum continua ciuilium 
bellorum series et interna mala fregissent, H. 4.54.3). The burning of the Capitolium above all signified 
Rome’s capacity for self-destruction and roused the Gauls (H. 4.54.2), for whom the burning of the 
temple was an encouraging reminder of the Gallic sack of Rome in 390 BC.447 Under Tiberius, 
Germanic tribes are expected to attack the Empire if they hear about the mutiny among Germanicus’ 
legions (A. 1.36.2), while Vespasian is concerned to send envoys to Parthia and Armenia to prevent 
revolt in his rear when his legions are engaged in the civil war (H. 2.82.3; cf. H. 4.51.2; A. 15.27.2).  
Another structural problem, explored in the second chapter (pp. 91-95), was that continued 
expansion made Rome ever more dependent on auxilia, who increasingly were incorporated into the 
imperial system and, by Tacitus’ time, had become a significant force in their own right, not merely 
ancillary to the legionaries. Tacitus, as we have seen, identifies two principal problems associated with 
																																																								
447 On the significance of the Capitolium in Tacitus’ Historiae, see Sailor 2008, 205 ff. For the various ways in which the Vitellians in 
the Historiae resemble the Allia Gauls in Livy and Plutarch, see Ash 1999, 37-55. 
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this development. The first is the increasing ‘barbarization’ of Roman armies. The second is that auxilia 
often are perfidious, unruly (especially Germanic cohorts), and dangerous to rely on in battle. The 
Cheruscan and Batavian revolts had demonstrated the dangers of having powerful auxiliary forces 
desert Rome and incite other tribes to join them. The Germania offers essential information about 
Germanic mores – particularly about their predisposition to rashness and violence – that serves to 
explain the many cases of desertion and/or revolt initiated by Germanic auxiliaries or trans-Rhenane 
tribes. What made native revolts particularly dangerous is that they often were initiated by men who 
once served in Roman armies themselves. Such men were intimately familiar with Roman military 
strategy and the workings of the Empire. Arminius and Civilis masterfully exploited their knowledge of 
the Empire’s weaknesses.448  
 There were financial constraints on continued expansion as well. The Augustan military 
system, a development of long adjustment, was based on a model in which soldiers serving in the 
standing armies accounted for a percentage of the Empire’s total adult male population. Payment of 
the standing armies was connected to the tax system and the imperial budget, an arrangement that 
proved inelastic over time and did not leave much room for economic shortfall.449 Failure to pay 
legions caused unrest, as the great mutinies of the German and Pannonian legions exemplify. Aside 
from the cost of military salaries and bonuses, it was expensive to campaign in regions that, like 
Germania, were inhospitable and lacked resources. So, Tacitus tells us, Claudius wisely refrained from 
undertaking war in the Bosporan Kingdom (modern Crimea), “a country without roads, on a sea 
without harbors... with a soil devoid of crops, where delay would cause weariness” (auio itinere, 
importuoso mari... solum frugum egenum, taedium ex mora, A. 12.20.1). Armenia was similarly inhospitable and 
exacting. Corbulo and his men, despite having incurred no losses, suffered from scarcity of food and 
																																																								
448 Perfidy: H. 1.43, 1.51-52, 3.5, 3.46, Books 4-5 passim (Batavian revolt); A. 1.57, 2.17, 4.73. Unruly conduct: H. 1.64 (Batavi), 2.27 
(id.), 2.66 (id.), 2.69 (id.). Relying on auxiliary forces: pp. 91-93 and n. 250. Experience gained in Roman armies: H. 3.40, 3.42, 3.43 
(Florus and Sacrovir), H. 4.17 (Civilis), A. 2.10, 2.13, 2.45 (Arminius), A. 2.52 (Tacfarinas), A. 11.18 (Gannascus).  
449 For the economics of this arrangement, see Potter 2013, 323-24 with plentiful references.  
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water, physical hardship, scorching heat, and long marches (ipse exercitusque ut nullis ex proelio damnis, ita 
per inopiam et labores fatiscebant... ad hoc penuria aquae, feruida aetas, longinqua itinera..., A. 14.24.1). Parthia’s 
geography, Tacitus notes, was similar to that of Armenia (situ terrarum… Parthis propiores, A. 13.34.2).  
Another major expense was the construction and maintenance of permanent garrisons, 
especially in economically underdeveloped areas. Appian wrote that Rome had preserved its empire 
through prudence (δι’ εὐβουλίαν) and imperial limitation (τὰ κράτιστα γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ἔχοντες σώζειν 
ἐθέλουσι µᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐς ἄπειρον), that is by declining to incorporate into the Empire “poverty-
stricken” (πενιχρὰ) and “profitless” (ἀκερδῆ), and therefore “useless” (οὐδὲν... χρησίµους), barbarian 
tribes (Praef. 7). According to Appian, Antoninus Pius would not annex new territory unless it could 
bear the cost its own garrison (Praef. 7.26). Dio criticized Septimius Severus’ annexation of 
Mesopotamia for this reason (Dio 65.3.3). It is evident from the Annales that Tiberius had similar 
qualms about Germania, whose resources he did not deem adequate to defray the cost of continued 
campaigning and annexation. He also seems not to have considered the plundering of Germanic 
territory a viable way to make up the delayed payment of Germanicus’ legions. The information in the 
Germania about Germania’s resources and economic potential largely bears out the emperor’s views.  
 A final constraint on expansion that Tacitus often adduces is cultural incompatibility, an issue 
we explored at some length in the Germania above. Just as some areas do not bear annexation 
economically, others do not bear it culturally. Germania and Parthia are the principal examples of this 
notion. The description of Germanic and Parthian royal hostages, who accustom themselves to 
Roman culture and subsequently fail to re-integrate within their native culture, is one way in which 
Tacitus illustrates this. He develops and underlines this notion by recording non-Roman views of 
Roman culture. For example, at the imposition of the Parthian royal hostage Vonones on the 
Armenian throne, the Parthians are said to have felt shame for having sought a king “from another 
world” (alio ex orbe), one “infected with the training of the enemy” (hostium artibus infectum, A. 2.2.2). 
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Italicus’ reception by the Cherusci is described is similar terms (A. 11.16 ff.; pp. 147-48). Neither 
Germanic nor Parthian culture, on Tacitus’ account, is compatible with or receptive to Roman culture. 
In addition to being military and geographical boundaries, the Rhine and Euphrates are conceived of 
as cultural barriers as well. Another non-Roman viewpoint, placed in the mouth of the Tencteri (who 
urge the Ubii to desert Rome), stresses the limits on the traditional methods of cultural imperialism: 
 
instituta cultumque patrium resumite, abruptis uoluptatibus, quibus Romani plus aduersus subiectos quam armis ualent. 
sincerus et integer et seruitutis oblitus populus aut ex aequo agetis aut aliis imperitabitis. (H. 4.64.3) 
 
Resume the manners and customs of your country and renounce the pleasures, through which, rather 
than through their arms, the Romans secure their power against subject nations. A pure and untainted 
race, forgetting your past bondage, you will be the equals of all or will even rule over others. 
 
 
Passages such as this one, composed with the benefit of hindsight, offer one explanation for why 
Roman expansion was halted in the north at the Rhine and in the east at the Euphrates. As for the 
Parthians, it would seem that Tacitus’ account both reflects and endorses Trajan’s decision (upheld by 
Hadrian) to abandon the provinces briefly held in modern Iraq.  
 In addition to cultural incompatibility, there is the problem of the moral corruption of the 
capital and the way this inverts the traditional model of cultural imperialism. We discussed this notion 
as it emerges from the Germania. It recurs in the historical works, where Tacitus illustrates it in a variety 
of ways. The moral corruption of the governing class is on display throughout both works. Tacitus, 
evoking Sallust, connects Rome’s moral corruption with the expansion of the Empire and the massive 
wealth that poured into the capital (A. 3.54). The provinces retained their simplicity, while Rome 
became ever richer and more corrupt; the contrast runs through both historical works.450 Tacitus’ 
reader is left with an ugly image of Rome and its imperial mission: the City is the center of corruption, 
where all shameful things come together and whence, in turn, they are spread throughout the world 
																																																								
450 On the simplicity of provincial life as contrasted with the excesses of the capital, note A. 13.54.3, 15.44.4, 16.5.1 On non-Roman 
forces losing their vigor and mental hardiness while staying in Rome: H. 2.89, 2.99. Authorial digression on Roman luxury: A. 3.54-55. 
Weak Roman vs. strong foreign troops: A. 3.40.3. 
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through military and cultural imperialism. Rome thus is the catalyst for universal corruption. 
Tacitus’ outlook on foreign policy and imperialism remains highly complex in the historical 
works. As in the Agricola and the Germania, the moral and emotional arguments for aggression and 
expansion are balanced, and in many ways outweighed, by structural pressures that advocate defensive 
consolidation. While the analysis of imperial rule is more complex and multifaceted in the historical 
narratives, the latter can be read profitably alongside the Germania, which explores the same problems 
(albeit it in a different generic framework and with a more circumscribed focus) and which explicates, 
on the whole, the same vision of empire. In the following pages, I explore in more detail how this 
vision emerges in the historical works, focusing on Tacitus’ account of early imperial foreign policy in 
Germania, Armenia, and Britain. 
 
III.3.3  Germania, Armenia, and Britain 
The military, financial, and cultural limits on empire that Tacitus adduces shaped a foreign 
policy of consolidation geared towards the maintenance of peace and stability. This policy was based 
on three main concepts: the maintenance (or expansion) of Rome’s imperium through diplomacy and 
client kings (‘soft power’); the outward projection of Roman military superiority (terrorization) to cow 
enemies into obedience; and the instigation and exploitation of internecine strife and warfare among 
barbarian tribes located beyond the Empire’s frontiers. Often these concepts were at work at the same 
time, making for a dynamic process of adjustment and calculation.  
 
III.3.3a  Germania 
After Germanicus’ recall from Germania, Roman policy with regard to the area was grounded 
in the expectation that the Germani, when left undisturbed, would suffer from persistent discord and 
wear each other down. Tiberius’ rationale was that Germanicus had accomplished enough in the way 
of revenge and that, in the past, more had been achieved in Germania through policy than by arms 
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(plura consilio quam ui perfecisse, A. 2.26.3). The Germani could be left to their internal feuds (internis 
discordiis relinqui, 2.26.3). While Tacitus ascribes Germanicus’ recall in part to imperial jealousy, the rest 
of the Annales bears out Tiberius’ vision. Roman withdrawal soon leads to an eruption of violence 
between the Marcomanni under Maroboduus and the Cherusci under Arminius (AD 19).451 The 
conflict, deliberately inflamed by Drusus (A. 2.62), led to the expulsion of Maroboduus and his 
successor Catualda (A. 2.63) and ultimately to the demise of Arminius.452  
In Tacitus’ account, the Roman response to the outbreak of this violence was carefully 
calculated to ensure the maintenance of Rome’s imperium and the avoidance of military involvement. 
Tiberius declined Maroboduus’ request for military aid and sent his son Drusus to deal with the 
situation (A. 2.46.5). When Maroboduus soon was expelled by Catualda, Tiberius settled him in 
Ravenna, nominally out of respect for his reputation, but in reality to use the threat of his potential 
restoration as a means to keep his former subjects in check (A. 2.63.4). In addition to such cost-
efficient methods of intimidation, Tiberius used client chiefs to maintain indirect control.453 When 
Catualda was driven out by the Hermunduri under Vibilius and settled in Forum Iulii in Narbonese 
Gaul, Tiberius, to prevent those attending the chief from harassing Roman territory, had Drusus settle 
them beyond the Danube among the Suebi under another client king, Vannius of the Quadi (A. 
2.63.6). In the same year, Arminius would perish through the treachery of his kinsmen (A. 2.88.2). 
Tiberius’ policy of leaving the Germani to their internal feuds and of maintaining imperium at a low cost 
evidently bore fruit and is endorsed by what we read in the Germania, particularly at G. 33.2. 
The outward projection of Roman power and its impact on the Germani is underlined by the 
words ascribed to the Cheruscans Segestes and Flavus. The latter, attempting to persuade his brother 
																																																								
451 Nam discessu Romanorum ac uacui externo metu gentis adsuetudine... arma in se uerterant (A. 2.44.2): “at the departure of the Romans and 
free from the fear of the foreigner, the tribes, in accordance with the nature of their race... turned their arms on one another.”  
452 Ceterum Arminius abscedentibus Romanis et pulso Maroboduo regnum adfectans libertatem popularium aduersam habuit, petitusque armis cum uaria 
fortuna certaret, dolo propinquorum cecidit (A. 2.88.2): “after the Romans had left and Maroboduus had been expelled, he aimed for the 
kingship but had opposition from his compatriots’ love of freedom, and having been attacked by arms he fought with varied success, 
until he fell through the treachery of his kinsmen.” 
453 On Tiberius’ use of intimidation as opposed to actual force in responding to problems abroad, cf. Suet., Tib. 37.4. 
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Arminius to lay down arms against Rome, extols the greatness and resources of the Empire and 
stresses the grave punishment meted out against the conquered and the mercy offered to those who 
surrender (magnitudinem Romanam, opes Caesaris et uictis grauis poenas, in deditionem uenienti paratam clementiam, 
A. 2.10.1; cf. magnitudo populi Romani, G. 29.2). Segestes, too, is described as understanding the nature 
of Roman foreign policy and as choosing loyalty and peace over revolt and subsequent destruction (A. 
1.58). Civilis’ initial hesitation to go through with his revolt is described as due in part to his reflection 
on Rome’s power (uim Romanam, H. 4.21.1), while Julius Auspex of the Remi considers peace for the 
same reason (uim Romanam, H. 4.69.1). Elsewhere, Mucianus and Tiberius stress the display of the 
might and prestige of imperial power as a principal method to keep foreign tribs in check (uim 
fortunamque principatus, H. 4.85; magnitudinem imperii extollens, A. 3.47.1).454 The aim was to avoid warfare 
by intimidating enemies and holding out the prospect of peace, which, if accepted, would affirm 
Roman superiority.455 If intimidation failed and the enemy opted for war, he would be engaged and 
Roman authority mercilessly restored. So, in AD 15, Germanicus’ legate Caecina, by displaying his 
arms, discouraged the Cherusci from aiding the Chatti (A. 1.56.5), but he engaged and crushed the 
Marsi, who had continued to resist (A. 1.56.5). The next year the Angrivarii, anticipating an attack by 
Germanicus’ legate Stertinius, surrendered and received full pardon (ueniam omnium, A. 2.22).456  
The account of the Frisian revolt of AD 28 (A. 4.72-74) is informative in terms of how Tacitus 
describes Tiberius’ response and of what the emperor’s real motivations might have been. The Frisii, 
oppressed by the unbearable demands of the centurion Olennius, revolted, killing a number of soldiers 
and investing the Roman fort at Flevum. A drawn out battle followed in which the Frisians ultimately 
																																																								
454 Cf. H. 4.26.3: paulo ante Romanorum nomen horrebant. The roles can be reversed as well, with barbarians intimidating Romans. So 
Civilis at H. 4.76.1: “we should await the arrival of the trans-Rhenane tribes, the terror of whose name will crush the shattered 
strength of Rome” (Ciuilis opperiendas Transrhenanorum gentis, quarum terrore fractae populi Romani uires obtererentur). 
455 The method of terrorizing enemies into obedience is closely connected with the notion of the importance of first impressions in 
war: see pp. 85-87. Note Agr. 18.3-4, 38.2-4; H. 1.63.2, 2.20.2; A. 12.31.2, 14.23.1.  
456 Similarly, in dealing with Tacfarinas, Tiberius instructs his legate Blaesus to hold out the offer of amnesty to the rebels (which 




were driven back, but in which, so deserters reported, 900 Romans died. Another 400 perished in a 
mass suicide, fearing betrayal at the hands of one Cruptorix, a former mercenary whose villa they had 
occupied. The governor L. Apronius did not attempt to avenge these losses and the Frisii were allowed 
(for now) to retain their independence. Tacitus writes that Tiberius kept the losses a secret because he 
did not want to entrust the war to another general (A. 4.74.1). This explanation is in line with other 
cases where Tacitus suspects an emperor of jealousy when making policy decisions. However, as in 
other cases (such as the recalls of Germanicus and Corbulo), the narrative shows that jealousy was 
merely one factor. The casualty numbers that Tacitus reports (recall that he often declines to do so: n. 
244) suggest that Tiberius’ decision not to commit more men and resources was quite sensible. In any 
case, the decision to allow the Frisii their independence reduced Roman imperium and no doubt it was 
in part this that led Tacitus to call these events a source of dishonor (dehonestarentur, A. 4.74.1) and to 
accuse Tiberius of jealousy.  
The foreign policy in Germania executed under Tiberius stood the test under Claudius and 
Nero. In AD 47, Roman imperium was ensured among the Cherusci by granting their request for a king, 
Italicus, who, however, was soon ousted (A. 11.16-17). Around the same time, the Chauci made an 
incursion into Lower Germany under Gannascus (A. 11.18), the Roman response to which conforms 
to the policy outlined above. Corbulo, likely on imperial orders, drove Gannascus out of the province. 
He followed up this success by imposing harsh discipline on his legions and keeping them under arms 
at all times near the frontier, a sight that intimidated the Frisii (terror, A. 11.19.1).457 The latter, 
independent since their revolt in 28, were cowed into giving hostages and settled in territories assigned 
to them by Corbulo, who established a garrison to keep them in check (A. 11.19.2). Thus the governor 
re-established Rome’s imperium among the Frisii without having to wage war.  
The ideology of costless victory is evidenced further in Claudius’ response to Corbulo’s 
																																																								
457 Corbulo’s mandata: Potter 1996, 52 (contra Isaac 1990, 379).   
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subsequent actions. The governor had sent men to entice the Greater Chauci to surrender and to have 
Gannascus murdered through treachery. The ruse was successful and hence, according to Tacitus, an 
acceptable stratagem (nec... degeneres, A. 11.19.2). But the result was that it roused the Chauci to renew 
their rebellion, prompting Claudius to order Corbulo to retreat beyond the Rhine and revert to prior 
protocol (A. 11.20.1-2). The contemporary response to Corbulo’s actions (apud quosdem sinistra fama, A. 
11.19.3) suggests that the attempt on Gannascus’ life was his own decision and that it conflicted with 
Claudius’ aim, which was to oust the rebel and avoid further commitment and expense.  
Three years later (AD 50), Vannius, the Roman client set over the Suebi by Drusus in AD 19 
(A. 2.63.6), was ousted by Vibilius of the Hermunduri and Vangio and Sido, sons of Vannius’ sister 
(A. 12.29). Claudius’ handling of this conflict mirrors Tiberius’ handling of the conflict between the 
Cherusci and Marcomanni. Like Tiberius, Claudius avoids military involvement and promises Vannius 
a place of refuge. He orders Palpellius Hister, governor of Pannonia, to recognize Vangio and Sido as 
the new Roman clients (thus maintaining imperium) and to place a legion and a number of auxilia along 
the Danube as a deterrent to the victors (terrorem aduersus uictores, A. 12.29.2). While Vangio and Sido, 
then, replaced Vannius as clients of Rome, the latter was settled in Pannonia (A. 12.30.2), likely in part 
as a check on the new clients, just as Tiberius had used Maroboduus’ potential restoration as a 
deterrent. Thus the situation was contained and Roman supremacy reaffirmed. Claudius’ policy with 
regard to Germania largely follows that of Tiberius: maintenance of control and supremacy at little to 
no military cost.  
 Under Nero, matters in Germania mostly were peaceful. Tacitus bitterly ascribes this state of 
affairs to a lack of initiative of the part of the governors, who, since the triumphalia ornamenta had 
become commonplace, hoped for greater honor (decus) if they maintained unbroken peace (peruulgatis 
triumphi insignibus maius ex eo decus sperabant si pacem continuauissent, A. 13.53.1). While the words reflect 
Tacitus’ displeasure with inaction, the concern to maintain peace is in line with imperial ideology.  
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In AD 58, the Frisii, noticing this inaction, left the reservation assigned to them by Corbulo 
(A. 11.19.1-2) and began occupying land east of the Rhine that was to be used by the frontier garrisons 
(A. 13.54).458 Again we see the typical Roman response. Dubius Avitus uses terror methods (minitando 
uim Romanam, 13.54.2) to force Verritus and Malorix, the Frisian instigators, to request a new abode 
from the emperor. When Nero’s order to depart from the territory was scorned, Avitus sent in 
auxiliary cavalry to enforce it, capturing or killing those whose resistance was firmest (A. 13.54.4).  
The Ampsivarii were dealt with similarly. This tribe had requested a place to settle and, when 
refused, resorted to war, urging the Bructeri, Tencteri, and other Germanic tribes to join their cause 
(A. 13.56). Again the Germani are described as being intimidated into obedience. Avitus had Curtilius 
Mancia, legate of the upper army, cross the Rhine and display his forces in the enemy’s rear, while he 
himself marched into the territory of the Tencteri and threatened them with destruction (excidium 
minitans), if they did not forsake the Ampsivarii. The Tencteri obeyed, as did the Bructeri, “terrorized 
by a like dread” (pari metu exterriti). The Ampsivarii, now abandoned, withdrew and eventually, after 
Germanic custom, were destroyed by fellow Germanic tribes. Further internecine slaughter occurred 
in the same year, with the Hermunduri crushing the Chatti in a major battle for the rights to a salt-
producing river (A. 13.57).  
Finally, the response to the Batavian Revolt (69-70) was executed in the same way. Roman 
governors (Hordeonius Flaccus, C. Dillius Vocula) or their legates and prefects (Herennius Gallus, 
Alpinius Montanus) extend offers of mercy and threaten force to avoid having to engage in a full war-
effort. When these methods fail, Mucianus, from Rome, orders no less than seven legions (including 
ones from Spain and Britain) to cross into Gaul to terrorize the Gallic tribes and meanwhile sends 
Cerialis to Mogontiacum (modern Mainz) (H. 4.68).459  
																																																								
458 Furneaux 1896, vol. II, p. 223.  
459 Failed intimidation and/or offers of mercy: H. 4.21, 4.23, 4.32, 4.57-58, 4.68, 4.69 (Julius Auspex of the Remi convinces his people 
and other Gallic states to lay down arms, but the Treviran Julius Valentinus persists). Cf. H. 4.77. For the distribution of the legions 
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The anticipation of this massive legionary force instills terror into many Gallic states, who, 
encouraged by Julius Auspex of the Remi, renounce the revolt (4.69.1-2). The Treviri and other states, 
however, fired up by Valentinus and Tutor, had persisted, as had Civilis and Classicus further north, by 
the time Cerialis arrived in Mogontiacum (4.69-70). Forced now to take military action, Cerialis takes 
Rigodulum (modern Riol) and captures Valentinus before entering the capital of the Treviri at Trier 
(4.70-71). The desire of Cerialis’ men to burn the place to the ground and brutally avenge Treviran 
crimes reflects the common Roman response to treachery and disregarded warnings and peace 
offerings (4.72). However, recalling the fate of Cremona and concerned not to incite further revolt 
elsewhere, Cerialis wisely restrains his men. He next wins over the Treviri and Lingones with a 
calculated speech that explains the principles of empire (see pp. 98-99) and that encourages the former 
rebels to choose submission and peace (obsequium cum securitate) over rebellion and destruction 
(contumaciam cum pernicie, 4.74.4). Intimidation and rhetoric prevailed upon the tribe, which had feared a 
harsher punishment (grauiora), and so, without expense, the Treviran territory was re-occupied and 
Roman supremacy restored.  
Civilis, Tutor, and Classicus remained defiant, however, and now marched on Trier, where an 
indecisive battle was fought (4.75-78). This was followed by Roman victories at the Colonia 
Agrippinensis (modern Cologne) and Vetera (modern Xanten) and by engagements at Novaesium 
(modern Neuss) and Bonna (modern Bonn), with mutual losses (4.79, 5.14-22). At this point, Cerialis 
again holds out the prospect of mercy to Civilis and Veleda and threatens vengeance if they fail to 
obey (5.24). Reflecting on the constant reinforcement of the Roman legions and their own losses of 
life and home (Cerialis had mercilessly destroyed the island of the Batavi: 5.23), the Batavi force Civilis 
to surrender (5.25-26). As the Historiae break off here, it is uncertain what happened to Civilis, but the 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
on 1 January 69 and the subsequent moves throughout the civil wars and the Batavian Revolt, see Chilver-Townend 1985, 14-19.  
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Batavi, as far as we know, received favorable treatment (G. 29.1; H. 4.12).460 The Roman response to 
the Batavian Revolt, then, was executed along the same lines we have seen thus far. Intimidation and 
offers of mercy are employed to cow the rebels into obedience. While the Gallic tribes were terrorized 
into abandoning the revolt, Civilis persisted, urging Rome to move in with full force, moving legions 
from other provinces to eventually secure the end of the revolt.  
In sum, Roman foreign policy as regards Germania, based on leaving the Germani to their 
internal struggles, on retaining control through client kings, and on intimidating foes by displays of 
force, was cost-efficient and, by and large, successful. This policy, though it failed initially to check the 
Batavian Revolt, eventually stood the test during that conflict as well. In the Germania, this imperial 
strategy is already on display, with G. 33.2 reflecting Tacitus’ endorsement of the policy of letting the 
Germani destroy one another, and with G. 29.2 and G. 42.2 reflecting the outward projection of 
Roman power and methods of indirect control, respectively. This policy, in turn, is supported by what 
the text as a whole tells us about the Germani’s predisposition to internecine discord and about the 
economic drawbacks of their land. It is one of the crucial conceptual links between the Germania and 
the historical works that the former articulates Tacitus’ approval of, and offers information that 
endorses, the foreign policy explicated in the latter.  
 
III.3.3b  Armenia and Parthia 
Julio-Claudian policy in Armenia was grounded in the same methods, except that the emperors 
interfered here more than they did in the north.461 Tensions between Rome and Parthia, which had 
																																																								
460 Apparently an allied people before the revolt, afterward the Batavi seem to have been reorganized into a civitas (CIL xiii. 8771). 
Their former capital Batavodurum, destroyed by Cerialis during the revolt (H. 5.23), was rebuilt under Vespasian and was named 
Ulpia Noviomagus (modern Nijmegen) under Trajan. The privileges attested by Tacitus at G. 29.1 otherwise are unattested and lack of 
evidence leaves it unclear whether they belong to the period before or after the revolt. In any case, after the revolt, the Batavi continue 
to be employed extensively as auxiliaries and as guards in the imperial bodyguard. See Rives 1999, 238-41 with further references.  
461 On Roman views and representations of Parthia and its culture, see Schneider 1998, 95-127 and Rose 2005, 21-75 (with focus on 
triumphal imagery and plentiful references to earlier scholarship). On the narrative function of the Armenian and Parthian sections in 
the Annales, see Gilmartin 1973, 583-626; Keitel 1978, 462-73; Vervaet 1999, 289-97; Ash 1999, 114-35, all variously engaging with 
Syme. For lucid overviews of Roman-Parthian relations regarding Armenia, see Bennett 1997, 186 ff.; Braund 2013, 83-101 with 
further references there. My focus here is on Tacitus’ description of imperial foreign policy in the East.   
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raged for over half a century,462 culminated in a settlement, proposed by Augustus in 20 BC (Suet., 
Aug. 21.3; Dio 54.8.1-3), whereby Rome would acknowledge Armenia’s status as a minor kingdom 
within Parthia’s hegemony, provided that the nominee for the Armenian throne be approved by 
Rome. It was an ostensibly fair and diplomatic solution, but one that was not foolproof and that, 
despite being maintained, by and large, until Trajan’s invasion, caused recurrent tension. Most 
nominees for the Armenian throne did not last long, either because those chosen by Rome, having 
resided in the capital, were too ‘Romanized’ for local tastes and soon expelled, or because those 
chosen by Parthia became too ambitious or despotic and so were a threat to Roman interests. There 
was also the fickle character of the Armenians themselves, who, located between two mighty empires, 
hated Rome and envied Parthia (aduersus Romanos odio et in Parthum inuidia, A. 2.56.1). Each time a new 
nominee was expelled or died (which was quite often), the selection process had to start anew, 
sometimes at considerable military cost. It was during such missions that the princes Gaius and 
Germanicus had perished. 
Despite the Augustan arrangement, his successors often saw reason to interfere in Armenia, 
taking advantage of the persistent discord that was endemic in the decentralized Parthian system.  
Tiberius, after the expulsion of the Parthian king Vonones in AD 17, had Germanicus install Zeno 
(called Artaxias by the Armenians) on the Armenian throne (A. 2.56.2-3). Upon that man’s death in 
32, the Parthian Artabanus III attempted to seize the throne, but he was checked by Tiberius’ legate L. 
Vitellius, who, displaying Roman arms (ostentasse Romana arma), threatened to invade Mesopotamia and 
so forced the Parthian to retreat (A. 6.31 ff.). While Artabanus meanwhile was being displaced in 
Parthia, the Iberian Mithridates was installed on the Armenian throne in 35 (A. 6.31 ff.). This king, 
having been deposed by Caligula in 37, was re-installed by Claudius in 41 (once more after threatening 
the Parthians with war: A. 11.8-10), before being expelled by the Iberian Radamistus in 51 (A. 12.44-
																																																								
462 Sulla, Pompey, Gabinus, Crassus, and, after Caesar’s untimely death, Antony all had interfered militarily in Parthians affairs, with 
many losses on both sides. Crassus and Antony suffered ignominious defeats.  
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51). The main threat to the Armenian throne at this time, the Parthian Vardanes, meanwhile (in 47) 
had been murdered by his brother Gotarzes, in yet another case of Parthian discord (A. 11.10). At this 
point, Claudius went so far as to interfere directly into Parthian affairs (and so violate the Augustan 
agreement), granting a Parthian request to install Meherdates (a royal hostage kept in Rome) as their 
king (A. 12.10-11; cf. A. 11.10), since Gotarzes’ rule quickly had become despotic. Until this point, 
matters had been resolved diplomatically, often under Roman threats of war, and most arrangements 
were to both Rome and Parthia’s advantage or at least could be argued to be by both.463  
  Matters became more complicated when Meherdates was deposed and replaced by 
Vologaeses I (A. 12.12-14), who revealed his ambitions by installing one of his brothers as king of 
Media in 51 and the other, Tiridates I, as king of Armenia in 54, after ousting Radamistus and beating 
back the latter’s attempted comeback in 52-53 (A. 12.50-51, 13.6). Vologaeses’ installation of his son 
on the Armenian throne without Roman approval was a plain violation of the existing agreement, 
perhaps encouraged by Claudius’ earlier unsanctioned intervention in Parthian affairs. When Claudius 
died in the same year, it was left to Nero to restore Rome’s reputation. 
In accordance with imperial policy, outright war with the Parthians was to be avoided and 
Roman supremacy restored through diplomacy and authority. Nero’s contemporaries, concerned with 
the young emperor’s age and familiar with imperial policy, stressed that “the highest rank mainly 
worked through its prestige and its counsels more than by the sword and hand” (pleraque in summa 
fortuna auspiciis et consiliis quam telis et manibus geri, A. 13.6). The seasoned Corbulo was sent to take over 
Cappadocia and Galatia, and three legions were transferred there from Syria, the chief Roman 
province in the east (A. 13.7-8, 13.35). Transfers from other provinces restored Syria’s full garrison, a 
move that weakened frontier security in other parts of the Empire and reflects the severity of the 
																																																								
463 Note especially Tacitus’ comment on Tiberius’ installation of Zeno (Artaxias) on the Armenian throne: “Tiberius was the more 
delighted at having established peace through wise policy than if he had completed the war with a battle” (laetiore Tiberio quia pacem 
sapientia firmauerat quam si bellum per acies confecisset, A. 2.64.1). The policy is underlined in the next clause, with Tacitus stressing that 




situation. At the same time, the client kings Agrippa and Antiochus were ordered to ready their forces 
for battle (A. 13.7, 13.37). In typical Roman fashion, Corbulo, having made a display of strength, made 
an attempt at diplomacy (A. 13.9, 13.37): Rome would acknowledge Tiridates as king of Armenia, 
provided that he and Vologaeses request Nero’s formal approval in Rome. When this was refused, 
Corbulo responded with military force and drove Tiridates from Armenia. Taking advantage of 
renewed internal problems in Parthia (i.e. the Hyrcanian revolt: A. 13.37.5), Corbulo took the 
Armenian strongholds of Volandum (without losses: A. 13.39), Artaxata (the capital, which was 
demolished because it was too expensive to be garrisoned, but whose inhabitants were spared because 
they surrendered: A. 13.41), and Tigranocerta (A. 14.23-25),464 forcing Tiridates to give up the idea of 
war and installing the pro-Roman Tigranes in Tigranocerta (AD 60). The new king was supported by a 
substantial force of legionaries and auxiliaries, while parts of Armenia were placed under the control of 
the Roman clients Pharasmanes, Polemo, Aristobulus, and Antiochus (A. 14.26.2). Corbulo’s 
successes were celebrated in Rome, where, upon the destruction of Artaxata, Nero was hailed Imperator 
(A. 13.41.4). Corbulo, capitalizing on Parthia’s problems elsewhere, had made himself master of 
Armenia with minimal losses and without having to engage in open warfare. 
In the next stages of the conflict, Rome’s policy remained geared towards preserving peace 
through diplomacy and threats of war. While Corbulo had been redeployed to Syria, Tigranes (against 
Nero’s instructions) attacked and occupied territory controlled by Parthia, forcing Vologaeses to go to 
war (A. 15.1-2). The latter again crowned his son Tiridates king of Armenia and prepared to besiege 
Tigranocerta, which held out in part because the Parthians had no knowledge of siege warfare (15.2-4). 
When Corbulo received tidings of Vologaeses’ plans, he sent two legions into Armenia, secured Syria, 
and posted his remaining forces on the banks of the Euphrates (15.3.2). To execute war efficiently in 
																																																								
464 Given the persistent emphasis in the Annales on Roman methods of terrorization, it may be surprising that Tacitus omits what 
Frontinus records about Corbulo: that the general catapulted the head of a captured nobleman over the walls into Tigranocerta, 
causing the besieged to flee (Str. 2.9.5). 
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Armenia and, at the same time, properly secure Syria, Corbulo requested that an additional general be 
sent to Armenia (15.3.1). He now threatened to cross the Euphrates and carry the war into Parthian 
territory, if Vologaeses did not stop harassing what the general now called a Roman provincia (15.5.1). 
This threat cowed the Parthian to retreat and to attempt a diplomatic solution by now agreeing to 
Corbulo’s original proposal that he ask for Nero’s formal recognition of his son Tiridates (15.5.4). This 
second-hand attempt was, for unclear reasons, refused. Corbulo’s success again was celebrated in 
Rome as a glorious victory, earned through efficient terrorization of his Parthian enemy (formidine regis 
et Corbulonis minis, 15.6.1).  
 The refusal of Vologaeses’ request incited the Parthians to make open war, attacking both 
Armenia and Syria. While Corbulo, through an imposing display of Roman power on the banks of the 
Euphrates, discouraged Parthian designs on Syria (A. 15.9), the new general, the incompetent 
Caesennius Paetus, pursued a more aggressive strategy (whether on imperial instructions or on his own 
volition is uncertain). The Parthians threw a large army at him, besieged him at Rhandeia, and soon 
forced the surrender and disgraceful withdrawal of all Roman forces from Armenia (A. 15.7-16). In 
the aftermath, Corbulo, having no mandata to avenge this setback, managed to secure a settlement 
whereby he would remove the fortresses on the bank of the Euphrates and Vologaeses would 
abandon Armenia, leaving Tiridates in place (A. 15.17).  
 After Paetus’ setback, Nero and his advisers resolved on war, granting Corbulo imperium maius 
to recover Armenia (A. 15.25). The general pursued active diplomacy with Vologaeses and secured an 
agreement whereby Parthia would retain the right to nominate the king of Armenia and Tiridates 
would have to receive his royal diadem officially from the emperor’s hand in Rome (A. 15.27-31). The 
way Corbulo secured this agreement was three-fold: by alerting Vologaeses to the persistent internal 
problems he faced and the fierce tribes he ruled over, while Nero enjoyed universal peace; by taking 
ruthless action against those Armenians who had first revolted from Rome, destroying their fortresses 
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and spreading terror (metus, 15.27.3); and through his personal authority (15.28.1). In an alteration to 
the Augustan arrangement, the Armenian throne henceforth would be occupied by a member of the 
Arsacid house chosen by the Parthians, while Rome’s involvement would be limited to bestowing the 
royal diadem on the new nominee. The Neronian settlement would remain in place until it was 
violated by Trajan’s invasion during his Parthian War.  
Tacitus’ account shows that, despite significant differences between Germania and Armenia, 
Roman foreign policy in both regions largely was executed with the same methods. The aim was to 
preserve peace and stability, while maintaining and extending Rome’s imperium beyond the northern 
and eastern boundaries of the Empire. Client kings, intimidation, and exploitation of barbarian discord 
remain the central components of the policy pursued by the emperors. The celebrations of Corbulo’s 
successes show that these methods, which amounted to a careful avoidance of warfare, could be 
celebrated as bestowing military glory on Rome.465 The foreign policy pursued in Germania and the 
East illustrates the prevailing imperial ideology starting under Tiberius and reflects the basic similarities 
between Germanic and Parthian mores, underlined by the internal discord endemic to both regions and 
the failure of Roman-bred royal hostages to last long in their native lands. Tacitus’ characterization of 
the Germani can usefully be brought to bear on his view of the Parthians.  
 
III.3.3c  Britain 
 After Caesar, Claudius was the first princeps to undertake a military campaign into Britain. 
Augustus and Tiberius were disinterested (Agr. 13.2), while Caligula made preparations for a campaign 
that was never executed (Agr. 13.2; Suet., Cal. 19.3; Dio 59.25, 29). Having lost the books of the 
Annales that covered the British campaigns under Aulus Plautius and Claudius himself, we do not 
know how Tacitus conceived of the motivations behind the emperor’s designs. In contrast with 
																																																								
465 Suetonius Paulinus’ desire to match Corbulo’s recovery of Armenia (Corbulonis concertator, A. 14.29.1) shows that the latter achieved 
massive military glory, even though he never engaged the Parthians in a pitched battle.  
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Claudius’ foreign policy elsewhere, the invasion of the island seems peculiar and may well have been 
motivated, as Levick suggests, by personal insecurity.466 In any case, the evidence from both Dio and 
other sections of the Annales suggests that the conquest of Britain was a complex process of 
adjustment and ad hoc decision-making rather than a concerted effort at aggressive expansionism.  
According to Dio, Plautius was sent to Britain in 43 in response to a request for military aid by 
a certain Bericus, who had been ousted from the island (Dio 60.19.1; cf. Suet., Cl. 17.1). A useful 
pretext had thus presented itself for a princeps who needed military glory to establish his credentials. In 
that year, Plautius (together with his legates Vespasian, the latter’s brother Sabinus, and Hosidius Geta) 
advanced up to the Thames, in preparation for Claudius’ joining the campaign (Dio 60.20-21.2).467 The 
emperor (whose departure from Rome for this campaign signifies its importance to him) defeated 
several tribes and took Camulodunum (modern Colchester), after which he returned to Rome to 
celebrate a triumph (Dio 60.21.2-23.6). Claudius exploited the occasion for personal glory. Not 
everyone bought into the spectacle. Suetonius calls the campaign “of little importance” (modicam, Claud. 
17.1). By 47, Plautius had overrun most of lowland Britain (cf. Agr. 14.1) and secured the services of 
Cogidumnus as a client managing areas beyond the frontier (14.1), when he was replaced by Publius 
Ostorius Scapula, in the middle of whose tenure the Annales pick up at A. 12.31.1.  
 The bulk of the action undertaken by Ostorius was in response to persistent unrest caused by 
British tribes (A. 12.31). Much like the Germani, Armenians, and Parthians, the Britons were seen as a 
warlike and discordant people, and their internal discord or harassment of Roman territory required 
constant military intervention. It would seem that most of Britain’s governors enjoyed greater latitude 
than governors elsewhere to decide how to proceed against such tribes on the fringes of the Empire.468 
Most (to Tacitus’ chagrin) did little more than consolidate territory and engage in operations to put 
																																																								
466 Levick 1990, 148.  
467 On the veracity of Dio’s claim that Plautius requested Claudius’ personal involvement because he dreaded advancing beyond the 
Thames, see Levick 1990, 142.  
468 Potter 1996, 59-60.  
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down rebellious tribes and preserve frontier security. Again we note the priority placed on preventing 
unrest and costly response operations by intimidating people or holding out the prospect of mercy. 
Ostorius defeats and punishes the rebellious Iceni and then immediately moves against the Decangi, 
aware that first impressions often induce submission. The policy also worked in the case of the 
Brigantes, who had broken out in mutual violence and caused unrest: a few were annihilated, causing 
the remainder to accept an offer of pardon. The Silures, however, were indifferent to either 
intimidation or mercy (Silurum gens non atrocitate, non clementia mutabatur, A. 12.32.2). Ostorius thus was 
forced to move against them, earning a cost-efficient and glorious victory over the renowned chief 
Caratacus, with the help of Cartimandua, queen of the Brigantes, who surrendered Caratacus to him 
when the latter sought her protection (A. 12.33-37; H. 3.45.1). The ideal of cost-efficient victory is 
reinforced in the inscription on the Arch of Claudius (CIL vi. 920a = ILS 216), constructed in 51-52 in 
honor of the Roman gains in Britain under that emperor: q]uod / reges Brit[annorum XI devictos sine] / 
ulla iactur[a in dedit ionem populi Romani redegerit] .469 But even this setback did not quiet down 
the Silures, who renewed their effort and induced other tribes to join, eventually causing the demise of 
the governor, who succumbed to his labors and anxieties (A. 12.39).  
In 52, Ostorius was replaced by Aulus Didius Gallus, who principally was concerned with 
containing the Silures and consolidating prior gains (A. 12.40). There continued to be unrest amongst 
the Brigantes. Discord between Cartimandua and her husband Venutius was anticipated and dealt with 
in traditional Roman fashion, by letting the Britons wear each other down (in this case, by supporting 
Cartimandua with a small force: A. 12.40.3). Despite Tacitus’ misgivings (see p. 43), Gallus had 
stabilized the province and prepared it for the next push, which, it seems clear from A. 14.29, was the 
complete annexation of the island up to the Forth-Clyde isthmus. Quintus Veranius was supposed 
carry out this mission (14.29.1), but his sudden death left the task to Suetonius Paulinus (14.29.2). 
																																																								
469 For the whole inscription and useful notes, see Boatwright 2015, 246 n.73.  
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 Paulinus’ mandata would have given him scope to deal with the British tribes south of the 
Forth-Clyde line as he saw fit in preparing the complete subjugation of that part of the island. It seems 
that his decision to attack Mona, a place of refuge for rebellious Britons, was his own (A. 14.29.2). A 
combination of factors, including the oppressive conduct of his procurators, led to the Boudiccan 
revolt, which would occupy Paulinus until his recall (A. 14.31-37). After his procurator Decianus and 
his legate Cerialis suffered substantial losses, due in part to rashness and disorganization, Paulinus 
restored order by gaining a crushing victory over Boudicca and the Iceni (equal to the victories of old: 
clara et antiquis uictoriis par ea die laus parta, A. 14.37.2). The losses at once were made up by the transfer 
of two thousand men from the Rhine legions, eight cohorts of auxiliaries, and a thousand cavalry (A. 
14.38.1), and those tribes that remained hostile were brutally crushed.470 In the aftermath, the alleged 
misconduct of the new procurator Classicianus (A. 14.38.3) caused the province to remain unstable 
and in part for this reason (the malicious letters about Paulinus sent to Rome by Classicianus were 
another) the governor was recalled and replaced by the ‘milder’ Petronius Turpilianus, who took 
limited military action during his tenure (again, to Tacitus’ displeasure: A. 14.39.3; Agr. 16.3).  
During the civil wars of 68-69, when Vettius Bolanus was governor, the recurrent unrest 
among the Brigantes came to a head, when Cartimandua divorced Venutius and took as her new 
husband a certain Vellocatus, Venutius’ former standard-bearer (H. 3.45.2).471 A civil war broke out 
between a faction supporting the queen and an anti-Roman faction headed by Venutius. Bolanus 
ultimately intervened and rescued Cartimandua, but Venutius now gained control of Brigantia. The 
replacement of the loyal Cartimandua by the hostile Venutius meant the loss of a friendly kingdom 
																																																								
470 Cf. the discussion about Paulinus’ procurators and his harsh response to the revolt on pp. 50-52. 
471 Similarities between the episodes at H. 3.45 and A. 12.60 have led some (e.g. Hanson and Campbell 1986) to see the latter as a 
‘doublet.’ On this view, Tacitus placed these events in the year 69 in the Historiae, only to change his mind and place them in the 50s in 
the Annales. Aside from the implausibility of such an error, the differences between the two episodes (in the description of Venutius 
and of Cartimandua’s fate, and in the mention, in the Historiae, of Vellocatus) show that Tacitus relates separate events. The passage in 
the Historiae, as D. Braund (1996, 130) points out, “reprises, as summarized background to the events of AD 69, the events of the 50s 
AD, which Tacitus was later to relate in the Annals.” In other words, already in the 50s there was continued unrest, which ultimately 
led to the divorce and the outbreak of civil war in 69.  
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that functioned as a buffer from the tribes in the far north and that now threatened to destabilize the 
areas that only recently had been pacified after the Boudiccan revolt. These developments compelled 
Vespasian, upon the completion of the Roman civil wars, to attempt the annexation of Brigantia, a 
task that was accomplished by Cerialis in 71-74 (Agr. 17.1) and consolidated by Agricola in 77-78 (Agr. 
20). Similar considerations compelled the subjugation of the Silures, accomplished by Frontinus 
(Cerialis’ successor) in 74-76 (Agr. 17.2). Finally, Agricola was the first governor who was granted 
permission to campaign north of the Forth-Clyde line. The Agricola, as we have seen, tells us how he 
executed his assignment, by combining the implementation of traditional methods of acculturation and 
financial reforms with instillment of fear to preserve stability. It appears that his task was, by stages, to 
effect the subjection of the entire island. The vital point is that, much like Trajan’s annexation of 
Dacia, the decision to subjugate all of Britain was as much, if not more, driven by a desire to eliminate 
recurrent instability as by a desire to gain military glory for the Flavian house.  
 The above sections on Rome’s foreign policy in Germania, Armenia, and Britain show that, 
notwithstanding the dynamic adjustments made in localized contexts, the prevailing imperial ideology, 
starting under Tiberius, was one aimed at peace and stabilization as opposed to expansion.472 
Understanding the limits of empire, Tiberius preferred to direct foreign policy through diplomacy and 
indirect influence rather than war. Suetonius’ succinct summary illustrates the policy’s success and 
consistency across the Empire (Tib. 37.4).473 The emperor’s successors by and large followed his 
example, despite adjustments in particular areas that necessitated a commitment of military forces and 
money. In Germania, the prevailing ideology remained that of containment. Domitian departed from 
this policy, before Trajan, with his extensive experience in the area, reverted back to Julio-Claudian 
precedent. In Armenia, too, despite many modifications, open military intervention was kept at a 
																																																								
472 Note, in this sense, also H. 1.89.2 (sub Tiberio... pacis aduersa ad rem publicam pertinuere), H. 5.9.2 (sub Tiberio quies), and A. 15.46.2 (of 
Nero’s reign: quippe haud alias tam immota pax). 
473 Hostiles motus nulla postea expeditione suscepta per legatos compescuit, ne per eos quidem nisi cunctanter et necessario. Reges infestos suspectosque 
comminationibus magis et querelis quam vi repressit; quosdam per blanditias atque promissa extractos ad se non remisit, ut Marobodum Germanum, 
Rhascuporim Thracem, Archelaum Cappadocem, cuius etiam regnum in formam prouinciae redegit. 
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minimum and outright war with Parthia avoided. The internal discord endemic in Germania and the 
East was recognized, carefully incited, and subsequently exploited. Unnecessary cost and loss of life 
were prevented by attempts not to have to engage in warfare at all, typically by displaying force and 
spreading fear, and by extending offers of mercy, which, if accepted, affirmed Rome’s supremacy. At 
the same time, imperium was maintained or extended through client kings and local chiefs. Although 
Britain at first seems to be an exception to this pattern, its conquest was a complex process of 
adjustment and ad hoc decision-making. Most of its governors were concerned with containment and 
stability, not with continued expansion of the Empire’s termini, a course of action typically pursued to 
alleviate persistent unrest and revolt. While Tacitus disapproves of such inaction on the part of the 
governors, the policy they pursued was in line with imperial foreign policy, geared towards 
consolidation and prevention of overextension. The crucial point for our purposes is that the above 
policy and Tacitus’ general endorsement of it are enunciated already in the Germania. 
Tacitus’ conception of Rome’s imperium and his attitude towards foreign policy remain 
consistent throughout the corpus. From the Agricola and the Germania to the Historiae and the Annales 
he reveals an emotional and moral penchant for military initiative and expansion. At the same time, he 
endorses the cost-efficient and defensive foreign policy initiated under Tiberius, showing himself to be 
acutely aware of the financial, military, and cultural limits on empire. Hence denunciation of military 
inactivity and frustration over lost territories balanced by endorsement of prudent policy-making. This 
attitude already is on display in the Agricola and the Germania. The latter voices Tacitus’ disappointment 
over lost territory (and knowledge: cf. Agr. 10, 22.1) beyond the Rhine, while at the same time offering 
information on Germania and its tribes that endorses Tiberian and post-Tiberian Germanic policy as it 
unfolds in the historical works.  
Tacitus’ attitude is reflected further in his famous methodological statement at A. 4.32-33 
about imperial foreign policy and the limits it placed on an historian’s narrative material. Tacitus’ 
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complaint that his predecessors could recount major battles, sieges, and glorious deaths, whereas his 
own narrative is circumscribed by nearly unbroken peace, reflects, inter alia, the nature of imperial 
ideology, calculated to prevent the dramatic (and costly) battles that his predecessors were able to 
recount. Germanicus’ campaigns ahead of his recall and Paulinus’ massive battle against the Iceni 
provided Tacitus with material for traditional battle narrative, but these campaigns were exceptions to 
the defensive and cost-efficient policy that underlies the bulk of his material.474 
Judging from his outlook as it emerges from his corpus, Tacitus will have approved of Trajan’s 
annexation of Dacia and the extension of the frontier and Rome’s ‘hard’ power (and intelligence) 
beyond the Danube. He will have approved of the glory that these wars bestowed on his princeps and 
the city, advertised by Trajan’s Forum and Column.475 In contrast, he likely disapproved of the 
emperor’s ambitions in the East, which, despite being suited to Rome’s ambition for world 
domination, were costly and impracticable in the long run. Hence he likely endorsed the abandonment, 
initiated by Trajan himself and continued by Hadrian, of the provinces briefly held in Iraq. Roman 
superiority there had been reaffirmed and neighboring kings integrated more firmly within Rome’s 
sphere of influence. For Tacitus, as for Hadrian, this was sufficient. Yet it is evident from the Annales 
that Tacitus did not share in Hadrian’s more distinctly defensive policy, which saw, among other 
things, the abandonment of trans-Danubian territories annexed under Trajan.  
 
III.4  Germania and the Germani in the Historiae  and the Annales   
In the first part of this chapter, I explored the depiction of Germania in the Germania, 
establishing the principal features of the land and the characteristics of its tribes. I then moved to 
																																																								
474 It is not necessary (though, of course, possible) to argue that Tacitus is “deliberately slanting his narrative in such a way as to make 
the warfare appear less significant and less exciting” (Levene 2009, 231) or that Corbulo’s campaigns in the East somehow are 
disappointing because he did not engage in open warfare, or that Tacitus is concerned primarily to describe Germanicus as a 
‘republican-style’ general. The differences in the descriptions of these campaigns simply reflect imperial foreign policy: Germanicus 
was charged with recovering the territory lost by the Varian disaster, until Tiberius recalled him, while Corbulo’s instructions had been 
to recover Armenia without engaging the Parthians in battle or suffering unnecessary cost and loss of life.  
475 Although it has been noted that Tacitus often is reticent about monuments and building programs: Rouveret 1991. I owe the 
reference to Sailor 2008, 187 n. 4.  
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Tacitus’ outlook on imperial foreign policy as it emerges from the Agricola, the Germania, and both 
historical works. I have argued, among other things, that the Germania sets out Tacitus’ vision of 
imperial rule and that it offers information about Germania and its tribes that may be taken as 
endorsing the cost-efficient and defensive foreign policy intitated by Tiberius. In the final pages, I look 
at how Germania and its tribes are characterized in the Historiae and the Annales, showing that, while 
Tacitus’ treatment of the Germani becomes more complex and multifaceted in the historical works, 
their portrayal largely remains consistent and based on the essential characteristics ascribed to them in 
the Germania.  
While there are noticeable differences between the ways in which individual tribes are 
characterized in the three texts, modern scholarship has placed undue emphasis on these differences to 
posit a change in Tacitus’ attitude towards the Germani. It often is argued that the latter come off 
much better in the Germania, where, it is said, they are idealized, than in the later works, where, it is 
argued, Tacitus has a less favorable view of them.476 This view is a manifestation of the preconception 
that there must exist between the monographs and the historical works a significant distinction in 
maturity and analysis.477 The depiction of the Batavi commonly is mustered as evidence of Tacitus’ 
changed outlook, since this tribe changes from loyal allies in the Germania to violent rebels in the extant 
books of the Historiae. Likewise, special emphasis is placed on the description of the rebellious 
Cherusci and other tribes in the opening books of the Annales, which is used to argue that the Germani 
as a whole are characterized less positively there than they were in the Germania.  
While the Batavi and other Germanic tribes certainly come off worse in some ways in the 
																																																								
476 Note, e.g., Christ 1965, 63-72: “Das im übrigen bekannte, in der Germania so eindrucksvoll gestaltete Germanenbild erfährt 
indessen bereits in den Historien... eine bemerkenswerte Veränderung” (63)... “Ihr Bild ist weniger idealisiert als in der Germania” 
(64)... “In den Annalen hat sich Tacitus dann von seiner ursprünglichen Germanenkonzeption am weitesten entfert” (65). Cf. Rives 
1999, 49: “the presentation of the Germani in the two works [i.e. the Germania and Historiae] is strikingly different.” Cf. Mellor 2010, 
50-51: “the Germania... was less about the real Germans than an idealized picture to contrast with the moral failings of Rome... There 
is little place for nuance in this idealized world. But when Germans appear in Tacitus’ Annals and Histories, they are far less 
sympathetic, as we see instances of cruelty, hypocrisy, and torture.” A more recent examination of the connections between the 
Germania and the historical works, that of Ash (2014, 185-200), although it usefully emphasizes similarities and interactions, uses the 
example of the Batavi to ultimately stress difference rather than continuity (esp. p. 199).    
477 Note Syme 1958a, 128-29; Martin 1981, 57-58; the assumption is implicit in more recent work as well: e.g. Mellor 2010, 50-51. 
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historical works, we would do well not to make too much of any differences in depiction. First, the 
differences are less stark than the above arguments suppose, for, to begin with, the Germani are far 
from idealized in the Germania. Second, the characterization of the Batavi and the Cherusci is far from 
one-sided, for their courage, military strength, and intelligence are much on display as well. Civilis and 
Arminius are characterized in a similarly balanced way as are Germanicus, Cerialis, and other Roman 
generals (H. 4.34 and 5.16-17 are good examples). But most important is the fact that, although 
Tacitus’ characterization of the Germani consists of more factors and considerations, and hence is 
more nuanced, in the Historiae and the Annales, their essential features and character traits remain the 
same throughout. Tacitus ascribes to the Batavi and the Cherusci (as indeed to other Germanic tribes) 
the stereotypical traits he ascribed to the Germani collectively in the Germania. Put differently, while 
the depiction of certain tribes or individuals becomes more complex, they nonetheless conduct 
themselves in typically ‘Germanic’ fashion; there is no compelling reason to assume that Tacitus’ view 
of the Germani changed over the course of his literary career. Hence, in the following pages, I should 
like to highlight some of the ways in which the depiction of the Germani and their land remains 
consistent across the three works, as well as to show how a reader was expected to use the monograph 
as a reference point when reading the Historiae and the Annales. 
 
III.4.1  Germania and the Germani across the Tacitean Corpus 
As in the Germania, so in the historical works, Germania is described as a dreary place marked 
by forests, swamps, and trackless plains.478 Its harsh climate, as in the Germania, is cold, stormy, and 
rainy, with short summers and long winters.479 While in the later works Tacitus illustrates methods to 
deal with these challenges (i.e. the construction of plank roads and bridges, the cutting down of 
																																																								
478 Forests/groves: H. 2.25.2, 2.42.2, 4.14.2, 4.22.2; A. 1.50-51, 1.56.3, 1.59-64, 1.67-68, 2.5.3, 2.11-12, 2.14.2, 2.16-17, 2.19-20, 2.25.2, 
2.45.3, 4.72-73, 13.54.1, 13.57.1. Swamps/mires: H. 4.73.3, 5.14-15, 5.17.2, 5.23.3; A. 1.61.1, 1.63-65, 1.67-68, 2.5.3, 2.19-20, 13.54.1. 
Trackless plains/deserts: H. 4.73.3; A. 1.61-64, 2.14.2, 2.17.3, 13.55.2. Neighboring Pannonia has a similar make-up: A. 1.17.3.  
479 H. 2.32, 2.80.3, 2.94.1, 2.99.1, 4.26.1, 5.18.2, 5.23.2-3; A. 1.56.2, 1.70, 2.5.3, 2.7.2, 2.15, 2.23-24, 2.26.2, 13.57.3. Cf. A. 1.17.3 and G. 
5.1 on Pannonia. 
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forests), the terrain remains treacherous and uncomfortable for Roman armies.480 Its geography and 
climate made Germania an unpopular place to be stationed and a dangerous environment for military 
campaigns.481 The Germani held a distinct military advantage in their natural environment, with their 
swimming skills and experience fighting in forests, swamps, and rivers frequently on display.482 
Germania continues to be described as broken up by streams, rivers, and tributaries, which 
provided logistical opportunities but, amidst storms, were dangerous passageways.483 Ocean, that 
formidable mental and physical boundary, remains trackless, treacherous, and full of mystery.484 
Germanicus’ naval disaster exemplifies the dangers of seafaring in stormy Germania (A. 2.23-24).    
 In terms of Germania’s natural and mineral resources, the later works likewise transmit the 
same picture. Most of the soil is poor (H. 4.73.3), its principal crop wheat (H. 4.26.1, 4.27.1, 4.35, 
4.58.3), its livestock mostly undersized (A. 4.72.2). Only the Mattiaci have silver mines, but these are 
slender and short-lived (A. 11.20.3). The Colonia Agrippinensis (modern Cologne) may have had 
access to silver as well (H. 1.57.2). All this is in line with what Tacitus writes in the Germania about 
areas along the Rhine having greater access to natural and monetary resources. The lack of any 
mention of iron or gold reaffirms the absence of these resources in Germania (G. 5.3, 6.1). Timber 
naturally was abundant in this forested land (G. 16.3; H. 4.23.3, 5.20.2). The general poverty of 
Germania’s resources is affirmed by Germanicus’ reliance on aid from Gaul, Spain, and Italy to make 
up for losses (A. 1.71.2) and was one reason why Tiberius decided to recall his nephew and re-
establish the frontier at the Rhine. Lack of provisions caused Roman legions trouble during the 
Batavian Revolt (H. 4.35.1; cf. 4.26-27, 5.23.3). In the case of these last examples, the Germania 
																																																								
480 Roads and bridges: A. 1.56.1-3, 1.61.1, 1.63.3-4, 4.73.1; plank roads: A. 1.63.3-4; cutting down forests: A. 1.50.3. 
481 Unpopular place: H. 2.80.3; A. 1.17.3 (on Pannonia); dangers of fighting in Germania: H. 4.12.1, 5.14 ff.; A. 1.63 ff. 
482 Agr. 18.4; H. 2.35, 2.42-43, 4.12.3, 4.66.2, 5.14-19, 5.21.2; A. 1.56.3, 1.63-68, 2.5.3, 2.8.3, 2.11-12, 2.19-20, 13.54.1, 14.29.3. Note 
also Dio 69.9.6 with CIL iii. 3676 (= ILS 2558). Dio records that in AD 121 Hadrian, wishing to intimidate several trans-Danubian 
tribes, had some Batavian troops swim the river in full armor. The inscription was set up by one of these Batavians, boasting of his 
skills. On Batavian confidence in their swimming skills, cf. Hassall 1970, 131; Speidel 1991.  
483 Cerialis: H. 5.18.2, 5.23.3; Germanicus: A. 1.56.2, 2.15.2-3, 2.23-26; P. Vitellius: A. 1.70.  
484 Boundary: H. 1.9.2; A. 1.9.5, 14.39.2; trackless: A. 2.15.2; treacherous: A. 1.70, 2.6, 2.23-24, 11.20.2, 13.53.2; immeasurable: A. 
2.24; marvels: A. 2.24, 14.32.1, 15.37.2.  
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provides essential information that clarifies military realities and Roman decision-making as they are 
recounted in the historical works.   
            As in the Germania, the Germani inhabit rural vici and pagi that lack Roman-style urbanization.485 
The difference between Germanic and Roman-style settlement is most evident in the description of 
Roman military camps or coloniae, such as the Colonia Agrippinensis, which has villas and city-walls (A. 
13.57.3; cf. H. 4.59.3: circumdatos Agrippinensis). The latter notably are seen as munimenta seruitii (H. 
4.64.2). The Germani continue to be described as living in scattered dwellings. So the Ubii, maintaining 
their loyalty to Rome during the Batavian Revolt, manage to slaughter all Germani in the colonia 
because the latter were, in Germanic fashion, “scattered throughout their dwellings” (dispersos in 
domibus, H. 4.79.1; cf. dispersos, H. 4.37.3). That the Germani do not like living in close proximity (G. 
16.1) is underlined by the fact that, when they are in Rome with Vitellius, they cannot handle the city 
crowds and incite brawls with whomever they run into (H. 2.88.3). Moreover, the fact that the 
Germani enjoyed only one kind of public performance (G. 24.1; cf. 19.1) explains why the Frisian 
chiefs Verritus and Malorix, “in their ignorance” (ignari, A. 13.54.3), did not enjoy the spectacle staged 
in Pompey’s theater when they were in Rome. As is clear throughout, the Germania variously functions 
as a reference point in the later works, offering background information which Tacitus assumes his 
readers have gleaned from the monograph. 
 The Germani continue to be described as a “pure” and “untainted” people (sincerus et integer, H. 
4.64.3) that place great value on their libertas, to whatever degree they have access to it. Some are ruled 
by kings, some by women, while most are led by chiefs like Arminius, Maroboduus, and Civilis.486 Such 
chiefs, as in the Germania, lead large retinues, while tribes compete with one another for glory (H. 
4.23.2: quo discreta uirtus manifestius spectaretur). Women continue to be described as enjoying great respect 
																																																								
485 G. 6.3, 12.3, 16.1, 19.1, 39.3; H. 4.15.3, 4.26.3, 4.28.2; A. 1.50.4, 1.56.3, 13.57.3. 
486 Pure race: H. 4.64.2; libertas: H. 4.17, 4.64-65, 5.25.2; A. 1.59.6, 11.16.2-3; led by kings: A. 2.44.2, 2.63, 11.16, 12.29, 13.54; by 
women: H. 5.25.  
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and authority within Germanic society. The notion that the Germani valued women’s advice and 
ascribed “a certain sanctity and prescience,” and even divine qualities, to the sex (G. 8.2) is recalled at 
H. 4.61.2, and Veleda remains an authority figure throughout (G. 8.2; H. 4.61.2, 4.65.4, 5.22.3, 5.24.1; 
cf. 5.25.2). The position of women and the closeness of Germanic family ties (G. 18-20) made the 
Germani dread captivity for their women more than for themselves (G. 8.1). For this reason, the 
strongest way to cement ties with other states or tribes was to include among the hostages a girl of 
noble birth (G. 8.1; cf. H. 4.28.1). This information functions as another reference point in the later 
works, explaining the hostility between Arminius and Segestes (the former had carried off the latter’s 
daughter: A. 1.55.3, 1.58), as well as Arminius’ frenzy about the fact that his wife (Segestes’ daughter) 
was taken captive by Germanicus’ forces (1.57-59.1, 2.10.1, 2.46.1; cf. 2.13.3) and that his future child 
would be born a slave (1.59.1, 2.46.1). It also allows us to discern the significance of C. Silius’ capture 
of the wife and daughter of Arpus, chief of the Chatti (A. 2.7.2), and of the Ubii’s offer to give up 
Civilis’ wife and sister and Classicus’ daughter to Cerialis if he relieves them (H. 4.79.1). Likewise, it 
explains Civilis’ indignation at the dilectus, which snatches children from their parents, brothers from 
brothers (H. 4.17.3). The courage with which Arminius’ wife is said to have endured her captivity (A. 
1.57.4) reflects the hardiness and valor expected of Germanic women (G. 18.3). Women and children 
continue to be present near the battlefield to incite their husbands, sons, and fathers (G. 7.2-8.1; H. 
4.18.2, 5.17.2; cf. Agr. 32.2). Allusions to both the Agricola and the Germania (hortamenta uictoriae, H. 
4.18.2 ~ uictoriae incitamenta, Agr. 32.2; feminarum ululatu, H. 4.18.2 ~ feminarum ululatus, G. 7.3) underline 
the consistency of Tacitus’ analysis across the different works. Finally, the militaristic nature of 
Germanic education (G. 13.1-2) is evoked by Civilis’ using prisoners as targets for his little son’s 
shooting practice (H. 4.61.1).  
 As in the Germania, the Germani deliberate while armed (H. 4.64.1) and show assent by 
shouting and clashing their arms (H. 5.17.3: ita illis mos; cf. 5.15.2). This custom is mirrored in military 
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contexts, with the Germani shouting in massive roars and wildly clashing their arms before engaging 
their foes (G. 3.1; H. 2.22.1, 4.18.3, 5.17.3, 5.22.2; A. 4.47.3). They are slow to assemble, however, 
since “they do not obey orders, cannot be controlled, and do everything according to their own 
wishes” (H. 4.76.2; G. 11.1-2). The fact that Arminius and Civilis managed to unite numerous 
Germanic tribes was an enormous feat of leadership.  
In terms of religious practice, the major Germanic gods remain (the equivalents of) Mars, 
Mercury, and Hercules (H. 4.64.1; A. 2.12.2, 13.57.2). Most tribes do not have temples (see n. 395), but 
they consecrate woods and groves (H. 4.14.2, 4.22.2; A. 1.59.3, 1.61.3, 2.12.1; cf. 13.57.1) and engage 
in human sacrifice (A. 1.61.4, 13.57.2). Their celebration of Arminius in songs (A. 2.88.3) recalls the 
earlier statement that songs were the only way in which the Germani preserved a record of their past 
(G. 2.2). Moreover, the practice among the Chatti of not cutting one’s hair and beard until one has 
slain an enemy (G. 31.1) is evoked by Civilis’ letting his hair grow long and finally cutting it upon 
slaying Roman legionary forces during his revolt (H. 4.61.1).   
As regards their physical characteristics, the Germani remain characteristically Germanic, 
having red hair (G. 4.1; H. 4.61.1), being extraordinarily tall, and possessing huge bodies that 
accommodate short bursts of energy but cannot endure persistent force or labor (H. 2.99.1, 5.14.2, 
5.18.1; A. 1.64.2, 2.14.3, 2.21.1). Their appearance remains terrifying to Roman eyes (G. 4.1; 20.1; H. 
3.24.2; A. 2.14.3).  
Germanic mores remain, by and large, consistent as well. Tacitus continues to depict the 
Germani as a fierce, warlike, and discordant people who thrive on conflict and violence and often act 
impulsively.487 Discord and violence mark Germanic conduct at every level: within tribes, between 
tribes, and between Germanic auxilia and Roman legionaries.488 The Germani continue to be described 
																																																								
487 H. 1.64.2, 3.84.5, 4.14.2, 4.23.2-3, 4.64.2, 5.14.2; A. 1.57.1, 1.59.1, 2.10-11, 2.14.3, 2.63.3, 11.19.3, 13.54.4, 13.56-57. 
488 Within tribes: Batavi: H. 4.12; Cherusci: A. 1.57-58, 2.10, 2.88, 11.16; Chauci: 11.18; Suebi: 12.29-30. Between tribes: H. 4.28, 4.63 
ff.; A. 1.57, 2.44, 2.63, 2.88, 11.16, 12.28-30, 13.55-56, 13.57; Agr. 28. Germanic cohorts and Roman legionaries: H. 1.64 (Batavi), 2.27 
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as indolent and drunk, traits that increased their violence and rashness.489 Their national character is on 
display when Germanic cohorts join Vitellius in Rome, where the luxuries of the capital ruin their 
discipline and where they get into brawls with city crowds (H. 2.88-89). The blow that one Germanic 
soldier is said to have aimed at Vitellius (H. 3.84.5), when the latter was paraded through the capital in 
chains (or at the tribune Placidus who led Vitellius along), underlines Germanic rashness; one can take 
Germani out of Germania but not Germania out of Germani. Other pervasive character traits include 
anger, arrogance, greed for booty, and treachery. This last aspect is prominently on display in both the 
Historiae and the Annales, in the account of the Batavian Revolt, Arminius’ rebellion, and other 
instances of Germanic perfidy (see below). 
The above character traits impaired the Germani’s military discipline and performance. More 
than once Germanic rashness leads to poor decision-making and opens up opportunities for Roman 
generals.490 Likewise, drunkenness and greed for booty cause Germanic forces to be unprepared for 
battle, to fight out of order, or to throw away victories.491 Cerialis escapes defeat because his Gallic and 
Germanic foes “engage in a perverse struggle for booty, while forgetting the enemy” (H. 4.78.2). 
Germanicus’ forces slaughter the Marsi, who lie in a stupor and, having posted no sentries around 
their camp, are taken by surprise, thus displaying indolence, carelessness, and lack of discipline (A. 
1.50.4). This context evokes the maxim that Tacitus offers in the Germania: “if you indulge their 
drunkenness by offering them as much as they want, they will be overcome no less easily by their own 
vices than by arms” (G. 23.1). 
In addition to the above faults, the Germani continue to be depicted as having physical 
limitations and inferior weaponry that restrict their military capacity. Their large bodies impair their 
movement in the densest forests, cause them to be clumsy at times, and make them ready targets for 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
(id.), 2.66 (id.), 2.69 (id.).  
489 H. 2.21, 2.88-89 (Germanic cohorts in Rome) 4.29, 4.79; A. 1.50-51, 1.65, 11.16, 12.27. 
490 H. 2.22.1, 4.29, 4.76; A. 1.68, 2.17, 12.28.1. 
491 Drunkenness and stupor: H. 2.21.1, 4.29.1, 4.79.3; A. 1.50-51, 11.16.2, 12.27.3. Greed for booty: H. 1.79.2, 4.63.1, 4.76.2, 4.78.2, 
5.17.1; A. 1.65.6, 1.68.1, 12.27.3; cf. A. 1.57.5. 
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Roman weapons (A. 2.21.1), while their lack of endurance was a distinct liability in drawn out conflicts 
(A. 2.14.3).492 Hence the decision of Germanic chiefs to engage Roman armies in marshes and forests 
–  where they inflicted the greatest losses – and not on open plains suitable for pitched battles. In 
terms of arms, the three works transmit the same picture: Germanic warriors commonly lacked a 
cuirass or helmet and they carried a large, though flimsy, shield, and either a short or long spear, but 
rarely a sword. Roman forces were more heavily armed, wearing full body-armor and helmet and 
wielding javelins and short-swords.493 In most contexts, Roman arms were superior and decisive. This 
was acknowledged and emphasized in pre-battle speeches.494 Finally, Germanic tribes continue to fight 
in predictable and static wedge formations (cuneus) and to abandon their lines when hard-pressed.495 
 However, as in the Germania, the characterization of the Germani is far from one-sided, for 
their strengths and virtues often are on display as well. As a whole, the description of the Germani 
yields a complex picture that variously accentuates Roman military glory or explains why Germania 
had defied conquest and inflicted crushing defeats on Roman armies. The Germani were fierce and 
courageous fighters, whose valor Tacitus frequently highlights. They were Rome’s most feared 
enemies, and it is no accident that the Rhine legions were considered the strongest legions and 
Germanic cohorts (particularly Batavian ones) the most powerful auxilia.496 As in the Germania, the 
Batavi, Chauci, Chatti, and Frisii are singled out for their strength and valor.497 Throughout the corpus, 
Tacitus never lets the reader forget the numerous setbacks Rome suffered against the Germani, either 
recalling these himself (G. 37; A. 4.72-74) or having Roman generals (Cerialis: H. 4.73.2) and 
Germanic chiefs (Civilis: H. 4.17; Arminius: A. 1.59; Maroboduus: A. 2.46) do so.  
																																																								
492 On Germanic clumsiness: J. Williams 2001, 47. 
493 Germanic and Roman arms: G. 6.1; H. 2.88.3, 5.14.2, 5.18.1; A. 1.64.2, 2.14.2-3, 2.21.1. 
494 Note the speeches of Caecina (A. 1.67) and Germanicus (A. 2.14) and Tacitus’ comments at A. 2.21. Cf. Agricola at Agr. 33.5.  
495 Wedge formation (cuneus): G. 6.4, 7.2; H. 4.16.2, 4.20.3, 5.16.1, 5.18.1; fleeing from battle: G. 6.4; A. 1.68.5 (Arminius and 
Inguiomerus), 2.14.3 (Germanicus commenting on Germanic tendency to flee), 2.17.3. 
496 Respect for Germani: G. 37; H. 4.21.2, 4.28.1, 4.61.1, 4.73.2; A. 1.24.2, 1.62.2, 1.67.2, 2.63, 3.46.1. Strength of the Rhine legions: H. 
2.23.1, 2.58.2, 2.75.1, 2.77.1, 3.2.2; A. 1.47.1, 4.5.1, 4.67.4, 11.1.2, 13.35.2, 14.38.1. Strength of Germanic auxiliaries: Agr. 36; H. 1.59.1, 
2.28, 4.15; A. 14.38.1. 
497 Batavi: G. 29.1; passim H. bks 4 and 5; Frisii and Chauci: G. 34-45; H. 4.16.2; A. 4.72-74; Chatti: G. 30.  
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 In many respects, Germanic shortcomings are balanced by corresponding strengths. For 
instance, their height, despite its limitations, facilitated their ability to swim, to fight and maneuver in 
waters and marshes, and to strike their foes from a distance (H. 5.18.1; A. 1.64.2), while their 
explosiveness allowed for swift attacks and quick movements in confined areas like woods.498 Likewise, 
when fighting in marshy conditions or waters, the weight of the otherwise superior Roman armor was 
a hindrance, while the lighter armed Germani moved more freely (H. 5.14.2). The contrast between 
Germanic and Roman military strategy, too, is to some extent elided, for Tacitus frequently stresses the 
intelligence of Germanic chiefs, Civilis and Arminius in particular.499 The latter, having previously 
served in Roman armies, know how to hurry or delay a campaign (Civilis often is swift in carrying out 
raids, sieges, and attacks: H. 4.33, 4.77), how to divide their lines in response to enemy strategy (H. 
5.20; A. 2.45), to choose long-term diplomacy over immediate gain (H. 4.56, 4.63), to use the 
landscape (passim), and to capitalize on Roman errors (H. 5.22). Moreover, they lead by example, are 
conspicuous in battle, and are able speakers who manage to unite great numbers of discordant and 
unruly Germani (G. 7; H. 4.14, 4.17, 4.78, 5.17; A. 1.59-60, 1.65, 2.15). Although the Germanic 
narratives in the Historiae and the Annales are directed towards a clear conclusion – the beating back of 
the Batavian and Cheruscan rebellions and the restoration of Roman supremacy – neither of those 
wars was a straightforward affair, with substantial losses on both sides. Tacitus’ characterization of 
Civilis and Arminius, and of their Roman foes Cerialis and Germanicus, is complex and, on the whole, 
quite balanced, with each of the four generals ascribed virtues and shortcomings.  
Finally, one of the principal charges leveled in modern scholarship against the Germani of the 
later works – that they are perfidious – is undermined not only by numerous examples of Germanic 
loyalty to Rome but by the fact that Tacitus describes Germanic rebellions as exceptions to, by and 
																																																								
498 J. Williams (2001, 47) and Ash (2014, 192) emphasize the shortcomings of the Germani’s height, but from Tacitus’ works it is clear 
that the reality was more complicated.   
499 For Tacitus’ depiction of Civilis as a cunning shape-shifter, see Ash 2014, 185-200.  
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large, unbroken loyalty. References to the Batavi’s status at G. 29.1, H. 4.12, and H. 5.25, chapters that 
enjoy close affinity, show that the tribe was loyal and enjoyed a favorable status both before and after 
the revolt. In the Agricola and the Annales, which cover periods after and before the revolt, respectively, 
the Batavi appear as loyal allies delivering valuable military service to Germanicus (A. 2.8.3, 2.11.), 
Corbulo (A. 13.35.2), Paulinus (A. 14.28 ff.; H. 4.12.3), and Agricola (Agr. 18.4, 36; H. 4.12.3). There is 
every reason to believe that in the lost books of both historical works the Batavi were characterized 
favorably as well. Their unfavorable description constitutes merely a portion of their overall 
characterization, and it is premature to use the Fourth and Fifth Books of the extant Historiae alone to 
argue for a change in Tacitus’ perceptions.  
Similarly, aside from their revolt against Varus and, subsequently, Germanicus, the Cherusci 
were loyal Roman allies (since at least AD 4). They did not, as far as we know, participate in the 
Batavian Revolt and, aside from internal dissensions, continued to be quiet subordinates of Rome.500 
The Cherusci also were not unanimous in their rebellion under Arminius, for his brother Flavus and 
Segestes (and no doubt others) retained their allegiance to Rome throughout. All this is more in line 
with Tacitus’ description of the Cherusci at G. 36 than often is assumed.501  
The Frisii, though more recalcitrant, broadly follow the same pattern. They were loyal allies 
since at least 12 BC, aided Drusus the Elder when low tides left his ships stranded (Dio 54.32.2-3), and 
offered Germanicus a local remedy for poisonous water (Plin., Nat. 25.21). They did not participate in 
Arminius’ rebellion and remained loyal in its aftermath. However, in 28 they revolted (A. 4.72-74), in 
58 they left the settlement (A. 13.54) in which Corbulo had placed them (A. 11.19), and they joined 
the Batavian Revolt and supplied Civilis with forces (H. 4.14-16, 4.79.2). By the time Tacitus wrote the 
Germania, they were back under Roman control (ILS 1461), and in the second century they are attested 
as serving in the imperial horse-guard (CIL vi. 3230) and as auxiliary cavalry in Britain (RIB i. 109) and 
																																																								
500 See Rives 1999, 268-69 for details and further references. 
501 As Rives (1999, 269) rightly notes as well.  
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Raetia (CIL xvi. 105). The Frisii, then, arguably are the most perfidious Germanic tribe in Tacitus. Yet 
it is significant that the historian stresses that their initial revolt in 28 was more the result of Roman 
maladministration than Frisian inability to endure subjection (nostra magis auaritia quam obsequii 
impatientes, A. 4.72). The revolts of Arminius and Civilis had similar causes. Tacitus locates the origin of 
the revolts not in Germanic character but in Roman oppression.  
Finally, the argument that the Germani of the Historiae and the Annales are more perfidious 
than those in the Germania is undermined further by the many examples of Germanic loyalty that 
Tacitus records and, in some cases, highlights explicitly. Just as the Batavian Revolt constituted an 
exception to longstanding loyalty, so the siege executed by the Chatti, Usipi, and Mattiaci on the 
Roman legionary fortress at Mogontiacum (modern Mainz) “put a stain on their excellent services to 
the Roman people” (donec egregia erga populum Romanum merita mox rebelles foedarent, H. 4.37.3). Elsewhere, 
Tacitus stresses the uetus obsequium and fides of the Suebi (H. 3.5.1), the fides and constantia of the 
Cheruscan chiefs Segestes (A. 1.57-58) and Flavus (A. 2.9.1), and the egregia aduersus nos fides of the 
Sueban chiefs Sido and Vangio (A. 12.30.2).502 In Tacitus, we cannot speak straightforwardly of 
Germanic ‘loyalty’ or ‘perfidy.’ Germanic conduct across the corpus is marked by a range of stances 
toward Rome, many of which are indeed favorable and loyal. Our texts do not bear out the claim that 
Tacitus’ attitude towards the Germani changes and becomes less favorable in his later works.  
 
III.5  Conclusions 
I began this chapter with a citation that illustrates the prevalent scholarly approach to the 
Germania, one which examines the work in a vacuum – undoubtedly in part due to its genre – and 
which, when read in conjunction with the historical narratives, focuses on the differences between the 
three works. D. Sailor’s exclusion of the Germania and the Dialogus from his 2008 volume, on the 
																																																								
502 Other examples are the loyalty of the Ubii (H. 4.28, 4.79), Italicus (A. 11.17), and Boiocalus, chief of the Ampsivarii (A. 13.55). 
Tacitus records the military aid provided by the Chauci (A. 1.60.2), depicts the Angrivarii as restoring to Germanicus some shipwrecked 
men (A. 2.24.3), and writes that Mallovendus, chief of the Marsi, indicated where one of Varus’ eagles was kept (A. 2.25.1).  
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theory that they show less affinity than the Agricola with the later works, is a good example of this 
approach.503 In this chapter, I have demonstrated that in fact there exist many conceptual connections 
between the Germania and the later works, as regards Roman foreign policy and its complexities, 
Tacitus’ outlook on imperial rule and imperium, the polarity between Roman and non-Roman culture, 
and Tacitus’ perception of Germania and its tribes. As we have seen, there are various concerns and 
viewpoints that cross the generic boundaries that might be seen to divide an ethnography from a 
historiographical work. My reading of the Germania as a meditation on the factors informing the 
formulation of foreign policy frees the text from its generic constrictions and suggests a way to 
account for its apparent complexities. The thematic and conceptual continuities between the Germania 
and the Historiae and the Annales make it imperative that we read the three texts in conjunction. 
Despite the open-endedness of the text, Tacitus’ attitude reveals itself largely to be in tune with 
post-Augustan foreign policy. The understanding that barbarian discord should be exploited and that a 
conservative and cost-effective foreign policy – based on diplomacy, indirect control, and outward 
projection of power – is the most prudent response to existing pressures on the Empire is set out in 
the Germania and taken up in the later works. That is not to say that Tacitus wholly favors imperial 
limitation. The Agricola, Germania, Historiae, and Annales show that Tacitus has a record of endorsing 
expansion on moral and emotional grounds. His view of Roman power and control is, above all, 
complex and, crucial for the argument of my study, remains by and large consistent throughout. 
The characterization of Germania and its tribes remains broadly consistent as well. In the 
historical works, Tacitus ascribes to the Germani the defining traits that he had ascribed to them 
collectively in the Germania. Likewise, the depiction of Germania’s situs moresque, as it unfolds in the 
Historiae and the Annales, largely mirrors that offered in the monograph. In addition to these broader 
connections, the Germania often serves as a specific reference point in the later works, which often 
																																																								
503 As is Suerbaum’s exclusion of the text (2015, 7) and the fact that the recent volume devoted to the opera minora (Devillers 2014) 
contains only one chapter on the Germania. 
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recall or elaborate on information offered in the monograph. Tacitus seems to expect his readers to be 
familiar with his earlier treatment of the Germani by the time they come to his historical works. 
The Germania reveals intellectual and thematic affinity with the Agricola as well. Both texts are 
concerned with imperial rule and its execution. The account of Britain’s situs moresque and those of 
Germania both are bound up with the desirability and/or practicability of the Roman occupation of 
different areas. The Agricola shows a Roman governor dealing with the sorts of geographical challenges 
on campaign and the gubernatorial challenges in administering a province that the Germania shows a 
governor would face beyond the Rhine. Both works compare and contrast Roman and non-Roman 
culture, a type of analysis that bears on the limits of cultural imperialism and offers implicit 
commentary on contemporary Rome. The Dialogus explores the Principate from an entirely different 
perspective and in yet another generic and narrative framework. It is to the last of Tacitus’ 


















Dialogus de Oratoribus , Historiae , Annales 
 
IV.1.1  Introduction: Manuscript Tradition and Reception 
 
Tacitus’ Dialogus de Oratoribus received no certain mention in antiquity. Aside from a possible 
contemporary reference to D. 9.6 at Plin., Ep. 9.10.2, the dialogue completely disappeared from view. 
While the Agricola and the Germania were available to Cassiodorus and known in the Middle Ages,504 
knowledge of the Dialogus did not surface until the discovery in 1425 of the Hersfeldensis (the Hersfeld 
codex), a 9th century manuscript containing in order the Germania, Agricola, and Dialogus of Tacitus and 
the de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus of Suetonius. Poggio Bracciolini’s correspondence with Niccolo Niccoli 
about the MS’s contents is notable for what it reveals about scholarly attitudes towards Tacitus’ corpus 
and the Dialogus in particular. For to Poggio the three monographs were ignota. As noted in the general 
introduction (see pp. 1-3), the monographs and the historical works descend through different 
manuscript traditions.505 A further complexity is that early readers of the Dialogus doubted that it was 
actually Tacitean. A letter from Panormita to Guarino in 1426 shows that the Hersfeldensis ascribes 
only the Agricola and the Germania to Tacitus. As for the Dialogus, Panormita wrote that the MS also 
contained “quidam dyalogus de oratore ... et est, ut coniectamus, Cor. Taciti.” In the following 
centuries, Tacitean authorship continued to be doubted. Beatus Rhenanus (1519), for instance, 
questioned the work’s authenticity in his edition of Tacitus; Justus Lipsius, Tacitus’ most important 
																																																								
504 Rudolf of Fulda used the Germania in the ninth century, while Adam of Bremen (before 1075) and Peter the Deacon (ca. 1135) 
seem to have known the Agricola. 
505 It is significant that the three monographs were grouped not with the Historiae and the Annales, but with Suetonius’ de Grammaticis et 
Rhetoribus. For modern scholarship on the manuscript tradition of Tacitus’ works, see n. 6. 
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early editor, ascribed the dialogue to Quintilian (he later rejected this idea); and J. H. Nast ascribed it to 
Pliny the Younger in his 1787 translation of the text. Tacitus’ authorship still was doubted as recently 
as 1995.506    
In addition to persistent doubt about its authenticity, the text was subject to frequent scribal 
interference. The Hersfeld codex, from which all our extant MSS derive indirectly, itself was corrected 
substantially by its scribe, and subsequent scribes made numerous other corrections. It is thus 
important to remember, as R. Mayer notes, “that our text is the product of much philological toil.”507 
This, too, bears on perceptions (since the early Renaissance) of the text’s ‘Ciceronian,’ and so 
ostensibly ‘non-Tacitean,’ style. Responses, aside from ascription of the text to other authors, included 
insistence on a pre-Domitianic date of composition on the theory that Tacitus had not yet found his 
characteristic style. It was not until the early 19th century, when A. G. Lange detected the possible 
reference to D. 9.6 at Plin., Ep. 9.10.2, and until the end of that century, when F. Leo (in a review of 
Gudeman’s 1894 edition) argued that the Ciceronian style was not a sign of early composition but due 
to the work’s genre, that its authorship and rightful place in the corpus were established more firmly.508  
The Dialogus never quite recovered from its status as an anomaly.509 Although scholarship on 
the text has increased in quantity and sophistication in the past decades, 510 systematic examinations of 
its connections with the historical works are rare.511 The conscious exclusion of the Dialogus and the 
																																																								
506 Crook 1995, 10, 174, 184. 
507 Mayer 2001, 49. 
508 Lange 1832; Leo 1898, reprinted in Leo 1960, vol. II, 285-93. Leo’s arguments were supported by Norden 1909, vol. I, 322-26.  
509 Goldberg 1999, 73-74: “the fraught complexity of such questions finds its frankest exploration in that great anomaly of the 
Tacitean corpus, the Dialogus de Oratoribus. The work is not a treatise, not a history and not written in ‘Tacitean’ style.” Cf. Rutledge 
2012, 62: “The Dialogus, though not easy by any means, would provide some refreshment to the student, were it not for the simple 
fact that it is rarely read since it is not considered representative of Tacitus’ language or his ethos.” 
510 Bibliographic reviews can be found in Benario 1986, 107-09; 1995, 120-23; 2005, 281-84; Bo 1993. Mayer (2001, 16-47) and Levene 
(2004) offer plentiful bibliography as well. Van den Berg 2014 is the most recent book-length study of the text and offers an extensive 
and up-to-date bibliography. The major commentaries are Gudeman 1914, Bo 1974, Güngerich 1980, Mayer 2001 (now standard). 
Scholarship increasingly has moved away from the argument of decline, embracing the dialogue’s complexity and competing 
viewpoints, placing the text within its broader historical and cultural milieu, and allowing for greater flexibility in its interpretation. 
The latest product of this approach is van den Berg 2014, which confronts previous scholarship head-on and offers a new model of 
interpreting dialogue (“argumentative dynamics”). 
511 Note Sailor 2008, 5: “though Germania and Dialogus are Tacitus’, and fascinating, they will not appear here as primary objects of 
attention, because they do not form part of that arc of narrative works that imagine themselves as a sequence.” Similarly, Suerbaum 
2015, 7. Examples of scholarship examining the connections between the Dialogus and the historical works include Levene 1999 and 
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Germania (likewise often studied in isolation) from recent studies of Tacitus is telling.512 With respect to 
the Dialogus, isolation occludes plain connections with the Historiae and the Annales, in terms of subject 
matter (the nature and scope of eloquentia in imperial Rome), the regime in which the dialogue is set 
(that of Vespasian), the men it mentions (Cassius Severus, Publius Vatinius, Eprius Marcellus, Vibius 
Crispus, Helvidius Priscus, Vipstanus Messalla, Aquilius Regulus), matters of style (many of the stylistic 
principles advertised by Aper mark Tacitus’ own writing in the historical works: brevity, use of 
sententiae, poetic language), and the nature of the Republic and the Principate and their perceived 
impact on eloquentia and the production of literature (including Tacitus’ own works). In particular, the 
Agricola, Dialogus, Historiae, and Annales all are concerned with the relationship between political and 
generic change and with the skewed appreciation of merit and ability in imperial society. Furthermore, 
the historical works, in exploring the position and influence of accusers and delatores, elucidate a major 
point of debate in the Dialogus.513 The many examples of powerful informers who lose their emperor’s 
support and subsequently are destroyed showcase the frailty of power that does not stand on its own 
but is dependent on that of others, and variously support and undermine the claims made by Aper and 
Maternus in the dialogue (D. 5.5-7, 8, 13.4).514 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
2009 on deliberative and judicial speech in the Dialogus and the Historiae; van den Berg 2012 on deliberative oratory in the Dialogus and 
the Annales. 
512 By Sailor (2008, 5) and Suerbaum (2015, 7).  
513 Both historical works shed light on Aper’s claims about the influence of delatores (D. 5.5-7, 8) and Maternus’ claims that the latter do not 
enjoy greater libertas and security and that their potentia is but feeble (D. 13.4). The distinction between accusers working in the employ of 
a province or the senate and those who bring charges on their own accord (the technical meaning of delator) and use the interests of the princeps 
and the state as pretexts to abuse the legal system and to eliminate their enemies has not been sufficiently stressed in the scholarship. The 
archetypical delator Romanus Hispo seems to belong to the second category: the point of subscribente at A. 1.74.1 is that he is putting 
himself forward to join the case brought by Caepio Crispinus against Granius Marcellus. Aper advances arguments that redeem 
delatores, showing that their activity and motives fit within the contemporary system of Roman aristocratic values.  
514 The senatorial debates at H. 4.6-8 and 4.42-43 show the extensive, but ultimately fragile, network upon which a delator’s power 
depended. H. 4.6.1 illustrates that, if Marcellus should fall, a host of informers associated with him also would go down (cf. H. 4.43; 
A. 13.33.3 for his network). Marcellus, like other delatores, depended on the good graces of his princeps and the latter’s close associates 
(cf. A. 11.5-6). Helvidius Priscus’ words at H. 4.7.3 indicate the virtual immunity that a man like Marcellus enjoyed when supported by 
his princeps (cf. Vibius Crispus’ position at H. 4.41). Marcellus remained a powerful associate of Vespasian until he suddenly fell out of 
favor and was destroyed in 78. The frailty of Marcellus’ (or any informer’s) position is underlined by the fact that he appears as a 
preeminent delator in the Dialogus and was ruined a few years after its dramatic date. The contrasting fate of men like Crispus (with 
whom Marcellus is paired in the Dialogus), Aquilius Regulus, and Baebius Massa (cf. H. 4.50) reinforces the point. This aspect of 
power frequently is on display in the Annales. Note how Tiberius uses powerful informers and, when he grows tired of them, discards 
them (A. 4.71.1). The language (on which see Martin-Woodman 1989 ad loc.) hints at the eagerness (and questionable morality) of 
these officials (cf. D. 8.3; A. 1.74.1) and reflects their precarious position. Delatores typically grow in influence and wealth as they ruin 
others but eventually ruin themselves: A. 1.74.2. Examples include Annius Faustus (H. 2.10), P. Celer (H. 4.10, 4.40), Catus Firmius 
	
	 203 
 The Dialogus, in sum, has long been marginalized and modern scholarship has sustained and 
mirrored attitudes already present in antiquity and beyond.515 While C. S. van den Berg’s monograph 
(2014) succeeds in recovering the dialogue and in dismantling some of the major assumptions that 
have obstructed full appreciation of the text, it does not entirely deliver on its promise to explore its 
interactions with the historical narratives. The call for more inclusive readings of the Tacitean corpus 
continues.516 Before further exploring some of the scholarly responses to the text, it will be useful to 
set out its contents and structure.  
 
IV.1.2  Format and Structure 
 The Dialogus is a fictional debate about the history and state of oratory consisting of an 
introduction (1.1-5.2), three pairs of speeches on three distinct, but related, issues (5.3-41.5), and a 
conclusion (42.1-2). The speeches are broken up by “interstitial passages” (to use van den Berg’s term), 
the “dramatic statements outside speeches that direct a reader towards key themes and that include 
metacritical commentary.”517 The debate, set ca. 25-30 years in the past, takes place among three 
speakers – Marcus Aper, Vipstanus Messalla, and Curiatius Maternus – in the presence of a young 
attendee, Tacitus, and another attendee, Julius Secundus, who for the occasion acts as ‘judge.’ The 
broad question underlying the debate is announced in the opening lines: Tacitus’ friend Fabius Justus 
repeatedly has asked him why it is that, whereas past ages flourished in men of genius and renown, 
their own age has lost the distinction of eloquentia and hardly uses the term “orator” anymore (cur, cum 
priora saecula tot eminentium oratorum ingeniis gloriaque floruerint, nostra potissimum aetas deserta et laude eloquentiae 
orbata uix nomen ipsum oratoris retineat, 1.1). Justus’ question (discussed more fully below) touches on 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
(A. 4.31), Sextius Paconianus (A. 6.3.4), and P. Suillius (A. 11.5-7, 13.42-43). Tacitus, commenting on Agrippina the Younger’s 
downfall, offers a formula that gets at the heart of the issue and bears on the position of delatores, imperial women, and imperial 
freedmen alike: nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fluxum est quam fama potentiae non sua ui nixae (A. 13.19.1). 
515 The fact that R. Mayer’s commentary (2001, still standard) was the first English commentary on the dialogue in nearly a century is 
another indicator of the work’s reception.  
516 Devillers’ edited volume on the opera minora (2014) contains several welcome chapters on the Dialogus (by Cytermann, Joseph, and 
Sailor) that, however, do not explore in depth its connections with the historical works. Devillers 2015, 137-53 explores the place of 
the Dialogus within the Tacitean corpus, focusing primarily on Tacitus’ changing attitudes towards various ruling emperors.  
517 Van den Berg 2014, 15. For a detailed overview of scholarship on the dialogue’s structure, see Bo 1993, 319-37. 
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both the quality of eloquentia (has it declined over time?) and the way it is evaluated within society (is 
eloquentia no longer appraised the way it used to?).  
 The question, as it emerges, enunciates a tension between decline in ability (ingenium) and its 
recognition by society (laus) that runs through the dialogue.518 Tacitus responds by saying that he will 
not take up the question himself, but that he will reproduce from memory a debate he attended as a 
young man that was concerned with the very same question.519 Having explained to Justus that the 
interlocutors, who occupied different positions, all made plausible (probabiles) arguments, Tacitus sets 
the scene and introduces the men. It is the day after the poet Maternus recited a play called Cato, which 
has offended powerful men (potentes). With the whole city discussing the play, Maternus is visited by his 
friends Aper and Secundus, eminent orators, who are accompanied on this occasion by one of their 
pupils, the young Cornelius Tacitus. The three men find Maternus in his bedroom holding the 
manuscript of the Cato. Worried for his friend’s safety, Secundus urges him to revise the play to make 
it less objectionable. Maternus responds that he will not and that whatever his Cato has left unsaid will 
appear in his next play, a Thyestes. Aper then criticizes Maternus for having abandoned oratory and his 
forensic duties in favor of writing poetry, a point that introduces the subject of the first debate: which 
employment of eloquentia is better and earns more recognition, poetry or oratory?  
 Aper begins and argues for oratory and against poetry (5.3-10.8) on the grounds of utilitas, 
uoluptas, honestas, financial reward, and fame. At the end of his speech he urges Maternus to abandon 
poetry and return to the bar, because he is a talented speaker and it is safer to offend the authorities on 
behalf of others. Aper does not have a problem with poetry per se, but with men who are talented 
enough to be good orators and yet choose to be poets.  
 Maternus in response (11.1-13.6) argues for poetry, claiming that it has afforded him more 
																																																								
518 Tacitus nowhere proclaims oratory’s decline in his own voice, but puts arguments of decline in the mouth of the speakers (cf. 
Goldberg 1999, 226). Messalla uses the words fracta, deminuta (26.8), desciscere (28.2), and corrupta (34.4) to designate ‘decline.’ Maternus 
uses the verbs degenerare (27.3), debilitatur, and frangitur (39.2). 
519 The claim that people debated the very same problem under Vespasian as they did under Trajan is significant, since it suggests that 
the intervening years brought no improvement.  
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fame than his oratorical endeavors (here he refers to his destruction of the Neronian scurra Vatinius); 
that it is not corrupt and marred by the bloodthirstiness that marks modern oratory (exemplified by 
the delatores); that he prefers peace and seclusion over statues and hordes of clients; and that poets 
enjoy no less, if not more, fame than orators (here he points to Ovid and Vergil, among others).520  
 At this point Messalla enters (14.1-16.3). He pokes fun at Aper for following today’s 
rhetoricians more than the orators of old. Aper retorts that Messalla admires only what is old, even 
though he himself (as well as his brother Regulus) is an exponent of modern oratory. Messalla rejoins 
by claiming that all men know there is a difference between ancient and modern oratory and suggests 
the utility of investigating its causes. The subject of the second debate is set. 
 Aper begins and defends modern oratory (16.4-23.6). He starts by challenging the efficacy of 
the labels “ancient” (antiquus) and “new/modern” (novus), suggesting that it has only been 300 years 
from Demosthenes’ time until their own day and a mere 120 since Cicero died. What is “ancient”? 
Why should Cicero be counted among the “ancients”? The truly “ancient” orators were men like 
Servius Galba or Gaius Carbo, and their style was unpolished. Oratory changes with the times and 
requires innovation, as Cassius Severus had realized. The changed nature of public oratory has 
rendered the old style redundant. In any case, the models that Messalla admires (Cicero, Caesar, 
Brutus) each had their faults, too.  
 Maternus now turns to Messalla and asks him not to give a defense of the ancients, whose 
superiority is taken for granted, but to explain why he thinks oratory has declined (24.1-3). Messalla, 
however, immediately launches into a defense of the old orators whom Aper had criticized (25.1-26.8). 
Of course they had their faults, but collectively they possessed greater genius. Modern orators are just 
like actors: their style is effeminate and excessively dramatic. By the way, Aper has not mentioned a 
																																																								
520 Maternus’ preference for life outside the city is evoked at times in the Annales, where prominent Romans wish to leave the capital 
due to the anxiety spread by the delatores. Note Lucius Piso (2.34.1), Vibius Serenus (4.28.3), Sejanus’ advice to Tiberius (4.41.3), 




single modern orator. Messalla will gladly point out why they are inferior to their predecessors!  
 Maternus now interferes and urges Messalla to stick to the task at hand (27.1-3): explain what 
you think are the causes of the decline of oratory. This marks the end of the second pair of speeches 
and we now move to the final debate: why has oratory declined? 
 Messalla takes a moral and cultural approach (28.1-35.5): there has been a decline in the 
upbringing of young Romans. Elementary education is neglected and rhetoricians are incompetent. 
Modern orators lack the broad base of knowledge that a Cicero possessed (and advertised in his 
Brutus). Knowledge of law and philosophy are essential to good oratory. The tirocinium fori, the practice 
whereby young Romans learned the tools of the trade by attending eminent orators as they practiced, 
has been abandoned for inadequate classroom experience. The rhetorical exercises of declamation (the 
suasoriae and controversiae) are unrealistic and therefore useless.  
 After a lacuna, the text resumes in the middle of Maternus’ speech, the last in the work (36.1-
41.5). Maternus takes a historical approach, explaining oratory’s alleged decline in terms of the political 
changes from the Republic to the Principate. Oratory flourished in the license and turmoil of the Late 
Republic, when it was unbridled and great matters were at stake. The peace and tranquility of the 
Principate, in which matters are decided by one man, render great oratory superfluous. License, not 
freedom, fosters oratory. If the interlocutors had been born in the Late Republic, they would have 
earned recognition for their eloquentia, whereas, if men like Cicero and Brutus had been born under the 
Principate, they would have been relegated to the same moderation and restraint that marks modern 
oratory: great renown and great security simply do not coexist. Let each generation appreciate the 
merits of its own times and not disparage other periods. 
 In a succinct conclusion (42.1-2), the interlocutors agree that more discussion is needed and 




IV.1.3  Choice of Format and Authorial Stance 
 The Dialogus’ interactions with Cicero’s de Oratore have been discussed at length and do not 
require lengthy exposition here.521 Two middle-aged authors, in response to a supposed question from 
a friend, report on a debate about the state of oratory that took place when they were young. The 
debate, set several decades in the past, takes place in the home of an older man, between several 
distinguished orators (in both cases, two of the author’s former teachers take part), who discuss a 
principal question from different sides, in the Aristotelian and Academic tradition of arguing in 
utramque partem. The authors themselves do not participate in the discussion, but merely record the 
different arguments without taking sides.522 These are some of the more obvious connections.  
 Two points merit further comment: the choice of format and the author’s stance. For both 
bear on a work’s purpose and on the conclusions that a reader is formally sanctioned to draw from it. 
For a work on oratory, the dialogue format was a logical choice, a respectful nod to a model (and a 
tradition), but it was not obligatory. Quintilian, Ciceronian in heart and mind, opted for a didactic 
treatise, while Pliny explicated his views in a carefully edited collection of letters. One of the dialogue 
format’s principal virtues is that it facilitates the exposition of multiple viewpoints (often of men other 
than the author), allowing readers to examine different arguments side-by-side and, depending on the 
author’s stance, to form their own opinions. Tacitus’ preference for a dialogue over a treatise and for 
presenting other men’s views over his own, despite his authority to speak on the subject, stands in 
contrast to the work of his contemporaries and is a first indication of his aims. His authorial stance 
complements his choice of format. 
 Beyond choosing a work’s formal structure, an author must define his own position with 
regard to it. In the case of a dialogue, in which the author himself does not participate, he must clarify 
																																																								
521 For detailed examinations of the Dialogus’ borrowings from Cicero, see Haß-von Reitzenstein 1970; van den Berg 2014, 208-93. 




whether any of the opinions or arguments set out may be taken to reflect his own opinion. There were 
various ways to go about this and Cicero, who usually is clear about what readers may infer from his 
dialogues, once more is paradigmatic.523 In the preface, Tacitus, variously recalling Cicero’s dialogues, 
carefully delineates the work and his stance.524 First, he claims that Justus’ question has come up saepe 
(1.1). The adverb, often used in philosophical texts to indicate complexity, at once signals that the 
debate to follow is unlikely to be straightforward (this impression is reinforced by frequenter et assidua 
contentio at 4.1).525 Next, Tacitus states explicitly that he will not take up Justus’ question himself, thus 
signaling the withholding of his personal opinion. This is followed up by the claim that the 
interlocutors took up different positions, signaling a debate along the lines of contemporary 
declamation and of the Academic Skeptical method of debating an issue in utramque partem.526 Each of 
the interlocutors, moreover, is said to have spoken subtiliter and grauiter (1.3) and to have offered 
arguments that seemed probabilis (“probable” or “convincing,” 1.3). This last term, again common in 
Cicero’s rhetorical and philosophical texts, typically signaled an open-ended inquiry.527  
 Tacitus does not pick sides. The prefatory claims are echoed in the conclusion. What is said 
there is as significant as what is left unsaid. The interlocutors agree that further discussion is needed 
and Tacitus foregoes statements about the plausibility of the arguments (42.1-2). Neither he nor the 
appointed ‘judge,’ Secundus, declare a ‘winner:’ the debate goes on.528 Tacitus leaves it to his readers to 
draw their own conclusions. His stance is underlined further by the fact that he does not anticipate the 
discussion by a lengthy introduction or exposition of his views on related topics. Tacitus takes for 
																																																								
523 An author may clarify in the preface that he favors the arguments of one of the interlocutors. Note Cicero at the start of de Senectute 
(iam enim ipsius Catonis sermo explicabit nostram omnem de senectute sententiam, 1.3). On the other hand, an author may state explicitly that 
readers should not seek his personal opinion in any of the arguments. So Cicero in the preface of the de Natura Deorum (qui autem 
requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est; non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda 
sunt, 1.10). Alternatively, an author may conclude a work by siding with a particular argument (either outright or more obliquely, as 
Cicero does in the final line of the de Natura Deorum), by stating that readers are free to draw their own conclusions (e.g. at de Div. 
2.150), or by merely recording the concluding thoughts of the interlocutors (as at the end of each of the books of the de Orat.). 
524 On the preface’s borrowings from Cicero’s dialogues, see van den Berg 2014, 59 ff. 
525 Van den Berg 2014, 64.  
526 Van den Berg 2014, 41, n. 76. On declamation and its connection with the Dialogus: van den Berg 2014, 41-47. 
527 Van den Berg 2014, 41, 64. 
528 As indeed it did, seeing that the same question was still debated under Trajan. The only pronouncement Secundus makes on any of 
the arguments is at D. 14.2 and it is a balanced one.  
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granted that his readers know many of the things that Cicero elaborates upon; the discussions in the 
three books of the de Oratore are preceded by 23, 11, and 16 prefatory chapters, respectively. 
 The open-endedness of the discussion is evidenced in the arguments, which neither pursue a 
single thesis nor reach a conclusion or ‘solution.’ The complexity of the different emphases, of the 
interactions between the arguments and other elements of the text, of the allusions to and reworkings 
of literary forerunners, and of the divergent approaches to aspects of eloquentia ultimately defy a unified 
message. What is more, each of the arguments betrays inconsistencies and self-contradictions, making 
it difficult for readers to side with any of the speakers and undermining “character-oriented” and 
“persuasion-oriented” readings.529  
 The assumption that the dialogue, despite its open-endedness and marked complexity, points 
to a single conclusion (i.e. oratory’s decline) arguably has been the greatest obstacle to its appreciation 
and its useful study alongside the later works.530 In order to uphold this assumption, scholars have 
been forced to explain away inconsistencies or resort to other measures to create coherence. Hence 
attempts to paint Aper as devil’s advocate, even though his arguments are sensible and, crucially, 
reflected in Tacitus’ own style in the historical works;531 explanations of inconsistencies as somehow 
ironic, as a form of “double-speak,” as reflecting lack of revision, or as an essential and familiar aspect 
of declamatory practice.532 This is not the place for a detailed account of the scholarly responses to the 
																																																								
529 Character-oriented readings seek to establish which interlocutor best represents the author and his opinion. Persuasion-oriented 
readings seek to equate the author with a single overarching position. It is now accepted that neither of the interlocutors can be taken 
to represent Tacitus’ opinion. See van den Berg 2014, 56 ff. 
530 Van den Berg 2012, 189-90; 2014, 49-50; 52-97 (outlining the approaches to the text common in modern scholarship). 
531 Van den Berg 2014, 65-66 recaps the scholarship. For rehabilitating accounts of Aper: Goldberg 1999; Champion 1994 on Aper’s 
arguments; Sinclair 1995 on Tacitus’ sententious style; Dominik 2007 on the ways in which Aper’s stylistic precepts are taken up by 
Tacitus himself.  
532 Mayer (2001) reads the dialogue as demonstrating the single thesis of ‘decline.’ Luce (1993) explains the text’s inconsistencies as a 
feature of declamatory practice, whereby the speakers take up a side in each of the issues under debate and argue that case to the best 
of their ability: thus inconsistencies between different speeches are expected and would not have troubled a rhetorically trained reader.  
Winterbottom (2001) explains the inconsistencies between Maternus’ two speeches as resulting from a lack of revision. The argument 
of irony used to be prominent in German scholarship (Köhnken 1973 is an exponent), especially with regard to Maternus’ arguments. 
Bartsch (1994, 98-125) builds on this approach to argue for ‘double-speak,’ an intriguing and lucidly argued solution that, however, 
depends on several assumptions (not the least of which is the date of composition, which Bartsch places in AD 97). Strunk 2010 is a 
more recent exponent of the theory of ‘double-speak.’  
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text’s inconsistencies.533 Suffice it to say that each of the solutions proposed, ingenious though they 
are, are not foolproof, being themselves riddled with inconsistencies, supported by (unverifiable) 
assumptions, and excellent at clarifying single problems but not others. Van den Berg’s model of 
“argumentative dynamics” (2014), which builds to some extent on Luce’s declamatory explanation 
(1993), arguably comes closest to accommodating the text’s complexities. This model, based on the 
notion that dialogue is a dynamic process that offers viewpoints that are then challenged or even 
abandoned in favor of others naturally comes with its own problems and assumptions.534 Yet, it is 
attractive because it is not hampered by the assumption that inconsistency is inherently problematic 
and, consequently, approaches it as a positive feature that enhances the work’s meaning.535 I broadly 
follow this approach and, as I elucidate below, seek to understand the chronological and conceptual 
inconsistencies from the perspective of time and memory and methods of reconstructing the past. I 
suspect that the work’s inconsistencies would have troubled an ancient reader considerably less (if at 
all) than it has modern readers. There are good reasons for this. Suspension of judgment and 
indecision were traditional features of philosophical and intellectual debate (and, indeed, of ancient 
literature more broadly).536 Dialogues did not, traditionally, confine themselves to the question posed 
in the preface nor were they, as a matter of course, designed to explicate a single thesis, as is evident 
from the extant body of Ciceronian dialogues.537 Finally, the open-endedness and complexity of the 
Dialogus is akin to that in the Germania, which likewise is organized in such as way as to preclude a 
single thesis or conclusion, and it anticipates the historical works, in which Tacitus rarely offers 
uncomplicated characterizations or explicit judgments on individuals and actions, leaving it to his 
																																																								
533 Van den Berg 2014, 52-97 recently has offered just such an overview. 
534 Well articulated in a recent review of the book (Pagán 2015). 
535 On the model: van den Berg 2014, 90 ff. 
536 This is an aspect of ancient literature that, I think, is still underappreciated. O’Hara 2006 deals lucidly with the way in which ancient 
authors employ poetic and rhetorical inconsistencies. While ‘complexity’ and ‘ambiguity’ are popular terms in Tacitean scholarship (as 
is evident from my own analysis in this study), the notion often is applied inconsistently. 
537 Goldberg (1999, 224) aptly notes that there is no basis for the claim that the Dialogus clearly demonstrates decline. Note also van 
den Berg 2014, 111: “the Dialogus repeatedly suggests that thesis [i.e. oratory’s decline] while subtly undermining the presentation of 
evidence in favor of it.” 
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readers to form their own judgment based on the totality of the information provided.538 The open-
endedness and complexity of the Dialogus neither is exceptional nor does it stand alone within the 
Tacitean corpus. 
 Finally, it should be noted that some of the ostensible ‘inconsistencies’ might not have struck 
a Roman reader as such, and there is a danger in thinking in too absolute terms when analyzing the 
text’s arguments (e.g. in using the labels ‘pro-Principate’ and ‘anti-Principate’ when reading Maternus’ 
speeches). For instance, a common argument is that Maternus’ arguments are inconsistent or reflect a 
change of attitude, since he first condemns the Principate as corrupt, fostering the bloodthirsty and 
venal activity of delatores, and then produces a favorable image of it as an institution bringing order and 
peace under the leadership of a single wise man (sapientissimus et unus). For one thing, he simply answers 
two different questions. In arguing why poetry should be preferred to oratory, he describes the latter in 
the worst possible way, focusing on the delatores. When answering the question of why contemporary 
oratory has declined, he argues that the order and stability brought by the Principate has made great 
oratory redundant. These are rhetorically apt (if exaggerated) responses to the particular questions 
posed. Moreover, his ostensibly ‘pro-Principate’ stance is offset by his emphasizing a firm break 
between the republican and imperial systems of governments, which goes against the Augustan and 
post-Augustan claims to have restored and maintained the Republic. Finally, Maternus’ claims are not 
inconsistent, for they point to different aspects of the same political system that were not mutually 
exclusive. Delatores were a persistent feature of Roman legal practice from the Republic into the 
																																																								
538 Cf. Champion 1994, 162 on Aper: “The Tacitean character is always complex; moral judgments on Tacitus’ historical characters are 
rarely uniform. The character of Marcus Aper in the Dialogus should be read in this vein.” While the Germania and the Dialogus rarely 
are connected in modern scholarship, likely due to their divergent subject matter and genres, there are crucial similarities. Both works 
examine complicated subjects of socio-political import that defy straightforward answers. In both, Tacitus withdraws his personal 
opinion and presents (to greater or lesser degrees) other people’s opinions. Many observations in the Germania are reported fact 
(reflected in the use of passive verbs like uidetur, narratur, habetur, etc.), while the dialogue is centered almost entirely on other people’s 
views. Moreover, anyone familiar with the speeches in the Agricola and the historical works knows that those rarely are aimed at 
making straightforward, uncomplicated points. It also should be kept in mind that, as in the Dialogus, in the Historiae and the final 
books of the Annales, Tacitus does not include himself as an actor in the narrative, even though he was alive and politically active 
under the regimes narrated there. In contrast with the Dialogus, in the historical works, Tacitus does, of course, intrude into the 
narrative in the authorial voice. Cf. Suerbaum 2015, 66-71.    
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Principate. The activity of these men, one of whose major concerns was to protect the emperor’s 
interests and who thus posed dangers to members of the governing class, largely was independent 
from the particular emperor in charge. Hence Maternus can criticize delation as an oppressive and 
dangerous aspect of the imperial system of government (which was true), while at the same time 
claiming that that system, under any emperor, offers a stability and order that the Republic had not 
(also true), or that, if the phrase sapientissimus et unus refers to Vespasian, that the latter is a good man 
(in many respects, yes). Maternus’ arguments need not reflect a change in attitude, towards either the 
Principate or Vespasian. The virtue of the dialogue format is precisely that it allows Tacitus to point up 
and explore contradictory aspects and perceptions of systems (Republic vs. Principate) or practices 
(delation, oratory, poetry, education, etc.). 
  For the purposes of this chapter it ultimately is less important that we read the dialogue 
within an airtight or precisely defined model than that we determine what the text reveals about 
particular concerns and how these are taken up in the historical works. It is essential that we take 
account of the entire text. Just as the Agricola and the Germania cannot be reduced to a single thesis (e.g. 
pro or contra expansion), so the Dialogus is not geared towards demonstrating a single point (e.g. 
decline of oratory or diminished recognition of eloquentia), but towards exploring a range of issues that 
themselves had a long and complex history and were not amenable to easy and straightforward 
answers. That approach is eminently ‘Tacitean’ and is one of many aspects that integrate the corpus.  
 
IV.1.4  Chapter Overview 
My purpose in this final chapter is to discuss several essential points of interaction between the 
Dialogus and the historical works and to explore some of the ways in which the three works connect 
with and elucidate one another. Like the Agricola and the Germania, the Dialogus establishes concerns 
and methods of analysis that recur in the later works. I propose to read the dialogue and its 
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chronological and conceptual inconsistencies from the perspective of Roman memory and methods of 
reconstructing the past. Each of the interlocutors, in associating socio-political and generic change 
with major individuals and/or events, reconstructs the development of eloquentia and its aspects in 
broad chronological schemas that are plausible but eventually reveal internal inconsistencies. Similarly, 
the discussion establishes tensions between concepts and values (laus and ingenium, libertas and eloquentia) 
that run through the dialogue and ultimately remain unresolved. The competing arguments, and the 
chronological and conceptual opacity they establish, illustrate that different narratives and realities are 
possible in historical and cultural reconstruction, and that socio-political and generic change cannot be 
analyzed accurately within tidy frameworks. The text forces readers to navigate different, convincing 
arguments and to adjudicate between competing reconstructions of the past, and in so doing urges 
them to apply a more nuanced analysis to the past and their own present. In essence, I argue, the 
Dialogus serves as a call not only to apply a more critical, complex analysis of cause and effect to 
discussions of eloquentia, but to bring greater intellectual rigor to discussions of time, periodization, and 
history generally.539 This is particularly crucial in a society whose ruling elite relies precisely on tidy 
reconstructions of the past and on Romans’ tendency to think and remember in such terms. 
After a short overview of the principal texts with which the dialogue interacts, I start by 
examining the prefaces of the Agricola and the Dialogus and the antithesis between past and present, and 
the relationship between political and generic change, explored in them. Here I show that, in both 
prefaces, Tacitus, while distinguishing between the general past and present (broadly to be identified 
with the Republic and the Principate), obfuscates where the break might be located chronologically or 
whether we can pinpoint it at all. This chronological opacity sets the tone for the rest of the dialogue, 
which is marked by constant chronological shifts and inconsistencies and ultimately shows that change 
cannot be analyzed by drawing polarizing distinctions or firm chronological boundaries. I further show 
																																																								
539 On the meaningful use by ancient authors of inconsistencies, see O’Hara 2006. See van den Berg 2014 passim on the designed 
inconsistencies in the arguments of the Dialogus.  
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how the dialogue’s preface establishes a tension between oratorical ability (ingenium) and its public 
appraisal (laus) that takes up one of the principal concerns of the Agricola. I then proceed to 
demonstrate how this tension runs through the rest of the debates. One of the observations that 
emerges is that, while oratory’s scope has diminished under the Principate, whether it has declined is 
left undecided. While the preface of the Agricola shows that under the early Principate biographical 
literature declined in volume and quality, the preface of the Dialogus suggests that the political climate 
may have a different impact on oratory than on the writing of literature.  
I end this part of the chapter by exploring the different reconstructions of the past advanced 
by the speakers and the different stances they take up toward the imperial regime. Here I illustrate the 
chronological inconsistencies between and within the different arguments, arguing that the ostensible 
incoherence issues from consistent methods of analyzing the past. Imperial ideology, finally, depends 
on tidy reconstructions and the drawing of firm chronological associations. The interlocutors take up 
various stances toward the regime that serve to show that multiple realities are possible and hence that 
official versions can be challenged.   
In the third part of the chapter, I move to the Historiae, starting with the preface and 
illustrating the way it takes up several of the essential concerns set out in prefaces of the Agricola and 
the Dialogus: the relationship between political and generic change, the tension between radical and 
gradual change, and the aim to complicate imperial ideology. The preface of the Historiae shows socio-
political change and transition to be one of the work’s central preoccupations. I explore this concern in 
more detail in the subsequent sections, looking at how Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian, variously 
reconstructing the past and analyzing the present, navigate the void left by Nero’s death. While Galba 
and Vitellius reveal themselves ignorant of the nature of socio-political transition and Otho initially 
succeeds but ends up parroting Augustan ideology, Vespasian and Mucianus are described as good 
‘historians,’ aware of historical precedent and carefully managing the transition from civil war to peace. 
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I end my discussion of the text by exploring how the senators, knights, and people analyze the civil 
wars of 68-69 in light of the republican civil wars (H. 1.50) and how Tacitus, in an authorial digression 
(2.38), corrects their analysis with his own, more nuanced, reconstruction of the past. Moreover, he 
frequently offers historical examples to demonstrate how awareness of historical precedent can help 
one make sense of analogous events in the present. One of Tacitus’ aims in the Historiae, I argue, is to 
put on display both simplistic and perceptive ways of reconstructing the past and to train his readers, 
as he does in the Dialogus, to apply a more rigorous analysis of both the past and present. 
In my analysis, I bring several scholarly approaches to ancient historiography to bear on the 
Dialogus. Recent scholarship has stressed the importance of passages in which characters in an 
historian’s narrative analyze their past (these periods prior to the characters’ present and the work’s 
chronological scope are called the ‘plupast’) to come to grips with their present.540 Such passages are of 
didactic utility because they allow a reader to see how different characters (fail to) analyze the past and 
apply its lessons to their present.541 A second recent approach, promoted by J. Grethlein, stresses the 
way prose authors use experiential narrative to place readers back into the past and allow them to 
experience the past as though they were there while it was happening.542 In this approach, ambiguity 
and complexity become especially useful didactically because the narrative reproduces the same 
feelings in the readers’ present as the witnesses felt at the time. Put differently, the narrative replicates 
the struggle of the characters to grasp present realities and allows a reader to share in these challenges. 
One case explored by Grethlein is Tacitus’ account of Germanicus’ possible murder at the hands of 
Piso.543 The designed ambiguities in that account, which occlude a clear answer about Piso’s guilt or 
Tiberius’ motivations, show that the truth was as unclear to contemporary onlookers as it is to readers 
now. Finally, earlier scholarship stresses the way in which characters in a narrative can ‘stand in’ for the 
																																																								
540 Grethlein and Krebs 2012. 
541 See Joseph 2012, 156-74. 
542 Grethlein 2013. 
543 Grethlein 2013, 131-79.  
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historian, in the sense that through their depiction he can advertise proper methods of analysis and 
steer readers away from simplistic reconstructions.544 I would suggest that such approaches may be 
applied fruitfully to other genres, in this case dialogue. Like the characters in the Historiae and the 
Annales, Tacitus has the interlocutors engage with their past (the plupast) and, through them, advances 
a complex of chronological and conceptual reconstructions and viewpoints without offering a final 
answer or conclusion, leaving this to the reader instead.  
In the final part of the chapter, I turn to the Annales. I again start with the preface, which is 
closely connected with the other prefaces and takes up recurrent concerns. The succinct summary of 
Roman history in the opening lines establishes chronological ambiguities that, as in the Dialogus, 
prefigure a complex analysis of Roman history and socio-political transition in the rest of the work. 
After examining the preface, I focus on two contexts in which Tacitus recounts how characters in the 
narrative reconstruct the past and shows them to be misguided in their analysis: A. 1.9-10 (the putative 
Roman perceptions of Augustus’ regime in the direct aftermath of his funeral) and A. 15.38-44 (Nero 
and the onlookers connecting the great fire to earlier episodes in Rome’s history). These passages 
neatly show Roman ‘anniversary’ thinking and memory’s tendency to operate in terms of major 
individuals and/or events. Next, I demonstrate how Tacitus, taking up an essential concern in the 
dialogue and the Historiae, points up the continuity in internecine discord and violence from early 
Roman history through the Republic into the Principate, identifying causae of human behavior and 
cutting through imperial ideology. Elsewhere, Tacitus shows that, when analyzing the past from 
different angles (e.g. Roman law [3.26-28] and table luxury [3.55]) different narratives develop. One 
observation that emerges from reading these passages in conjunction is that the past is not always 
better than the present, a point that also emerges from the Dialogus and the Historiae at places. I end by 
showing how particular developments in imperial Rome – restrictions on freedom of speech (libertas), 
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restrictions on the public celebration of military glory of men outside the Imperial family, inter alia – 
have different starting and turning points and, consequently, cannot be firmly tied with single events, 
individuals, or even institutions. That is one of the conclusions advanced in the Dialogus as well. What 
emerges from reading the dialogue and the historical works from the perspective of time, memory, and 
historical reconstruction is that analyzing the past and socio-political change inevitably yields 
inconsistencies and that tidy chronological and conceptual frameworks are unlikely to reflect reality.  
 
IV.1.5  The Dialogus  within the Tacitean Corpus and the Rhetorical Tradition 
 
The Dialogus and the Historiae deal with the same time period and were composed in close 
conjunction. The dramatic date of the dialogue, derived from Aper’s remarks at D. 17.2-3, is either 
74/5 or 77/8, ergo under Vespasian, whose reign Tacitus narrated in detail in the lost portions of the 
Historiae.545 The date of composition for the dialogue remains controversial. Possible dates range from 
as early as 97/8 to as late as 108/9, taking into consideration initial composition, possible revisions and 
recirculation, and eventual ‘publication.’546 Establishing dates, to a large extent, is tied up with the text’s 
interactions with Pliny’s Letters, whose dates of composition are not without controversy themselves, 
particularly now that Sherwin-White’s book dates have been shown to be too narrow.547 The year 102, 
when the Dialogus’ dedicatee, Fabius Justus, was consul, is a plausible year of composition, with the 
likelihood that Tacitus revised the text in the following years and ‘published’ it as late as 108/9. The 
evidence is inconclusive and the date of composition reasonably could lie anywhere between 100 and 
108/9. While knowing the exact date of composition is of considerable import for reconstructing 
Tacitus’ biography, what is significant for our purposes is that he likely was at work on the Dialogus at 
																																																								
545 Aper’s remark that it has been “120 years since Cicero’s death until the present day” (a calculation echoed by Maternus at 24.3) 
points to the year 77/8, while his remark that they now are in the sixth statio (“year” or “reign”; the exact meaning is uncertain) of 
Vespasian’s reign points to 74/5. See Mayer 2001, 142-43; van den Berg 2014, 31-32. The loss of the books on Vespasian’s reign 
undoubtedly has contributed to the scarcity of examinations of the connections between the Dialogus and the Historiae.   
546 Van den Berg 2014, 32 ff. offers a useful summary of the problem with relevant bibliography. I follow the communis opinio in dating 
the Dialogus as Tacitus’ third work and in finding any date before 100, though not impossible, unlikely.  
547 Whitton 2013, 15-20. Cf. Whitton 2012, 349-50. Edwards 2008 revisits the possible dates and the connections with Pliny’s Letters. 
For Sherwin-White’s book dates, see Sherwin-White 1966, 20-65. 
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the same time that he was collecting material for and composing the Historiae; hence, in addition to 
material points of contact, an affinity in treatment and analysis.548   
The Dialogus has many conceptual connections with the Annales as well, despite the fact that 
they are concerned with different time periods and more time separates their composition. The history 
of the Julio-Claudian Principate and the developments in deliberative (in the senate), judicial (in the law 
courts), and epideictic (at funerals or to the princeps) oratory is directly relevant to a debate on the state 
of oratory set in the mid-seventies, just as the narrative of the Flavian Principate in the Historiae would 
be. The representation of public speech in those works, in terms of its scope, style, and capacity to 
confer fame, bears directly on the observations made in the dialogue, and Tacitus will have had the 
latter in mind while he composed the Historiae and the Annales.  
To focus exclusively on the dialogue’s interactions with the historical works, however, would 
be to ignore the work’s retrospective aspects. The dialogue shares various conceptual and 
organizational aspects with the Agricola and the Germania. All three monographs explore the workings 
of the Principate from a comparative or indirect perspective. The Agricola and the Dialogus both are 
concerned with the connection between political and generic change and with freedom of speech 
(written and spoken) in imperial Rome, while the Germania and the Dialogus share a fundamental aspect 
in that they are both left open-ended. Specific topics, moreover, are explored in all three works and, 
indeed, recur in the historical narratives. For instance, Tacitus’ remarks on Agricola’s youth and 
training (Agr. 4-5) should be read in conjunction with his comments about Germanic upbringing (G. 
18-20), with Messalla’s remarks about the education and training of young Romans (D. 28 ff.), with 
Tacitus’ own position as a pupil in the dialogue, and with his remarks in the Historiae and the Annales 
about depraved characters and their troubled childhoods (see p. 45 and n. 110).549 Another example is 
the influence of Roman conquest on foreign populations. Here the comments on the corrupting 
																																																								
548 Cf. Syme 1958a, 672-73.  
549 On the concept of youth in the Agricola and the Dialogus and its implications for Tacitus’ own career, see Sailor 2014, 101-13. 
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influence on the Britons of Agricola’s measures (Agr. 21.2) should be read together with the 
description of the unimpaired moral and physical vigor of the Germani, with Messalla’s claims about 
the spread of vice from Rome throughout the world (D. 28.2), and with analogous comments Tacitus 
makes in the historical works (esp. at A. 13.54.3, 15.44.4, and 16.5.1).  
 Beyond the Agricola and the Germania, the Dialogus looks back to an entire Greco-Roman 
rhetorical tradition, stretching from Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle through Cicero into the early 
Principate. Despite the importance and range of the Greek tradition, Romans looked primarily to one 
man: Cicero. The latter produced an authoritative body of theory on oratory and the orator, in the 
traditions of Plato and Aristotle, in two dialogues (the de Oratore of 55 BC and the Brutus of 46 BC) and 
a treatise (the Orator of 46 BC). In these works, set against a background of civil strife, Cicero was 
concerned, inter alia, with the history and development of Roman oratory until his own time (esp. in 
the Brutus), with its role within the state and its scope under despotic rule (in the de Orat. and Brutus), 
with the education and knowledge of the ideal orator (in the de Orat.), and with the ideal rhetoric style 
(esp. in the Orator). The de Oratore is the chief model for the Dialogus, suggesting format, style, 
organization, dramatic date, and interlocutors. The connections between the two dialogues are myriad 
and scholarship has become increasingly sophisticated in teasing them out.550 Beyond the de Oratore, the 
Dialogus interacts with many other texts concerned with oratory and eloquentia, both Ciceronian and 
post-Ciceronian, both prose authors and poets.  
In the first century AD, many authors discussed the state of oratory (and, in some cases, of 
literature and artistic talent more broadly), most avowing a decline both in style and scope as compared 
with the Ciceronian age. So Seneca the Elder, Velleius, Petronius, Seneca the Younger, Pliny the Elder, 
and Tacitus’ contemporaries Quintilian, Pliny the Younger, and Juvenal.551 The cause usually is seen as 
																																																								
550 The most advanced and recent examination is in van den Berg 2014, 208-40 et passim. 
551 Depending on his dates, Pseudo-Longinus might be included here as well. He is dated variously to the first or third century AD.  
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a decline in morality and education, while the influence of declamation often is mentioned as well.552 
The topos of decline was common among the poets, one manifestation of which was the frequent 
reference to a (now lost) Golden Age.553 An important source for Tacitus was Horace and the literary 
criticism explicated in his Satires and Epistles.554 To what extent the argument of decline reflects 
historical reality remains difficult to determine with exactitude. While the advent of the Principate 
undoubtedly brought change, many aspects of rhetorical practice remained the same or similar, and it 
was, in any case, common among the ancients to set their own times against a better past.555 
Among the extant authors that wrote about contemporary oratory Quintilian was the most 
optimistic. He composed a now lost work on the causes of oratory’s decline (the de Causis Corruptae 
Eloquentiae of ca. 89/90), but, given his favorable attitude towards the Flavians, it is unlikely that he 
ascribed the decline to political change, and, judging from his masterpiece, the 12-book didactic 
treatise Institutio Oratoria (published ca. 95/6, before Domitian’s assassination), he was hopeful that it 
could be overcome.556 In his treatise, Quintilian, who served as the first salaried professor of rhetoric 
in Rome, produced an extraordinarily comprehensive study of the education of the ideal orator, from 
babyhood all the way to late adulthood. Imbued with the Catonian ideal of the uir bonus dicendi peritus 
and Ciceronian principles of style and education, his aim was to produce great orators, and he clearly 
thought a revival of oratory in the post-Domitianic era possible. His optimistic outlook is reflected in 
his claim that there were contemporaries in the Forum (his pupil Pliny and Tacitus presumably among 
them) who could rival the orators of old and whose works would last (Inst. 10.1.122). While Quintilian 
																																																								
552 For discussion of the topic of decline, see Kennedy 1972, 446-64; Williams 1978, 6-51; Heldmann 1982; Kennedy 1994, 186-92. It 
is a curious fact that these pessimistic pronouncements about contemporary oratory begin to appear only under Tiberius, in the 
aftermath of the reign of Augustus, under whom literature flourished. 
553 The Golden Age topos goes as far back as Hesiod (Op. 106-201). Examples of the latter or of comments on the decline of poetry 
include: Ter., Ad. 302-7; Cat. 64.382-408; Verg., E. 4; G. 2.458-540; Aen. 6.791-800, 8.319-27; Ov., Met. 1.89-243; Hor., Epod. 16; 
Carm. 2.15, 3.6, 4.15; Luc. 1.61-2; V. Fl. 1.555-67; Sil. 3.622-4; Mart., Ep. 8.55; Juv. 6.1-24286-313.  
554 On the interactions between the Dialogus and Horace’s works, see van den Berg 2014, 241-93. 
555 Oratory remained an avenue to self-enrichment and promotion, as the success of Quintilian, Pliny, and Tacitus shows. Domitian 
had added a contest in Greek and Latin oratory to the Capitoline Games (Suet., Dom. 4.4; 20), while Suetonius composed biographies 
of prominent contemporary rhetors. On the continuities in rhetorical practice between the Republic and the Principate, note the 
discussions in Rutledge 1999 and 2001 (on the continuities in the style and activity of delatores); Rivière 2002 on the essential role of 
delatores in the republican and imperial legal system; see also Rutledge 2012; Dominik 2007; Roller 2011.  
556 On the scope of the de Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae and its relationship with Tacitus’ Dialogus, see Brink 1989.  
	
	 221 
was a confirmed Ciceronian and critical of the postclassicizing style that had developed in the first 
century (represented by the speeches of Seneca (Inst. 10.1.26) and advocated by Aper in the Dialogus), 
he did not want an anachronistic renewal of Ciceronianism, but rather a Ciceronian injection into the 
more restrained style that he and his contemporaries favored.557   
A final source to be considered is Pliny the Younger, whose work reveals a complex view of 
the state of oratory. He laments the decline of oratory and the moral failures of modernity (e.g. Ep. 
1.5.12, 2.14). He professes dissatisfaction with the circumscribed scope of oratory as it exists in his day 
(e.g. Ep. 6.2). Deliberative oratory dealt with trivial themes (e.g. Ep. 3.20.10, 9.2-1-3). As for judicial 
oratory, court cases are now limited in time and lawyers hurry to finish their argument (Ep. 6.2). Hence 
shorter speeches and the terse and violent style championed by men like Regulus (Ep. 1.5), Marcellus, 
and Aper. Despite these perceived drawbacks, Pliny must have thought oratory to be in fairly good 
shape. Activity in the law courts flourished at this time and men like Pliny, Quintilian, and Tacitus 
owed their influence, wealth, and status in large part to their career at the bar.558 Oratory was still a 
principal avenue to advance politically and financially. Like Quintilian, Pliny explicitly praises the talent 
of young contemporaries, some of whom took him as a model and teacher (e.g. Ep. 6.11). Tacitus, too, 
despite the common but unverifiable claim that he abandoned forensic oratory after the Dialogus, 
continued to be a model (Ep. 7.20, 8.7, 9.23.1-3). With such talent and exemplars oratory was not so 
poorly off, after all. The status of rhetors and grammarians at this time is reflected in Suetonius’ 
composition of their biographies in the de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus, a segment of the larger de Viris 
Illustribus, composed between 107 and 119.559 Suetonius’ place within the contemporary debate about 
oratory is difficult to assess given the fragmentary state of the DVI (which contained a now lost 
section ‘de Oratoribus’). Already by 97 he had established a reputation as an author and scholar, as his 
																																																								
557 See Kennedy 1972, 506; Dominik 1997, 57.  
558 See Crook 1995 on the flourishing of advocacy at this time. 
559 On this work, only partly preserved, see Kaster 1995.  
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correspondence with Pliny shows (Plin., Ep. 1.18, 24).560 Beyond this we do not know how the work 
was received nor can we readily derive from it a good sense of Suetonius’ personal opinion on the state 
of oratory. His composition of biographies of grammarians and rhetoricians may be indicative of 
optimism. That he will have been a respected voice may readily be granted. 
 Pliny championed Cicero’s classicizing style and longer speeches (e.g. Ep. 1.2.4 1.5.12-13, 
1.20.14–15). In the Letters and the Panegyricus, both carefully revised for publication, he shows himself 
to be “one of the most rhythmic of Latin writers.”561 His advocacy of longer speeches is evidenced 
both by the massive Panegyricus (which will have been exceptional in length even before its revision) 
and by his effort throughout his writings to distance himself from the modern oratory of the delatores, 
exemplified by his enemy Regulus.562 Like his model Cicero and his teacher Quintilian, Pliny 
responded to oratory’s perceived problems by championing a particular style and a kind of oratory. 
Tacitus variously engages with all the above authors, in particular with Cicero, Quintilian, and Pliny, 
the latter two his close acquaintances.563  
 Finally, in addition to looking both backward and forward, the Dialogus of course also looks 
inward, in the sense that what Tacitus writes about the nature of the Principate and the alleged state of 
oratory in the mid-seventies (and about its development in the Historiae and the Annales) bears, in 
various ways, on the situation at the time of writing.564 Given its multidimensionality, it quite simply is 
insufficient to read the work in isolation. The Dialogus positions itself not only as the latest member of 
a Greco-Roman tradition on oratory but as an integral part of the Tacitean corpus. 
 
																																																								
560 Suetonius’ reputation is further evidenced by the progression of his career, for he would go on to hold the three secretaryships ab 
epistulis, a studiis, and a bibliothecis under Trajan and Hadrian. For the significance of these positions, see Millar 1967, 9-19. 
561 Whitton 2012, 361.  
562 The intricate organization and virtuosity of the Letters, consciously shaped as a unified whole for contemporary and future 
appreciation, has received much scholarly attention recently: Marchesi 2008; Gibson and Morello 2012; Whitton 2010; 2012; 2013. 
563 On the relationship between Quintilian and his contemporaries, see Kennedy 1972, 487-552 (515-26 on Tacitus and Quintilian). 
On Tacitus and Pliny, see Syme 1958a, 59-120, esp. 112-20; Griffin 1999; Whitton 2012.  
564 Cf. van den Berg 2014, 35: “the Dialogus responds both to the more immediate imperial context and to the longue durée of rhetorical 
texts, the challengers and champions of public speech in the Greco-Roman world.” The contemporary relevance of the work (nostra 
aetas at 1.1 includes the Trajanic present) and some of the characters (especially Aquilius Regulus, Messalla’s brother: 15.1) is evident.  
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IV.2  Republic and Principate: Political and Generic Change   
 The most obvious place to start an examination of the interactions between the Dialogus and 
the historical works is at the start, with the prefaces. I begin with a few observations about the preface 
of the Agricola before turning to that of the Dialogus, to preserve both the order in which Tacitus 
conceptualized the problems with which he engages and the experience of the ancient reader, who 
came to the Dialogus having read Tacitus’ remarks in the Agricola about the history of (auto)biography 
and the issue of the representation and public appreciation of merit (uirtus) and ability (ingenium). For 
the same reason, I explore the prefaces of the Historiae and the Annales only after those of the Agricola 
and the Dialogus, because the historical works (and the history of historiography in their prefaces) were 
composed against the backdrop of the monographs and their history of (auto)biography and oratory 
there, not vice versa. 
 
IV.2.1  The Agricola: the Evaluation, Production, and Transmission of Virtus and Ingenium 
 
Clarorum uirorum facta moresque posteris tradere, antiquitus usitatum, ne nostris quidem temporibus quamquam 
incuriosa suorum aetas omisit, quotiens magna aliqua ac nobilis uirtus uicit ac supergressa est uitium paruis magnisque 
ciuitatibus commune, ignorantiam recti et inuidiam. Sed apud priores ut agere digna memoratu pronum magisque in 
aperto erat, ita celeberrimus quisque ingenio ad prodendam uirtutis memoriam sine gratia aut ambitione bonae tantum 
conscientiae pretio ducebantur. Ac plerique suam ipsi uitam narrare fiduciam potius morum quam adrogantiam 
arbitrati sunt, nec id Rutilio et Scauro citra fidem aut obtrectationi fuit: adeo uirtutes isdem temporibus optime 
aestimantur, quibus facillime gignuntur. At nunc narraturo mihi uitam defuncti hominis uenia opus fuit, quam non 
petissem incusaturus: tam saeua et infesta uirtutibus tempora. (Agr. 1) 
 
The practice of handing down to posterity the deeds and ways of famous men, common in the past, 
is not even neglected by the people of our times (uninterested in their own though they are), on the   
rare occasions when some great and noteworthy excellence has overcome and gone beyond that 
defect, common to small and large states alike: ignorance of what is right, and envy. Yet, just as 
among those who came before us it was easy and more in the clear to do things worthy of recording, 
so the most celebrated talents were led to publish a record of their merit without partiality and 
unambitiously, but by the reward of a good conscience only. And in fact very many in the past 
thought that to narrate their own life was tantamount to confidence in their behavior, not self-
aggrandizement. Rutilius and Scaurus, in doing so, were not without credibility nor were they 
criticized: so true is it that virtues are appreciated best in those times in which they are generated 
most easily. But, as things are, when I was going to record the life of a dead man, I needed to seek 
pardon, which I would not have needed to seek if I were going to reproach that man’s life: so savage 





The opening chapter of the Agricola introduces a nucleus of terms and issues that signals the 
work’s primary concern and that encapsulates a problem with which Tacitus would continue to engage 
in the Dialogus and the historical works: the relationship between the recognition by society, the 
production by individuals, and the proper transmission by authors of merit (uirtus) and ability 
(ingenium).565 The opening words, which recall the opening of Cato the Elder’s Origines, define the genre 
of biography as being concerned with the transmission for future generations of the actions and ways 
of famous men. Unlike historiography, biography is not concerned with any actions or anyone’s 
character, but with the facta and mores of elite men, men who had displayed uirtus and ingenium and 
earned public recognition for their achievements.  
The aim of biographical work is the public appreciation of excellence, while laus is the medium 
through which to recognize and transmit it. As soon becomes clear, this practice of representation 
does not stand on its own, being dependent on the conditions imposed on it by the society in which it 
is produced. Tacitus, drawing a broad chronological divide, writes that in the past (antiquitatus/apud 
priores) excellence earned recognition and that the conditions of that time encouraged Romans to 
produce noteworthy deeds and authors to record them; usitatum signals the profusion of both 
excellence and works that transmit it. Elite Romans even composed autobiography. At this time, 
production, evaluation, and transmission stood on equal footing, with individuals and authors taking it 
as axiomatic that excellence earns praise. Hence, the “economy of representation,” to use D. Sailor’s 
term, was such that authors did not write for ulterior motives, but merely were concerned with the 
accurate transmission of the record of conspicuous men.566 Even autobiographical work was credible 
and truthful. This economy of representation was predicated on the libertas that Romans enjoyed (Agr. 
2.3), meaning, inter alia, a freedom of expression stemming from a freedom from the relations of 
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reciprocity (especially with the princeps) that would impair truthful representation in imperial Rome. 
In the present (nostris temporibus/nunc/tempora), conditions have changed. Not only is there a 
general disinterest (incuriosa suorum) in examples of excellence, but there is an active hostility to it. Only 
truly exceptional uirtus can overcome this attitude, while facta and mores that would have been noted in 
the past now fall into oblivion. It is clear that Agricola’s achievements belong to the latter category and 
that the text largely serves to restore to him his due praise. Disinterest and hostility affect performance, 
discouraging Romans from displaying their ability and authors from writing biographies, let alone 
autobiographies; quotiens signifies a shortage of both magna ac nobilis uirtus and biographical literature. 
When biographies are composed in this period, we are to understand, by the extended contrast with 
the past, that their authors lack credibility and that their depictions are distorted. This is one aspect, as 
Sailor shows, of the skewed economics of representation at this time: “since virtutes are no longer 
worth much, commemorators must be remunerated with something that does have value, that is, with 
a real wage. This wage comes in the form of… gratia (“favor”) and rewarded ambition.”567 Extending 
the contrast with the past, the present, then, is marked not by libertas, but by its opposite, seruitus, that is 
by the obligations and ambition that render authors dependent.  
To sum up for the moment, several important points emerge from the Agricola’s preface. First, 
the production of uirtus and the exercise of ingenium are linked with public recognition, a point Tacitus 
makes explicitly: adeo uirtutes isdem temporibus optime aestimantur, quibus facillime gignuntur (see p. 38). 
Second, the different conditions under which ancient and modern authors work are conceptualized 
through the common dichotomy between freedom and slavery, signifying, respectively, freedom from 
and dependence on the obligations that impair freedom of speech and truthful representation.568 
Finally, the appreciation, production, and representation of excellence are connected with political 
climates. Without explicitly linking generic and performative change to political change, Tacitus points 
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to the transition from Republic to Principate as the principal cause for the above developments.  
 Within the broader distinction between Republic and Principate, Tacitus distinguishes 
between the immediate past under Domitian and the Trajanic present. The bleak attitude towards 
merit that characterizes the Principate generally was extreme under Domitian, who executed and 
banished authors and philosophers and had their books burned (2.1-2). Delatores scrutinized people’s 
words and actions (2.3). Under such a regime, Romans faced not just restricted opportunities to 
exercise their ingenium and display uirtus (whether in action or in writing), but no opportunity at all: 
hence silentium (3.2) and libertas nearly abolished (2.2-3, 3). Under Domitian, the writing of biography 
was not just impaired by such motives as gratia and ambitio, which entangled authors in relations of 
reciprocity, but by sheer oppression: authors did not write at all. Hence, complete lack of 
independence and lack of free speech, the mark of a slave: “just as the people in the past saw libertas to 
the greatest degree, so we saw seruitus to the greatest degree” (et sicut uetus aetas uidit quid ultimum in 
libertate esset, ita nos quid in seruitute, 2.3; seruitutis, 3.3). Inactivity and lack of independence became so 
dominant, Tacitus admits, that he and his fellow senators developed a love of inertia and desidia (3.1), 
the ultimate symptom of oppression and the culmination of performative decline. 
 In contrast with the immediate past, which was extreme (ultimum in servitute), Nerva and 
Trajan “restored” libertas (cf. Libertas Restituta: ILS 274), which effectively meant that there was relatively 
greater freedom for individuals and authors to display their merit and ability. As we have seen, the 
claim that Nerva ‘reconciled principatus and libertas’ ought not be taken to mean that Rome had returned 
to the ideals of the Republic as defined earlier in the prologue. Unlike past biographers, Tacitus must 
seek uenia from his princeps, which bound him in obligation. That he, consequently, had to work against 
the potential charge of gratia or ambitio – by professing to have written the work out of a sense of pietas 
– reflects not republican libertas but the conditions imposed on authors under the Principate. The 
current age (tempora) that is hostile to uirtutes (1.4), which is set in contradistinction to the general past 
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(1.1-3), designates the Principate as a whole and by necessity includes the rule of Nerva and Trajan (see 
pp. 27-28). The broad distinction that Tacitus draws in the opening chapters is between two systems 
of government that properly recognize, transmit, and foster excellence on the one hand, and disregard, 
distort, and discourage it on the other. This distinction broadly seems supported by what we find in 
the extant Latin literature. For a close inspection of the works of the eminent authors of the later 
Republic (especially Cicero and Sallust) reveals that there it is still taken for granted that outstanding 
ingenium meets with laus, gloria, or claritudo, whereas that link is complicated in early imperial literature. 
The laudatio for Verginius Rufus, which Tacitus delivered in 97 (Plin., Ep. 2.1.1), and the Agricola, 
composed the next year, shared a similar aim in demonstrating how excellence shines through under 
bad principes. 
 While in the opening chapters of the Agricola, then, Tacitus establishes a polarizing divide 
between the Republic and the Principate, he does not clarify at what point he thinks that divide 
occurred nor what periods are subsumed under the designation “past.” Are the priores to be identified 
with the Late Republic or does the term include the Middle Republic and even earlier eras? Does the 
past end at Caesar’s dictatorship or his assassination? With Cicero’s death? In 31, 27, or 23? Earlier 
still, with the Gracchi, Sulla, or Pompey, or later, with the first peaceful transition with Tiberius? These 
questions are no mere hairsplitting, for they bear on the essential link between political, societal, and 
generic change. The preface offers little chronological precision. Tacitus mentions two men from the 
general past, M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115) and P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105), who are paired elsewhere 
as luminaries of a past generation (Cic., Brut. 110-16). While their autobiographies are fine examples of 
the authorial fidelity on which Tacitus comments (Scaurus was lauded for his fides: Cic., Brut. 112), their 
mention as examples of the ‘age of freedom’ is less salutary. Rufus did not write his de Vita Sua in 
Rome but while exiled in Smyrna and both men enjoyed the heyday of their political career ca. 60-70 
years before Caesar’s assassination and 75-85 years before Actium. Thus their example is of little value 
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as evidence for the conditions of the past as a whole (let alone for the Late Republic) and therefore has 
little bearing on the essential difference between the Republic and the Principate drawn in the preface. 
Ancient and modern readers alike may reasonably guess that Actium is the unstated, but assumed, 
turning point. But not every author drew the line there and the deliberate ambiguity of the temporal 
markers used (antiquitatus/apud priores/nostris temporibus/nunc) suggests that there was room for doubt, 
room to draw the line elsewhere or, indeed, to question the act of drawing a line at all.569  
 
IV.2.2  The Dialogus: the Evaluation of Ingenium and the Production of Eloquentia in Past and 
Present 
 
 The relationship between generic and political change, set out in the preface of the Agricola, 
is taken up in that of the Dialogus, where Tacitus offers a succinct history of oratory along similar lines 
as the history of biography, engaging with similar issues and using similar terms of analysis: 
 
Saepe ex me requiris, Iuste Fabi, cur, cum priora saecula tot eminentium oratorum ingeniis gloriaque floruerint, nostra 
potissimum aetas deserta et laude eloquentiae orbata uix nomen ipsum oratoris retineat; neque enim ita appellamus nisi 
antiquos, horum autem temporum diserti causidici et aduocati et patroni et quiduis potius quam oratores uocantur. Cui 
percontationi tuae respondere et tam magnae quaestionis pondus excipere, ut aut de ingeniis nostris male existimandum 
<sit>, si idem adsequi non possumus, aut de iudiciis, si nolumus, uix hercule auderem, si mihi mea sententia 
proferenda ac non disertissimorum, ut nostris temporibus, hominum sermo repetendus esset, quos eandem hanc 
quaestionem pertractantis iuuenis admodum audiui. Ita non ingenio, sed memoria et recordatione opus est, ut quae a 
praestantissimis uiris et excogitata subtiliter et dicta grauiter accepi, cum singuli diuersas sed probabilis causas adferrent, 
dum formam sui quisque et animi et ingenii redderent, isdem nunc numeris isdemque rationibus persequar, seruato 
ordine disputationis. Neque enim defuit qui diuersam quoque partem susciperet, ac multum uexata et inrisa uetustate 
nostrorum temporum eloquentiam antiquorum ingeniis anteferret. (D. 1.1-4) 
 
Often you ask me, Fabius Justus, why it is that, whereas past ages flourished in the genius and glory 
of so many eminent orators, our age above all, having been deserted and having lost the distinction of 
eloquentia, hardly preserves the term “orator”; for we do not call anyone by that term except the 
ancients, but the fluent men of our times are called “pleaders,” “counselors,” “defenders,” and 
anything but “orators.” To respond to this inquiry of yours and to take on the burden of a question 
that is so weighty that either we must judge poorly of our talents, if we are unable to accomplish the 
same, or of our judgments, if we are unwilling, is a task I hardly would dare to undertake if I had to 
offer my own opinion and not to recall a discussion among the most fluent men (taking into account 
our times), whom I heard dealing with this same question when I was a mere boy. Hence I do not 
require talent, but memory and recollection, in order to recount now, with the same divisions  
 
																																																								
569 I assume that the ambiguity is deliberate given the meticulous care that Tacitus otherwise bestows on the preface and given that the 
ambiguity recurs in much the same way in the Dialogus. 
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and lines of reasoning, and preserving the order of the discussion, those precise reflections I heard, 
spoken with conviction, by the most eminent men, each offering different but plausible arguments 
and thereby displaying an outline of his feeling and disposition. For there was a speaker who took up 
the opposite position, too, and he, having at length criticized and ridiculed antiquity, maintained the 
superiority of the eloquence of our times over the talents of the ancients. 
 
 
Like that of the Agricola, the preface of the Dialogus is concerned with the essential connection between 
the public evaluation and the production of particular qualities or abilities. The concern now is not 
biography but oratory, and uirtus, the principal criterion of proper male elite conduct, has been 
replaced with eloquentia, the principal criterion by which public speakers are judged. While in the 
Agricola the connection between achievement/production and cultural recognition is straightforward 
and explicit, in the Dialogus it is ambiguous and complicated.  
 The opening lines of the Dialogus formulate the work’s principal concern and the categories 
with which the reader is to analyze the development and state of eloquentia. Tacitus displaces onto his 
friend Justus the question underlying the discussion: why is it that, whereas past ages flourished in the 
genius and glory of so many eminent orators, our age above all, having been deserted and having lost 
the distinction of eloquentia, hardly preserves the term orator? The question is followed by an 
explanatory sentence: “for we do not call anyone by that term except the ancients, but the fluent men 
of our times are called “pleaders,” “counselors,” “defenders,” and anything but “orators.”” The 
communis opinio has it that Tacitus here pronounces oratory’s decline, on the ground that deserta and 
orbata indicate a decline in oratorical ability along with renown.570 This reading is attractive in light of 
what other imperial authors write about decline and of what Tacitus himself told us in the preface of 
the Agricola. Since there he explicitly links achievement and production with public recognition, it 
stands to reason that he holds a similar view about the development of oratory: eloquentia earns less 
recognition under the Principate and has declined as a result. This view, however, is undermined by his 
																																																								
570 See van den Berg 2014, 99 ff. with references to scholarly responses in the notes. 
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stance and by the ambiguous language of the preface, which complicates the problem of decline.571  
 Tacitus carefully distances himself from the opening question by displacing it onto Justus 
and from the general attitudes of his age by distinguishing them from his own voice.572 The text does 
not advance a single thesis about eloquentia. Tacitus nowhere proclaims oratory’s decline in his own 
voice but ascribes the argument of decline to Messalla and Maternus.573 Nor does the preface explicitly 
state that modern orators possess less raw talent or accomplish less. While the juxtaposition of past 
and present implies the loss of ability and/or quality along with renown, the Latin simply states that 
the current age has lost not eloquentia, but laus eloquentiae, i.e. the recognition for, or the distinction of, 
eloquence. Indeed, the following clause, which serves to clarify (enim) the preceding one, stresses the 
way society labels modern speakers and makes no explicit claim about natural ability or achievement: 
the words laus eloquentiae, nomen oratoris, appellamus, and uocantur, and the labels causidici, patroni, and 
aduocati, all are concerned principally with the act of classifying or naming, not with ingenium or 
achievement, even though the terms may be seen as obliquely reflecting on the latter as well.574 The 
Latin is ambiguous. As van den Berg notes, the noun laus can designate both the act of praise and the 
reputation of an object or person deserving of that praise – i.e. both fame and merit.575 It is significant 
that Tacitus did not write orbata eloquentia, which would have condemned modern oratory explicitly. 
Cicero indeed was much more explicit: post Hortensi clarissimi oratoris mortem orbae eloquentiae (Brut. 330). 
Saying that an age no longer receives the same recognition or distinction for eloquentia does not mean 
that its speakers are less talented or achieve less.576 Of course, one way to get around this view would 
be to take deserta absolutely (“is barren”) and assume that Tacitus intends for us to supply ingenium from 
																																																								
571 See van den Berg 2014, 101 ff. with relevant scholarship in the notes. 
572 On the way Tacitus displaces the question of decline onto Justus, see Goldberg 1999, 225-26; Syson 2009, 50-51; van den Berg 
2014, 101 ff. On the way Tacitus distinguishes between his own opinion and that of his age, see van den Berg 2014, 104 and n. 14. 
573 Cf. n. 518.  
574 Van den Berg 2014, 103. Cf. Syson 2009, 52: “is the label orator withheld because there is no eloquence that deserves the name or 
because the current received wisdom is all against glorifying modern speakers with a word so loaded with expectations in the 
rhetorical tradition?” 
575 Van den Berg 2014, 102 n. 8. 
576 See Syson 2009, 52; van den Berg 2014, 102. 
	
	 231 
the previous clause: “our age, barren of ability and having lost the distinction of eloquence…” While 
this reading would link oratory’s decline to its diminished appreciation and thus would be in concert 
with the analysis in the Agricola, it requires much work on the part of the reader and would be to make 
the Latin fit our presuppositions. Gudeman’s gloss, neglecta (1914 ad loc.), for deserta is attractive in light 
of suorum incuriosa at Agr. 1.1 and would locate the problem squarely in diminished recognition as 
opposed to diminished ability. In the end, the language is designedly ambiguous. Tacitus prepares the 
reader to make a distinction between natural oratorical ability and the way it is appraised by society.  
 In addition to diminished recognition, Tacitus points to oratory’s diminished scope and 
employment. The distinction between the term orator, signifying the oratorical authority of former 
speakers, and the terms causidici, patroni, and aduocati, designating contemporary speakers, while 
implying a difference in distinction, achievement, and ability, primarily reflects a change in oratory’s 
employment within society. The breadth of activity subsumed under the term orator stands in contrast 
with the more circumscribed activity in the modern courtroom, an issue on which Maternus will 
elaborate in his final speech. While modern speakers may achieve some renown in the courtroom, they 
do not have the same opportunities to display their ability as ancient orators did. The language 
reinforces the tension between ingenium and the political climate in which it is exercised. For the fact 
that modern orators enjoy fewer opportunities does not necessarily mean that they are intrinsically less 
talented or that their oratory is of lesser quality. Tacitus directs the reader’s focus to the uneasy 
relationship between raw talent and the cultural climate in which it is employed, stressing the 
diminished recognition and scope of eloquentia in imperial Rome, while at the same time leaving open 
the possibility of, but not explicitly asserting, a concomitant decline in talent and/or achievement.577 In 
the preface of the Agricola, Tacitus had asserted that under the Principate the writing of biography 
declined in both volume and quality: people write less and are less credible. The preface of the Dialogus 
																																																								
577 Here I follow the principal argument of van den Berg’s third chapter (2014, 98-123). 
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suggests that the imperial system of government may have a different impact on oratory than on the 
writing of literature.  
 The tension between ability and recognition is reflected in Tacitus’ response to his friend’s 
question: upholding Justus’ claim means that “either we must judge poorly of our talents, if we are 
unable to accomplish the same [i.e. as the ancients], or of our judgments, if we are unwilling…” (ut aut 
de ingeniis nostris male existimandum sit, si idem adsequi non possumus, aut de iudiciis, si nolumus, 1.2). Iudicium 
denotes aesthetic judgment and taste and, like the term laus, bears on cultural attitudes towards 
eloquentia. The distinction once more is between innate ability and public evaluation. And again Tacitus 
leaves open various possibilities. His words often are explained away by those seeing decline as the 
dialogue’s thesis, since they clearly suggest that modern orators can match their ancient counterparts.578 
The judgment is in line, however, with the rest of the preface and the dialogue, in which the superiority 
of ancient oratory is assumed, but never actually demonstrated, by two of the speakers (Maternus and 
Messalla) and the superiority of modern oratory is argued for, more directly and at greater length, by 
the other speaker (Aper). Tacitus gives pride of place to this last argument in the final words of the 
opening chapter (1.4).  
 The reputation of the work’s interlocutors exemplifies the tension between fame and ability. 
Tacitus introduces the speakers as “the most fluent men, taking into account our times” (disertissimorum, 
ut nostris temporibus, hominum, 1.2). The words usually are taken to reflect Tacitus’ opinion that the men, 
despite being great speakers, fall short of ancient eloquentia and that the choice of disertissimorum over 
Cicero’s eloquentissimorum – of the interlocutors in the de Oratore (hominum eloquentissimorum, 1.24) – 
underlines this.579 This may well be correct. But, like the rest of the preface, Tacitus’ words are more 
ambiguous than we would like, and a reader may just as readily take them to mean that the men are 
indeed great speakers, despite the fact that the current cultural disposition restricts their opportunities 
																																																								
578 E.g. Reitzenstein 1915 and Mayer 2001, 89-90. 
579 Mayer 2001 ad loc.  
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and/or fails to acknowledge their talent.580 That Tacitus’ words here bear more on oratory’s 
diminished scope and recognition than on diminished ability or achievement is suggested by claims 
elsewhere in the text. In the immediately following chapter, Tacitus stresses society’s flawed appraisal 
of his mentors’ abilities: even though they were the most distinguished talents of the day (celeberrima tum 
ingenia fori nostri, 2.1), many unjustly and maliciously (maligne) thought that Secundus did not have a 
ready tongue (promptum sermonem) and that Aper had earned a reputation for eloquentia by his genius and 
natural talent rather than by training and letters (ingenio potius et ui naturae quam institutione et litteris, 2.1). 
The words, as is well known, recall the opening of the second book of de Oratore (2.1). Like Cicero, 
Tacitus is concerned to correct the flawed assessment of the interlocutors’ education and knowledge. 
Unlike Cicero, Tacitus extends his focus to rhetorical ability: Secundus was in fact a fluent speaker and 
Aper, wishing to earn greater glory, pretended to lack the learning he really possessed (2.2). The adverb 
maligne is significant since it reflects social attitudes. The term malignitas often is used in contexts of 
social recognition and rewards, of people unjustly refusing to accord recognition to other people’s 
abilities.581 Aper’s need to feign lack of learning in order to earn true appreciation of his abilities is a 
telling indication that, in this period, ingenium and laus are not properly aligned.582  
 The second relevant passage comes from the final chapter, in which Maternus addresses his 
fellow speakers with words that recall Tacitus’ words in the preface:  
 
credite, optimi et in quantum opus est disertissimi uiri, si aut uos prioribus saeculis aut illi, quos miramur, his nati essent, 
ac deus aliquis uitas ac uestra tempora repente mutasset, nec uobis summa illa laus et gloria in eloquentia neque illis 
modus et temperamentum defuisset: nunc, quoniam nemo eodem tempore adsequi potest magnam famam et magnam 
quietem… (D. 41.5) 
																																																								
580 One possible way to elucidate the meaning of the phrase is to compare it with similar phrases elsewhere. Recall, e.g., how Tacitus 
described Frontinus’ achievements as governor of Britain: he was uir magnus, quantum licebat (Agr. 17.2). These words do not indicate 
that Frontinus was a less capable general than the generals of old, but that the principate curbed his ambitions and/or true potential.  
581 See van den Berg 2008 on malignitas as a term in literary criticism, esp. pp. 421-27 on the Dialogus. The term often is used to 
promote the proper evaluation of merit: by accusing others of malignitas, an author can underline and advance what he thinks is the 
right appraisal of someone’s ability or virtue, and so the term often has a corrective function. 
582 Aper’s dissimulation of knowledge and learning recalls Cicero’s Crassus and Antonius, who similarly feign ignorance (either of 
Greek rhetoric or of learning altogether) in order to appear more authoritative (de Orat. 2.4). Although the intertext underlines the 
engagement with similar challenges across time-periods and political systems, Aper’s need to act and pretend is particularly poignant 
given the way the Principate, according to Tacitus, evaluates and fails to acknowledge uirtus and ingenium.   
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Believe me, my most excellent and, as far as our age requires, most fluent fellows: if you had been born 
in former times or those men, whom we admire, had been born in our times, or if some god suddenly 
had switched your life and time-periods, you would not have lacked that eminent praise and glory for 
eloquentia and they would not have lacked moderation and self-control. Now, since no one can, at the 
same time, enjoy great fame and great tranquility… 
 
 
Maternus’ focus is on oratory’s diminished scope and on the diminished recognition of oratorical 
ability. The phrase in quantum opus reflects the circumscribed employment of eloquentia in imperial Rome 
and the diminished opportunity for speakers to exercise and display their ingenium. As Maternus says in 
the preceding lines, in the presence of a princeps, there is no need (opus) for long speeches in the senate 
or to the people, and there are fewer voluntary prosecutions under a peaceful system like the 
Principate. Such a limited playing field for eloquentia affects its value and appraisal within society; great 
tranquility and great fame cannot coexist. The two passages elucidate Tacitus’ words in the preface and 
underscore the tension between natural ability and the cultural climate in which it is employed. The 
language continues to make the problem of decline profoundly ambiguous.583  
 In its diminished recognition of ability, the current age is described in similar terms as in the 
Agricola, where Tacitus describes the present as not fairly appraising and transmitting uirtus. The unjust 
refusal to appreciate people’s ingenium reflects similar social attitudes as the hostility to uirtus deprecated 
in the Agricola. Both ingenium and uirtus are less on display and less appreciated. Both texts work against 
this problem. Just as the Agricola serves in part to restore a fair circulation of glory by distributing 
praise and blame where they are due, so the Dialogus promotes a realignment of fame and ability by 
correcting poor aesthetic judgment and putting on display the ingenium and knowledge of its 
participants (including that of the author himself). The text preserves for posterity the speakers’ ability 
and, in doing so, fulfills one of Aper’s predictions, namely that the interlocutors will, in the future, gain 
the fame that the malice and envy of their own age denies them (23.6). Thus emerges one of the 
																																																								
583 The phrase in quantum opus est may be read in light of A. 14.47.1: Memmius Regulus, auctoritate constantia fama, in quantum praeumbrante 
imperatoris fastigio datur, clarus. Here, too, the problem is one of diminished opportunity, not of innate quality: Regulus, who was a good 
and able man, would have achieved more had he not lived in the shadow of a princeps.  
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essential aspects that unify the Tacitean corpus; just as the Agricola and the Dialogus work to rectify false 
representation, so the Germania, the Historiae, and the Annales, in their effort to work against official 
versions and to accurately depict people, actions, motives, and places, have the same aim. 
 
IV.3  The Imperial System of Government and Oratory 
 In both the Agricola and the Dialogus, Tacitus correlates the advent of the Principate with the 
restrictions imposed on both literature and oratory and with the skewed mechanics of recognition and 
fame. In the Dialogus, he elucidates in more detail the connection between political and generic change 
that he had pointed up, but not elucidated, in the Agricola. There, he drew a distinction between the 
libertas enjoyed by former authors and the restrictions imposed on modern authors, due in large part to 
the erosion of social equality in the presence of a princeps. In the Dialogus, the issue of libertas recurs in 
the analysis of the development of eloquentia. Aper, in his argument for oratory over poetry, links the 
exercise of eloquentia to independence, arguing that, when defending others (as opposed to oneself, as 
Maternus has done), one may more freely offend, both in terms of what one says and whom one 
addresses.584 In those contexts, says Aper, one’s “outspokenness” may be “excused” (libertas excusata, 
10.8). The language suggests that, outside the social context singled out here, libertas readily offends. At 
the end of his second speech, Aper addresses Maternus, Secundus, and Messalla with similar language 
(sic libertatem temperatis, 23.6), once more underscoring the limitations of free speech.585 Indeed, the 
interlocutors carefully avoid offending one another (27.1-2) and show awareness that their comments 
may reach beyond Maternus’ bedroom and offend others (26.7, 32.7).586 These comments, made in the 
text’s metacritical asides, reinforce the image, sketched in the speeches, of imperial society and the 
restrained employment of eloquentia within it. The description of anxiety about the scrutiny and 
																																																								
584 See van den Berg 2014, 138-39. 
585 Levene (2004, 179) notes that, while the phrase may refer to an aesthetic quality here, it likely has political overtones. 
586 Recent scholarship has suggested that Maternus, recognizing Aper’s solidarity with the delatores and Messalla’s relationship with the 
delator M. Aquilius Regulus, changes his tone and his attitude towards the Principate in his second speech. So, e.g., Strunk 2010; cf. 
Reitz 2014. On the danger of offending powerful individuals as a serious obstacle to free speech, see Gallia 2009. While the impact of 
the delatores on modern oratory is everywhere apparent, the term delator notably does not occur in the Dialogus.   
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reception of one’s words is akin to the description of the paralyzing effects on authors and officials of 
the activity of delatores at Agr. 2.3.  
 The impact of such social pressures on the employment of eloquentia is taken up by Maternus, 
whose remarks to Messalla suggest that diminished freedom of expression negatively affects the quality 
of eloquentia. Messalla claims not to feel offended by Aper’s remarks about modern oratory and 
promises that his own arguments about the poor state of education will not offend: “for you all know 
that the rule in these sorts of discussions is to express our convictions without impairing mutual 
affection” (sciatis hanc esse eius modi sermonum legem, iudicium animi citra damnum adfectus proferre, 27.2). 
Messalla’s maxim reflects a limitation on what a speaker may say and, while his words may simply 
mean that friends should not offend each other in private discussion, they bear on the broader 
connection between libertas and eloquentia. They suggest that modern speakers, even in private settings, 
cannot speak their mind with complete freedom and that they must tiptoe around particular topics or 
tread carefully when speaking about certain people. This is the issue with which Maternus is concerned 
when he urges Messalla to “carry on… and use ancient freedom, from which we have fallen away even 
more than from eloquence” (perge… utere antiqua libertate, <a> qua uel magis degenerauimus quam ab 
eloquentia, 27.3). Maternus expects that Messalla will not to speak his mind freely and that this will 
impair his argument and eloquentia. The call to use ancient libertas underlines the fact that modern 
speakers enjoy less of it. Maternus’ words recall the connection between eloquentia and its cultural-
political climate that was raised in the preface and prefigure its more detailed analysis in his final 
speech. In the current passage, he explicitly connects libertas and eloquentia, but the connection is not 
strict: the current age has fallen away from libertas more than from eloquentia. This suggests that the 
degree of political and oratorical freedom that speakers enjoy influences the quality of their oratory, 
but that “free speech and qualitative speech do not exactly mirror each other.”587 Maternus only 
																																																								
587 Van den Berg 2014, 117-18.  
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cautiously claims that the quality of oratory has declined and emphasizes the restrictions on libertas.   
 It is not until the final speech that Tacitus elaborates on the impact of the Principate on the 
nature and scope of eloquentia. The speech, which offers a historical explanation for oratory’s alleged 
decline, engages with each of the issues raised thus far – natural ability (ingenium), independence 
(libertas), cultural recognition/fame (laus/gloria/claritudo), and oratorical opportunity/scope. It should be 
recalled that the speech (like Messalla’s) does not serve to demonstrate oratory’ decline, but, rather, to 
explain it – assuming it is true – in light of political climates.588 It also should be noted that Maternus’ 
speech does not, in any way, ‘cap’ the work’s ‘thesis of decline.’589 Tacitus, as we have seen, does not 
gear the text towards this conclusion, and Maternus’ arguments about oratory’s diminished scope and 
quality are balanced by Aper’s emphasis on its novel qualities and avenues. 
 The extant portion of Maternus’ speech opens with an account of the vital role of oratory in 
the past. In both the past and present, Romans enjoyed the typical advantages that eloquentia brings to 
peaceful and prosperous societies, but past orators enjoyed the additional advantages derived from 
social and political turmoil (D. 36.1-40.4). Eloquentia flourished in the strife and discord of the Late 
Republic. The persistent unrest and strife of that period allowed eloquentia to grow and made being 
eloquens essential to political success and survival. Strife amongst all orders, and men of all stations 
prosecuting one other, made for grand cases of enduring fame that allowed men to exercise their 
talent. Speakers operated in the open forum or other venues more or less accessible to crowds and 
hence conducive to great oratory. In criminal trials, speakers were not constrained by the time 
restrictions later imposed on speeches in the civil courts. Moreover, the nature of senatorial 
deliberation was such that it encouraged and required men to support their arguments with ingenium 
and eloquentia. In accordance with its scope, eloquentia reaped great rewards. Good speakers easily gained 
																																																								
588 It is significant that Messalla is about to launch into a detailed explanation of oratory’s decline (quibus gradibus fracta sit et deminuta 
eloquentia, D. 26.8), when Maternus interrupts him and urges him to take up his argument about modern educational standards.  
589 As Mayer 2001, 215-16, following much prior scholarship, argues.  
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office, enjoyed authority with the people and senate, and earned fame for their eloquentia in Rome and 
abroad. At the same time that eloquentia was nourished by strife and turbulence, it also fed it; eloquence 
is both a defensive and an offensive tool. Hence, a cyclical system of strife and eloquentia continually 
feeding one another. This is the rationale behind Maternus’ comparison of eloquentia to fire: magna 
eloquentia, sicut flamma, materia alitur et motibus excitatur et urendo clarescit. Eadem ratio in nostra quoque ciuitate 
antiquorum eloquentiam prouexit, 36.1). Like fire, eloquentia feeds on its fuel and consumes what gives it 
strength. Like fire, it shines most brightly when it has the most energy. Other metaphors reinforce the 
point: ancient oratory was like uncontrolled fields that produce unusual herbage (40.4) or like military 
performance, which improves when it is exercised in wartime (37.8). For this reason, Maternus argues, 
great eloquentia does not require merely libertas, but licentia, i.e. the chaos that exercises and fosters it 
most intensely. Maternus describes three political climates that roughly can be equated with three 
political periods: the Catonian period, when Romans enjoyed libertas, the Ciceronian period, when 
libertas turned into licentia, and the Principate, which restricts libertas. Great oratory was not produced in 
well-regulated states like Sparta or Crete, or among absolute regimes like Macedon or Persia, or indeed 
under the Principate. Rome of the past was more like classical Athens, where members of all orders 
could do anything (omnia omnes poterant, 40.3). In the past, in sum, eloquentia had free reign, was 
exercised and stimulated constantly, and earned speakers fame and reward. Maternus closely ties 
oratorical scope with political disorder.  
 In contrast, the present climate, marked by political and legal order and stability, and governed 
by the authority of a single man, has restricted oratory’s scope: prosecutions are fewer, cases less 
grand, popular assemblies and senatorial deliberation circumscribed. In the civil courts, advocates now 
face time restrains and judges frequently impose silence. Advocates wear cloaks that impair their 
movements, and the great majority of cases are not heard in the open forum, but in confined hearing 
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halls and record offices.590 While such measures promote justice and the uncovering of the truth (38.1), 
they negatively impact eloquentia: extending the metaphor of fire to the present, eloquentia cannot feed 
on anything and peters out. In accordance with its circumscribed scope, oratorical ability is less on 
display and earns less appreciation; merit goes unrecognized and great oratory is denied laus and gloria.  
Modern speakers, Maternus argues, do not possess less ability (ingenium) than their ancient 
counterparts, but eloquentia’s diminished scope and appreciation prevents them from exercising and 
cultivating that ability. Grand cases, says Maternus, foster a speaker’s uis ingenii (37.5), that is the force of 
his talent, not his ingenium itself (cf. similar implications at 36.7, 37.3, 37.5, 40.1). The language again is 
precise. The nature of the material with which speakers work or the venues in which they operate does 
not increase or decrease their ability, but determines whether they can exercise their talent to its full 
potential. If eloquentia, that is the quality of oratory, has indeed declined, on Maternus’ view this is due 
to its circumscribed scope in the current political climate.  
The text does not sanction the reader to equate Maternus’ view with that of Tacitus. As F. 
Klingner and C. Brink argue, the principal categories used to distinguish the Republic from the 
Principate – order, peace, and tranquility - are limited and naturally in favor of the former.591 Second, 
Maternus’ argument about the distinction between the Republic and the Principate is balanced by 
Aper’s argument about periodization, in which he all but elides the political transition (17.2),592 and by 
his claims about the ways political change has forced eloquentia to adjust and find different avenues. 
The stylistic features of modern oratory deprecated by Messalla (brevity, the use of sententiae, poetic 
adornment) are championed by Aper as improvements suitable to oratory’s more restrained role. 
While Maternus claims that it was ancient orators who earned greater fame in Rome and abroad, Aper 
argues that modern speakers (such as Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus) enjoy as much, if not 
																																																								
590 On the importance of clothing and venues for oratorical performance, see Frier 2010.  
591 Klingner 1965, 506-07; Brink 1989, 485; van den Berg 2014, 119. 
592 See Levene 2004, 173-74; Strunk 2010, 256, 261-62.  
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more, renown.593 As van den Berg suggests, the speeches of Aper and Maternus may be read together 
as illustrating a continuation of oratorical norms and practices.594 Certainly, Tacitus’ own career 
accords well with Aper’s arguments. No single thesis is established about the state of oratory. What the 
men do seem to agree on is that modern speakers are intrinsically as talented as the ancients, that the 
political transition from the Late Republic into the Augustan Principate reshaped and, in some ways, 
circumscribed oratory’s role in society, and that oratorical ability no longer receives the recognition and 
fame it used to. The work ends with this last point: the interlocutors would have received the laus and 
gloria that ancient speakers did, if they had enjoyed the latter’s circumstances. Since great renown and 
great tranquility cannot coexist, let each man enjoy the blessings of his own age without disparaging 
other ages (bono saeculi sui quisque citra obtrectationem alterius utatur, 41.5).595 After Aper’s criticism of 
ancient oratory and Messalla’s denunciation of modern education, Maternus concludes with a historical 
perspective, stressing the limits imposed on oratory. Despite their restrictive impact, such limits were a 
political necessity and offered a stability and order that the Republic could not provide. The latter, in 
contrast, suffered discord and civil war that offered a climate in which ability and merit were 
recognized and oratory’s scope was great. Both political climates have their merits and drawbacks, and 
one would do well to appreciate the former without denouncing other periods. Far from capping the 
work’s ‘thesis of decline,’ the text’s final words, which recall the preface, redirect our focus to the 
tension between ingenium and renown that was enunciated there. The final words establish the reality of 
oratory’s diminished scope and appreciation. Whether eloquentia has in fact declined is left 
undetermined.596 What has in fact happened throughout the dialogue is that the speakers, through their 
discussion, have moved from epiphenomena of the problem (changes in taste and educational 
practice, as advanced by Aper and Messalla) closer to its essence, that is to the political transition from 
																																																								
593 This argument derives strength from the fact that Tacitus’ own style in the historical narratives reflects it. 
594 Van den Berg 2014, 165-207. 
595 The interaction between the final words of the Dialogus and A. 3.55 will be discussed below (pp. 279, 281, 293-94). 
596 My view of the text thus corresponds in various ways to van den Berg’s, although I would hesitate to see the text’s final words as 
reflecting Tacitus’ optimism (van den Berg 2014, 121).    
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the Ciceronian into the Augustan age that reduced oratory’s scope and broadly accounts for the 
epiphenomena, but which in itself does not get us to a conclusive answer. Hence the call for further 
discussion, which likely would proceed to undermine Maternus’ argument and take the debate 
increasingly further.  
The analysis in the Dialogus shares clear conceptual connections with that in the Agricola, 
yielding the following picture: in the past, the political climate is supposed to have been such that 
Romans enjoyed independence of speech and thought (libertas), both written and spoken, and had the 
opportunity to exercise and display their ability (ingenium), whether in the form of eloquence (eloquentia), 
virtuous conduct (uirtus), or good, credible literature. In this period, ability and merit earned renown 
and were appraised and transmitted properly. The production, appraisal, and transmission of ability 
and merit, all functions of their political climate, were aligned properly. In both works, the 
establishment of the Principate imposed conditions that occasioned generic change. Romans are 
discouraged from writing or speaking their mind freely; outspokenness (libertas) and honesty may 
offend the powerful, while the malicious activity of delatores and other officials inspires fear. Both arts 
have seen a reduction in productivity: authors write less and public speakers have fewer opportunities 
to exercise their eloquentia and display their ingenium.597 In the modern age, ability and merit are not 
properly appraised and transmitted. In the case of literature, the consequence is described as generic 
decline: authors are no longer credible and produce tainted literature (or at least tainted biographies). 
In the case of oratory, the consequences are more complicated: many would have it that eloquentia has 
declined, but Tacitus constructs an entire dialogue on the premise that others saw it differently.  
 
IV.4  Analyzing Change: Periodization and Stances toward the Regime 
In addition to their similar analyses of political and generic change, the Agricola and the Dialogus 
enunciate a variety of stances toward and perceptions of the imperial system of government and its 
																																																								
597 Secundus’ Vita of Julius Africanus is presented as a welcome exception that confirms the status quo (D. 14.4).  
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relationship to the political climate that preceded it. As we have seen, in the preface of the Agricola 
Tacitus complicates the polarizing distinction between both systems of government, using ambiguous 
chronological markers to define the past and present and obfuscating the point at which one system 
morphed into another. This chronological opacity recurs in the preface of the Dialogus, which similarly 
sets a general past against a general present and which similarly distinguishes between the reigns of two 
principes within the broader present.598 Although the distinction between the Domitianic and Trajanic 
regimes in the Agricola is marked and essential to that work’s message, both are subsumed under the 
broader label “present” and display systemic features (restrictions on libertas, hostility to uirtus) that 
mark the Principate as a whole. Similarly, though the Dialogus distinguishes between the Vespasianic 
and Trajanic regimes, what is stressed is a shared, and persistent, concern (underlined by the adverb 
saepe, the present tense of the verb requiris, and the phrase eandem hanc quaestionem). Tacitus goes back a 
generation to explain conditions that still hold true at the time of writing. Despite the distinctions 
between different principes, then, the prefaces of the Agricola and the Dialogus invite a reader to analyze 
the Principate as a single system.  
As for the past, the language is more ambiguous. Do priora saecula and antiquos take us back to 
the early Principate or the Late Republic? Or do the terms specify a broader era, such as the Republic 
as a whole, or does it include even earlier eras, such as the age of Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, and 
Aeschines? The preface offers no clarification and the text offers various suggestions. Most equate 
priora saecula either with the Late Republic, based on the periods established in the final four 
speeches,599 or with the Ciceronian age, based on the canon of seven authors from the Late Republic 
																																																								
598 In the preface of the Dialogus, Tacitus distinguishes between “past ages” (priora saecula/antiquos/antiquorum) and the “present,” marked 
by the terms nostra aetas/horum temporum/ut nostris temporibus/nostrorum temporum (“our age”, “our/these times”). As in the Agricola, the broad 
distinction is between a general past and present, both only partially defined. In the Agricola, the distinction appears to be broadly between 
the Republic and the Principate, while a further distinction is drawn within the latter between the reigns of Domitian and Trajan. In the 
Dialogus, the distinction is between a general past, presumably the Republic but, on first sight, possibly including earlier periods, and the 
Principate, and again a distinction is made within the latter between different reigns: the Trajanic present (requiris/nostra aetas) and the 
Vespasianic past (iuuenis admodum).  
599 Mayer 2001, 88. That priora saecula may be equated with the Late Republic is implied by the fact that Maternus caps his historical 
argument about the differences between the Republic and the Principate with the words prioribus saeculis (41.5). 
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and early Principate singled out in the discussion of oratory: Cicero, Caesar, M. Caelius Rufus, C. 
Licinius Calvus, M. Junius Brutus, Asinius Pollio, and Messalla Corvinus (17.1).600 The Dialogus, like the 
Agricola, does not establish at what point “ancient” becomes “modern,” raising essential questions 
about the transition from the Republic into the Principate, or from the Ciceronian into the Augustan 
age. This has obvious import for one’s stance toward imperial ideology, which variously sought to 
stress or gloss over the disruption of the 40s and 30s. The chronological opacity also bears directly on 
Messalla’s argument about educational change and on the connection, drawn by Maternus (and by 
Tacitus in the Agricola), between political climates and generic development. Those arguments are 
prefigured and complicated by Aper’s claims about periodization, which question the utility of 
analyzing social and cultural change on the basis of arbitrarily chosen transition points and which all 
but elide the transition between the Republic and the Principate.  
 Each of the speakers advances a particular view of the political transition during the 40s and 
30s and all take up complex stances toward the imperial regime that, when taken together, reflect both 
the challenge of analyzing change and the complexities of Tacitus’ own outlook. Aper’s arguments 
reveal him to be an adherent of imperial ideology. He claims that oratory has not declined since the 
Ciceronian age but merely changed along with changing tastes (18.2, 19.2). While he acknowledges 
change, he refuses to link to it to political events and glosses over the disruption between the Republic 
and the Principate. He elides the transition from the former to the latter by stressing that Augustus’ 
first consulship fell in the year of Cicero’s death in 43 BC (17.2), a point also advertised on the fasti 
Praenestini and in the Res Gestae.601 He further obfuscates the transition by saying that there are still men 
who knew Augustus and that he himself met a man in Britain who claimed to have fought against 
Caesar, and that such a man could have heard Caesar, Augustus, and Aper alike (17.4-6); on the grand 
																																																								
600 See van den Berg 2014, 34, 208 ff., 244 with references. 




scale, the Republic and early Principate were but ‘yesterday.’602 Aper’s loyalty to the regime is reflected 
further by his allegiance to and connections with the delatores, who, like him, protect the interests and 
enjoy the confidence of the princeps and his associates (7.1, 8.3).603 It is no surprise, then, that Aper 
explicitly pronounces the felicitas of Vespasian’s rule (17.3). In fact, he carefully distinguishes between 
“that long year of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius” (illum Galbae et Othonis et Vitellii longum et unum annum) 
and the six happy years under Vespasian, obscuring the latter’s record in the civil wars.  
 Unlike Aper, Messalla acknowledges the disruption between Republic and Principate and 
stresses oratory’s decline under the latter. He calls into question Aper’s argument of periodization and 
maintains a firm distinction between the past and present that runs through his argument. However, 
while he blames oratory’s decline on educational and cultural deterioration (much like Quintilian in de 
de Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae), he nowhere explicitly connects these developments with political 
events.604 He identifies Cicero’s death as a turning point but does not acknowledge its concurrence 
with Augustus’ first consulship, carefully disavowing any connection between oratory’s decline and the 
advent of the Augustan Principate. His stance may be explained by his political connections and close 
relationship with his half-brother Regulus, the infamous delator and imperial favorite lauded by Aper at 
D. 15.1. Moreover, Messalla was an influential speaker and respected member of the governing class, 
indicating that he knew how to work within the system.  
 Maternus’ attitude, finally, is complex. In his first speech, he reveals himself to be critical of the 
imperial system of government – in part because it has ruined eloquentia and facilitated the power of the 
delatores – and his poetic activity shows that his political allegiance lies squarely with fellow dissidents 
(Pomponius Secundus and Helvidius Priscus) unwilling to relinquish their libertas. He is the only 
speaker who explicitly connects oratory’s decline with the establishment of the Augustan Principate: 
																																																								
602 Aper’s claims stand in marked contrast to Tacitus’ exclamation at A. 1.3.7: quotus quisque reliquus qui rem publicam uidisset? 
603 On the institution of amici principis, see Crook 1955, 21-30. 
604 On the views of Messalla and Quintilian, see Barwick 1954, 8-18; Brink 1989, 484-88.   
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under Rome’s first princeps, there was lasting quies, otium, tranquillitas, and disciplina that pacified 
everything (including eloquentia) and set the tone for subsequent regimes (38.2, 41).605 While Aper and 
Messalla gloss over the disruption of the 40s and 30s, Maternus stresses it: his emphasis on discord, 
civil war, and bloodshed, particularly Cicero’s destruction at the hands of the triumvirs and Rome’s 
first princeps (40.4), undermines imperial ideology, which sought to smooth over these events. It is 
notable that Maternus, like Messalla, clouds his intellectual and political views in cautious language. 
The main indictment of the imperial regime – that the pervasive peace and order under the leadership 
of a single, wise man has pacified and restrained everything – is articulated in terms that reflect 
imperial propaganda. For it was precisely the peace and tranquility that the Augustan and Vespasianic 
regimes imposed in the aftermath of civil war that allowed them to smooth over the disruption and 
justify the new order.606 It was also a tenet of Augustan and post-Augustan propaganda that the 
Principate was necessary precisely because it offered a stability that the old political configuration 
could not guarantee. Maternus carefully uses imperial ideology to indict the Principate. 
 What emerges is a range of stances toward the imperial regime and a range of explanations for 
oratory’s development and its connection with major personalities and events. Of course, the text’s 
format, which allowed Tacitus’ to advance a variety of viewpoints without taking authorial 
responsibility, itself constitutes a stance, one similar to those he takes up in the Agricola and the 
Germania and, in a different way, in the historical works.607 A modern reader would do well to resist the 
urge to find a single message in the text. While a good case could be made for a radical change in the 
world, particularly for the art of oratory (some venues of which simply ceased to exist), “Tacitus 
constructs a whole dialogue on the premise that some people might not see it this way.”608 The 
																																																								
605 Maternus’ words are recalled in the prefaces of the historical works, where Tacitus describes Augustus’ usurpation of power. 
606 The opening chapters of the Res Gestae reflect this effort and it is Augustus’ claims there to which Tacitus responds in his 
description of the man’s usurpation of power at A. 1.10.1-4. Cf. SCPP 47; Vell. 2.89. Vespasian carefully modeled his position on that 
of Augustus. The preface of the Historiae and H. 2.101 point up how the Flavian record in the civil wars was sanitized. 
607 On Tacitus’ authorial stance in the historical works, consult especially Sailor 2008. 
608 Sailor 2008, 132.  
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transition of the 40s and 30s was difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize with exactitude. 
Augustus and his successors presented their regime as a return to, or restoration of, the Republic. 
Under Augustus, this return was reinforced visually both in his forum, whose statuary traced the 
emperor’s lineage back to Rome’s founders, and on the fasti consulares, fasti triumphales, and other lists 
and calendars. There was no separate nomenclature to designate a novel system of government; the 
emperor was called princeps, a republican term used to designate the most authoritative member of the 
senate, and the new system simply was named after him: principatus. At the same time, Augustan and 
post-Augustan thought distinguished between two systems (as modern scholarship does), each with 
peculiar characteristics and socio-political dynamics, in part to justify the new order and the power 
invested in a single man; the new status quo, as Maternus points out, offered peace and stability in 
place of instability and incessant strife. The various changes and continuities from the Republic into 
the Principate, and the official versions promoted by the principes, will have been challenging to 
navigate (cf. D. 17.6), particularly for later generations, and promoting a single interpretation would 
seem shortsighted – all the more so since the notion of the Principate as an institution safeguarding 
peace and order was seriously undermined by the outbreak of the civil wars in 68 and the near 
eruption of another major conflict in 97.  
Tacitus’ analysis reflects this. Through the interlocutors, he advances a nexus of interpretations 
of political and cultural change that reflect the complexity of the issues at hand. The dialogue illustrates 
and reflects the way Romans reconstructed their past. Memory is attached to great personalities and 
events, which in hindsight are identified as responsible for, or associated with, major turning points in 
Rome’s social and political history.609 Romans thought in terms of individuals, not years, and analyzed 
contemporary or recent events in light of various analogous events in the past. As such, a Roman 
author might connect particular developments with different events or individuals. Taken together, 
																																																								
609 On Roman computations of time and reconstructions of the past, see Feeney 2007. 
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such associations yield an incoherent picture, as changes in socio-political practices, customs, or forms 
of social behavior are shown to set in at different moments and so cannot be associated with a single 
person, event, or historical moment. This ostensible incoherence, however, results from a coherence 
of methods of thinking and analyzing. This is evident from the chronological inconsistencies and the 
various turning points for different aspects of oratory identified by each of the speakers.  
 One example is the identification of Cicero’s death and the advent of the Augustan era as 
watershed moments in oratory’s development. Velleius closely connects Cicero and Octavian, and his 
words neatly reflect Roman ‘anniversary’-thinking: not only did the former’s death coincide with the 
latter’s first consulship, but the latter was born in the year (63 BC) in which the former held his first 
consulship (Vell. 2.36.1). One of the purposes of the Dialogus is to complicate such tidy chronological 
boundaries and frameworks. So, while Cicero’s death and the advent of the Augustan Principate both 
are identified as turning points in eloquentia’s development, Aper and Messalla (albeit for different 
purposes and to different effects) point to Cassius Severus’ vigorous oratory as the moment Roman 
style truly changed (19.1, 26.4).610 On Tacitus’ account, Severus was the first man to be charged (in AD 
8 or 12) with maiestas for producing famosi libelli about distinguished men and women that provoked 
even the princeps himself (A. 1.72.4, 4.21.3).611 Severus was banished from Rome and died in exile.612 He 
also was one of the first men to have his books burned.613 It stands to reason that these events 
solidified the later tradition that Severus’ style marked a definitive change. However this may be, the 
fact that the heyday of Severus’ oratorical career lay well into the Augustan regime weakens the direct 
connection of Cicero’s death or the advent of the Principate with a definitive change in oratory, or at 
least suggests that the effects of those events were gradual, not immediate. This last notion derives 
																																																								
610 On the men’s arguments on style and their use of Severus as an example, see van den Berg 2014, 82, 111, 137, 166-68, 182, 271 ff.  
611 For his biography: PIR2 C 522. For the technicalities of the charge and the veracity of Tacitus’ claim, see Goodyear 1981, 151.  
612 That he was exiled to Crete (A. 4.21.3), a place argued by Maternus to be highly unfavorable to oratory (D. 40.3), is both apposite 
and ironic.  
613 According to Seneca the Elder (Contr. 10 pr. 5-8), Titus Labienus (in AD 12) was the first whose books were burned and Severus 
the man who pronounced the verdict. Severus’ books were burned while he was in exile.  
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strength from Maternus’ claim that Rome has “fallen away” (degenerauimus, D. 27.3) from libertas and 
eloquentia, and that at different paces (antiqua libertate, a qua uel magis degenerauimus quam ab eloquentia). 
The verb degenerare, which technically means to fall from a former standard, suggests a gradual loss of 
essential nature.614 
The tendency to connect change with major events and individuals can be seen elsewhere in 
Messalla’s argument, which is marked by various chronological inconsistencies. Messalla, while 
drawing a firm distinction between Ciceronian and post-Ciceronian education, singles out the mothers 
of the Gracchi, Caesar, and Augustus as exemplars of proper upbringing (28.4). When we add to this 
the fact that Agricola (and perhaps Tacitus himself?) was educated in a similar fashion (note the 
intertext between Agr. 4.2 and D. 28.5), we are left with three major personalities (the Gracchi and 
Caesar) that fit Messalla’s chronological schema and two (Augustus and Agricola) that fall outside it. 
Similarly, his claim about the abeyance of the tirocinium fori (the practice whereby young Romans gain 
oratorical experience by attending experienced speakers as they practice: Cicero again is the paradigm) 
is undermined by Tacitus’ own apprenticeship under Aper and Secundus (2.1), which suggests that the 
practice still flourished in Tacitus’ time (or at least was thought by him to have).615 Similar 
inconsistency underlies his argument about the extravagance of modern oratory, which, again, he 
connects with particular individuals (26.1). He associates the modern theatrical style with Maecenas, 
Augustus’ friend and agent, and L. Junius Gallio, a later orator who was a friend of Ovid and Seneca 
the Elder. While Maecenas is a fine example of the theatrical style that Messalla condemns (the man’s 
style disconcerted following generations), his association with the ‘modern’ age is problematic. His 
dates place him squarely within the canon of authors labeled by Messalla as antiqui – in fact, Pollio and 
Corvinus outlived him. Though one could argue that not every speaker from the age of the antiqui 
																																																								
614 This is one of several verbs used throughout the text to designate ‘decline.’ Messalla uses fracta, deminuta (26.8), desciscere (28.2), and 
corrupta (34.4), while Maternus uses degenerare (27.3), debilitatur, and frangitur (39.2). Some of these verbs suggest a radical break, others a 
more gradual development. 
615 Van den Berg (2014, 72 ff.) suggests that the inconsistency between Messalla’s claim and Tacitus’ own training ultimately serves to 
liken the author to Cicero; like the latter, Tacitus enjoyed the proper oratorical training and developed into a rhetorical luminary.  
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need necessarily meet Messalla’s standards, he groups the speakers together and stresses their likeness 
and affinity (similitudo et cognatio, 25.4), not allowing for the finer gradations within generations that 
Aper promotes. Extravagance, then, is not confined to the modern period, and the firm distinction 
between past and present is difficult to sustain.616 The examples of Asinius Pollio and Messalla 
Corvinus, who are counted among the antiqui but lived into the first century AD, similarly challenge 
the arguments of Messalla and Maternus. Finally, we may note Messalla’s claim that professional 
rhetoricians are in part responsible for modern educational decline, a point complicated by his own 
admission that these men appeared in Rome before Cicero’s time (35.1) and so were not a strictly 
modern phenomenon, and Maternus’ association of the Principate with time limits and other 
restrictions imposed on speakers (38.1; cf. 19.5), a connection weakened by his own claim that it was 
Pompey who first introduced such measures (38.2).617  
The above examples illustrate essential points about Tacitus’ view of socio-political and 
cultural change and the way Roman memory operates. While Tacitus, like his interlocutors (all of 
whose arguments, it should be recalled, he calls probabiles), distinguishes between a general past and 
present, he continually offers evidence that complicates this distinction. Different events and 
personalities are connected with particular developments, undermining any attempt to identify a single 
event or personality as marking the defining turning point in Roman social, political, and cultural 
history. Imperial authors reconstructed the past in various ways. In the Agricola, Tacitus claims that 
libertas and truthful biography ceased with the advent of the Principate. Seneca the Elder saw different 
turning points: ueritas first declined at the onset of the civil wars in the time of the Gracchi, while 
libertas declined at Brutus’ death.618 Velleius saw the destruction of Carthage and Corinth as the onset 
																																																								
616 Van den Berg 2014, 182.  
617 On the lex Pompeia de ui et ambitu and the lex Iulia, see Mayer 2001, 206.  
618 The de Vita Patris of Seneca the Younger tells us that his father’s History covered the time “from the beginning of the civil wars, the 
point at which ueritas declined for the first time” (ab initio bellorum ciuilium, unde primum ueritas retro abiit, fr. 1). It is commonly assumed that 
Seneca the Elder, like other authors, located the onset of moral decline in the period surrounding the destruction of Corinth and Carthage 
in 146 BC and that he dates the onset of the civil wars to the period of the Gracchi shortly thereafter. So Sussman 1978, 141-43; Calboli, 
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of moral decay and the period of the Gracchi as the origin of the civil wars (2.1-3). Yet he glossed over 
the break between the Republic and the Principate, in part by excusing Octavian’s role in Cicero’s 
proscription and by stressing that the latter, through his enduring fame, lives on (2.66): like Cicero, the 
Republic was not really dead, and Rome merely moved from a Republic to a better Republic.619 The 
Dialogus shows that there are multiple ways to look at the past and that Roman history, rather than 
being marked by a one watershed moment, is characterized by a series of developments, with different 
origins, that variously fit within or cut through imperial ideology. In essence, the Dialogus urges readers 
not only to apply a more nuanced analysis of cause and effect to discussions of eloquentia, but to bring 
greater intellectual rigor to discussions of time, periodization, and history generally.  
In the historical narratives, to which we will now turn, Tacitus takes up the concerns and the 
methods of analysis set out in the Dialogus. The relationship between past and present, the analysis of 
socio-political transition (particularly after civil war and disruption), the relationship between political 
and generic change, and the degree to which imperial ideology and official versions reflect reality 
continue to occupy him throughout. While his focus shifts to a different genre and subject matter, his 
methods of analyzing political and cultural change, the techniques with which he illustrates Roman 
perceptions of the past, and his view of the relationship between the Republic and the Principate 
remain, by and large, consistent throughout. 
 
IV.5  Past and Present in the Historiae  and the Annales 
 Above we saw how the prefaces of the Agricola and the Dialogus distinguish between the 
general past and present but obfuscate the precise point at which one turned into the other. I have 
shown how this chronological opacity informs the rest of the dialogue, both challenging the notion of 
a radical change in the world and enunciating a complex vision of time, and of historical and cultural 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Brill’s New Pauly (2006), s.v. Seneca. Libertas and Brutus: amissa enim libertate, quam Bruto duce et auctore defenderat (Lact., Div. Inst. 7.15.14)  
619 Gowing 2005, 41-48. 
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change, that variously accords with or negates imperial ideology. In the preface of the Historiae, Tacitus 
continues to explore these issues, constructing a history of historiography along similar lines as the 
history of biography and oratory in the monographs.  
 
IV.5.1  Political Transition and Imperial Historiography: the Preface of the Historiae  
 
Initium mihi operis Seruius Galba iterum Titus Vinius consules erunt. nam post conditam urbem octingentos et uiginti 
prioris aeui annos multi auctores rettulerunt, dum res populi Romani memorabantur, pari eloquentia ac libertate; 
postquam bellatum apud Actium atque omnem potentiam ad unum conferri pacis interfuit, magna illa ingenia cessere; 
simul ueritas pluribus modis infracta, primum inscitia rei publicae ut alienae, mox libidine adsentandi aut rursus odio 
aduersus dominantis: ita neutris cura posteritatis inter infensos uel obnoxios. sed ambitionem scriptoris facile auerseris, 
obtrectatio et liuor pronis auribus accipiuntur; quippe adulationi foedum crimen seruitutis, malignitati falsa species 
libertatis inest. mihi Galba Otho Vitellius nec beneficio nec iniuria cogniti. dignitatem nostram a Vespasiano inchoatam, 
a Tito auctam, a Domitiano longius prouectam non abnuerim: sed incorruptam fidem professis neque amore quisquam et 
sine odio dicendus est. quod si uita suppeditet, principatum diui Neruae et imperium Traiani, uberiorem securioremque 
materiam, senectuti seposui, rara temporum felicitate ubi sentire quae uelis et quae sentias dicere licet. (H. 1.1) 
 
The starting point of my work is the year that Servius Galba (for the second time) and Titus Vinius 
were consuls. The reason is as follows: of the former period, many authors have related the 820 years 
after the city’s foundation and, while the affairs of the Roman people were being commemorated, they 
did so with as much eloquence as freedom of expression; after the Battle of Actium and when it was in 
the interest of peace that all power be transferred to one man, those great geniuses departed; at the 
same time, the credibility of historiography was impaired in many ways, first because of ignorance of 
the res publica, as though it was someone else’s, soon out of a desire to flatter or alternatively out of 
hatred against those in a position of mastery: to such a degree has neither group had regard for 
posterity, when they were either hostile or subservient. But while one instinctively rejects ambition in a 
writer, detraction and spite are met with ready ears; for flattery involves the disgraceful charge of 
slavishness, whereas malice comes with a false appearance of freedom. I had no acquaintance with 
Galba, Otho, or Vitellius, either from favor or injury. That my standing commenced under Vespasian, 
was increased by Titus, and still further advanced by Domitian I would not deny: but those who have 
professed uncompromised truthfulness must speak of all without love or hatred. Should my life be long 
enough, however, I have set aside for my old age a richer and safer subject, the Principate of the divine 
Nerva and the rule of Trajan, in these rare and happy times when one may think what one wishes and 
say what one thinks. 
 
 
In the opening words of the Historiae, Tacitus takes up the relationship between generic and political 
change that he explored in the prefaces of the Agricola and the Dialogus. The starting point of the work 
is the year AD 69 and the alleged reason lies in the way that historiography has declined during the 
century following the Battle of Actium. The adverb nam is significant, for it explains not only the 
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sentence it begins but also those that follow it.620 Tacitus at once ties the development of 
historiography to constitutional history. Many authors have recounted the 820 years from Rome’s 
foundation (ca. 753 BC) to the year AD 69. While the affairs of the Roman people (res populi Romani) 
were recounted, authors wrote with equal libertas and eloquentia, but the Battle of Actium and the advent 
of the Principate imposed conditions that impaired the writing of history, causing authors to write 
compromised accounts. Tacitus’ words are dense and, like the preface of the Dialogus, at once 
introduce chronological complexity. The phrase dum res populi Romani memorabantur conflates the writing 
of republican history, which both republican and imperial historians did, with writing history under the 
Republic. The phrase technically means the former, but given the perils of writing republican history 
under the Principate (cf. Cremutius Cordus’ fate under Tiberius) it is likely that the phrase means 
“while the subject matter was the affairs of the Roman people,” hence “during the Republic.”621  
The preface demonstrates that both the subject matter of history and its mode of writing have 
changed since Actium.622 The former, as D. Sailor shows, has changed in two ways, both in the agency 
and ownership of history. After Actium, the agency of history was transferred from the people to the 
princeps and, consequently, post-republican history became concerned with recording the achievements 
of that man, that is his res gestae. The res publica, which used to be the res populi Romani, has become the 
res priuata of the princeps. Hence Tacitus emphasizes historians’ inexperience with the res publica ut alienae, 
since the res publica now belongs to someone else.623  
A related change lies in the ownership of history. Since the business of the state now belongs 
to the princeps, only he has full access to the transactions of the state, and it lies with him to determine 
which version of the truth is propagated. While republican historians merely had to transcribe the res 
																																																								
620 Steinmetz 1968, 251-62; Marincola 1999, 397 n. 33; cf. Sailor 2008, 160-61 n. 85.  
621 If we take the phrase to mean “republican history,” we are to suppose that there were imperial historians writing republican history 
with equal libertas and eloquentia. This would cut right through Tacitus’ argument. 
622 Sailor 2008, 119 ff. 
623 For the scholarly discussion on the meaning of the phrase inscitia rei publicae ut alienae, which may also refer to political inexperience, 
see Sailor 2008, 124 ff. with plentiful references in the notes. 
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populi Romani, which were the public property of the people, imperial historians only have partial access 
to the truth; they have to draw on official versions promulgated by the princeps, who in effect has 
become an historian himself.624 Dio makes similar observations about the challenges of writing 
imperial Roman history (53.19). Historians’ inexperience with the new political order and their 
restricted access to the truth are two reasons why ueritas has been broken.  
Finally, Tacitus identifies a shift in the mode in which history is written. The connection, 
drawn in the Agricola, between freedom of expression (libertas) and the production of good and reliable 
biography, taken up by Maternus, who associates libertas with aesthetically pleasing speech (eloquentia), 
recurs in the preface of the Historiae, where Tacitus ties libertas with the production of truthful and 
eloquent writing (eloquentia). Taking up his analysis in the Agricola, he conceptualizes the political 
transition and its impact on historiography through the common metaphor of slavery. As in the 
Agricola, he points to relations of reciprocity between authors and their princeps as a principal reason 
why truthful writing has been impaired. Whereas republican authors enjoyed the material (the res populi 
Romani) and the socio-political climate (libertas) that allowed them to transmit the truth freely and 
eloquently (the hallmark of a healthy economy of representation), imperial authors, due to their 
exchange relationship with their princeps, write either out of favor and ambition or out of spite. While 
writing out of spite gives off the appearance of libertas, given that the emotion prevents authors from 
transmitting the truth, it renders them as subservient as those writing with an eye toward pleasing their 
‘master.’  
Having firmly linked post-Actian historiography with slavishness and compromised fidelity, 
Tacitus next explains why his own opus will not suffer from these faults. In order to extricate himself 
from a charge of ambitio, gratia, or obtrectatio, he stresses that he had no connection, favorable or hostile, 
with Galba, Otho, or Vitellius. As for the Flavians, under whom his career advanced, he promises an 
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impartial account, free from favor or hatred. By claiming to be impartial, Tacitus characterizes himself 
as impervious to the social forces that have compromised historiography and aligns himself with past 
ingenia. It is his stance toward the current regime that allows him to do so.625 Tacitus’ libertas (hence his 
authority as an historian) is underlined by his not choosing to write about the current regime. Yet, his 
choice not to do so is ingeniously couched as a celebration of the new regime, which allows him not to 
take up contemporary events. Tacitus’ attitude towards the Principate and the emperors suggests that 
the preface’s final words do not advance his true opinion, but serve to establish his authorial persona. 
This rhetorical shiftiness recurs throughout the corpus. It is akin to his postponement in the Agricola of 
composing a work on the regimes of Domitian and Trajan and to his profession to have written the 
biography out of pietas. It is evidenced in the Germania, which, though topical at the time of writing, 
presents itself as not bearing directly on a particular regime and which lacks a preface, possibly to make 
a reader feel as if the author does not need to prove his impartiality. As in the Agricola and the Historiae, 
in the Dialogus Tacitus avoids contemporary events, going back to the Flavian Principate and 
constructing his authorial libertas by claiming merely to record a discussion he attended; like republican 
authors, he allegedly has no other motive than transmitting the truth and so only requires memoria. 
Each of the stances Tacitus occupies allows him to claim to be free from the motives and exchange-
relationships that impair imperial literature. This in turn allows him to reconstruct Roman history 
without clinging tightly to official versions and the chronological and ideological reconstructions of the 
past promoted in them.  
 
IV.5.2  The Nature of Change 
The prefaces of the Agricola, the Dialogus, and the Historiae reveal Tacitus’ tendency to connect 
political and generic change and to blame the Principate for literature’s decline.626 Through Maternus, 
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626 Cf. Giua 1985, 12. 
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he offers a compelling explanation for why political revolution should have caused generic and artistic 
decline, and we often take his view as received wisdom. Yet one of the merits of reading the Dialogus in 
conjunction with the other works is that it allows for different narratives and urges closer scrutiny of 
the relationship between political and cultural change.  
It is not until the Historiae that Tacitus explicitly mentions Actium as a watershed moment in 
Roman history and historiography. While he firmly ties the decline of historiography to the advent of 
the Principate, it at once becomes clear that the connection is not as strict as the language at first 
suggests. It has been noted that there is an inconsistency between Tacitus’ claim that Actium marks a 
turning point in Roman historiography and the fact that he does not start there but in the year 69. 
Whether he first chose his starting point and then set out to justify it (so Marincola) or whether his 
purpose is to pin the blame for historiography’s decline squarely on the Principate only to extricate 
himself from its implications (so Sailor),627 the language suggests that the effects of Actium set in only 
gradually: ueritas was broken first (primum) by inexperience with the new political order and, as time 
went on (mox), by flattery and malice. This process lasted several generations and was complete by 69, 
the year in which Tacitus’ narrative begins.628 In the preface of the Annales, Tacitus similarly identifies 
Actium as the turning point and, while there, too, he posits a gradual process of decline, he sees it as 
completed much earlier, toward the end of the Augustan regime, the starting point of that work. 
Marincola argues that the different computations are best understood as a strategy of presentation 
rather than a change of opinion.629 However that may be, I should like to stress the similarities in 
analysis in both prefaces. Rather than arguing that Actium ruined historiography at once, Tacitus 
suggests that social and generic development gradually follows shifts in power (postquam… omnem 
potentiam ad unum conferri). His description of Augustus’ measured solidification of power and the 
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628 Marincola 1999, 397-98 and n. 33.  
629 Marincola 1999, 398. 
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gradual decline in public morality (A. 1.1-4) underlines this view. This analysis of time and change is 
already at work in the Agricola and the Dialogus. In the former, Tacitus describes the moral decline of 
the senatorial class under Domitian and its recovery after Trajan’s succession as a gradual process (subit 
quippe etiam ipsius inertiae dulcedo, et inuisa primo desidia postremo amatur, 3.2).630 In the Dialogus, as we have 
seen, Aper and Messalla identify Cicero’s death as the event that changed eloquentia, but point to 
Severus’ oratory as the turning point in Roman style, a computation broadly in line with that at A. 1.1. 
As for the notion that the effects of major events set in gradually, we may further note that Messalla, 
though he argues that Roman education declined after Cicero’s death and ties this decline to moral 
degeneration, sees the latter as having spread only gradually (mala primum in urbe nata, mox per Italiam 
fusa, iam in provincias manant, 28.2). What emerges is that Tacitus, like other Romans, identifies change 
with major events or personalities, but that he avoids strict correlations, firm dichotomies, and 
schematic analyses. He hardly could omit Actium in a history of the early Principate, but his 
description of historiography’s gradual decline urges a reader not to view post-Actian Rome as a static 
entity, shaped definitively and absolutely in 31 BC. Seneca the Elder (like Messalla) drew the line at 
Cicero’s death and condemned post-Ciceronian ingenia altogether (Con. 10 pr. 6-7). Tacitus knew better.  
The Dialogus and the Historiae can be usefully read together regarding political transitions, both 
that from the Ciceronian into the Augustan period and that from the civil wars of 68-69 into the 
Flavian Principate. We have seen how the dialogue’s interlocutors advance competing views of these 
transitions and take up different stances toward imperial ideology, constructing different narratives and 
realities. The Historiae closely engage with the same issues, narrating a series of civil wars and the 
establishment of a new regime, which, like that of Augustus, was concerned with constructing its 
legitimacy and sanitizing its relationship with the past. The lex de imperio Vespasiani formalizes 
Vespasian’s imperial powers with reference to those of Augustus, Tiberius, and Claudius. The grant of 
																																																								
630 The Agricola also supports Tacitus’ computation at A. 1.1.2: among the decora ingenia who recounted the early years of the Augustan regime 
must still be included Livy, whom Tacitus characterizes as eloquentissimus at Agr. 10.3.  
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tribunician power and proconsular imperium maius to Titus followed Augustus’ elevation of Tiberius 
(and that of Agrippa, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, and Agrippa Posthumus). At A. 3.56.1, Tacitus writes 
that, starting with Augustus, the bestowal of tribunicia potestas became an official mark of a man’s 
designation as heir (summi fastigii uocabulum, A. 3.56.1; cf. 13.17; 15.65). Nerva and Trajan, narrowly 
avoiding a new civil war, followed the same procedure in 97, in part by sharing tribunicia potestas. Nerva 
explicitly followed Vespasian’s modus operandi, as Pliny the Younger attests (simul filius, simul Caesar, mox 
Imperator, et consors tribuniciae potestatis, et omnia pariter, et statim factus es: quae proxime parens uerus tantum in 
alterum filium contulit, Pan. 8.6). The founders of Rome’s first three imperial dynasties largely adopted the 
same strategy in navigating the transition between civil war and peace. Hence Tacitus’ analysis of the 
civil wars of 68-69 and the establishment of Vespasian’s rule bears meaningfully on the transition from 
the Republic into the Principate and on the advent of the Trajanic regime. 
In light of these considerations, Tacitus’ starting point is significant. His decision to include the 
events of the years 68-69 is motivated by the fact that Flavian historians had distorted the Flavians’ 
role in the civil wars, emphasizing their care for peace and country (H. 2.101). The glossing over the 
disruption and the distortion of the victors’ motives will have followed official versions propagated by 
the regime, which echo Augustan propaganda (note esp. Aug., RG 1-3; Vell. 2.89; SCPP 47; Tac., A. 
1.8-9). By including the civil wars and not glossing over the Flavian involvement (this is the implication 
of his claim to be free from motives of flattery), Tacitus at once reveals that the present work will take 
a critical, inward look at imperial ideology.631  
One of the justifying arguments for the Principate’s existence, as Maternus told us, is that it 
offers general peace and order, whereas the late Republic was marked by continuous strife and unrest. 
Including the civil wars in a history of the Flavian Principate takes issue with this vision and at once 
underlines that the Principate in fact had not guaranteed peace. Where imperial regimes gloss over the 
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disruption of war and sharply distinguish between the latter and the subsequent peace, Tacitus 
emphatically removes such distinctions: “I approach a work rich in disasters, harsh in battles, rent by 
seditions, vicious even in peace” (opus adgredior opimum casibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam 
pace saeuom, H. 1.2.1). In the summary of disasters and exempla that follows, there is no distinction 
between those produced in war and those produced during peace (note plerumque permixta, H. 1.2.1). 
The inversion of social values during civil war continued in peace: nobility, wealth, and display of merit 
were grounds for accusations and the activity of delatores posed the same threats as civil war (1.2.3), a 
notion that recurs in the Annales. The impression of continued crisis is reinforced by the organization 
of the rest of the preface (1.4-11), which is ordered geographically, not chronologically. Tacitus thus 
announces that he will merge Principate with civil war, which is exactly what happens when the wars 
are over: “after Vitellius’ death it was more the case that war had stopped than that peace had started” 
(interfecto Vitellio bellum magis desierat quam pax coeperat, 4.1.1).632 The preface of the Historiae reveals the 
work to be concerned with exploring socio-political change and transition and, as such, takes up one 
of the principal issues explored in the Dialogus. It is extremely unfortunate that we have lost the books 
that narrated Vespasian’s regime and the rest of the Flavian dynasty. Nonetheless, the extant Historiae 
recount the way four emperors, in a crisis in which values, meanings, symbols, and expectations are 
turned upside down and confused, navigate the crisis and construct their position vis-à-vis the 
Republic, the Julio-Claudian Principate, the immediate Neronian past, and one another. Just as the 
dialogue demonstrates that different narratives and realities are possible, depending on one’s analysis 
of time and reconstruction of the past, so the Historiae show how different emperors make sense of 
their present based on their perceptions of the past. And just as the dialogue points up the drawbacks 
in analyzing change in too broad or rigid terms (especially by narrowly associating values and 
institutions with major personalities or events), so the Historiae show why, in a context of transition 
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and shifting expectations, Galba, Piso, and Vitellius fail and Otho (initially) and Vespasian (ultimately) 
succeed. One essential ingredient of success, as it emerges, is the ability to carefully apply the lessons 
of history to one’s present.  
 
IV.5.3  Galba: Imposing Radical Change 
Galba’s adoption of Piso is recounted at H. 1.12 ff.633 Tacitus grants Galba a rare speech in 
oratio recta, in which the princeps explains his rationale for adoption over hereditary succession and for 
choosing Piso over Otho. The speech, which does not appear in the parallel tradition, probably was 
Tacitus’ own invention and had obvious relevance for his contemporary readers. It is accorded great 
significance within the narrative of Book One.634 Although the loss of many Roman texts and 
documents, in particular Nerva’s adoption speech, hampers our understanding of Tacitus’ account and 
its relationship to the events of 97, it is evident from Pliny’s Panegyricus (e.g. 5.2) that, after Nerva’s 
successful adoption of Trajan, the idea of adoption was perceived as less problematic than the 
selection of a suitable candidate. My focus here is on how Galba’s speech and the surrounding 
narrative illustrate the princeps’ failure to grasp the realities of power in the city. 
Galba justifies the practice of adoption by drawing sharp chronological distinctions. He argues 
that Rome has long accepted the necessity of the Principate: the Republic is past and the burden of the 
Empire requires a single ruler. Whereas under Tiberius, Caligula, and Claudius the state had passed 
from one family member to another, as though it belonged to them, Galba will create a new 
configuration, in which the sitting princeps chooses his successor from the body politic as a whole. 
While he draws a distinction between the Julio-Claudian Principate and his own proposed system, he 
cannot claim to be going back to the Republic, which is a dead letter. Instead, his new government will 
																																																								
633 The literature on Galba’s succession speech is extensive. On the speeches in the Historiae, see Sage 1990, 920-926; Keitel 1991 and 
1993; Levene 1999 and 2009. See Keitel 1991 and 1993 for an examination of their function and mutual responsion. Ullmann 1927, 
202-05 treats the rhetorical aspects of these speeches. On Galba’s short period in power, see Ash 1999, 73-83; Morgan 2006, 31-56. 
634 Cf. Klaassen 2014, 73-75 (with plentiful references) on the techniques Tacitus uses to draw attention to the speech. 
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offer Romans a substitute for libertas (loco libertatis), which consists of having the opportunity to 
reinvent themselves at each new accession instead of being passed down passively as the property 
(quasi hereditatis) of the principes.635 This claim is significant in light of the preface, where Tacitus stressed 
that after Actium the res populi Romani became the emperor’s res priuata. Galba seeks to break with Julio-
Claudian precedent to put in its place something that approximates republican libertas. 
As H. Haynes shows, while Galba recognizes that Rome cannot return to the Republic and 
breaks ideologically with the Julio-Claudians, his actions do not live up to his claims: “his precepts are 
informed by the former and haunted by the latter.”636 Galba’s claim to be making the process of 
succession a public affair is undermined by the fact that it is conducted privately.637 Furthermore, his 
choice of successor does not accord with his chronological schema. His preference for Piso, on 
account of the man’s ancestry and old-fashioned demeanor, shows him to be steeped in republican 
values, and he elects an heir who, like himself, belongs squarely in the Republic. Indications 
throughout the narrative of the widespread displeasure with Galba’s own stern character, which does 
not accord with the recent Neronian spirit and the leniencies of civil war, makes the selection of a man 
who closely resembles him highly dubious. Finally, while Galba claims to be following Augustan 
precedent, the contrast between Augustus’ chosen successor, a seasoned military commander and 
politician, and Galba’s favorite, a man who had been exiled and had not gained any meaningful 
political experience, suggests that the princeps has shockingly misconstrued the past.  
The holes in Galba’s configuration are evidenced further by the shiftiness with which he uses 
the term libertas throughout his speech. His claim that Piso will bring fides, libertas, and amicitia to the job 
(aside from being an oversimplification of the qualities required of a princeps), does not accord with his 
aim to be establishing something loco libertatis. At the end of his speech, he advises Piso that he will rule 
																																																								
635 H. Haynes 2003, 50. 
636 H. Haynes 2003, 52.  
637 I.e. in a comitia imperii (H. 1.14.1). Cf. Damon 2003 ad loc.: “comitia, properly of an assembly of the populus Romanus… real comitia 
were crucial institutions of popular sovereignty during the Republic but in the Principate (as T. describes it) the term rings hollow.”  
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a people “who can neither endure compete slavery nor complete freedom” (nec totam seruitutem pati 
possunt nec totam libertatem). Piso’s prolonged exile would not seem to have prepared him to display the 
various applications of libertas that Tacitus highlights throughout his works. Moreover, the three uses 
of the term libertas have different meanings: first, a generic marker of conduct, but otherwise 
undefined; next, an aspect that marks the Julio-Claudian Principate and that Galba now aims to replace 
with a substitute; finally, libertas as an absolute term defined by its opposite, tota seruitus. What emerges 
is a flimsy justification for the choice of a candidate supported with an argument that does not hold 
together. As Haynes puts it, “though he intuits the political climate, which depends upon the notion of 
libertas as the lack of uetus res publica, he does not fully understand that changing it is not a matter of 
calling attention to it in order to announce something new.”638 Indeed, later in the narrative, Tacitus 
has Otho criticize Galba precisely for misusing language in this manner (1.37.4). Finally, Galba’s advice 
to Piso to act as he would wish other principes to act betrays ignorance of the nature of the Principate 
and presupposes more freedom in a princeps’ conduct than that system of government allows for.639 We 
may see Galba’s misguided advice in part as reflecting the lack of a formalized set of ‘rules’ about what 
was required of a princeps, about how the latter ought to act and how, in turn, his subjects ought to act 
toward him. The Res Gestae, the lex de imperio Vespasiani, Tacitus’ Agricola, and Pliny’s Panegyricus each 
constitute attempts at clarifying these rules and expectations.640 The extant books of the Historiae 
demonstrate the difficulty for emperors and their subjects to navigate political transition and analyze 
shifting expectations.  
Galba’s naïve perception of socio-political transition is evidenced further by his inelastic stance 
toward the Neronian past and his rejection of Otho as his adopted heir. Galba’s promotion of a firm 
																																																								
638 H. Haynes 2003, 53. 
639 Seneca’s explanation to Cato that it does not matter whether Pompey or Caesar wins, since the victor is unable not to be worse (non 
potest non peior esse qui uincerit, Ep. 14.13), shows sensitivity to the impact of absolute power on an individual’s conduct.  
640 To these documents and texts we may add the senatus consultum de Pisone patre and the tabula Siarensis, which reveal shifts in what 
acceptable senatorial conduct looks like. The continued emergence of these texts and documents, which notably do not show up 
during the later Principate, reflects the efforts of the early Principate to figure out its existence.  
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break with the Julio-Claudians includes promoting a government wholly opposed to the Neronian 
regime. Tacitus, describing the strife amongst Galba’s intimates Vinius, Laco, and Icelus, carefully 
records Galba’s attitude towards Nero and Otho. Vinius promoted the latter, while Laco and Icelus 
worked against him. Galba, says Tacitus, was aware of the amicitia between Vinius and Otho, and 
rumors circulated that the former planned on marrying the latter to his widowed daughter, making the 
one son-in-law and the other father-in-law (neque erat Galbae ignota Othonis ac Titi Vinii amicitia; et 
rumoribus nihil silentio transmittentium, quia Vinio uidua filia, caelebs Otho, gener ac socer destinabantur, 1.13.2). 
Unlike Plutarch, who records this plan as fact (G. 21.1), Tacitus describes it as a rumor, pointing up the 
confusion dominating the capital at this time. The connection between Vinius and Otho was one 
reason for Galba to pass over the latter. The combination gener and socer evokes the alliance between 
Pompey and Caesar, famously described with these words by Catullus (29.24), and suggests that Galba 
prudently used lessons of history to avoid similar ties, and potential conflict, between Vinius and 
Otho.641 The subsequent account, however, shows him to be misguided in his analysis of current social 
attitudes and in rejecting Otho. Indeed, an additional reason for Galba to pass over Otho is that he 
resembles Nero and that, so Galba assumes, if a break with the Neronian reign is to be actualized, 
adopting Otho is the wrong way to go. Tacitus next offers a succinct sketch of Otho’s character, 
which in part justifies Galba’s suspicions but at the same time shows the latter to be unaware of 
popular sentiment and the realities of power. Tacitus already told us (H. 1.4-7) about the instability of 
social attitudes towards Nero – amongst the soldiers and the different social strata – and hence warned 
against overhauling the system too swiftly and decidedly. Galba does not see this and misses what is 
crucial: that most of the soldiers favored Otho and that Nero’s court, too, inclined to him because he 
was like him (fauentibus plerisque militum, prona in eum aula Neronis ut similem, 1.13.4).642 Nero’s suicide left a 
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obligation to one of his own advisers.   
642 Galba’s disregard for the portents that warn against Piso’s adoption (H. 1.18.1) solidifies the impression that he misses essential 
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vacuum in which each of the pretenders to the purple needed to connect, in some way, with the recent 
past, as opposed to breaking away from it completely.643 The Dialogus and the preface of the Historiae 
prepare a reader to scrutinize the realities constructed by the emperors and their associates. Galba’s 
principal failure lies in his unawareness that social attitudes do not change overnight. His blindness to 
this truth is poignant given his own inability to adjust his stance toward the praetorians and his failure 
to enforce different rules.    
 
IV.5.4  Otho: Delicate Balancing  
While Piso, like Galba, attempts to break with the past and refuses to acknowledge current 
realities (his speech at H. 1.29-30 shows that, like Galba, he makes naïve assessments, glosses over 
disagreeable realities with agreeable language, and unwittingly reveals that the adoption has offered 
nothing in place of the uacua nomina “Republic,” “Senate,” and “People”), Otho proves himself more 
aware of the complexities of socio-political change and hence more flexible.644 He adroitly exploits the 
moment of transition (opportunos magnis conatibus transitus rerum, 1.21.2) by hovering in the middle and 
not explicitly aligning himself with any particular regime or side. Aware of the impracticability of a 
radical break with the past, he exploits his perceived links with the Neronian regime, while “invoking 
only the shadow of Nero with his resemblance to him.”645 Where Galba, in a context of trauma and 
disorientation, imposes and alienates, Otho carefully entices. So, when marching with the soldiers, he 
evokes the memory of their former princeps (memoria Neroniani comitatus) by calling them contubernales and 
complaining about the rigorous discipline imposed on them by Galba. In doing so, he carefully 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
things. It was a republican custom to break off an election in such circumstances. We would expect the old-fashioned man to 
conform to ancient custom, but he once more proves himself inconsistent. Cf. H. 1.27.1, 1.29.1.  
643 Cf. H. Haynes 2003, 54: “Not only does the crowd not accept Galba because it prefers the easier image of life that Nero in some 
respects provided, Nero also represents what makes it possible to go on believing in a positive form of political reality, or gives 
positive shape to the abyss of anarchy that confronts the populace now that he and his dynasty are over. Nero as specter provides the 
link in the symbolic chain between Julio-Claudian and Flavian rule, which throughout the Histories comes close to breaking.” 
644 It is notable that Piso’s speech largely depends on moral arguments as opposed to arguments of expediency: Levene 1999, 209. On 
Piso’s misguided views and flawed speech, cf. also Morgan 2006, 66-67. On Otho’s short reign, see Ash 1999, 83-94; Morgan 2006, 
91-111. 
645 H. Haynes 2003, 55.  
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constructs an image of himself that reminds them of their easy service under Nero (1.23), an image he 
then feeds by bribing and sympathizing with the soldiers (1.25). He employs a similar strategy when 
addressing the praetorians (1.37-38), claiming that he is not sure how he has presented himself up to 
this stage (quis ad uos processerim commilitones, dicere non possum, 1.37.1). Moreover, he carefully undermines 
Galba’s claims, not least by stressing that the latter’s freedman Icelus already has amassed more than 
Polyclitus, Vatinius, and Egnatius, notorious Neronian freedmen. Without explicitly referencing Nero, 
he shows Galba’s anti-Neronian claims to be hollow. While his view of the future is shortsighted, 
Otho knows how to play to the tastes of his audience, a skill singled out by Messalla at D. 30.5: ad 
utilitatem temporum, cum uoluptate audientium possit. 
Once in power and a slave to the armies that elevated him, Otho’s stance gradually begins to 
reveal inconsistencies. While he continues to muster support (among other things, through careful 
appointments: H. 2.77-78), he evidently struggles to maintain the liminal status he has cultivated so far. 
According to Plutarch and Suetonius, he begins to actively align himself with Nero – appointing 
Neronian officials, financing further construction of the domus aurea, planning on marrying Nero’s 
former wife Statilia Messalina, and sending documents under the name “Otho Nero” – and that 
eventually he ceased these efforts because they offended important men.646 Tacitus has a different 
emphasis: it was believed (creditus est) that Otho had suggested celebrating Nero’s memory; some set up 
statues of Nero, while on certain days the people and soldiers called him “Nero Otho” in an attempt 
to honor him. Otho, says Tacitus, kept the matter undecided, afraid to forbid these things or ashamed 
to acknowledge them (1.78.2). While Damon (2003 ad loc.) suggests that Tacitus omits Otho’s agency 
either to preserve the “honouring Nero” theme for Vitellius (2.95.1) or to keep Otho’s characterization 
consistent, I suspect that it also serves to highlight the difficulty for any princeps and his subjects to 
perceive meaning and social attitudes in a context of confusion and shifting expectations: Otho, while 
																																																								
646 Damon 2003, 256-57 for references and commentary. 
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trying to avoid it, gives the impression that he aligns himself with Nero.647 The mismatch between 
imperial presentation and popular reception is also evident from the fact that Otho, despite his delicate 
strategies to deal with public perception, inspired fear and mistrust (2.31.1). As the Agricola, the 
Dialogus, and the early narrative of the Historiae show, in imperial Rome social attitudes and values are 
fickle and difficult, if not impossible, to grasp, particularly during civil war. Neither Galba nor Otho 
ultimately succeeds in doing so. 
 Otho’s position remains shaky, and Tacitus gradually shows him to be less able to speak in his 
own voice, as he slowly takes to parroting Augustan ideology.648 In his speech to the praetorians after 
their nighttime riot (1.80-82) Otho glosses over the inevitable collapse of discipline, while his praise of 
the senate as the body on which the state depends has no place in a struggle in which matters are 
decided by legions and praetorians (1.83-84). In particular, his claim that the endurance of the Empire, 
global peace, his own safety, and that of the praetorians depends on the senate’s security, and that the 
latter has continued unharmed from Romulus into the Principate shows him using Augustan ideology 
to construct a reality that does not exist (1.84.3-4). The next chapter, describing the senate’s flattery 
and dissimulation, at once undermines his claims. He virtually repeats himself before setting out for 
battle, enlarging on the dignity of the state, the consensus between the senate and people, and the 
ignorance, as opposed to the audacity, of the Vitellian legions (H. 1.90.1-2). Otho started as an 
independent voice cleverly navigating his way to the purple but ends up talking like a Julio-Claudian. 
That he has his speech composed for him by an experienced orator (Galerius Trachalus), who knows 
exactly what the senate wants to hear, ironically makes him resemble Nero, who had Seneca write his 
speech for him at Claudius’ deification (A. 13.3). Whereas under Nero the senators could still see 
through Seneca’s words, on this occasion they are wholly taken in: they slavishly flatter Otho and see 
him off as though he were Caesar or Augustus (quasi dictatorem Caesarem aut imperatorem Augustum 
																																																								
647 His destruction of Tigellinus (H. 1.72) and restoration of Poppaea’s statues (H. 1.78.2) likely contributed to this impression. 
648 H. Haynes 2003, 4-7. 
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prosequerentur, H. 1.90.3). Thus the supposed continuity of Roman institutions is matched by a 
concomitant decline in morality. It perhaps should be noted here that in the extant books of the 
Historiae oratorical skill often is used by morally corrupt characters to persuade listeners of futile and 
destructive policies, a notion that complicates the discussion in the Dialogus of the role of eloquentia in 
imperial Rome and its connection with uirtus. In the Historiae, the ideal of the uir bonus dicendi peritus has 
all but crashed.649  
 
IV.5.5  Vitellius: Misunderstanding Past, Present, and Future 
Tacitus’ Vitellius fails in nearly every way to establish himself, being insensitive to historical 
precedent, failing to navigate the present, and being careless about the future (praeterita instantia futura 
pari obliuione dimiserat, 3.36.1).650 Of particular interest for this chapter is the way he unwittingly 
associates himself with different personalities of the past, evoking memories and establishing 
connections that work against him. For instance, he takes the title “Germanicus” (1.62.2) and bestows 
the same title on his little son while parading him in front of the legions dressed in the paludamentum 
(formerly a general’s cloak but now a symbol of imperial power) and invested with imperial insignia 
(2.59.3). The title “Germanicus” implied victory in Germania, a precarious claim given Rome’s 
persistent struggles with Germanic tribes. Second, “Germanicus” was an emotive and prestigious 
cognomen of the Julio-Claudian family, originally awarded to Tiberius’ dead brother Drusus and his 
descendants by the senate (Suet., Cl. 1.3). Third, it evoked the memory of the actual Germanicus, even 
more so because, just as the latter had his little son Caligula with him on the Rhine front, dressed in 
miniature military outfit (Suet., Cal. 9), so Vitellius parades his little “Germanicus” in front of his men. 
These associations do not work in his or his son’s favor. The title “Germanicus,” promoted in his 
letters and on his coinage, evidently was hollow when it came to his character: even his own mother is 
																																																								
649 Levene 1999, 214-15.  
650 On Vitellius’ short reign, see Ash 1999, 95-126; Morgan 2006, 139-69. 
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recorded as saying, after receiving a first letter from him, that she “had born a Vitellius, not a 
Germanicus” (2.64.2). As for grooming the little “Germanicus” for succession, the implications are 
more unsettling. Vitellius shows himself ignorant of Roman custom, for it was traditional for a son to 
cover himself with a cloak at his father’s funeral (Plut., Mor. 267a).651 Moreover, the boy evidently 
could not compete with Vespasian’s sons Titus and Domitian, making his designation as heir apparent 
dubious at best. Finally, the title did not help the son, for he was swiftly executed by Mucianus (H. 
4.80.1), likely in part due to his conspicuous name (cf. H. 3.66.2).  
If his naïve employment of the title “Germanicus” makes Vitellius seem unaware of historical 
precedent, present realities, and future hazards, so does the way he positions himself. While the title 
“Germanicus” aligns him firmly (though unrealistically) with the Julio-Claudians, he refuses the titles 
of “Augustus” and “Caesar” even while assuming the powers associated with them (H. 2.62.2). After 
the collapse of the Othonian cause, Vitellius, now clearly a Caesar but not identifying himself as such, 
approaches the capital cloaked and on horseback – as though Rome were a captive city – before, on 
advice of the senators with him, disingenuously continuing on foot wearing only a toga (H. 2.89). On 
the same day, he bestows on his mother the title “Augusta”(2.89.2), linking him with Tiberius (Livia) 
and Claudius (Antonia), while on the next day he again refuses the title “Augustus” before accepting it 
under pressure of the people, revealing complete ignorance of popular perceptions (2.90.2). It is not 
until his cause is lost that he is said to finally assume the title “Caesar,” out of fear and superstition 
(3.58.2). At this stage, Vitellius is so out of touch with reality that his soldiers have to remind him that 
he is a princeps (3.62.2). The confusing misalignment between his actual powers and his self-identity is 
worsened by his open admiration for Nero, which he fosters both by his own conduct and by 
performing funeral rites for Nero in the Campus Martius. What is more, he has the sacrifices 
performed by the Augustales, a priesthood dedicated by Tiberius to the Julian family, just as Romulus 
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had once done for king Tatius (2.95.1). These actions disgusted members of the nobility. Vitellius’ 
schizophrenic self-positioning, his inability to grasp current perceptions, and his lethargic, Neronian 
conduct did not promote a clear stance toward the republican, Julio-Claudian, and Neronian past, and 
it is unsurprising that, first, Caecina and Bassus betray him and that, soon thereafter, the senate, 
people, and soldiers abandon him.  
Like Galba and Otho, then, Vitellius fails to navigate the present and to fill the traumatic void 
left by Nero’s death. Tacitus describes all three as having different perceptions of the past and present 
and as constructing different realities. One purpose of the narrative, as it unfolds, is to demonstrate, as 
the Dialogus had done, that different versions and realities are indeed possible, not only for 
contemporary actors but also for the reader. Tacitus’ style and content in part serve to replicate the 
difficulty that the emperors and the onlookers (and the reader now) had in creating meaning and 
identity in a society that, even in peace, inevitably was a construct, one in which rules and expectations 
rarely were well defined and values never absolute. In this respect, the Agricola and the Dialogus, in 
narrating how Agricola and the interlocutors navigate the changing values, concepts, and meanings 
under the Principate, has prepared a reader to expect a similar mental exercise in the historical works. 
As we have seen, one way to analyze the present and anticipate the future is by carefully scrutinizing 
the past. The Dialogus shows the interlocutors attempting to make sense of contemporary oratory and 
society in part by constructing divergent narratives and associating change with different individuals 
and/or events. Similarly, in his historical works, Tacitus traces how the actors in his narrative (fail to) 
analyze and use the past to make sense of their present. Where Galba, Otho, and Vitellius reveal 
themselves to be unaware of or careless about historical lessons, Vespasian and Mucianus, as it 
emerges, turn out to be much better ‘historians.’652 
																																																								
652 Mucianus’ attention to historical precedent is intriguing in light of his later literary career, which included, inter alia, memoirs of 
Vespasian’s eastern campaigns and a volume devoted to ‘memorabilia,’ used extensively by Pliny the Elder in the Nat. On Mucianus as 
a source for Pliny, see Baldwin 1995, 291-301.  
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Tacitus is concerned to stress the historical lessons and precedents missed by Vitellius and his 
advisers. Awareness of Rome’s civil war past would have told Vitellius that entering the capital in 
military cloak and on horseback, as a conqueror, was unlikely to promote peace and consensus. His 
ignorance stands out against the terror of the senate, knights, and people, who anxiously recall the civil 
wars and the times Rome had been taken by its own generals (H. 1.50). He displays similar insensitivity 
to Rome’s past when, as pontifex maximus, he does not observe the religious proprieties on the 18th of 
July, the anniversary of the defeat of the Fabii by the Etruscans from Veii (477 BC) and Rome’s defeat 
at the hands of the Allia Gauls (390 BC): “so ignorant was he of all civil and religious precedent” (adeo 
omnis humani diuinique iuris expers, 2.91.1). Tacitus carefully records it when people notice Vitellius 
ignoring precedent. So, when Rosius Regulus completed the single day that was left of the consulship 
of the traitor Caecina, experienced men noted that an unlawful election of this sort had never occurred 
before and connected it with a similar event during Caesar’s dictatorship, when Caninius Rebilus was 
consul for a single day and “the rewards of civil war had to be distributed in haste” (3.37.2).653 The 
passage shows how Romans tend to analyze present events in light of analogous events in the past and 
underlines the fact that it was crucial to be mindful of public perception. Such passages also serve to 
remind readers to pay attention to the details, not only in reading the narrative but in analyzing their 
own present. 
A final example concerns a misremembering of past events that has destructive consequences 
for the City. When Vitellius agrees with Flavius Sabinus to a peaceful surrender, his advisers convince 
him to persist, on the theory that, should he surrender, Vespasian inevitably will execute him and his 
family: after all, they claimed, “Pompey was not left unharmed by Caesar, nor Antony by Augustus” 
(non a Caesare Pompeium, non ab Augusto Antonium incolumis relictos, H. 3.66.2). The claims are inaccurate, 
and Tacitus is clear about the import of knowing one’s history: “if Vitellius had been able to change 
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the minds of his partisans as easily as he had himself yielded, Vespasian’s army would have entered the 
city without bloodshed” (quod si tam facile suorum mentis flexisset Vitellius, quam ipse cesserat, incruentam urbem 
Vespasiani exercitus intrasset, H. 3.66.1).654  
 
IV.5.6  Vespasian and Mucianus: Good ‘Historians’   
Like historians, Vespasian and Mucianus, while awaiting events, ‘read’ their rivals’ failures from 
hindsight. Though by no means sanitizing Flavian policies, Tacitus shows how Vespasian and 
Mucianus successfully navigate the transition from civil war to peace, avoiding some of the errors 
committed by Galba, Otho, and Vitellius and constructing an attractive reality.655 As emerges from the 
narrative, Vespasian’s success is based on several closely connected factors. One was the careful 
promotion of his rise to power as the result of fortuna. The Flavians actively promote Vespasian’s 
divine backing,656 capitalizing on the superstitio sparked both by the omens presaging his Principate 
(2.78) and by his healing miracles in Alexandria (4.81), and using this as a mechanism to shape a new 
role for the princeps as a leader in whom subjects could believe.657 The impact of this ideology evidently 
was powerful. Tacitus, in hindsight, admits that he himself, along with everyone else, believed (after 
the fact) that Vespasian’s victory was divinely sanctioned (occulta fati et ostentis ac responsis destinatum 
Vespasiano liberisque eius imperium post fortunam credidimus, H. 1.10.3). Romans had a history of thinking of 
civil war as a type of divine punishment (e.g. Cic., Marc. 18; Tac., H. 1.3.2, 1.18.1, 2.38.2, 4.3.3, 4.54.2) 
and of seeing the winner in such conflicts as divinely favored. So Caesar, so Augustus, and so 
Vespasian. As Damon notes, Flavian propaganda apparently was effective in getting the divine aspect 
of Vespasian’s rise to power into the historical record.658 The most forceful promotion of Vespasian’s 
																																																								
654 Of course, Vitellius, his brother, and his son are indeed murdered, but only after they had continued the war. 
655 On the start of Vespasian’s reign, see Levick 1999, 43-123; cf. Ash 1999, 127 ff. 
656 This seems to be in part the design of Titus’ trip to the temple of Paphian Venus on Cyprus (2.2-4.1) and of Vespasian’s trips to 
Carmel (2.78) and the temple of Serapis (4.82-84).  
657 On this aspect of Flavian imperial ideology, see H. Haynes 2003, 112-47. Cf. Ash 2007a, 73-77.  




divine favor was in the reconstruction of the Capitol (4.53). The ceremony was carefully staged and 
highly charged symbolically, restoration and continuity being the principal theme, and its impact was 
made stronger by the fact that Vespasian himself was not in Rome at the time.659   
Being absent allowed Vespasian slowly to shape reality and his position vis-à-vis the senate, 
easing the transition after three emperors wrenched the capital around within a single year. His letter to 
the senate shows him deliberately speaking with both authority and deference: “Vespasian’s letter, 
written as though the war was still ongoing, raised the senate’s zeal. That is how it looked at first. But 
he spoke like a princeps, modest about himself, and outstandingly about the res publica” (addidere 
alacritatem Vespasiani litterae tamquam manente bello scriptae. ea prima specie forma; ceterum ut princeps loquebatur, 
ciuilia de se, et rei publicae egregia, 4.3.4). As H. Haynes notes, if Vespasian thinks the war is not yet over, 
he technically speaks as a general in the field deferring authority to the senate.660 This stance is 
designed to placate the civil government and illustrates how rhetoric shapes reality. Vespasian knows 
the war is over: “the letter summarizes the old Augustan problem: how to rule and defer ruling at the 
same time.”661  
Vespasian delicately shaped his position vis-à-vis the Julio-Claudian and recent past. The lex de 
imperio Vespasiani allows us an insight into how he reconstructed the past and shaped the present.662 
Vespasian proceeds along the same lines as Tacitus does in the Dialogus, drawing particular 
chronological and conceptual divides. So he does not set his reign against a unified Julio-Claudian past 
but, removing Caligula, Nero, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius,663 aligns himself with ‘good’ predecessors 
only: ergo continuity but with good elements only. While this ideology was powerful and evidently 
																																																								
659 Trajan, too, upon becoming princeps, stayed away from Rome during the initial political transition. When he was informed about 
Nerva’s death (which occurred on 28 January 98), he stayed in Lower Germany until the summer, before moving to the Danube to 
begin preparations for the Dacian War. Only in the autumn of 99 did he return to Rome.   
660 H. Haynes 2003, 153. 
661 H. Haynes 2003, 153. 
662 On the nature of the lex de imperio Vespasiani and the powers conferred on Vespasian, see Brunt 1977, 95-116. 
663 While Caligula’s memory never was condemned officially and his acta remained valid, his absence in the lex seems a striking 
condemnation. Nero, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius were condemned officially. Galba’s memory was restored soon after Vespasian’s 
accession, but evidently not before the adoption of the lex. Cf. Brunt 1977, 104. 
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effective, the senatorial debates and Flavian measures recorded at H. 4.6-8 and 4.40-44, and the license 
enjoyed by the Flavian troops in the city, reminded the senate (and the reader) that the establishment 
of imperial power was a delicate balancing act: even under a welcome princeps like Vespasian there were 
restrictions on libertas. That was the nature of the Principate, as Eprius Marcellus knew.   
 Marcellus’ speech at H. 4.8 is significant for connecting the Dialogus and the Historiae, for what 
he basically says is that rhetoric creates the present and that history (or at least his personal history) 
does not matter; he remembers and even admires past regimes, but what matters is the present. His 
comments about restrictions on libertas (something Tacitus would utter in propria persona) problematize 
the Flavian construct and show his awareness of the reality behind it. His words also point up the 
urgency to buy into that construct, by adjusting one’s conduct and, to some extent, by ‘forgetting’ 
history. This is what Helvidius Priscus, the praetor urbanus dominating events in the senate at this 
time, does not appreciate. His attachment to old-fashioned libertas is underlined by Tacitus (H. 4.5) and 
Marcellus (H. 4.8.3), who stress his connection with Thrasea (his adopted father-in-law) and his 
attachment to Brutus and Cato (4.8.3; cf. A. 16.22.2). Marcellus’ rhetorical power and political 
experience allow him (for the moment) to navigate the transition, whereas Helvidius, misapplying 
historical exempla to a reality that does not accommodate them, misconstrues present realities. His 
conduct here foreshadows his destruction in 75. Marcellus’ words further suggest that, since the 
present is a rhetorical construct, one can construct one’s own position within that present as well; on 
this view, being eloquens is an essential element of political success and survival.  
 The senatorial business recounted at H. 4.6-8 directly evokes Aper’s comments on the same 
events at D. 5.7 as well as Maternus’ comments about Marcellus at D. 13.4, inviting us to read those 
passages in conjunction. There are also plain connections between H. 2.10, on Vibius Crispus’ 
character and position in the state, and his portrait at D. 8. Aper, who holds up Marcellus and Crispus 
as the preeminent pleaders of his time, alludes to the former’s quarrel with Helvidius, stressing how his 
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eloquentia and loyalty to the regime helped him overcome his inexperienced opponent. Aper builds on 
this example to characterize Marcellus and Crispus as archetypical delatores whose oratorical and 
financial success and favor with the princeps exemplify modern oratory and a particular stance toward 
the regime. The dramatic date of the dialogue (ca. 75) reminds a reader of Helvidius’ imminent demise 
and at first would seem to underscore Aper’s reconstruction.  
But, just as the dialogue shows that different reconstructions and realities are possible, so 
Maternus’ counterargument about Marcellus and Crispus problematizes Aper’s reality. On Maternus’ 
view, their position is unstable and precarious, depending as it is on the favor of the sitting princeps and 
his associates. Indeed, as the lost portions of the Historiae will have recorded, while Marcellus emerged 
from the senatorial attacks in 70 unscathed and remained a powerful official in the Flavian court, in 79 
he suddenly fell out of favor and was destroyed (Dio 65.16.3-4). Marcellus’ fate and the contrary 
fortune of Crispus, who would flourish into the Domitianic regime, points up the frailty of power that 
does not stand on its own but is dependent on that of others (cf. n. 514). The dramatic juxtaposition 
between Marcellus’ position in the dialogue (at the height of his powers) and his imminent demise (of 
which the reader knows but Aper is ignorant) underscores the unpredictability of shifts in power and 
an onlooker’s inability (in this case that of Aper and Marcellus) to anticipate them. The examples of 
Helvidius and Marcellus, who occupy different stances toward the regime and nonetheless both are 
destroyed (Maternus’ destruction is hinted at in the text as well), point up one of the major premises of 
the dialogue: that there is no single, essential reconstruction or reality, and that it is impossible to gain 
an airtight understanding of a princeps and his motivations, in part because his regime is a construct and 
does not perfectly reflect reality. It is perhaps for this reason that Tacitus is compelled to ask (at A. 
4.20.3) whether it is due to fate or chance of birth that emperors incline favorably to some and take 
offense at others, or whether the right policy or conduct can allow one to steer clear from imperial 
hostility. We have seen that Agricola’s life is presented as typifying the second option. Yet even he was 
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oppressed and possibly murdered by his princeps.  
 
IV.5.7  The Historian: Challenging Tidy Reconstructions and Imperial Ideology  
The techniques used by the Flavians to build the image of their legitimacy depend on dealing 
with and reconstructing the past the way Tacitus does in the Dialogus. While Tacitus shows how the 
Flavians succeed in constructing an attractive reality – one he himself initially bought into – he 
complicates it by recording the greed, ambition, and violence of the victors. His emphasis on the 
disruption of war and the continuation of violence into Vespasian’s regime assimilates civil war and 
Principate, exposing the distortion promoted by the Flavians and collapsing the distance between 
reality and representation. The narrative cuts right through imperial ideology, as Tacitus had 
announced in the preface, and encourages readers to apply a more nuanced analysis to the past and to 
their own Trajanic present. This is salutary for several reasons. Imperial regimes evidently were 
successful in distorting reality and getting favorable versions into the historical record. Their ability to 
do so can be explained both by the pressure on their subjects to flatter and write favorable accounts 
and by the nature of memory, which is selective and tends to operate in neat patterns and connections. 
Since they appear logical, linear narratives are readily absorbed and believed, and it is in part for this 
reason that imperial ideology works. One aim of Tacitus’ writings is to work against distortion and to 
promote more ‘truthful’ and critical accounts of Rome’s political and cultural history. This, as we have 
seen, is one of the purposes of the Dialogus. A closely associated aim lies in historiography’s utility for 
the contemporary reader. By writing complex narratives that ask much from readers in the way of 
analysis and interpretation, the latter come away not only with a more nuanced understanding of 
Rome’s past but with a better understanding of their own present and future. This in turn is tied to 
social behavior. For it is the uncritical acquiescence in the narratives propagated by the regime that 
facilitates the indoctrinated, servile conduct that Tacitus despises in imperial Rome. Throughout his 
	
	 275 
historical works, Tacitus illustrates how characters in the narrative fail to understand their present and 
misinterpret history. Of course, the historian and the reader, looking back in hindsight, have a distinct 
advantage over the actors in the narrative. At times, Tacitus will digress from his narrative to correct 
the analysis of his characters, drawing together aspects or pointing out historical patterns that the latter 
could not discern, but that his readers can see and learn from. Let us consider two passages, H. 1.50 
and H. 2.38, in which Tacitus digresses from the narrative and introduces the republican civil wars as a 
precedent against which to analyze the events of 69.664 
 In the first passage, Tacitus records the public response to Galba’s assassination and the 
hostilities between Otho and Vitellius, which now would prolong the civil wars. The passage is 
significant for what it reveals about how Romans analyze present events in light of past events, for 
what it implies about the Principate and civil war, and for what it shows about the imperfection of 
memory and the impact on it of literary traditions and imperial ideology. Tacitus writes that the 
senators, knights, and people alike complained that two most shameless men (deterrimi), Otho and 
Vitellius, were plunging the Empire into ruin, as though by fate (fataliter). They turn to past events to 
help them evaluate their current situation: “no longer did they speak of the recent horrors of a dreadful 
peace but they recalled the memory of the civil wars” (nec iam recentia saeuae pacis exempla sed repetita 
bellorum ciuilium memoria, 1.50.2). The language is precise, showing that, first, the people set the horrors 
of the civil wars (atrocitatem recentis sceleris, 1.50.1; cf. atrox, H. 1.2.1) against the “recent horrors of a 
dreadful peace” (recentia saeuae pacis exempla), which commonly is taken to designate the whole of the 
Julio-Claudian Principate.665 This view assimilates the Principate with civil war and suggests that 
Rome’s recent history was marked by continuous violence and mutual destruction, a powerful 
indictment of imperial ideology, made all the stronger by the fact that all strata of society allegedly 
																																																								
664 On these passages, see the discussions in Ash 2010, 119-31; Damon 2010, 375-88; Joseph 2012, 156-74. 
665 Damon 2003 ad loc. Some translate nec iam as “not” instead of “no longer,” which has the unfortunate effect of ignoring the fact 
that the people assimilated the horrors of the Principate with those produced in the civil wars. 
	
	 276 
shared it.666  
Next, their analysis takes the onlookers further back, to the republican civil wars. Whereas the 
events under the Julio-Claudians were recent enough for them to remember, for earlier Roman history 
they inevitably rely on literary accounts: “they spoke of how often the city had been taken by its own 
armies, how Italy had been devastated, the provinces plundered, about Pharsalus, Philippi, Perusia, and 
Mutina, famous names associated with national disasters” (repetita bellorum ciuilium memoria captam totiens 
suis exercitibus urbem, uastitatem Italiae, direptiones prouinciarum, Pharsaliam Philippos et Perusiam ac Mutinam, 
nota publicarum cladium nomina, loquebantur, 1.50.2).667 These words variously recall phrases in the works 
of Cicero, Sallust, Vergil, Livy, and Lucan, solidifying the impression that the onlookers’ memoria of the 
republican civil wars is fashioned by the literary accounts they read.668 In particular, the close link 
between the battles of Pharsalus and Philippi (emphasized and linked in asyndeton) mirrors the 
conflation of these conflicts that started with Vergil (G. 1.465-514) and was taken up by Ovid (Met. 
15.823-24), Manilius (Astr. 1.910), Lucan (1.680, 6.582, 7.872, 9.271), and Statius (Sil. 2.7.65-66).669 The 
emphasis, in both the literary accounts and the onlookers’ memoria, is on continuity, that is Rome’s 
recurrent self-destruction. The series of battles that the onlookers recall, the chronological order of 
which notably is incorrect,670 ultimately takes us back to Sulla’s march on Rome in 88 BC. They 
continued: “the world nearly was turned upside down when the struggle for power had been between 
good men (boni), but the Empire had continued after the victories of Caesar and Augustus, and the res 
publica would have continued if Pompey or Brutus had won: are we now to enter temples on behalf of 
Otho or Vitellius? ... one thing was certain: the winner would turn out the worse.” These last words, 
too, have antecedents in literary works, notably at Cic., de Har. Resp. 54 and Sen., Ep. 14.13.  
																																																								
666 The uolgus in Tacitus is not often granted a care for politics. The fact that all strata of society share the same view reveals a rare 
concordia at a time of great discordia: Ash 2010, 121-22. We may see this, too, as subtly undermining imperial creed, which associated the 
Principate with concordia.  
667 Joseph (2012, 158-59) is right, I think, in taking memoria here as meaning “the literature that preserves memory.”  
668 Joseph 2012, 158-165 lays out the intertexts in detail. 
669 Joseph 2012, 161-63.  
670 The dates are 48, 42, 40, 43 BC, respectively. 
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 The passage neatly shows Roman memory at work, similar to the way we see it operating in 
the Dialogus. Present developments are conceptualized in light of past events, and the past is analyzed 
in terms of major individuals and/or events. We note how scrutiny of the present and recent past 
prompts the mind to go back further in time to find antecedents – in much the same way that Tacitus 
goes further back chronologically across his writings. The passage also illustrates the selectiveness of 
human memory and some of the problems inherent in analyzing the past. The logical antecedent for 
the civil wars of 68-69 were the civil wars of the Late Republic, but Tacitus shows the crowd’s analysis, 
and that of the authors on which they base it, to be flawed in several respects. The oversimplification 
that at once stands out is the people’s designation of the protagonists of the past civil wars as boni.671 
This characterization is dubious at best and sets up a black-and-white polarization between men like 
Caesar, Pompey, Brutus, and Octavian and men like Otho and Vitellius that fails to capture historical 
and current realities. While we need not go to great lengths to question the label boni, it is instructive to 
look forward to A. 1.10, where Tacitus records the negative assessment of Augustus’ career and reign 
held by some in the direct aftermath of his funeral. Their assessment of his conduct at Mutina is 
significant, as Ash points out.672 Octavian, the machinator doli, had poisoned Pansa and used trickery to 
eliminate Hirtius (A. 1.10.2). Suetonius (Aug. 11) confirms the existence of rumors to this effect. Ash 
suggests that Tacitus deliberately places Mutina at the end of the list of battles to urge the reader to 
investigate it more closely.673 I suspect that it also serves to show how literary traditions and imperial 
ideology shape public memory. Indeed, did the various groups consciously leave out Antony, who 
could not possibly be classified as bonus, or did they simply forget him? After his suicide, Antony’s 
memory for some time became subject to damnatio memoriae, and subsequent history became the history 
of the victors.  
																																																								
671 The distinction here between boni and deterrimi may in part be one between the ‘pure’ and aristocratic Romans of the past and 
Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, whose family origins either lay outside of Rome or were of less noble stock. 
672 Ash 2010, 122. 
673 Ash 2010, 122.  
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The impact of literature on memoria is evident in the people’s claim that the res publica would 
have continued with Pompey or Brutus. Brutus practically became synonymous with the republican 
ideal of libertas, while Pompey’s reception was largely favorable during the early Principate.674 His image 
as an honorable but tragic man, who followed the better side too late, was reinforced, shortly before 
the dramatic date of our passage, in Lucan’s Pharsalia. The claim that under Pompey and Brutus the res 
publica and political freedom would have continued is reflective of these traditions and of the tendency 
to connect socio-political elements, even institutions, with major individuals. As regards imperial 
ideology, the sanitization of Augustus’ career and reign constructed a favorable version of the events 
of the 40s, 30s, and beyond that was reinforced in the following generations. The fact that the 
governing class and the people in 69 think of Augustus as bonus reflects the success of this sanitization.  
 While the onlookers and the authors they read are correct in stressing the continuity of civil 
war across Rome’s history (as do the Gallic chiefs at H. 4.55, in language that recalls that of the 
onlookers at H. 1.50), their perception of the participants in the past wars lacks nuance and leaves 
them with bleak expectations. Regardless of how matters turn out (including the possibility of 
Vespasian marching on the city like a latter-day Sulla: 1.50.3), Rome’s imperium will endure and since, in 
their reconstruction of the past, they are stuck not with boni but deterrimi and ignaui, there is nothing 
they can do but await a dreadful future; the character contrast they have constructed leaves them 
feeling as if their current predicament is somehow extraordinary. 
 In the second passage (H. 2.38), Tacitus freezes the narrative before the Battle of Bedriacum to 
offer another digression about the republican civil wars, recalling the above passage and setting his 
own analysis against those of the groups at H. 1.50. Tacitus, with the benefit of hindsight, advances a 
																																																								
674 His assessment in contemporary literature was balanced. Cicero praised (de Imp. Cn. Pomp. passim; Fam. 8.2.8) and criticized (Att. 
8.16.1) him. According to Sallust, “he has an honest face but a shameless character” (Hist. fr. 16M; Suet., de Gramm. 15). Livy (3.2) is 
sympathetic towards him, Valerius Maximus lauds his clementia and humanitas (5.1.9, 10), Velleius calls him sanctissimus et praestantissimus 
uir (2.53.3), and Pliny the Elder equates him with Alexander, Hercules, and Liber Pater (Nat. 7.95). Plutarch gives a positive portrayal 
that “reflects a long line of Pompeian propaganda” (Edwards 1991, 280). See Grenade 1950 on the ‘Pompeiani’ in the early Principate; 




more nuanced analysis. He goes further back and, unlike the onlookers, who merely recognize a 
recurrent pattern, identifies a principal causa for human conflict (an innate desire for power: uetus ac iam 
pridem insita mortalibus potentiae cupido, 2.38.1), the process through which it grew (Roman conquest: cum 
imperii magnitudine adoleuit erupitque), and the turning point after which it became excessive (the 
subjection of the world and the destruction of Carthage (subacto orbe et aemulis urbibus regibusue excisis 
securas opes concupiscere uacuum fuit, prima inter patres plebemque certamina exarsere). The other notable aspect in 
Tacitus’ reconstruction is that he moves from institutions/offices to individuals: first there were 
struggles between patricians and the people, then between tribunes, then between consuls wielding 
unconstitutional powers (these struggles constituted “practice for civil war”: temptamenta ciuilium 
bellorum), before Marius and then Sulla established personal dominatio. They were followed by Pompey, 
“whose true character was more disguised but not better” (occultior non melior), and the subsequent 
struggles for absolute power. Where the onlookers do not name the individuals with whom Rome’s 
discordia became excessive, Tacitus identifies Marius and Sulla. Moreover, he identifies the causa that ties 
together the recurrent power struggles in Roman history: each of the major personalities involved in 
these conflicts proceeded from the same innate motivation, potentiae cupido: “the same divine anger, the 
same human madness, the same origins of crime led them into discord” (eadem illos deum ira, eadem 
hominum rabies, eaedem scelerum causae in discordiam egere, 2.38.2).675 The only difference between the past 
civil wars and the present ones is that the latter were completed in a single blow, as it were, due to the 
ignauia of the principes (2.38.2).676 His emphasis on the essential similarities between the Romans of the 
past and those of the present takes up one of the crucial points set out in the Dialogus: that the past is 
not always better (a point he will reiterate at A. 3.34 and 3.55) and that it ought not inevitably be the 
benchmark against which to measure the present.   
																																																								
675 On Tacitus’ emphasis on the sameness of the civil wars and their motives, see Sage 1991, 3401-04; O’Gorman 1995, 119; Ash 
1999, 82-83; Ash 2010, 124-26. 
676 Tacitus also emphasizes continuity in crime and corruption: Otho, Vitellius, Mucianus, and Marcellus were different men, not 
different characters (magis alii homines quam alii mores, 2.95.3). 
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Tacitus silently corrects the naïve reconstruction of the onlookers. While he acknowledges 
their assessment of Otho and Vitellius as ignaui, he cuts through the character contrast between the 
latter and the republican commanders, giving a damning assessment of Pompey’s character and 
stressing the causae of conflict as opposed to individual personalities: Cinna, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, 
Caesar, Brutus, Cassius, and Octavian had the same motives as do Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and 
Vespasian.677 Tacitus, doing away with republican sentimentality, literary traditions, and imperial 
ideology, goes right to the heart of the issue. His emphasis on the recurrent conflict between the 
orders678 shows that the onlookers in 69 are misguided in hiding behind their leaders and holding them 
up for blame. A more nuanced analysis of the past and of the causae of Roman discord would have told 
them that their current predicament is far from extraordinary and might have prompted them to take a 
less defeatist and more constructive attitude.679  
Tacitus’ claim that desire for absolute power is an innate and persistent human emotion has 
uncomfortable implications for imperial ideology, which sought to gloss over tyrannical aspects and 
stressed concern for peace and order. The historian’s analysis of the nature of power urges readers to 
be critical of their own government, to be wary of official versions and tidy reconstructions. This is 
one way in which both Tacitus’ analysis of Rome’s history and his characters’ analysis of their history 
and present can help readers navigate the Trajanic present and anticipate the future. 
Throughout the Historiae, Tacitus offers examples from Roman history that suggest how the 
actors in the narrative might have acted differently. While the latter are ignorant of such historical 
precedents, the examples instruct readers how they might use history to guide them in the present. At 
H. 3.83, for example, Tacitus condemns the Roman people for taking joy in watching the Vitellian and 
Flavian forces slaughter one another, recalling the civil wars under Cinna and Sulla, in which the 
																																																								
677 This suggests one reason for why Otho’s suicide did not lead to peace. 
678 Tacitus presents the struggles between Marius (e plebe infima) and Sulla (nobilium saeuissimus) and the subsequent wars (non discessere ab 
armis in Pharsalia ac Philippis ciuium legiones) as conflicts between the orders as well.  
679 Ash 2010, 124-25. 
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carnage had been no less but people had not acted basely. Similarly, when he recounts that a Flavian 
soldier had killed his brother and demanded a reward for this, he relates a similar incident during the 
war against Cinna, in which the perpetrator, feeling ashamed, nobly committed suicide: “so much 
more acute among our ancestors was the glory in virtuous action and the repentance for guilt” (tanto 
acrior apud maiores, sicut uirtutibus gloria, ita flagitiis paenitentia fuit, 3.51.1-2). Despite the bleak reality and 
the recurrence of civil war, then, Romans can still act in positive ways, by recalling past examples of 
valor and setting their own conduct against them. A programmatic statement underscores the purpose 
and utility of recording such historical examples: sed haec aliaque ex uetere memoria petita, quotiens res locusque 
exempla recti aut solacia mali poscet, haud absurde memorabimus (3.51.2). 
As T. Joseph notes, the rejection of republican sentimentality that emerges when we juxtapose 
Tacitus’ remarks at H. 2.38 with the perceptions of the onlookers at H. 1.50 evokes the discussion 
about the past and present in the Dialogus.680 The dialogue complicates the glorification of the past and 
its utility as a yardstick against which to analyze the development of eloquentia. Maternus suitably ends 
with the maxim that, given their respective merits and drawbacks, people should enjoy the blessing of 
their own age without disparaging other periods (41.5). In the Annales, Tacitus, in a digression on the 
history of luxuria in Rome, remarks that “not all things were better among the ancients, but our age, 
too, has produced many an instance of excellence in the arts that deserves to be imitated by posterity” 
(3.55.5). This passage, discussed more fully below, may be seen as a continuation of the open-ended 
and balanced message in the Dialogus.681 
The identification of causae and origines for particular developments is a persistent concern 
throughout Tacitus’ writings. While he, like any Roman, analyzes the past in terms of major 
personalities and events, he goes beyond the identification of epiphenomena (e.g. the recurrence of 
																																																								
680 Joseph 2012, 172-73. 
681 Cf. van den Berg 2014, 104 n. 14, with a slightly different emphasis. Woodman and Martin (1996, 409 n. 2) suggest that the words 
may be meant as a “partial riposte” to the opening of the Dialogus. Such a rendering depends on reading the opening of the dialogue as 
a condemnation of modern eloquentia, a view I do not share.  
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civil war) to establish broader problems and their causes. This is precisely what he does in the Dialogus, 
where he has Aper and Messalla identify epiphenomena of a larger issue that Maternus attempts to tie 
together from an historical perspective. Yet even this argument does not get us to a conclusive answer, 
and so Tacitus stresses that the discussion must go on. This progression toward an increasingly deeper 
and at times ostensibly inconsistent analysis reflects his broader historical method and is mirrored by 
the chronological trajectory of his corpus, which would have been supplemented by a work on the 
Augustan regime, if he had lived longer. It is on display at the very start of the Annales, where Tacitus 
refines the analysis he advanced at H. 2.38 and claims that desire for (absolute) power did not become 
excessive in 146 but has been a part of Rome’s history from its very foundation. We now turn to 
Tacitus’ final work.  
 
IV.6  The Annales: Ambiguity and Inconsistency in Searching for the ‘Truth’ 
 I end this chapter by exploring how the methods of analysis that were enunciated in the 
Dialogus and taken up in the Historiae continue in the Annales. I begin with the preface, which is closely 
connected with those of the Agricola, Dialogus, and Historiae. Next I show how Tacitus’ analysis of the 
past – of the transition between the Republic and the Principate and of the socio-political and cultural 
developments under the Julio-Claudians – broadly follows the same methods as set out in the dialogue 
and how it serves to make similar observations about Roman computations of time and 
reconstructions of the past. In particular, Tacitus continues to point up the drawbacks of associating 
socio-political change, even institutions, with major individuals and events. As in the Dialogus and the 
Historiae, in the Annales he does away with broad, polarizing distinctions between republican and 
imperial Rome, demonstrates that socio-political change is a complex and gradual, not a radical, 
process, and shows that accurately reconstructing the past (and indeed the present) requires moving 
beyond the superficial and neat computations prevalent in Roman thought.  
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IV.6.1  Roman History and Reconstructing the Past: the Preface of the Annales 
 
Urbem Romam a principio reges habuere; libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit. dictaturae ad tempus sumebantur; 
neque decemuiralis potestas ultra biennium, neque tribunorum militum consulare ius diu ualuit. non Cinnae, non Sullae 
longa dominatio; et Pompei Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere, qui 
cuncta discordiis ciuilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit. sed ueteris populi Romani prospera vel aduersa 
claris scriptoribus memorata sunt; temporibusque Augusti dicendis non defuere decora ingenia, donec gliscente adulatione 
deterrerentur. Tiberii Gaique et Claudii ac Neronis res florentibus ipsis ob metum falsae, postquam occiderant, recentibus 
odiis compositae sunt. inde consilium mihi pauca de Augusto et extrema tradere, mox Tiberii principatum et cetera, sine 
ira et studio, quorum causas procul habeo. (A. 1.1) 
 
The city of Rome from its inception was held by kings; freedom and the consulship were established by 
L. Brutus. Dictatorships were taken up occasionally; the rule of the decemvirs lasted no more than two 
years, nor did the consular authority of the military tribunes last for long. Neither Cinna’s nor Sulla’s 
domination was long; and the power of Pompey and Crassus soon passed into Caesar’s hands, the arms 
of Lepidus and Antonius soon into those of Augustus, who with the name of princeps took everything, 
wearied as it now was by civil dissensions, under his command. But the successes and setbacks of the 
Roman people were recounted by famous authors; and there was no shortage of fine minds to tell of 
Augustus’ times, until they were deterred by growing sycophancy. The affairs of Tiberius, Gaius, 
Claudius, and Nero were falsified through fear while they were in power and composed with hatred 
fresh after their fall. Hence my plan is to recount a few things about Augustus and the end of his reign, 
then to recount Tiberius’ reign and the rest, without anger and partiality, from any motives for which I 
am far removed. 
 
 
 The preface of the Annales takes up the antithesis between past and present and the 
relationship between political and generic change explored in the other prefaces. As in the Historiae, 
Tacitus identifies Actium as a turning point in the development of Roman historiography and, as in 
the other works, he points to libertas as an essential prerequisite for truthful history and flattery as a 
principal cause of compromised writing. Again, as in the other works, while he identifies a firm break 
between pre- and post-Actian Rome, he undermines the notion of a radical break by suggesting that 
the impact of the transition was gradual: under Augustus sycophancy kept growing (gliscente) until it 
reached a point when great authors were deterred. Other evidence helps elucidate this process. In the 
early years of the Augustan regime, independent and even hostile literature was condoned (cf. A. 4.34). 
Repression began near the end of his reign (ca. 8/12 AD), when T. Labienus’ books were burned and 
Cassius Severus was exiled. The choice now left to authors was either to write flattering accounts or to 
not write at all. The more prevalent sycophancy became and the more flattering accounts of recent and 
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contemporary events were produced (Velleius is exemplary), the more difficult it became for authors 
to tell the truth; the more adulatio grows, the more regimes seek to repress libertas.682 This account of 
historiography’s decline, analogous to that at H. 1.1, shows that the connection between political and 
generic change is not strict: social and cultural change follows political change. Likewise, political 
change itself is a gradual process: while the emphasis on Actium gives the impression of a radical 
change, Tacitus’ succinct account of Augustus’ rule (A. 1.2-4) stresses how his measures progressively 
shaped social attitudes and public morality.683  
 The opening words of the Annales offer a succinct but monumental summary of Roman 
constitutional history that sets the scene for the work as a whole (Rome under the emperors), reveals 
something of Tacitus’ outlook (Rome has developed into the personal property of despots), and sets 
up chronological and conceptual ambiguities that undermine simplistic reconstructions of Rome’s past. 
The opening words are complex and leave much to the reader’s own analysis and interpretation. The 
common reading is as follows: in the beginning there was regnum. Then, with the removal of the kings 
and the establishment of the Republic, came libertas. Freedom was preserved as long as the holding of 
power was collegial and temporary; it was impaired in times of crisis but only temporarily. The real 
change came with Augustus, who established absolute power. While old forms and designations 
continued, in truth libertas was destroyed: Rome had returned to regnum. This cyclical reading is logical, 
plausible even, but it is not the only possible rendering. Another reading might stress the emphasis on 
recurrent cases of individual power, eventually secured decisively by Augustus, suggesting that, rather 
than seeing the latter’s rule as a break from previous history, dominatio has marked Rome’s political 
history from the start: Augustus merely continued a persistent trend. This reading is reinforced by the 
																																																								
682 The antithesis between ueteris populi Romani prospera uel aduersa, on the one hand, and temporibus Augusti and Tiberii Gaique et Claudii ac 
Neronis res, on the other, recalls the antithesis between res populi Romani and rei publicae ut alienae in the preface of the Historiae and 
suggests that lack of information (which strengthens adulatio) is another deterrent for imperial historians.  
683 “Augustus, by enticing the soldiers with gifts, the people with food, all men through the sweetness of inactivity, gradually grew greater and 
drew to himself the responsibilities of senate, magistrates, and laws” (militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit, insurgere paulatim, 
munia senatus magistratuum legum in se trahere, A. 2.1.1). 
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opening words – a principio instead of principio – a conscious emphasis that seems to recall Sal., Hist. fr. 
11M (dissensiones fuere iam inde a principio).684 Desire for absolute power, and the civil bloodshed it feeds, 
can be traced back to Rome’s very foundation, to the fratricidal strife between Romulus and Remus, 
and Roman authors indeed frequently allude to fratricide in describing civil war.685 A third reading 
might stress the change from institutions to individuals, analogous to the way Tacitus proceeded at H. 
2.38. Urbem Romam signifies that the Annales are concerned with the history of the city and its 
institutions. Without mentioning specific individuals, Tacitus moves from kingship to dictatorships 
and other offices, before naming individuals: the dominatio of Cinna and Sulla,686 the potentia of Pompey, 
Crassus, Caesar, Lepidus, Antony, and Octavian, and finally the absolute imperium of Rome’s first 
princeps. On this reading, the main point would seem to be that civil war is tied directly to personal 
dominatio, which started with Cinna. Thus Roman history has moved from being a history of 
institutions to a history of individuals, or, put differently, from urbs Roma and populus Romanus to tempora 
Augusti and Tiberii Gaique et Claudii ac Neronis res. However one reads these lines, and by whatever path 
Rome reached its current political configuration, the implication is clear: Rome has become a city of 
personal dominatio. That is a ruthless correction of the development sketched by Livy, whose work 
teleologically progresses towards the blessed Augustan present. It also cuts right through imperial 
ideology and the concern for peace and state that it advertises. 
  Tacitus, taking up the analysis he advanced in the Dialogus and the Historiae, complicates the 
polarizing distinction between the Republic and the Principate, in part by identifying a complex of 
turning points in Rome’s history. Above, we noted how he complicates the concept of radical change 
by suggesting that social and cultural change follows political change gradually. He further challenges 
the identification of Actium as the decisive turning point between past and present. While broadly 
																																																								
684 Leeman 1973, 192.  
685 Fantham 2010, 207-220, esp. 214-19.  
686 Is the seven-time consul Marius not mentioned because his dominatio was not short-lived? 
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distinguishing between pre- and post-Actian Rome, he locates several pivotal changes within the 
former: the establishment of the Republic, the first installment of a temporary dictatorship, Cinna’s 
dominatio, Octavian’s victory at Actium. The emphasis on these events undermines the close association 
of the Republic with libertas, which was infringed upon on multiple occasions. Rather than at Actium, 
one might locate the turning point at Cinna’s dominatio, which infringed decisively on Rome’s libertas: 
after him, the Republic was marked by individual potentia. Or perhaps the decisive moment was the 
first time libertas was infringed upon, when a temporary dictatorship was established, the event that set 
in motion the gradual disintegration of freedom. Instead of drawing superficial distinctions between 
the republican and imperial systems of government, or the ‘past’ and ‘present,’ Tacitus advances a 
deeper analysis, in part by identifying causae of human behavior. Just as at H. 2.38 he cut through the 
distinctions between the republican civil wars and those of 68-69, so here he suggests that personal 
dominatio has marked Rome’s history from Cinna’s time onwards. Yet he foregoes explicit 
pronouncements. As in the Dialogus, he leaves options open, encouraging his readers to consider a 
complex of factors before drawing conclusions.687  
 
IV.6.2  Reconstructions of the Past: Anniversary Thinking and Simplistic Analysis 
We may start off by observing that the chronological schizophrenia that marks the Dialogus and 
(to a lesser extent) the Annales mirrors the chronological systems and methods of measuring time that 
existed by the early Principate.688 Romans marked years not by numbers but by individuals and events. 
Traditional methods of computation were complicated by the introduction of a new calendar by 
Caesar and the emergence of the fasti, the calendars and the lists of magistrates and triumphs inscribed 
in the Augustan and Tiberian periods, making for the existence, side-by-side, of various computations 
of time and reconstructions of Rome’s past that made it challenging (both at the time and in hindsight) 
																																																								
687 Cf. Goodyear 1972, 88: “he suggests rather than explains.” 
688 On Roman computations of time and the development of historiography, see Feeney 2007. 
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to reconstruct historical development and socio-political change. Alongside the complexities inherent 
in Roman computations of time, there was a tendency to think in broad chronological schemes, as is 
evidenced by the tendency to connect change with outstanding personalities/events and by the 
importance of anniversaries and other chronological markers that served to create conceptual 
coherence. One hazard of such computations is that they cause one to blend together particular 
phenomena, ignore details, and create coherence where the reality was incoherent and unpredictable. 
Early in the Annales Tacitus illustrates such methods of thinking, recording how Romans, in the direct 
aftermath of Augustus’ funeral, conceptualized his reign (A. 1.9.1). He notably distinguishes between 
the views of the majority and those of a small group of prudentes, moving toward an increasingly more 
nuanced analysis that is endorsed by the surrounding narrative. Most Romans, Tacitus shows, simply 
absorbed imperial ideology: 
 
Multus hinc ipso de Augusto sermo, plerisque uana mirantibus, quod idem dies accepti quondam imperii princeps et 
uitae supremus, quod Nolae in domo et cubiculo in quo pater eius Octauius uitam finiuisset. numerus etiam 
consulatuum celebrabatur, quo Valerium Coruum et C. Marium simul aequauerat, continuata per septem et triginta 
annos tribunicia potestas, nomen imperatoris semel atque uiciens partum aliaque honorum mutiplicata aut noua.  
(A. 1.9.1) 
 
Then followed much talk about Augustus himself. Most marveled about empty things, about the fact 
that the same day marked the beginning of his assumption of imperium and the end of his life, and that 
he had died at Nola, in the house and bedroom in which his father Octavius had died. They were also 
celebrating the number of his consulships (in which he had equaled Valerius Corvus and Caius Marius 
combined), the continuation for 37 years of his tribunicia potestas, the title of Imperator twenty-one times 
earned, and other honors either repeated or novel.  
 
 
The reconstruction whereby Augustus’ reign started in 43 BC was one of several reckonings advertised 
during and after his regime (there were others, from Actium or 27 or 23) that shaped a particular 
vision of his rise to power. As we have seen, placing the start of the Augustan regime in 43 served to 
elide the disruption during the 40s and 30s BC. This reconstruction of the Augustan period evidently 
was a powerful one, for Aper (D. 17.2) and Suetonius (Aug. 8.3) still conceived of Augustus’ reign in 
these terms. On the fasti, people would have seen Augustus’ assumption of the consulship, on 19 
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August 43 BC, on the same grid as his death, on 19 August AD 14, solidifying the impression that his 
reign spanned the interval between those dates. The people’s admiration for his honors and titles, 
which were repeated on the fasti and in other lists and documents, further reflects this process of visual 
reinforcement. It is notable that Tacitus does not accord this group any actual thoughts about 
Augustus’ reign: they simply admire his honors and titles.   
 In the remainder of the account, Tacitus records the views of a smaller group of prudentes, the 
more perceptive minority. The first segment of this group also bought into imperial propaganda, as is 
suggested by the similarities of their claims to the language of the Res Gestae: Octavian had undertaken 
civil war out of pietas towards his father, one-man rule was the sole solution to ongoing discord, he had 
not made himself rex or dictator but princeps, and his use of force was aimed at establishing peace. This 
group is more perceptive than the great majority, but still uncritically follows the official version 
promoted by the regime. The other prudentes, in contrast, are described as more discerning. They 
claimed that pietas and the critical position of the state were mere pretexts and that Augustus’ actions 
were not born out of necessity but out of “a lust for supreme power (cupidine dominandi)… no doubt 
there was peace, but it was peace stained with blood” (pacem sine dubio post haec, uerum cruentam). This 
small group of onlookers carefully dissects the way in which Octavian removed Hirtius and Pansa, 
betrayed the trust of Sextus Pompey, Lepidus, and Antony, and proscribed prominent citizens.689 His 
private life, religious practice, and choice of Tiberius as his successor are condemned as well. Just as 
the favorable reception at A. 1.9.3-5 is expressed in language that mirrors the Res Gestae, so the critical 
analysis at A. 1.10 seems designed to invert it.690 The passages constitute a miniature case study of 
different ways of analyzing the past. Where the majority of Romans and the first group of prudentes 
uncritically follow what is prescribed for them by the regime, the final group shows itself to be good 
																																																								
689 Sen., Cl. 11 shows that this type of engagement with Augustus’ conduct and his posthumous reputation would have been familiar 
to Tacitus’ readers. 
690 So already Haverfield 1912, 197-99. I owe the reference to Goodyear 1972, 159-60.  
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‘historians’: they move beyond the tidy reconstructions and pretexts promoted in official versions to 
find causae, and their analysis notably is lengthier and more detailed. Their outlook and methods of 
analysis correspond to that of the historian, who proceeds in similar fashion in the opening chapters of 
the Annales. As he does in the Dialogus and the Historiae, Tacitus instructs his readers by putting on 
display competing methods of analysis and guiding them in adopting the most nuanced approach to 
the past.  
 An analogous example of anniversary thinking and of imperial efforts to capitalize on it comes 
from Nero’s reign (A. 15.38-44). In the aftermath of the great fire of AD 64, Tacitus reports, there 
were some who recalled the burning of Rome by the Gauls in 390 BC and proceeded to make several 
calculations to link the two events: “there were those who noted that this fire first broke out on the 
nineteenth of July [fourteen days before the Kalends of Sextilis], the day on which the Senones 
captured and burned the City. Others took their efforts so far as to count the interval between the two 
fires into equal numbers of years, months, and days” (fuere qui adnotarent XIIII Kal. Sextiles principium 
incendii huius ortum, quo et Senones captam urbem inflammauerint. alii eo usque cura progressi sunt, ut totidem annos, 
mensesque et dies inter utraque incendia numerent, A. 15.41.2).691 In this computation, which Tacitus reports 
with apparent disdain, the interval of 454 years (from 390 BC to AD 64) is broken up into 418 years, 
418 months, and 418 days.692 The calculation is artificial and inexact. Moreover, while most authors in 
antiquity followed Varro in dating the Gallic sack of Rome to 390, others placed the event in 386 
(which would yield a computation of 414 years, 414 months, and 414 days). In Roman memory, 
coherence and patterns beat out detail. 
The anniversary is connected with past episodes of destruction and rebuilding in Rome’s 
history and serves to construct a sense of continuity across time: the fall of Troy, the foundation of 
Rome by Romulus, the foundation of the Republic under Brutus, and the re-foundation of the city by 
																																																								
691 On the concept of time, anniversaries, and reworkings of the past in these chapters, see Feeney 2007, 104-07.   
692 Feeney 2007, 106. 
	
	 290 
Camillus. These are the events that catalyze Livy’s narrative as it heads toward the final turning point in 
his Roman history: from the Republic founded by Brutus to the nouus status under Augustus. Under the 
early Principate, the theme of rebuilding continues to be employed by the emperors. We have seen 
how the Flavians use the re-foundation, in AD 70, of the destroyed Temple of Jupiter (H. 4.53) to 
advertise continuity with Rome’s republican past. Nero, on this occasion, advertises a similar re-
foundation of the city, but Tacitus crucially stresses how the princeps misreads the past. Nero, unlike the 
onlookers, does not connect the fire with the city’s burning by the Gauls and re-foundation by 
Camillus, but with the destruction of Troy (peruaserat rumor ipso tempore flagrantis urbis inisse eum domesticam 
scaenam et cecinisse Troianum excidium, praesentia mala uetustis cladibus adsimulantem, A. 15.39.3).693 And unlike 
Camillus and Augustus, Nero appears to have advertised himself not as a new founder of the city, but 
as the founder of a new city, named after himself (uidebaturque Nero condendae urbis nouae et cognomento suo 
appellandae gloriam quaerere, 15.40.2).694 The narrative makes clear, however, that with Nero the city will 
not move into a new historical era. As D. Feeney notes, Tacitus closely reworks the narrative at the 
start of Livy’s Books 2 and 6, but, while Livy’s narrative heads toward the foundation of a new future, 
Tacitus emphasizes loss, the fire having destroyed many of the great monuments dating to Rome’s 
foundation, the regal period, and the Republic. Moreover, Tacitus’ reworkings here of Vergil’s 
description of the fall of Troy yields the same observation: while Aeneas, after the sack of Troy, 
engineered a new future, under Nero Rome remains stuck.695 Tacitus once more puts on display 
various analyses and reconstructions of the past, only to demonstrate that they are misguided. The 
narrative shows the onlookers to be simplistic in connecting the fire with the Gallic sack of Rome, 
while the princeps gets it wrong by drawing connections with Troy and advertising the foundation of a 
																																																								
693 The Neronian regime indeed advertised close links with Rome’s mythological origins. Stories circulated that, when Nero was a baby, 
snakes looked over him, suggesting a connection with Hercules (A. 11.11.3). Note also A. 12.58.1 on Nero’s first public speech (at age 16) on 
behalf of the people of Ilium (causa Iliensium), in which he expounded “on Rome’s descent from Troy, on Aeneas, founder of the Julian line, 
and on other things akin to fable” (Romanum Troia demissum et Iuliae stirpis auctorem Aeneam aliaque haud procul fabulis). 
694 The name was supposed to be “Neropolis” (Suet., Ner. 55).   
695 See Feeney 2007, 106-07 on Tacitus’ reworkings of Livy and Vergil. 
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new city. Indeed, Tacitus emphasizes that the Romans did not fall for Nero’s measures and that the 
princeps was forced to divert suspicion away from himself and onto the Christians in the capital.  
 
IV.6.3  Analyzing Past and Present: Republic, Principate, and Civil War 
Tacitus’ concern with the relationship between civil war and the Principate, prominent in both 
the Dialogus and the Historiae, continues in the Annales. The preface and the chapters on Augustus’ 
reign (A. 1.1-10), on the transition from the civil wars into the Principate, take up the analysis 
advanced in the preface of the Historiae. They cut through imperial ideology and stress the violence, 
disruption, and personal ambition that were covered up or distorted in the favorable accounts written 
by sycophantic historians. The Augustan regime stressed continuity, visually reinforced on the fasti, in 
the Augustan forum, and through other methods of visual propaganda. Subsequent regimes followed 
protocol, with every new reign starting off with promises about restoration and continuity with the 
past. Tacitus’ assimilation of civil war and Principate, and his concern to produce ‘truthful’ accounts of 
imperial history, persists throughout the Annales. E. Keitel has shown how the historian’s account of 
the Tiberian and Neronian regimes employs graphic civil war language and imagery to demonstrate 
how the principes wage war on their own people.696 Tacitus lays special emphasis on the terror spread by 
the growing severity of the maiestas trials, as well as on the greed and savagery with which informers 
and senators – cooperating with the regime – plot against fellow Romans or, in turn, against the 
Empire. He stresses the prevalence of discordia, stasis, and the inversion of traditional morality and 
values – hallmarks of the late Republic that, contrary to imperial claims, were not removed with the 
establishment of the Principate. Indeed, Octavian’s treacherous removal of his rivals in the 40s BC is 
mirrored by the persistent rivalries within the imperial house, which lead to the destruction of Agrippa 
Posthumus (A. 1.3.3, 1.6.1), Lucius and Gaius Caesar (perhaps through Livia’s plotting: A. 1.3.3),  
 
																																																								
696 Keitel 1984, 306-25.  
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Drusus Caesar (4.8), Britannicus (A. 13.15-17), and a host of other eminent personalities. In each case, 
nearly without exception, the murders are covered up or glossed over, just as Augustus and the 
Flavians covered up the removal of their rivals. The Historiae and the Annales point out the continuity 
of civil strife from the republican civil wars into the Augustan Principate, throughout the Julio-
Claudian Principate, and from the civil wars of 68-69 into the Flavian Principate. Tacitus exposes the 
speciousness of imperial propaganda, putting on display “the essential instability of… a regime which 
is constantly in danger of perishing by the same violent means through which it rose to power.”697  
 The essential continuity between the conditions under the late Republic and those under the 
Principate is underlined most forcefully at A. 3.26-28, an authorial digression on the development of 
Roman law, which is closely connected with A. 1.1, 1.4.1, H. 2.38, and Maternus’ claims at D. 12. 
Tacitus here presents an account of historical decline through the lens of Roman law.698 He moves 
from the beginnings of mankind – the primeval, golden age when there was no crime or ambition and 
hence no laws, penalties, or rewards (evoking the picture sketched by Maternus at D. 12) – to the 
destruction of equality (aequalitas) and the emergence of ambitio and uis and, subsequently, the 
establishment of dominationes. Unlike other societies, which remained despotisms forever (e.g. Parthia), 
others, like Rome, preferred leges to dominationes. After Tarquin’s expulsion, Rome created numerous 
laws to preserve libertas and concordia, culminating in the Twelve Tables, “the epitome of fair legislation” 
(finis aequi iuri, 3.27.1). The rest of the account is a sweeping summary of the subsequent abuse of the 
law. Romans abandoned the original purpose of the leges, that is the preservation of libertas and concordia, 
and now abused them for personal ambition, private feuds, and class struggles (3.27.1-3). The 
demagoguery of the Gracchi, Saturninus, and Drusus was followed by the violent removal and re-
establishment of the tribune’s powers (by M. Aemilius Lepidus, Sulla, and Pompey). The legal abuses 
																																																								
697 Keitel 1984, 325. 
698 On this digression, see the detailed commentary of Woodman-Martin 1996 ad loc., which offers a wealth of references to Polybius, 
Sallust, and other authors with whom Tacitus engages in these chapters. 
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under these men were followed by twenty years of civil war (discordia), during which mos and ius ceased, 
until Augustus established peace and imposed legislation that was more repressive than what went on 
before (acriora uincla, A. 3.28.3). By AD 20, the year in our narrative, the abuse of the leges by the 
delatores has become such that the laws are as destructive as the crimes (flagitia) themselves (3.25.1).  
The continuity of personal dominatio from the Republic into the Principate, emphasized in the 
opening lines of the Annales, is reinforced by the discussion of Rome’s legal history. The plain intratext 
between exui aequalitas (A. 3.26.1, of the regal period) and exuta aequalitate (A. 1.4.1, of Augustus’ 
regime), and the echo of igitur uerso ciuitatis statu nihil usquam prisci et integri moris (A. 1.4.1) at A. 3.28.1-3 
(non mos, non ius; deterrima quaeque impune ac multa honesta exitio fuere, of the turmoil of the 40s and 30s 
BC), underlines the notion that conditions under the Republic continued into the Augustan era. At H. 
2.38, A. 1.1, and A. 3.26-28 Tacitus offers sweeping summaries of Roman history, moving beyond the 
reconstructions of the past entertained by the interlocutors in the Dialogus and by the characters in his 
historical works, emphasizing the principal causa that propels human behavior and decision-making: 
desire for personal dominatio.   
 If the Dialogus has taught us anything, however, this is unlikely to be the whole picture. Indeed, 
the digression on law at A. 3.26-28 is balanced by an analogous digression on the development of 
luxury at A. 3.55, which advances quite a different view. Whereas in the digression on law Tacitus 
looked back into the prehistoric past from AD 20, at 3.55 he looks forward from AD 22 to his own 
time, to find the causae whereby the table luxury (luxus mensae), which had been practiced without 
restriction from the battle of Actium until the civil wars of 68-69, gradually (paulatim) went out of 
fashion. Tacitus posits that, “after there had been savage slaughters and the grandness of one’s 
reputation meant ruin” (postquam caedibus saeuitum et magnitudo famae exitio erat, ceteri ad sapientiora conuertere, 
A. 3.55.3), the survivors gradually changed their ways. One cause was that noui homines from the 
provinces brought their modest ways with them. The main cause was the example of Vespasian’s 
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ancient dress and diet (antiquus cultus et uultus): “from then there was compliance with the princeps and a 
love of rivalry more effective than either punishment by laws or dread” (obsequium inde in principem et 
aemulandi amor ualidior quam poena ex legibus et metus). Thus Rome slowly returned to the old ways. This 
observation prompts Tacitus to wonder whether there is not a cycle (orbis) in all things, whether 
morality operates cyclically like the seasons. He then observes that, indeed, “not everything was better 
in the past, but our age, too, has offered much glory in the arts, to be emulated by posterity. May we 
still maintain with our ancestors a rivalry in all that is honorable” (nec omnia apud priores meliora, sed nostra 
quoque aetas multa laudis et artium imitanda posteris tulit. uerum haec nobis <in> maiores certamina ex honesto 
maneant, A. 3.55.5).  
This passage, when taken in conjunction with the Dialogus, H. 2.38, A. 1.1, and A. 3.26-28, 
suggests a crucial observation, namely that change is not one-directional or one-dimensional and that 
its analysis does not yield the same conclusions when approached from different angles. Whereas at H. 
2.38, A. 1.1, and A. 3.26-28 Tacitus stressed continuity from the Republic into the Principate, in part 
to undermine the perceived superiority of the past, at A. 3.55 he posits a change in Roman table luxury 
from Actium until AD 68-69 and then a slow reversal back to old-fashioned, pre-Actian ways. While 
the development of Roman morality as seen through the lens of power or the law follows a linear and 
consistent trajectory from Rome’s far past into the present, when approached from the perspective of 
luxus, the development becomes more cyclical. Similarly, while Tacitus’ analysis of potentia and dominatio 
suggests a dynamic that is likely to persist no matter the circumstances or the particular princeps in 
power, the development of luxus is dynamic and more tied to personalities and contexts. Another 
passage offers another perspective, that of foreign policy and provincial government. At A. 4.34, in a 
senatorial debate on provincial commands, Valerius Messalinus claims “that much of the sternness of 
antiquity had been changed into a better and more amiable system; for the city is not, as it once was, 
beset with wars nor are the provinces hostile” (respondit multa duritiae ueterum in melius et laetius mutata; 
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neque enim, ut olim, obsideri urbem bellis aut prouincias hostilis esse, 4.34.1). Messalinus’ claims derive support 
from A. 1.2.2, 4.32, and 15.21 (though Maternus’ assertion at D. 41.1 complicates the issue somewhat). 
The past, then, is not always superior to the present, and presuming that it was, as Messalla in the 
Dialogus and various characters in the historical narratives do, leaves one with a misguided vision of the 
past and its misapplication to the present. This is where the onlookers at H. 2.38 went wrong, and this 
is in part why the arguments of the dialogue’s interlocutors suffer from internal inconsistencies. Given 
that the past, then, ought not in every respect be taken as the benchmark against which to measure the 
present, it is fitting that Maternus ends the dialogue by urging the speakers (and the reader) to “make 
use of the goodness of one’s own age without disparaging other periods” (bono saeculi sui quisque citra 
obtrectationem alterius utatur, D. 41.5).  
The Dialogus and the historical works, in sum, combine to show that socio-political and cultural 
change is a multifaceted and dynamic process that ought not be analyzed in strict terms or within rigid 
chronological or conceptual schemas. Reading the arguments in the Dialogus in conjunction shows that 
eloquentia developed gradually and in diverse ways from the Ciceronian into the Augustan and later 
periods, that some of its aspects changed before Cicero’s death, while others persisted or changed at a 
later dates; eloquentia as a concept, therefore, cannot be linked decisively to any particular period or 
personality. A similar picture of socio-political and cultural development emerges from the Annales. 
For instance, freedom of speech (libertas) was restrained already under the Late Republic and allegedly 
was impaired decisively at Actium (H. 1.1; A. 1.1). At the same time, however, a decisive turning point 
came with the exile (in AD 8 or 12) of Cassius Severus, who was the first to be charged with treason 
(maiestas) for writing libelous verses (1.72.4, 4.21.3) and perhaps also the first to have his books burned 
(see p. 247 and n. 613). Yet the first time a man was charged for writing a work of history (nouo ac tunc 
primum audito crimine, 4.34.1) was not until AD 25, when Cremutius Cordus was destroyed (4.34-35).  
While Augustus, then, was the first to apply a charge of maiestas to the written word, Tiberius is 
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said to have revived the lex maiestatis (1.72.2) and, through a series of measures, gave the praetors and 
informers carte blanche, imposing on the state “a most severe form of destruction, which crept in, was 
then suppressed, and finally flared up and gripped everything” (grauissimum exitium inrepserit, dein 
repressum sit, postremo arserit cunctaque corripuerit, 1.73.1). The application of the lex maiestatis, then, did not 
develop linearly. Indeed, Caligula formally abolished charges of maiestas but continued to use it against 
enemies (Dio 59.4.3), while Claudius removed the charge as it pertained to writing and general conduct 
(Dio 60.3.6). The law was revived under Nero (A. 14.48.2). 
The restrictions on the celebration of military glory by members outside the imperial family 
likewise developed gradually and cannot be firmly associated with either Augustus or Tiberius. The 
former’s assumption of imperium maius in 23 BC subordinated all other officials holding imperium to the 
princeps. Next, in 19 BC, L. Cornelius Balbus was the last man outside the family of the sitting princeps to 
be granted a triumph (this turning point was reinforced visibly on the fasti triumphales, which end with 
this year), but it was not until AD 22 that the title of Imperator was restricted, Junius Blaesus being the 
last man outside the imperial family to receive it (A. 3.74.4).  
As regards other competing ‘firsts’ and turning points, we may recall that Maternus firmly 
associates restrictions on oratory with the institution of the Principate (D. 38), but at the same time 
claims that these started with Pompey (D. 38.2). Likewise, the decline of Roman morality as a result of 
wealth and luxury could be perceived to set in after 146 BC (H. 2.38) or after Actium (A. 3.55). Other 
decisive changes that are tied to individual principes and not to institutions include the move toward a 
more conservative and defensive foreign policy under Tiberius and the admission, under Claudius, of 
the Gauls into the Roman senate. The point of these examples is that, just as the development of 
eloquentia and its aspects cannot be tied to single events, individuals, or institutions, so the development 
of the major aspects of imperial society (socio-political, cultural, military, or legal) cannot be directly 
associated with Actium, the Principate, or individual emperors. Roman history was a complex and 
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non-linear development of continuity and change that cannot be understood accurately within neat 
chronological or conceptual frameworks. In fact, the image of the Principate itself was not static. One 
might start a history of imperial Rome in 44/43 BC, with the death of Caesar or Cicero, with Actium, 
in 27, 23, or 19, or, as Tacitus does, in AD 14, for only with the first successful succession can one 
truly speak of an institution.699 Suetonius, however, started his series of Caesares with Julius Caesar.  
 
IV.7  Conclusions 
I began this chapter by laying out the Dialogus’ reception from antiquity to the present day and 
by showing that the text has suffered a relative neglect as contrasted with Tacitus’ other works. Among 
the reasons for the text’s status as an ‘anomaly’ has been that its nature, style, and subject matter seem 
not to fit within the corpus. Hence the text often is read in isolation, and scholarship has focused 
primarily on its connections and interactions with other texts in the rhetorical tradition. In this final 
chapter, I hope to have demonstrated that there are in fact many material connections between the 
dialogue and the historical narratives, not only with regard to specific issues but also with regard to 
their broad methods of analysis and narrative purpose. There are many ways to explore how the three 
works elucidate or build on one another. The works share many essential interests: the nature and 
scope of eloquentia in imperial Rome, the position and role of delatores,700 the essential elements of good 
and deficient speeches,701 attitudes towards imperial ideology and individual principes,702 and the 
continuities and changes in eloquentia from the Ciceronian into later periods.703 My focus in this chapter 
has been on the chronological and conceptual ambiguities and inconsistencies that pervade the 
arguments of the interlocutors, as well as on the methods of analysis which Tacitus attempts to teach 
																																																								
699 Octavian held his first consulship in 43, defeated Antony and Cleopatra in 31, formally surrendered his plenary powers and 
returned the administrative power over the res publica to the Senate in 27, took up tribunicia potestas and imperium maius in 23, while 19 is 
the final year on the fasti triumphales and marks his return from the East. On the settlements of 27 and 23 BC, see Lacey 1974; 1985.  
700 Rutledge 1999; 2001. 
701 Levene 1999; van den Berg 2012.  
702 Devillers 2015.  
703 Dominik 2007; Rutledge 2012. 
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his readers. I have approached the competing viewpoints and the internal inconsistencies within the 
speeches from the perspective of memory and Roman methods of computing time. I have argued that 
the Dialogus serves in part to demonstrate that analyzing change requires moving beyond the polarizing 
distinctions and tidy reconstructions inherent in Roman memory and computations of time, and that 
different narratives and realities are possible in historical analysis.704 The dialogue shows that a most 
accurate analysis of eloquentia’s development would require one to move beyond the individual 
positions and perspectives assumed by the speakers and to engage with the divergent arguments and 
reconstructions they offer. It is significant that the text ends without an authorial conclusion and that 
further discussion is needed. The dialogue forces a reader to navigate different convincing viewpoints 
and to adjudicate between mutually inconsistent reconstructions of the past and present. This mental 
exercise is meant in part to promote a more nuanced analysis of Rome’s past and the nature of socio-
political change. Such analysis is of crucial import in a society whose elite relies on tidy reconstructions 
of the past and on their subjects’ tendency to think and remember in such terms. 
These methods of analyzing the past and present, as well as the concern to complicate existing 
modes of thinking, recur in the historical works. Tacitus remains concerned with offering more 
nuanced analyses of Rome’s past and, in so doing, with encouraging his readers to apply a more 
rigorous analysis themselves. While in the dialogue he lets the reader work through the speeches, in the 
historical works he recounts how the characters in the narrative analyze their past and present, only to 
correct their analysis with his own, more delicate, reconstruction(s). He does this, as we have seen, 
either in authorial digressions or in the narrative itself. In holding up examples both of individuals who 
sharply analyze the past and use this knowledge in the present and of characters who fail to do so, 
Tacitus shows his readers the right way of doing things and guides them in becoming better ‘historians’ 
themselves. This purpose of his work is akin to the holding up of examples of virtuous and shameful 
																																																								
704 Sailor calls such alternative narratives “unTacitean” (2008, 132). I would say that the promotion of different narratives and 
possibilities, as opposed to a single, authoritative account or theory is eminently “Tacitean.”  
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behavior (A. 3.65) to encourage readers to emulate or avoid certain types of conduct. 
While Tacitus acknowledges a break between pre- and post-Actian Rome, he continuously 
complicates the polarizing distinction between the republican and imperial systems of government. 
Each of the prefaces enunciates this concern. Tacitus’ aim to go beyond such distinctions to find causae 
of human behavior or of particular developments cuts through neat chronological schemas. Of 
particular importance in this regard is his concern to emphasize the persistent discord and violence 
from the Republic into the Principate, which serves to undermine the sanitized versions of reality 
advertised in imperial ideology. 
 Finally, the dialogue’s format, the inconsistencies between and within the different arguments, 
and the lack of a decisive conclusion reveals something essential about Tacitus’ method of analysis and 
of his view of the nature and practice of historiography. Close analysis of the past and socio-political 
change inevitably yields inconsistencies and, given the way that information was transcribed and 
transmitted in the ancient world, getting to the absolute ‘truth’ is impossible, and offering conclusive 
and consistent accounts therefore inevitably inaccurate. The complexity that marks the Dialogus persists 
in the historical works. Tacitus’ narrative of the early Principate is notoriously complex. He frequently 
offers multiple explanations or suggestions without explicitly stating what he thinks is the ‘truth.’ His 
accounts of the possible murder of Germanicus at the hands of Piso and of Nero’s involvement in the 
great fire of AD 64 are excellent examples of the way he illustrates and insinuates but does not 
conclusively demonstrate. The ambiguity and complexity of his narratives replicate the difficulty that 
the characters in his works face in ‘reading’ their princeps and analyzing former and current 
developments.705 Agricola, the dialogue’s interlocutors, and the emperors and other characters in the 
Historiae and Annales all variously try to understand the nature of the imperial state and to grasp and 
adjust to perceived realities, in a society in which, as a matter of course, meanings, symbols, values, 
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motives, and language were unstable. Furthermore, the documentary habit of the ancient world was 
not verbatim. The transcription of senatorial and other business and events inevitably was a version of 
a version and, consequently, the historian’s account a version of a version of a version.706 The designed 
complexity of Tacitus’ works and the fact that, in many cases, he does not offer conclusive 
observations reflects this aspect of the ancient world and, rather than betraying an historian’s effort to 
obscure the truth, illustrates it perfectly. This aspect of Tacitean historiography is well reflected in 
Hayden White’s words in a review of Paul Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting.707 The Dialogus is an 
essential text within the corpus, engaging with enduring Tacitean concerns and, crucially, enunciating 













706 On the documentary habit of the ancient world and the manner in which senatorial proceedings were recorded and transmitted, 
see Coles 1966, esp. 9-27; cf. Potter 1999, 81-85. Note Suet., Aug. 57 on the mendacity of senatorial decrees and his preference to 
look at what was recorded by the other levels of society (particularly the equestrian order). 
707 “Indeed, the historian is always encouraged to defer judgments of the kind judges must make whether they have sufficient evidence 
or not. In the face of epistemic imperatives appertaining to the nature of the evidence, the incompleteness of the facts of the matter, 
the absence of witnesses for direct interrogation, and the difficulty of establishing motive and responsibility for actions and the 
consequences of actions taken long since, historians must always come to conclusions that can only be provisional and subject in 










Cornelius Tacitus was at the height of his powers when he embarked on a literary career, and 
in his first three works he establishes models of analysis that he subsequently uses to write a complex 
and incisive history of a period that his fellow senators will have known virtually by heart. In the 
Agricola, Germania, and Dialogus, Tacitus theorizes the Roman state, the nature of imperial rule, and the 
practice of historiography, revealing himself to be a wide-ranging intellectual aware of the complexities 
of political and cultural analysis and the nature of his work. Tacitus uses the theories he established in 
his first three works to come to an increasingly nuanced understanding of the history of the early 
Principate; his outlook becomes more complex while his methods of analysis remain, on the whole, 
consistent. This is the crucial conclusion that emerges when we read the Agricola, Germania, and 
Dialogus on their own merit, outside the confines of their genre, and in conjunction with the later 
historical narratives.  
This dissertation started out with an overview of the manuscript tradition and the transmission 
of Tacitus’ works (pp. 1-3) and an illustration of the heuristic distinction between ‘early’ and ‘late’ 
Tacitus that has marked humanist and scholarly attitudes towards our author and his writings since 
antiquity (pp. 3-7). Tacitus entered historical consciousness as an historian, and, as we have seen, his 
monographs often are approached as immature and as preliminary to his historical works. In this 
approach, the early works are reduced to a marginal infancy, on the theory that Tacitus does not fully 
come into his own until the Annales. One expression of this approach is the notion that Tacitus 
became ever more disenchanted with the Principate and ever more pessimistic about the validity of 
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Roman rule – a notion difficult to sustain and increasingly less supported in the scholarship (p. 31 and 
n. 70).   
The different works, moreover, often are analyzed within the confines of their respective 
genres and the ‘rules’ and expectations that govern them (pp. 1-7, 20, 103, 198, 200-03). This generic 
determination, which pigeonholes texts within narrow frameworks, leaves us with a biography of a 
senator, an ethnography of a foreign people, and a dialogue about oratory that appear, first, to have 
little to do with one another, and, second, to have little meaningful connection with two 
historiographical works that are institutional and event-based in nature. As a result, the monographs 
hardly are studied in conjunction with the historical works nor are the former often read together. If 
we allow ourselves to look beyond these generic boundaries, however, thematic and conceptual 
continuities emerge that connect the shorter works, integrate the corpus, and undermine the ‘early’ vs. 
‘late’ dichotomy that has dominated Tacitean scholarship.  
As regards the first point, despite the generic boundaries that may be seen to divide them, the 
Agricola, Germania, and Dialogus share essential thematic and organizational aspects that reflect not 
disparate intellectual attempts but an analytical program in which those texts interact with and build on 
one another. In the Agricola, in which he sets out his vision of the Principate as an institution 
oppressive in nature and marked by systemic problems (pp. 26-45, 100-01), and in which he advocates 
particular strategies of senatorial conduct and career management (pp. 45-78), Tacitus establishes 
himself as a political theorist. The text further reveals an interest in ethnography and foreign culture 
(pp. 22, 72-73, 88-91) and sets out models of imperialism and provincial administration (pp. 63-88, 95-
99), based on efficient but morally questionable methods of acculturation (pp. 96-100, 149-51). 
Tacitus composed the Agricola in close conjunction with the Germania, where he examines in 
greater detail the problems inherent in imperialism and imperium. The text, which offers an account of 
the factors (natural and cultural) that bear on the practicablity of military expansion and annexation 
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(pp. 103-104), guides a reader in analyzing Roman power and its limits and in formulating foreign 
policy objectives. The work’s complexity (pp. 103-04, 118-54, 198) reflects an awareness of the limits 
on historical and cultural reconstruction that continues to inform Tacitus’ analysis throughout his 
corpus. Using a similar comparative approach, Tacitus reinforces observations in the Agricola about 
Roman political culture, particularly as regards power structures and social hierarchy, public morality, 
and education (pp. 103, 105-06, 115, 120, 127, 135, 145-46, 149-50, 199). Both works are concerned 
with the truthful representation of people, actions, motives, and places, and, like Tacitus’ other 
writings, work against official versions (pp. 39-40, 52-53, 114, 234-35). Finally, the Germania’s format (a 
descriptive account without preface or conclusion) and Tacitus’ authorial stance (didactic, embracing 
complexity, and eschewing authorial conclusions) sets out modes of analysis that guide Tacitus’ 
thought in all his works (cf. pp. 115-17, 210-212, 218, 303).  
In the Dialogus, Tacitus takes up concerns that he explored in the Agricola and assumes the 
same stance as he did in the Germania. Like the Agricola, the Dialogus is concerned with freedom of 
speech (pp. 202, 216-18, 223-41), the nature of imperial political culture (pp. 218, 235-41), and the 
relationship between political and generic change (pp. 202, 213-14, 218, 223-35). The analysis of 
eloquentia’s development is based on similar concepts as the analysis of the history of biography (pp. 
223-35), but Tacitus’ understanding of the relationship between political climates and artistic practice 
here is more nuanced, one of the main premises of the dialogue being that different narratives and 
realities are possible (Chapter IV passim). The Dialogus mirrors the Germania in its marked emphasis on 
complexity and inconsistency and its lack of authorial conclusions (pp. 210-11, 218, 303); both texts 
are didactic and serve in part to illustrate the limits inherent in cultural and historical analysis. The 
Dialogus, in essential ways, is self-reflective of the nature and practice of historiography.   
In the shorter works, in sum, Tacitus models the Roman state, imperial rule, and the practice 
of historical analysis, increasingly elucidating and adding to his understanding of these essential issues. 
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The three texts reveal a rich array of concerns and showcase an extraordinarily wide-ranging author, 
who shows himself to be simultaneously a political theorist, a theorist of international power and 
cultural imperialism, an educator, a social commentator, and a complex intellectual, aware of the 
challenges, limits, and role of his craft. 
Each of the monographs in turn possesses material connections with the later historical works. 
The Agricola, the Germania, and the Dialogus explore from their particular perspectives the central 
preoccupations of the Historiae and the Annales. Tacitus’ analysis of the nature of the Principate, 
enunciated in the Agricola and complicated in the Dialogus, everywhere informs his account of the Julio-
Claudian and Flavian eras. While Agricola and Domitian form only one example of the emperor-
senator relationship, the latter informs Tacitus’ treatment of similar relationships throughout the 
historical narratives. His experience under Domitian, and his portrayal of that emperor in the Agricola, 
shaped his assessment and depiction of earlier principes in his later works (pp. 26-45). As for Agricola, 
Tacitus’ depiction of the man’s upbringing (pp. 45-47), his development under Suetonius Paulinus and 
Petilius Cerialis (pp. 48-53), and his governorships of Aquitania (pp. 63-71) and Britain (pp. 72-88) 
articulate a model of senatorial and gubernatorial conduct that informs his depiction of other officials 
in the historical works. While Tacitus’ characterizations become sharper and more nuanced in the 
historical narratives, the qualities that define Agricola’s conduct remain the core criteria in the 
historian’s assessment of men like Germanicus, Paulinus, Cerialis, Corbulo, and others (pp. 69-88 and 
n. 192). A good example of how Tacitus’ analysis evolves while his methods remain consistent is 
Paulinus’ characterization, which becomes more complex in the historical works, but which remains 
based in large part on Agricola’s example and on Tacitus’ bias against equestrian officials (pp. 48-52).  
Similarly, Tacitus’ theory of imperial rule and acculturation, set out in the Agricola and 
complicated in the Germania, is taken up and nuanced in the Historiae and the Annales. Reading the four 
texts in conjunction reveals a complex theory of imperium and its limits that remains, by and large, 
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consistent throughout (pp. 104-05, 118-19, 155-85, 198). The vision of cultural imperialism enunciated 
at Agr. 21 – which there earns Tacitus’ simultaneous approval and criticism (pp. 96-100) – is developed 
in the Germania, which explains the Germani’s moral and physical strength as a function of their 
freedom from Roman domination (see esp. pp. 133-38) and which complicates the image of Rome’s 
moral superiority (pp. 149-51). These issues subsequently are worked out in greater detail in the 
historical works, where Tacitus continues to undermine the vision of a morally superior Rome 
spreading humanitas across the world and stresses cultural limits on empire (pp. 46-47 and n. 115, 133-
35, 149-51, 218-19). Tacitus’ depiction of Germania and its tribes, with his marked emphasis on 
internecine discord and violence, cultural isolation, and economic drawbacks, may be seen as an 
implicit endorsement of the cost-efficient and defenseive foreign policy initiated by Tiberius and 
continued by his successors (pp. 104, 124, 154, 166, 168-75, 184-87, 189-90). The manifold ways in 
which the historical works evoke or are informed by the Germania suggest that Tacitus expects his 
readers to be familiar with the monograph by the time they come to his historical works (cf. pp. 188-
94, 198-99).   
The Dialogus and the historical narratives, finally, explore a range of shared interests (pp. 202 
with the notes there, 250-300), such as the scope and development of oratory in imperial Rome and 
various subsidiary concerns: freedom of speech (pp. 251-56, 272-74, 282-86), the power and influence 
of the delatores (pp. 202 and nn. 513-14, 258, 272-74, 293, 297), the connection between virtue and 
good oratory (i.e. the legitimacy of the concept of the uir bonus dicendi peritus: pp. 265-66; cf. 272-74), the 
characteristics of persuasive speech (cf. p. 265), the influence of political systems on culture (pp. 235-
41, 251-54, 282-86), and the nature of historical analysis (pp. 241-300). In this case, too, it is evident 
that Tacitus expects his readers to be familiar with the themes he treats in the dialogue before coming 
to his historical narratives. The treatment of Eprius Marcellus in the three works is a good example of 
the way in which Tacitus’ different writings interact with and elucidate one another (pp. 202 and n. 
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514, 272-74).  
Beyond these thematic continuities, the Dialogus and the historical works share theories of 
historical reconstruction. We have seen how the three works share the aim of advocating a more 
rigorous analysis of past and present. In each of the three texts, Tacitus describes individuals analyzing 
socio-political transition and change. By recording both sophisticated and naïve attempts at such 
analysis, and by endorsing or refuting them in his own voice or in the narrative, Tacitus educates his 
readers to think in more complex ways and to take a critical stance toward imperial ideology, which 
relies on tidy reconstructions of the past and on the Roman tendency to think and remember in such 
terms (pp. 241-300). The Dialogus, composed in close conjunction with the Historiae, illustrates the 
challenges inherent in cultural and historical reconstruction and, as such, is self-reflective of the nature 
of historiography. The complexity and inconsistencies that mark the Germania, the Dialogus, the 
Historiae, and the Annales reflect the impossibility of getting at the absolute ‘truth’ and Tacitus’ 
awareness of this essential law of historiography (see esp. pp. 297-300 and n. 707). 
There are concerns and literary aims that connect and integrate all five works. For example, 
Tacitus has a vivid interest in education and upbringing that informs his thinking and remains a 
significant concern throughout (pp. 45-55, 133-35, 218, 233, 248). As for the purpose of writing 
literature, all five works are motivated in part by the aim to work against official versions, to restore a 
fair circulation of glory and recognition, and to promote the accurate representation of individuals, 
events, and causes (pp. 39-40, 52-53 and n. 133, 114, 135, 151 n. 412, 223-35, 253). 
In light of the evidence provided by our texts, we would do well to discard the heuristic 
distinction between ‘early’ and ‘late’ Tacitus or between opera ‘minora’ and ‘maiora,’ as well as to rethink 
the generic determination on the Tacitean corpus and, concurrently, on Latin literature more broadly. 
These approaches create artificial divisions that are restrictive in scope and risk a misunderstanding of 
the progression of Tacitus’ oeuvre and the development of his thinking. To draw firm distinctions 
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among the monographs or between the latter and the historical narratives is to lose sight of the 
thematic and conceptual continuities across the corpus that lend it greater coherence than scholars 
have assumed. Even at a most basic level, the narrative sections and pre-battle speeches in the Agricola, 
the ethnographic sections of the Germania, and the historiographical self-awareness of the Dialogus 
display features and techniques typical of Roman historiography, at once questioning any polarizing 
dichotomy between the two sets of works. The Tacitean corpus is an integrated project in which a 
seasoned thinker progressively shapes his thinking and adds to his canvas of early imperial history. 
Although Tacitus’ reputation is based firmly on his historical works, he is more than simply a historian. 
In the monographs, he shows himself to be a wide-ranging theorist and a highly skilled author. In the 
Historiae and the Annales, he remains all that, bringing an already rich and mature intellectual persona to 
the project of writing history. This is a fundamentally different picture than the one common in 
modern scholarship, which sees Tacitus reaching full maturity as a thinker only in the Annales and 
which posits a substantial shift in his thinking. Reading the different texts in conjunction suggests a 
more leveled and gradual intellectual development. It also suggests that we ought to approach the 
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